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Abstract
This thesis examines the evolution of China's Hong Kong policy 
in the period 1949-84, and how China came to reach its 
agreement with the British government over Hong Kong's future. 
It attempts, through the study of China's Hong Kong policy, to 
explore one of the most important aspects of China's external 
policy —  the combination of principles and flexibility, and 
how Chinese leaders rationalized a flexible external policy in 
accordance with their principles.
In general terms, the thesis analyses how the ideological 
convictions of Chinese leaders have shaped their view of the 
world, moulded their strategy, and provided the rationale for 
both the ends and means of their policies. It will also 
outline the principles applied operationally in China's 
external relations. There then follows a discussion of the 
particular tactics and processes of decision-making as 
relevant to the Hong Kong issue. China's legal interpretation 
of unequal treaties is contrasted with the its actual 
position, from both a theoretical and practical point of view.
With specific regard to Hong Kong, there is a detailed 
analysis of the evolution of China's Hong Kong policy. This 
begins by examining the establishment of China's Hong Kong 
policy in the early years of the People's Republic. The 
factors contributing to China's tolerance of a British colony 
on its doorstep are considered. How China came to reach a 
tacit understanding with Britain for maintaining the status 
quo of Hong Kong is explored.
The examination then turns to the impact of the Cultural 
Revolution on China's Hong Kong policy. Particular attention 
is paid to the PRC's policies towards overseas Chinese and to 
possible lessons to be learnt from Beijing's handling of its 
Hong Kong policy in a delicate situation. The changes in 
China's domestic politics after the Cultural Revolution are 
related to the country's external policies, especially 
regarding Hong Kong. The connection between China's Hong Kong 
policy and its Taiwan policy is also discussed.
The subsequent consideration of the negotiations between the 
PRC and the United Kingdom seeks to explain how Beijing 
maintained its stand on the principal issues such as 
sovereignty while, at the same time, being flexible on 
specific matters. Finally, the concept of 'one country, two 
systems' is examined, with particular reference to China's 
declared principles of territorial integrity, sovereignty and 
unification, on the one hand, and its pragmatic goals of 
economic development and modernization on the other.
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A NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION
Chinese names, terms, phrases and titles used in this thesis 
are given in Pinyin, the official system of transliteration in 
the People's Republic of China. The exceptions are those 
applying to Hong Kong and Taiwan where Wade-Giles has been 
adopted.
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INTRODUCTION
From its establishment in 1841 as a British colony, Hong 
Kong has survived successive changes of regimes on the 
mainland. The birth of the People's Republic of China under 
the domination of the Communist Party of China (CPC) in 1949 
seemed a threat to the colony's very existence. It was feared 
that the new government was determined to overrun Hong Kong. 
The Chinese Communists had strong anti-imperialist and anti­
colonialist sentiments and were concerned to remove the 
humiliation which the unequal treaties of the 19th century 
represented. It was also thought that the PRC had the military 
ability to take over Hong Kong in a matter of days. The PRC 
could also have used its supporters in Hong Kong to wage a 
'people's war' or, instead of resorting to violent means, it 
could have introduced a total blockade of the colony.
Yet none of these options was adopted and Hong Kong 
continued to be a British colony. It was not until the 1980s, 
that the status of Hong Kong was challenged, and with it the 
colony's future.
.Britain and China formally entered diplomatic negotiations 
in October 1982. After two years of negotiations, the two 
governments reached a historic agreement on the future of Hong 
Kong. According to the agreement, the British government would 
restore Hong Kong to China with effect from 1 July 1997, while 
the Chinese government promised to maintain Hong Kong's 
existing social, political and economic system without change 
for at least fifty years after 1997 and to allow Hong Kong a 
high degree of autonomy under China's sovereignty.
China's tolerance of the existence of a British colony on
its doorstep and its pragmatic approach towards the settlement 
on the territory's future seem to be in contradiction with the 
ideology and principles which the Chinese communist leaders 
have always proclaimed. For a country whose leaders have 
always insisted that its foreign policy has been based on firm 
principles consistently applied, this raises an important 
question. The apparent anomaly of the continued existence of 
colonial Hong Kong on the doorstep of the state whose leaders 
have portrayed themselves as in the vanguard of opposition and 
struggle against imperialism requires explanation. So flagrant 
a contradiction could not be the result of an oversight. 
Therefore the question that arises is what principles did 
Chinese leaders apply in the case of Hong Kong? Were they 
applied flexibly within an accepted series of operational 
guidelines or was only lip-service paid to them? The issue of 
Hong Kong therefore is an important test case for examining 
the significance of principles and the conduct of China's 
external relations.
Since the 1980s, the question of Hong Kong has attracted 
considerable academic research, particularly by Hong Kong- 
based scholars. The books published in recent years have 
covered almost every aspect of the question of Hong Kong. 
However, while a great deal of this research has focused on 
Hong Kong's political and economic development in connection 
with the territory's future, little attention has been given 
to the evolution China's Hong Kong policy, particularly the 
way in which the Chinese government has conducted this policy 
in coordination with its overall external policy, in varying 
domestic and international circumstances.
The literature produced by Western scholars on China's
9
foreign policy has normally focused on China's global as well 
as its regional role, and on its bilateral relations with 
other countries, particularly the United States and the Soviet 
Union. The factors shaping China's foreign decision-making 
have been widely explored. There are two general approaches 
adopted in studying China's foreign policy. One emphasises the 
domestic political conflict, including the influence of 
Marxism-Leninism and Mao's thought, the historic legacy, 
traditional political culture and factional politics, and the 
bureaucratic factors. This approach is reflected in John King 
Fairbank's works which stress China's traditional foreign 
relations, Lucian Pye's political-cultural study of 
factionalism and nationalism, and Kenneth Lieberthal and 
Michael Oksenberg's research on China's bureaucratic structure 
and process. A second approach sees China's foreign policy as 
a response to outside threat, which is dominated by the 
country's concern for security and territory integrity. Steven 
I. Levine concludes that China's foreign policy agenda is 
dominated by its desire to prevent any other power from 
establishing hegemony in Asia, suggesting that China is a 
regional power without a regional policy. Michael Yahuda's 
works focus on China's geopolitical situation, suggesting that 
underlying the apparent changes there is considerable 
continuity in China's foreign policy.1 The two approaches are
1See, John K. Fairbank, edited, China's World Order, 
Harvard University Press, 1968; Michael Yahuda, Towards the 
End of Isolation, China's Foreign Policy after Mao, Westview 
Press, 1984; Steven I. Levine, China's Regional Role, in Harry 
Harding edited, Chines Foreign Relations in the 1980s, Yale 
University Press, New Haven, 1984; Kenneth Lieberthal & 
Michael Oksenberg, Policy Making in China, Leadersf 
Structures, and Processes, Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, N.J., 1988; These references are representatives of 
an extensive literature too numerous to cite. But the more
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not necessarily mutually exclusive, but their focus is clearly 
different. It would appear that, in the case of Hong Kong, 
both domestic and international factors have contributed 
equally to Beijing's decision-making and a combination of the 
two approaches is thus permissible in the study of Hong Kong.
The concepts of communism and nationalism are frequently 
mentioned in academic accounts of China's external policy, but 
so far the complexities inherent in demonstrating their 
specific impact on China's actual policy have not been 
addressed. More specific aspects of the ideology and
principles of China's external relations need further 
attention, especially when they are in apparent conflict with 
China's actual policy.
The position of Hong Kong in China's external relations 
has been neglected. Research on China's external policy can be 
carried out through a variety of perspectives and case 
studies. Yet the case of Hong Kong is unique. Not only does it 
strongly involve the important issues of sovereignty and
unification of China as a whole, but it also occupies an 
important position in contributing to China's practical needs. 
Hong Kong is at a crucial juncture of China's domestic 
politics and external policy. China's Hong Kong policy has
always reflected both China's domestic interests and its
overall external policy. Hong Kong thus provides a significant 
case study for China's external policy, especially the way in 
which Beijing seeks to combine its principles with practical 
considerations.
The books and articles written by Chinese scholars on
important writings are listed in the bibliography.
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China's external policy tend to lack objective analyses, but 
they are useful because they largely reflect the government's 
position, providing a theoretical interpretation for 
governmental policy.
This thesis assumes that China, as a socialist country 
dominated by the communist party, displays great differences 
with non-socialist countries in terms of political system, 
ideology and other aspects that necessarily influence its 
foreign relations. However, as a state, China's external 
policy has reflected its domestic interests, such as the 
country's security, territorial integrity and economic 
development. Thus, in conducting its external affairs, China 
can be as realistic, pragmatic and flexible as other 
countries. On the other hand, Chinese external policy is also 
the outcome of the Chinese leaders' perceptions of needs, 
interests, and beliefs and their-perceptions of the outside 
world. For historical as well as ideological reasons, Chinese 
leaders have attached special importance to the inviolability 
of sovereignty and national unification. The principles that 
they have upheld have had considerable impact on Chine's 
external policy and determined the limits to its flexibility 
in conducting external affairs. The dilemma of reconciling 
principles and flexibility is clearly illustrated in the case 
of Hong Kong.
Since the Chinese leaders are concerned about China's 
national interests, operational principles have evolved to 
provide guidelines for day-to-day policy in China's external 
relations. Those principles which are regularly expressed in 
the CPC's official reports have to be consistent with the 
party's stand on Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong thought,
12
while the more operational principles reflect China's 
fundamental interests relating to China's national security, 
territorial integrity and the need for economic development. 
The declared principles and operational principles often 
complement each other, though they can be contradictory. This 
thesis will focus on those principles applied operationally in 
China's external policy and will examine how Chinese leaders 
modify them to suit different circumstances.
The notions of 'declared principles' and 'operational 
principles' are related to what Joseph Frankel distinguishes 
as 'aspirations' and 'actual policy', or 'long-range 
objectives' and 'short-range' objectives. Frankel states that 
"while long-range objectives can be reasonably well deduced 
from an ideology, the shorter the time-scale, the less the 
necessary correlation between the aspirations and the actual 
policies". Thus, "when it comes to day-to-day conduct of state 
affairs, to the tactics of foreign policy, expediency usually 
takes precedence over ideological guidelines".2
Operational principles are related to 'core values and 
interests' —  a notion frequently used in the literature on 
international relations. Ensuring the sovereignty and 
independence of territory and perpetuating a particular 
political, social and economic system are seen as the most 
acceptable contents of 'core values and interests'.3 They are 
so important and well-grounded that they turn into
2See, Joseph Frankel, International Politics, Conflict and 
Harmony, Allen Lane The Penguin Press, London, 1969, p.
3Kalevi Jaakko Holsti, International Politics, A Framework 
for Analysis, 4th edition, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Gliffs, 
N.J. 1983, p.129.
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'principles' .4
The thesis is not a comprehensive study of China's 
external policy, although the major developments are 
systematically described for the period 1949 to 1984. It does 
not seek to provide a deep analysis of Hong Kong's internal 
politic or economics, but rather highlights the impact of 
China's policy. It attempts, from the specific point of view 
of principles and flexibility, to examine the development of 
China's Hong Kong policy within the major sweep of its 
external policy. By so doing, it might provide a better 
understanding of China's Hong Kong policy and of China's 
behaviour in handling similar cases in which principles and 
reality are in conflict.
This thesis has absorbed the knowledge provided by the 
existing literature on China's foreign policy, China's 
domestic politics and economics, British foreign policy, and 
general international politics and international law. Primary 
sources used in the thesis include the files available in the 
British Public Record Office and the Hong Kong Public Record 
Office, official statements of the governments of China, 
Britain and Hong Kong, interviews and memoirs.
The main policy items of the Chinese government are 
translated into English and printed in Chinese official 
English language newspapers, such as the China Daily, and 
periodicals, such as the Beijing Review. This is especially 
the case when the translations themselves are regarded as 
official, such as the selected works of Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai 
and Deng Xiaoping. This thesis generally uses the English
4George Modelski, A Theory of Foreign Policy, Pall Mall 
Press, London, 1963, p.86.
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translations when they are available, with the original 
Chinese sources mentioned in footnotes.
News reports and analyses are another important source for 
research. The Hong Kong media is clearly divided into 
different categories on the basis of the attitude towards 
China. Several newspapers and magazines are influenced by the 
Chinese authorities and reflect Chinese government's position. 
This fact is taken into account in the thesis.
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Chapter One
Principles in the Conduct of China’s 
External Policies
China's Hong Kong policy has, on the one hand, been
subject to the country's overall external policies, while on 
the other hand, it has reflected to a certain degree the 
character of China's decision-making process on territorial 
claims and other matters left over from history. To understand 
China's policy on Hong Kong well, it is therefore necessary to 
explore some general aspects of China's external policy, 
particularly the theoretical perspectives. This thesis argues 
that while China's foreign policies have had a carefully
articulated theoretical base they have been characterized by
a tactical opportunism and adaptability that has enabled
China's leaders to exercise remarkable flexibility in the 
conduct of their external affairs, especially in handling an 
issue as complicated as Hong Kong.
This chapter first examines the major aspects of ideology 
reflected in China's external relations. It then looks at the 
development of China's principles as applied to its external 
relations, and their relationship with the actual tactics 
employed and with the decision-making process.
1-1. Ideology in China's external relations
Ideology can be defined in several different ways and 
there is no single agreed definition. Nevertheless, in 
considering how the PRC's external policy came to be affected 
by a certain ideology, it is worthwhile examining the 
definition suggested by PRC scholars.
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Ideology —  "Yishi Xingtai" in Chinese —  is defined by 
Chinese scholars as views on the world and society forming the 
basis of a certain economic system. It includes ideas and 
standpoints of politics, law, art, religion, philosophy and 
morality. It is part of a superstructure and has a distinctive 
class character in a class society, reflecting a certain 
social existence, such as feudalist ideology in feudalist 
society and bourgeois ideology in capitalist society. However, 
certain ideologies will continue to exist beyond their time, 
making their influence felt even after a particular society 
has changed. Thus, the establishment of the new regime in 
China did not mean the disappearance of all ideologies left 
over from previous societies.1
In the PRC, the ruling party is the Communist Party which 
regards communism as an official ideology. The Communist Party 
of China (CPC) has always stressed the need to promote 
communist ideology within the party to guide internal affairs, 
and it has also paid considerable attention to approaching its 
external policies on ideological considerations. Ideology, in 
the eyes of the CPC, is not simply a system of ideas or 
beliefs. It has also been the basis for the legitimacy of the 
CPC's leadership and served as a guideline for its major 
policy. In other words, China's external policies have been 
ideologically affected. However, China has not simply grafted 
communism onto its external policies. Marxism-Leninism, and 
even Mao Zedong Thought, do not constitute useful manuals for 
the day-to-day operations of China's diplomacy. The question 
of the influence of ideology on China's external policies can
1Dictionary of Philosophy, Jilin People's Press, China, 
1983, p.372.
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be explained by the notion of 'practical ideology' -- ideas, 
principles, and preferences that provide the dominant 
conceptual framework of the leadership's intentions and 
actions, the matrix of its collective conscience.2 Motivated 
by practical needs, the CPC has developed more adaptable or 
flexible forms of 'ideology'. These forms are examined below.
1) Anti-imperialism The CPC had made its well-known anti­
imperialist stand long before the final seizure of power. This 
preoccupation of the CPC with imperialism was the result of 
bitter experience at the hands of Western powers. Thus the 
notion of anti-imperialism was actually shared by most Chinese 
people, particularly intellectuals with powerful nationalistic 
and patriotic feelings. Mao followed Lenin's theory on 
imperialism based on class characteristics, and considered 
that the contradiction between imperialism and the Chinese 
nation, and the contradiction between feudalism and the great 
masses of the Chinese people, were the principal 
contradictions in modern Chinese society. Based on this 
estimation, Mao pointed out that the CPC bore two great tasks: 
to carry out a national revolution to overthrow foreign 
imperialism and a democratic revolution to overthrow feudal 
landlord oppression. "These two tasks11, he said, "are 
interrelated. Unless imperialist rule is overthrown, the 
feudal landlord class cannot be terminated, because
2 This term was used by Professor Seweryn Bialer of 
Columbia University in explaining Soviet foreign policy. See, 
Seweryn Bialer, "Ideology and Soviet Foreign Policy", in 
George Schwab, edited, Ideology and Foreign Policy —  a global 
perspective, Irvington Publishers INC., 1981, pp.76-102.
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imperialism is its main support."3
It would have seemed that with the defeat of the 
Kuomintang and the establishment of the People's Republic, the 
above-mentioned two tasks would have been accomplished. Yet, 
in Mao's view, the struggle against imperialism was still far 
from at an end. When the People's Liberation Army (PLA) was 
about to seize state power, he warned party cadres that to win 
a country-wide victory was only the first step in a "long 
march of ten thousand li".4
China's concern, firstly, was related to its understanding 
of the mutual influences of different ideologies. The Chinese 
leaders believed that imperialism would try every unscrupulous 
means to overturn the new regime, and that a severe struggle 
in the ideological field was inevitable.
Secondly, anti-imperialism reflected China's perception 
of external threat. It also served the government as a means 
of obtaining popular support. Indeed, from the very beginning, 
the new regime was threatened by external powers, in 
particular the United States. The Western bloc, headed by the 
United States, adopted a hostile attitude towards the PRC. 
China was isolated and only a few Western countries showed 
any intention of recognizing the new government. The American 
intervention in the Korean War and the subsequent direct Sino- 
American confrontation made matters even worse. During the 
Korean War and afterwards, the United States stationed its 
Seventh Fleet in the Taiwan Straits and, by a series of
3Mao Zedong, "Chinese Revolution and Chinese Communist 
Party", Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Foreign Language Press, 
Beijing, 1965, vol. II, p.318.
4Mao Zedong, Selected Works of Mao Zedong, People's Press, 
Beijing, 1969, p.1328.
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treaties, succeeded in forming an alliance involving Taiwan, 
Japan, South Korea, South East Asia countries and South 
Vietnam, whose aim was to contain China. The pressure of the 
US military forces clearly helped Beijing mobilize its people 
and served as an ideological motivation for the country's 
anti-imperialist drive.
As a result of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 
1968 and the bloody clashes between China and the Soviet Union 
in February 1969, China acknowledged a military threat from 
the Soviet Union. Its anti-imperialist ideology thus had a new 
target, but its primary function remained the same.
Thirdly, anti-imperialism provided Beijing with a common 
ideological ground in its relations with the newly developing 
countries. On many occasions, Chinese leaders reiterated to 
Third World countries that China shared a common experience 
with them and that they should stand together against the 
common enemy. Beijing was aware of the considerable 
differences between China and other Third World countries in 
terms of ideology and social system and it was therefore 
important to seek common ground in its efforts to win friends 
from Third World countries.
Thus, China, when it applied anti-imperialism to its 
external relations, was motivated, on the one hand, by the 
desire to form an international united front to counter 
external threats -- at first the threat from the United 
States, later from the Soviet Union. On the other hand, 
China's Third World theory was an expansion of its anti­
imperialist ideology expressed in general terms which could 
tie China with the Third World countries on a common ground. 
Those two functions were interrelated, since Third World
20
countries were seen as the most important force in China's 
International United Front strategy.
The theme of anti-imperialism has been applied with great 
adaptability by Chinese leaders as testified to by the gradual 
weakening of its role in China's foreign policy, particularly 
after the Cultural Revolution when China started on a policy 
of economic reform and opening up. Internally, it abandoned 
the principle of "taking class struggle as the key link", 
admitting that class struggle only existed in limited scope 
and was no longer a common phenomenon in China. The principal 
contradiction, then, was to be the contradiction between the 
increasing demands of people for a better material and cul­
tural life and the backward productive forces.' Thus the CPC 
shifted its focus from class struggle to economic 
development.
This change in China's politics has had a profound impact 
on the country's external policies, and has provided a 
theoretical justification for its policy of opening to the 
West. Since 1980, the Chinese leadership has perceived a 
reduction in external military threats to its security from 
the two superpowers, and its view of the non-inevitability of 
war has thus changed.
The condemnation of imperialism has been modified by the 
Chinese leaders with the implementation of China's policy of 
reform and opening up. However the Chinese leaders have not 
abandoned the theme of anti-imperialism. Although they have 
become more pragmatic, they have been deeply concerned over 
the domestic impact of China's opening up to the outside 
world.
2) Patriotism can be defined in a simple term as love for
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and loyalty to one's country, implying a readiness to act in 
its defence and to favour it in other dealings.5 However, 
according to the interpretation of Chinese scholars, the 
patriotism of an exploiting class, such as the patriotism of 
the bourgeoisie, is limited by its class status, though it 
could have a positive effect in certain historical stages. 
But, with the intensive development of the contradictions 
existing within capitalist countries, bourgeois patriotism 
became a form of national self-interest and chauvinism.6 What 
then, is Chinese patriotism?
Zhou Enlai once said that patriotism for China was the 
patriotism of socialism and the people's democracy and was not 
like capitalist chauvinism.7 In the explanation of Chinese 
theoreticians, patriotism is rich in content, being a kind of 
ideological feeling and love for, and loyalty to, one's 
motherland, its culture and tradition; its valiant and in­
dustrious people; its independence, unity and dignity. It is 
also determined by certain historical conditions. Thus, in the 
semi-colonial and semi-feudal China, patriotism was regarded 
as saving the country from the oppression of imperialist rule, 
the corrupted ruling class and the feudal system. It was said 
that for nearly one hundred years, a thousand "noble-mind 
patriots" sacrificed their lives to save the country, but that 
their efforts failed because of the lack of a guiding 
communist ideology and the inevitable conclusion, therefore,
5David Miller edited, The Blackwell Encyclopedia of 
Political Thought, Oxford University Press, 1987, p.319.
6Qian Junrui, Building Socialism with Chinese Characteris­
tics. Hu Bai People's Press. 1986. p.412.
7Zhou Enlai, Selected Works of Zhou Enlai (Zhou Enlai 
Xunji) People's Press, 1979. vol.II., p.91.
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was that "only socialism could save China."8
Thus, patriotism under the CPC's leadership can be seen 
as a further development of the traditional patriotism which 
had emerged in an intensive way as a result of Western im­
perialist penetration. It is also a patriotism, to an
increasing degree, of promoting a fuqiang (rich and powerful) 
China —  a goal that both the old generation of Chinese
people, including the CPC leaders, and the younger generation 
have desired. This concept is also linked with a deeply rooted 
commitment by the CPC leaders towards a 'big family' inherited 
from imperial China to which they have continued to defend at 
all costs. 'Big family' is a notion referring to the Chinese
state and contains not only the Han Chinese —  the largest
ethnic group in the country -- but also the Tibetan, Mongol, 
Manchurian and many other minorities. Thus, in the process of 
seizing national power, patriotism became the unifying force 
to bring together people from different backgrounds. It also 
helped justify the CPC's united front strategy, and came to be 
the core of this strategy.
Beijing's patriotism has also been characterized by its 
dualism. On the one hand, the Chinese leadership has claimed 
that the new patriotism is tied up closely with the new 
society, the communist party being its fundamental 
manifestation. Communism and patriotism cannot be separated 
and the integration of the two is regarded as the principal 
characteristic of patriotism in the stage of socialism. 
According to the official view, people who love the country
8Qian Junrui, ibid., p.412.
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should love the communist party and the socialist system.9 The 
Chinese authorities tried to link patriotism with domestic 
mobilization as a means of winning support for communism. The 
CPC issued a 'study outline' on education in ideology in 
October 1983 which stated:
"We must proceed from education in patriotism, whip up 
people's patriotic fervour, and raise the level of their 
patriotic awareness. At the same time, we must link this kind 
of fervour with their specific practice in building socialism, 
and gradually help them raise their consciousness for 
communism. "10
On the other hand, patriotism has been applied by Beijing 
as a means of mobilizing people to defend the country's 
interests, interests which are not necessarily concerned with 
communist ideology. "We are patriots", a Chinese leading 
theorist said, "with our own national pride and dignity. We 
will consistently fight for the independence and prosperity of 
China and for the unity of the whole country. We will permit 
no damage to national dignity or the national interest."11
This policy has produced another type of Chinese 
patriotism, one which can summon the overseas Chinese people 
and the 'compatriots' in Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan. Beijing 
has. clearly been alive to the fact that the only thing that 
could bind it with the overseas Chinese and the 'compatriots' 
is the sentiment of patriotism —  love for and loyalty to the 
fatherland. The CPC has carefully defined the criteria for the
9Qian Junrui, ibid., p.413.
10"The Practice of Communism and Education in Communist 
Ideology (Study Outline), the English text in Foreign 
Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), China, 21 October, 1983, 
p.K41.; also see, Allen S. Whiting, "Foreign Policy of China", 
in Roy C. Macridis, edited, Foreign Policy in World Politics: 
States and Region, Seventh Edition, Prentice-Hall 
International, Inc., 1989, pp.269-270.
nQian Junrui, ibid., p.413.
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type of patriotism applying to people within China and the one 
relevant to the Chinese outside. While it has required people 
within the territory to love the country and, at the same 
time, to love the party and socialist system, Beijing has 
indicated that such a requirement did not apply elsewhere. It 
has stated that patriotism provides a broad political basis 
for the national united front policy of promoting the 
unification of Taiwan and the mainland which, in the eyes of 
Chinese leaders, is an alliance consisting of all socialist 
labouring people, patriots who support socialism, as well as 
the patriots, including the overseas Chinese and the 
'compatriots' in Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan, who support the 
unity of the whole country. "We would not force everyone to 
support the socialist system. To be patriotic or not is the 
basic political dividing line. We hold that all patriots 
belong to a big family, whether they rally to the common cause 
early or late, so long as they support and promote the unity 
of the country."12
3) Internationalism was central to the thought and 
activity of Marx and Engels. They considered that whereas the 
bourgeoisie in each country had its own special interests, the 
proletariat in all countries had one and the same interests, 
one and the same enemy, and one and the same struggle. Marx 
and Engels saw this common interest as lying not only in 
cooperation across frontiers to defend immediate class 
interests but also in creating a great social revolution. 
However, they also recognized that "though not in substance, 
yet in form, the struggle of the proletariat with the
12Qian, Junrui , ibid., p. 322.
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bourgeoisie is at first a national struggle".13 Lenin further 
developed the concept of Marx and Engels and argued that 
"proletarian internationalism demands, first, that the 
interests of that struggle in any one country should be 
subordinated to the interests of that struggle on a world-wide 
scale, and second, that a nation which is achieving victory 
over the bourgeoisie should be able and willing to make the 
greatest national sacrifices for the overthrow of 
international capital".14
According to Beijing's definition, internationalism is the 
basic view of the proletariat in different countries aimed at 
maintaining international solidarity, and of promoting common 
interests to achieve a common goal. The proletariat should 
process its revolution not only for the fundamental interests 
of its own country, but also for the fundamental interests of 
all the people in the world.1:)
China's internationalism has primarily been based on the 
CPC's conviction that the socialist system in the end would 
replace the capitalist system, regardless of how much 
reactionaries tried to stop this process of history. From this 
point of view, China's interpretation of internationalism is 
thus not much different from that of classical Marxism- 
Leninism, which calls for the proletariat in the world to 
unite for the common cause to overcome the capitalist system
13Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Communist Manifesto, 
Penguin Books, 1967, p.2.
14F. I. Lenin: "Preliminary Draft Theses on the National
and the Colonial Questions for the Second Comintern Congress", 
Collected Works, vol.21, p.148.
l5Social Science- Dictionary (Shehui Kexue Cidia) , Shanghai 
People's Press, 1979, p.617.
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and realize communism.
Yet, when Beijing applied its policy of internationalism 
in its external relations, the scope of internationalism 
broadened. It appeared that China's internationalism was 
related to Beijing's wish to promote a friendly atmosphere and 
favourable conditions in its relations with Third World 
countries, rather than being related to its aspirations to 
create an immediate proletariat international revolution. The 
Chinese leadership believed that a great harmony of communism 
would emerge in the end, but at the same time it also 
considered that such communist harmony would not become a 
reality unless all countries in the world first achieved a 
socialist victory. The Third World countries were regarded by 
the PRC as revolutionary forces in the 20th century because 
they were victims of Western imperialism and colonialism. In 
this context, the CPC's understanding of internationalism was 
beyond the definition of classic Marxism which was based on 
class characteristics. From China's own experience, the 
revolutionary process consisted of at least two stages: the 
new-democratic revolution and the socialist revolution. The 
former was a part of the international socialist revolution 
because of its aim of opposing imperialism and international 
capitalism, but it was also different from that of a socialist 
revolution, whose aim was to destroy the capitalist system. A 
new-democratic revolution did not necessarily destroy any 
section of capitalism which could contribute to the anti­
imperialist and anti-colonialist struggle.16
16Mao Zedong, "Chinese Revolution and Chinese Communist 
Party" (Zhongguo Gemin yu Zhong Guo Gongchandang), Selected 
Works of Mao Zedong, People's Press, Beijing, 1969, p.613-614.
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China has always regarded Third World countries as its 
potential allies on the battlefield against the common enemy. 
It considered that it would naturally stand with the oppressed 
countries and nations suffering from aggression and support 
their struggle to win and maintain independence and 
sovereignty. Thus, Beijing interpreted its involvement in the 
Korean War in the 1950s, its support for the Vietnamese war 
against French colonialism and US aggression, and its aid to 
Albania's resistance to Soviet pressure, all as actions of 
fulfilling its internationalist commitments.17
China has similarly regarded its aid to Third World 
countries as the fulfilment of internationalism. China's 
foreign aid cannot be said to be large in comparison with that 
of some Western and Soviet bloc countries. However, given in 
the name of internationalism, China's aid has bought itself a 
good reputation among the recipient countries.
It seemed, for the Chinese leaders, that patriotism was 
not contrary to internationalism. Theoretically, it was 
claimed, the proletariat of the world should stand together 
against capitalism in order to abolish the system of 
exploitation and oppression, but it should also adhere to the 
principles of independence and sovereignty. In practice, if 
the proletariat were unable to defend its national dignity and 
national interests or to handle its internal affairs by its 
own efforts, this would then damage the interests of the 
international proletariat, and it would therefore not be able 
to fulfil its international duties.
Anti-imperialism, patriotism and internationalism are thus
17See, The Journal of International Studies. Beijing, 
no.1, 1981.
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three major ideological aspects China applied in its handling 
of external relations. They should not, however, be seen as a 
simple extension of the communist ideology, though certain 
connections could be made between the two. Communism, while it 
played an important role as an official ideology in shaping 
China's internal affairs, seemed too abstract to cope with the 
concrete international situation. But, anti-imperialism, 
patriotism and internationalism have largely reflected 
Beijing's perception of the international situation and its 
understanding of national interests. They have helped to 
rationalize and justify the choice of China's foreign policy 
strategies and have also played important roles in China's 
day-to-day problem-solving. For example, in the early stage of 
the People's Republic, China's foreign policies were strongly 
coloured with anti-imperialism and, in particular, an anti- 
American-imperialist mood. After the 1955 Bandung Conference, 
when China began to develop a new dimension to its Third World 
diplomacy, anti-imperialism as well as internationalism 
provided common links between China and the newly-independent 
countries. However, in the 1980s there has been a major shift 
in China's domestic politics and foreign goals. Under such 
changing circumstances, anti-imperialism, and possibly also 
internationalism, have been modified, while patriotism has ap­
peared more useful in Beijing's implementation of its modern­
ization programme and the recovery of sovereignty over Hong 
Kong and Macao.
1-2. Principles in China's external relations
Principles can be defined as rules guiding one's actions 
and policy. The principles applied in China's external
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relations can be divided into two categories —  the declared 
principles and operational principles. The declared principles 
are those selected by Chinese leaders in relation to different 
audiences and different circumstances in order to achieve 
propaganda results, while the operational principles have 
reflected Beijing's stands on ideology as well as its 
perception of the country's fundamental interests.
In the late 1940s, the CPC was more self-confident in 
seizing state power than it had ever been before. As the CPC 
came closer to attaining nation-wide power, foreign policy 
issues, such as what type of diplomatic relations were to be 
adopted, had to acquire greater precision, especially as it 
became apparent that the new regime would have to develop 
relations with countries with different social systems. In a 
speech to Chinese diplomats in April 1952, Zhou summed up a 
number of principles applying to - China's external relations 
which had been put forward in 1949 by Mao Zedong, including 
"Make a fresh start", "Lean to one side", and "Clean the house 
before inviting guests".18
"Make a fresh start" meant that the new regime tended not 
to recognize diplomatic relations established by the previous 
Chinese government with foreign governments. Beijing would set 
up its diplomatic relations with other countries on a new 
foundation. It considered the cutting off of diplomatic ties 
with the Kuomintang government in Taiwan as a precondition for 
a foreign country to have formal relations with the People's 
Republic.
"Lean to one side" indicated China's stand, allying itself
18Zhou Enlai, Selected Works of Zhou Enlai (Zhou Enlai 
Xuanji), People's Press, Beijing, 1984. vol.II, pp.85-88.
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with the communist bloc headed by the Soviet Union.
•'Clean the house before inviting guests" was concerned 
with Beijing's understanding of the influence of both the old 
regime and of imperialism as it still existed, which could 
affect the country's independence and development; it was 
therefore necessary to get rid of these sorts of influence.
Those were the basic principles enunciated by the Chinese 
government in the early stage of the People's Republic. They 
were clearly ideologically inspired and reflected Beijing's 
anti-imperialism and internationalism. But, at the same time, 
they were closely related to China's fundamental interests and 
foreign policy goals, such as safeguarding its security and 
independence, maintaining its territorial integrity and 
promoting the unification of the whole of China.
When the nationalist government was defeated and withdrew 
from the mainland in 1949, it managed to maintain its state 
apparatus in Taiwan. Most countries in the international 
community were hesitant about cutting their ties with Taiwan, 
and regarded the nationalist government as the legitimate one 
which represented the whole of China. Beijing thus faced the 
task of "liberating Taiwan" and gaining its legitimate 
position in international society. Beijing considered the 
Taiwan question as one concerning China's independence, 
sovereignty and territorial integrity and held that Taiwan was 
an inalienable part of Chinese territory, and that how to 
bring about reunification was China's internal affair and not 
one calling for interference by any foreign country. "Make a 
fresh start" then became the most important principle in 
dealing with diplomatic relations.
In the early 1950s, Beijing felt a military threat from
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the United States. Beijing made it clear that the United 
States was its principal enemy. In these circumstances, China 
put its security and the liberation of Taiwan as the top 
priorities and adopted a hostile attitude toward the West, 
while regarding the Sino-Soviet alliance as the most 
important factor countering the "imperialist camp headed by 
the United States". China achieved its goals, but at a 
considerable price and its foreign policy options were 
restricted by these principles.
In the first place, China initially made clear its 
intention to establish certain relations with Western 
countries, including the United States. For instance, Zhou 
hinted to an American emissary in 1949 that -the new China 
would lean to one side, but how far depended on the Unites 
States.19 The fact that the United States and its allies 
decided not to recognize the new government forced China 
finally to lean entirely to the Soviet side. This, in turn, 
largely limited China's options and opportunities to develop 
wider external relations and to establish normal state-to- 
state relations with Western countries.
Secondly, since Beijing had drawn a clear line between the 
socialist camp, which it itself belonged to, and the 
capitalist camp, any alternative model of economic development 
which might have benefited China was abandoned. Beijing lacked 
experience in state construction and, therefore chose to copy 
the Soviet model. By the end of 1957, the Soviet Union was 
supplying China with complete sets of equipment and technical
19See, The Diplomatic History of the PRC (Zhonghua Renmin 
Gongheguo Waijao Shi) , edited by College of Diplomacy, 
Beijing, 1986, p.37.
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aid for 211 major industrial enterprises. It also sent a total 
of 10,800 specialists to China to assist in industrial 
development and in the training of Chinese workers and 
technicians. China's economic theory, industrial management 
system and educational system -- including even teaching 
materials —  were heavily affected by the Soviet Union.
Thirdly, Beijing had to make considerable concessions to 
the Soviet Union in its implementation of the "lean to one 
side" policy. China was not regarded by the Russians as an 
equal and independent partner in the alliance. On some 
international issues China held identical views with the
Soviet Union and its own voice was hardly heard. Moreover, 
Beijing had to tolerate the appearance of Soviet troops on its 
soil at Port Arthur and Darian, which enclaves were not
returned to China until May 1955. Mao believed that Stalin was 
deeply suspicious of China becoming another Yugoslavia, and 
with himself becoming a second Tito. Mao showed great respect 
to Stalin and regarded him as the leader of the socialist
bloc, although he admitted that he had to struggle with the
Russians. Nevertheless, China's compromises on the principal 
matters concerning sovereignty and independence were necessary 
because they helped the PRC to achieve its major goal of 
establishing a military alliance with the Soviet Union.
It is obvious that these early principles adopted by 
Beijing were conditioned by the state of the Cold War, and 
were relevant to its specific conditions. When these 
conditions changed, the principles became less suitable, and 
Chinese leaders saw that the rigidity of the early principles 
would limit China's options in dealing with various kinds of 
countries. The Korean War helped the PRC establish its
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international prestige and gain respect from other countries, 
especially some Third World countries. After the war, Beijing 
became more confident in conducting its own external relations 
and began to make efforts to develop relations with other non­
socialist countries on a state-to-state basis. Consequently, 
more flexible principles emerged.
At the end of 1953, when talking to an Indian government 
delegation, Zhou first put forward the idea of the five prin­
ciples. In April 1954, China signed an agreement with India on 
the issue of Tibet. This agreement also formally set forth the 
statement of the "five principles of peaceful coexistence", 
which included "mutual respect for each other's territorial 
integrity and sovereignty; non-aggression; non-interference in 
each other's internal affairs; equality and mutual benefit; 
and peaceful coexistence."20
Shortly thereafter, in June 1954, Zhou visited India and 
Burma. The joint communiques issued contained the five prin­
ciples. Zhou explained:
"All the nations in the world can peacefully coexist, no 
matter whether they are big or small, strong or weak,- and no 
matter what kind of social system each of them has. The rights 
of the people of each nation to national independence and 
self-determination must be respected. The people of each 
nation have the right to choose their own state system, 
without interference from other nations. Revolution cannot be 
exported; at the same time, outside interference with the 
common will expressed by the people of any nation should not 
be permitted. If all the nations of the world put their mutual 
relations on the basis of these principles, intimidation and 
aggression by one nation against another would not happen and 
the peaceful coexistence of all nations of the world would be 
turned from a possibility into a reality."21
China approached the "Five Principles of Peaceful
20Text in New China News Agency Daily Bulletin, April 29,
1954 .
21Peoole's Daily editorial of July 2, 1954.
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Coexistence1 against a background in which China shifted its 
foreign policy orientation. With the end of the Korean War, 
Beijing's hostile attitude towards the West eased, though 
with- out fundamental change and it started to seek for a new 
ways to improve China's external relations with the outside 
world and to develop a more positive diplomacy.
China claimed that the principles both embodied the new 
China's peaceful diplomatic policy and reflected the common 
will of many newly-independent countries to safeguard their 
territorial integrity from external interference and invasion, 
and to defend world peace. The "Five Principles", a Chinese 
diplomat said, "are universally accepted, a noteworthy 
contribution of Chinese diplomacy to ,international 
politics. 1,22
The "Five Principles" were originally applied to relations 
between China and Third World countries, but they were later 
also considered to be suitable for handling relations with 
Western countries. This stand was questioned by some Chinese 
people: why should China, as a socialist country, need to
coexist peacefully with those capitalist countries whose 
system should be abolished? Some felt that it should be only 
a temporary tactic for China to adopt a policy of peaceful 
coexistence, because of the socialist countries were not 
strong enough to eliminate the world capitalist system for the 
time being; in the near future, though, when the socialist 
countries gained overwhelming power, peaceful coexistence
22Ibid. , p.418.
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would become useless.23
However, the government's interpretation was different. It 
argued that, first, according to the law of historic 
development, the entire world would be transported into a 
socialist society, and then into a communist society, but that 
the transition throughout the world from the old system to the 
new one could not be accomplished simultaneously, and 
therefore, during a long period, different systems would 
coexist whether one liked it or not. Secondly, although people 
in socialist countries firmly believed that their system was 
the best in the world, something that people in capitalist 
countries would also realise in the end, they, the socialist 
countries, must not intervene in other countries' internal 
affairs for the sake of promoting socialism. The governments 
of socialist countries should not use force as a means of 
solving international disputes and a peaceful world situation 
could be created by using the principles of peaceful coexis­
tence. Thirdly, peaceful coexistence between the two different 
systems did not mean that the struggle would cease, but rather 
that it took on a form of peaceful competition. Socialist 
countries should be confident of the superiority of their 
system to beat the capitalist system and to win final victory 
in the competition.24
It should be noted that the term 'peaceful competition' 
was used during the period when the Chinese leaders hoped for 
a peaceful environment and sought to ease tensions with the
23Shi Liang, Can Peaceful Coexistence be Realized? (Heping 
Gongchu Nenggao Shixian ma?). People's Reading Press, 
Tianjing, 1956. p.12.
24Shi Liang, ibid., p. 12.
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United States. But this view changed by 1958 when a more 
radical foreign policy was adopted by the Chinese leadership.
As regards relations among the socialist countries, the 
principle of proletarian internationalism, based on friendly 
cooperation, was supposed to be the guiding rule. Yet the 
experiences that were to come failed to demonstrate that 
socialist countries could really maintain fraternal relations 
and avoid disputes. Even the Soviet Union admitted as early as 
1956 that there occurred "violations and mistakes which 
belittled the principle of equal rights in the relations 
between socialist states" .2>
Internationalism which aimed at promoting mutual 
assistance and integrating 'the world socialist system' was 
challenged by a revival of nationalism and conflicts between 
some of these states. These conflicts included those between 
China and the Soviet Union, China and Vietnam, and Vietnam and 
Democratic Kampuchea. Relations between the Soviet Union and 
its East European allies were not normal or equal. Soviet 
military intervention, presented as 'internationalist 
assistance against counter-revolution' took place in Hungary 
in 1956 and in Czechoslovakia in 1968. The CPC supported 
Moscow's intervention of Hungary in 1956, at a time when the 
Soviet Union was still seen as a socialist country. But the 
Soviet Union's invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 was strongly 
condemned by the Chinese leaders, since, in their view, the 
Soviet Union was no longer a socialist state. Nevertheless, 
Beijing acknowledged that proletarian internationalism could 
not work properly, and that it was therefore necessary for
25"The Statement of the Soviet Government", Soviet News, 
31 October, 1956.
37
socialist countries to develop their relations based on 
"normal" diplomacy. In this context, Zhao Ziyang concluded in 
1984 :
"The facts of the past 30 years have proved that if 
countries with different ideologies and social systems follow 
the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, good relations of 
mutual confidence will be established between them, and if the 
Five Principles are violated —  such as violating another 
country's integrity and sovereignty, or interfering with other 
countries' internal affairs to gain benefit at the expense of 
others -- acute confrontation and even conflict may occur, 
even between countries with the same ideologies and social 
systems. "26
On another occasion, Deng Xiaoping made the point even 
more clearly, stating that: "In dealing with state-to-state
relations, the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence are the 
best way. All other ways, such as those labelled "big family", 
"collective politics", or "sphere of influence", can bring 
about contradictions and intensify the international 
situation. 1,27
Since 1954, the Five Principles have been a primary theme 
in China's diplomacy and they are written into the country's 
constitution. They have obviously reflected China's primary 
interests of security, independence, sovereignty and 
territorial integrity. A vice-minister for foreign affairs 
stated that China had been subjected to aggression and 
oppression at the hands of other nations. He said, "To achieve 
independence, the Chinese people fought a protracted, arduous 
struggle, which explains why China treasures its hard-won 
independence so deeply and will never allow it to be
26"Primer Zhao Ziyang on Five Principles", in Beii ing 
Review, no. 31, July 30 1984, p.16.
27Deng Xiaoping, Building Socialism with Chinese 
Characteristics (Jianshe you Zhongguo Teshe de Shehui Zhuyi). 
People's Press, Beijing, 1982. p.67.
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jeopardised by anyone or any means."28
The principle of non-interference in each other's internal 
affairs could serve to justify action on China's part to 
prevent further internalization of Taiwan's status. Such a 
consideration has also been relevant to China's attitude 
towards the issues of Hong Kong and Macao. Any substantial 
change in the colonies' status, such as, for instance, 
becoming independent -- would clearly have been seen in 
Beijing's eyes as interference in its internal affairs.
However, the principle of non-interference seems to be in 
contradiction with internationalism. Indeed, as a communist 
party, the CPC found it difficult to withdraw its commitment 
to support communist parties in other countries/ particularly 
those in the South East Asia. In the 1960s and 1970s, apart 
from strong moral support, the CPC provided some financial 
assistance and supplied certain equipment to the communist 
parties in the South East Asia, and also allowed communist 
activists to take refuge in China. The CPC's support of the 
communist movement in South East Asia became one of the major 
obstacles for the PRC to improve its relations with these 
countries in the region. This situation changed in the 1980s 
when the CPC decided to make the country's economic 
development its top priority and tried to establish good 
relations with South East Asian countries. Gradually, the CPC 
has lessened its support for the communist movement in the 
region and adopted a more pragmatic attitude towards its 
international duty.
In comparison with Beijing's earlier principles, the Five
28Han Nianlong, "Five Principles Guide China's Diplomacy", 
Reg Flag (Hongqi), no.14, 1984.
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Principles are obviously less ideologically coloured. They 
refer to some of the most important rules, such as 
sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence, which 
have been universally acknowledged. The Five Principles are so 
general that their role in shaping China's actual policies has 
become less remarkable. Nevertheless, they have provided a 
wide scope for the exercise of policies, allowing Chinese 
decision-making to enjoy great flexibility. They are also 
important in the sense that by maintaining them, China, as a 
socialist country, has shown to the world its intention of 
following international rules for state-to-state relations.
1-3 Tactics and flexibility
In the pursuit of its policies, the CPC has developed 
various tactics. Tactics are regarded by the CPC as concrete 
methods servicing strategic plans. They normally concern 
short-term goals, including "forms of struggle, organization 
and slogans for action." The aim of the implementation of 
certain tactics is to win partial victory and create the 
necessary conditions for strategic victory. To do so demands 
the use of every possible instrument in a flexible way, formal 
and informal, overt and covert, to influence and shape the 
changing pattern of realities. The major tactics that have 
been frequently employed by the CPC can be listed as follows.
1) Compromise The CPC, during its long struggle to gain 
state power, made several important compromises towards its 
counterpart, the Kuomintang, that brought positive 
consequences.
For example, in 1937, the CPC faced great military 
pressure from the Nationalist government, while its operating
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areas were limited to the Shanxi-Ningxia-Gansu border region. 
Thus, it adopted the National United Front strategy of 
resistance to the Japanese invasion. In order to gain a 
legitimate position, as well as to develop its forces at the 
border area, it rescinded the name of 'Revolutionary 
Government of Workers and Peasants' as well as changing the 
name of 'Red Army' to 'National Revolutionary Army', the name 
approved by the Nationalist government. It stopped the policy 
of confiscation of landlords' land, and discontinued the 
policy to overthrow the Kuomintang by armed force. Mao 
regarded these concessions to the Kuomintang as necessary as 
well as permissible. He pointed out:
"Only thus can we, in line with the change in the 
political specific gravity in China's internal and external 
contradictions, change the situation of antagonism between the 
two regimes at home and achieve solidarity against the 
enemy. 1,29
Consequently, these compromises helped to form the second 
period of cooperation between the CPC and the Kuomintang. 
During the eight years of war of resisting the Japanese 
invasion, the CPC's strength and armed forces were developed 
rapidly. When the war came to an end, the communist forces had 
reached a total of 1,300,000 and controlled an area about 
956,000 square kilometres with a total population of 
9, 550, 000.30 These gains created a firm basis for the 
communists to defeat the Nationalist forces in the end. This 
example suggests that the CPC leaders could be induced to com­
29Mao Zedong, "Question of Independence and Initiative 
within the United Front" (Tongyi Zhanxian zhong de Duli Zizhu 
Wengti), in Selected Works of Mao Zedong, People's Press, 
Beijing, 1969, p.504.
30The Modern History of China (Zhongguo Xiandaishi) . The 
Press of Beijing Normal University, Beijing, 1983. vol. II, 
p. 103 .
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promise if they were convinced that the existing balance of 
political and military forces made this desirable and 
necessary. As Mao mentioned:
"Our concessions, withdrawals, turning on the defensive or 
suspending action, whether in dealing with allies or enemies, 
should always be regarded as part of the entire revolutionary 
policy, as an indispensable link in the general revolutionary, 
as a segment in a curvilinear movement."31
However, Mao also made it clear that the CPC's concessions 
were conditional and principled. "There are limits to 
concessions," he said, "They are necessary to preserve the 
Communist Party's leadership in the Special Region and in the 
Red Army, and to preserve the Communist Party's independence 
and its freedom to make criticisms in its relations with the 
Kuomintang -- these are the limits to concessions beyond which 
it is impossible."32
Beijing has long been willing to make compromises towards 
other countries. Its tolerance of Russian troops in its ports 
in the early 1950s, its concessions to Burma, and Pakistan on 
bilateral border questions, and more recently its flexible 
attitudes on the issue of Hong Kong, show that the method of 
compromise has been frequently used by Beijing in its external 
relations. Such compromises or concessions were made with 
varying aims, to obtain in return what was necessary for the 
accomplishment of China's strategic plans. Again, they were 
conditional and guided by certain principles.
2) Making Use of Contradictions Mao initially made this 
tactic for the CPC's national united front strategy. In 1935, 
he proposed establishing a national united front in order to.
31Mao, ibid., p.503.
32Mao, ibid. p. 504.
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fight against the Japanese invasion. After a detailed analysis 
China's changing internal situation and political forces, he 
said:
"We must keep a record of all the fights, spits and con­
tradictions within the enemy camp to direct them against the 
principal enemy."33
This tactic, according to Mao, could enable the 
revolutionary forces to select the right enemy, drive it into 
an isolated position, and win over from the enemy's camp all 
those who had joined it under compulsion, those who "were our 
enemy yesterday, but may become our friends today."34 In 
applying the tactic of making use of contradiction, Mao paid 
particular attention to winning over the middle forces. The 
middle forces were thought by Mao to be the most decisive 
factor in the struggle between communists and the 
conservatives.35
Mao applied this tactic to China's external relations. 
Even before the CPC seized state power, Mao had put forward 
the concept of the intermediate zone. He stated in his talk 
with the American correspondent Anna Louise Strong in 1946:
"The United States and the Soviet Union are separated by 
a vast zone which includes many capitalist, colonial and semi­
colonial countries in Europe, Asia and Africa...At present, 
the real significance of the United States' waging an anti- 
Soviet war is the oppression of the American people and the 
expansion of the United States forces of aggression in the 
rest of the capitalist countries."36
33Mao Zedong, Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Foreign 
Language Press, Beijing, 1956, vol. I, p.169.
34Mao, ibid., vol. I, p. 166.
35Mao, ibid., p. 167.
36Mao Zedong: "Talks to American Correspondent Anna Louise 
Strong" (He Meiguo Jizhen Anna Louise Strong de Tanghua), in 
Seclected Works of Mao Zedong, People's Press, Beijing, 1969, 
p.1089 .
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Here, Mao distinguished the United States even from its 
allies, regarding only the United States as the principal 
enemy. Mao and the CPC believed that, in the early post-war 
years, Western European countries had to submit to US control, 
but later the struggle against such control would emerge. 
Hence, China should take advantage of such struggles and 
isolate the United States, which until the late 1960s was 
considered as China's most dangerous enemy.
The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and a series 
of clashes along the Sino-Soviet border in 1969 indicated that 
the PRC faced a major Soviet military threat. Consequently, 
after 1968-69, the Chinese leaders considered the Soviet Union 
as the main military threat to their country, and to the world 
as a whole, while it viewed the United States as a somewhat 
defensive power. An anti-superpower hegemonist strategy was 
set up that regarded the countries of Western Europe as an 
important counter-balance against the Soviet threat. In this 
respect, Mao said that:"we should win over these countries, 
such as Britain, France and West Germany.1’37
3) Adjusting policies to a changing situation Mao paid 
great attention to the study of changing situations and new 
conditions. He argued that all things were involved in a 
continual process of motion and change, and that nothing was 
static. But among the many contradictions, there must be a 
"principal” contradiction whose existence and development 
determined and influenced the existence and development of 
other contradictions. However, due to the changes and
37"Chairman Mao's Theory of the Differentiation of the 
Three Worlds is a Major Contribution to Marxism-Leninism", by 
the editorial department of the People's Daily, 1 November, 
1977 .
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development of contradictions under certain conditions, the 
principal and non-principal contradictions often transform 
themselves into each other. Mao argued that it was necessary 
to understand properly the various contradictions and discover 
the principal one in order to adopt the correct method of 
resolving it. He stressed that one should adopt one's thinking 
to the changed conditions, but he also warned that one should 
not disregard reality and indulge in flights of fancy, or make 
plans for action unwarranted by the objective situation, or 
reach for the impossible.38
Such an argument is particularly worth recalling in 
connection with China's foreign policy. China has been able 
to adjust the orientation of its foreign policy in the light 
of the changing international situation and of its domestic 
needs, and when it has considered the conditions as unripe for 
resolving certain problems, it has normally preferred to 
maintain the status quo and not take precipitous action.
1-5 Flexibility and China's decision-making system
The flexibility enjoyed by Chinese leaders is linked with 
China's political system. In other words, China's political 
system has provided the possibility for the Chinese leaders of 
formulating and operating their policies in a flexible way. In 
comparison with countries with a democratic system, China's 
decision-making process is more centralized. The CPC has 
declared that it represents the fundamental interests of the 
country and of the people, directly unleashing the creativity 
and initiative of the people. There is almost no space for the
38Mao Zedong, Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Foreign 
Language Press, Beijing, 1956, vol.II, p.36.
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existence of any other interest groups which could openly act 
as independent forces, and the decision-making elite in China 
need not worry about electoral considerations. This has 
enabled the CPC to enjoy ultimate power in decision-making.
It is a universal phenomenon that ultimate power to make 
decisions on major foreign policy issues is fairly 
concentrated, but in China it is even more highly concentrated 
and personalized than elsewhere.. The Party's Politburo and 
Standing Committee play the most decisive role. It is clear 
that all important decisions concerned with external relations 
have to be discussed and approved by the Politburo, and a 
small elite group is expected to formulate decisions, among 
whom are a few key figures with influential positions. This 
contributes to a personalized form of the decision-making 
process. For instance, it was Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai who 
controlled all important foreign policy decision-making during 
Mao's era, while Deng Xiaoping has had similar power since.
The difference, however, is that Deng's authority is not 
total. He has to consult with other senior Chinese leaders on 
important foreign policy issues, although his personal role 
still dominates the policy-making process, especially policy 
concerned with external relations. During Mao's era, the PRC's 
external relations were dominated largely by the country's 
security concerns and by its relationships with the two 
superpowers, which were seen as the major sources of external 
threat. Since that time, the PRC's external relations have 
become more complicated and diverse, and a lot of foreign 
policy decisions, such as those concerning economic and trade 
relations, have become less sensitive. Thus, steps to 
stabilise the system have been taken, such as shifts in the
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locus of much decision-making, from the Standing Committee and 
full Politburo to the Secretariat and the State Council. On 
some foreign policy issues, however, Deng has been seen not 
only as the court of final decision, but also as an the 
initiator of new moves. De-centralization of the decision­
making process has been accompanied by the emergence of 
special interests of different ministries, especially those 
involved in external relations. Even some provinces, such as 
the coastal provinces of Guangdong and Fujian, have played a 
role in shaping Beijing's external policy. Chapter Five will 
contain a more detailed discussion of these changes and their 
impact on China's Hong Kong policy.
To sum up, the manner of this personalized decision-making 
makes it possible for the Party and the government to enjoy 
remarkable flexibility in decision-making, especially at the 
top level. The several major shifts of China's foreign policy 
from one orientation to another during the past three decades 
can be seen as evidence of this. These shifts were clearly 
necessary and useful, except at the beginning of the Cultural 
Revolution, when sinocentrism and xenophobia took over. The 
shifts helped China maintain its security and other basic 
interests, and demonstrated its ability to determine foreign 
policy objectives in the context of the changing international 
situation.
47
Chapter Two
The PRC’s Treatment of Territorial and Border 
Claims and the Question of Hong Kong
In April 1949, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) crossed 
the Yangtze River and captured the Kuomintang's capital of 
Nanking. The impending victory of the Communists seemed 
certain to come earlier than had been anticipated. Thus, in 
September 1949, the Chinese People's Political Consultation 
Conference was held in Beijing, when the new regime formally 
announced its foreign policies in the "Common Programme of the 
Conference".1 Article 55 of this programme concerns the 
existing treaties and states: "the central government of the
People's Republic of China shall examine the treaties and 
agreements concluded between the Kuomintang and foreign 
governments, and shall, according to their contents, 
recognize, abrogate, revise, or renegotiate them."2
This statement is the primary legal basis for the 
government of the People's Republic to handle issues such as 
Hong Kong, because, according to China's official view, the 
article also applies to the treaties signed by the Qing 
Dynasty. The statement reflects the new China's interpretation
!The Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference 
(CPPCC) was set up in 1949 and was composed of 
representatives of the CPC, the various democratic parties, 
the People's Liberation Army, minorities, the overseas 
Chinese and other patriotic elements. Before the establishment 
of National People's Congress in 1954, the legitimation of new 
Chinese came from the CPPCC. The first meeting of the CPPCC 
passed basic organizational laws for the central government 
and for the CPPCC. See, Franz Schurmann, Ideology and 
Organization in Communist China, University of California 
Press, 1966; pp.178-179.
2See "The Common Programme of the First Political 
Consultation Conference", in The Collection of Documents of 
External Relations of the PRC, edited by World Knowledge 
Press, Beijing, 1957, vol.I, p.l.
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of international law, particularly on state succession as well 
as the law of treaties. This chapter will first discuss the 
question of state succession and the application of treaties 
in general international law. It will then analyse China's 
interpretation of international law regarding state succession 
and treaties, and the way the Chinese government has handled 
these issues in practice. Finally, the chapter will examine 
Hong Kong's status in both international law and Chinese law.
2-1 State succession and the application of treaties in 
general international law
In accordance with general international law, state 
succession arises when there is a definitive replacement of 
one state by another in respect of sovereignty over a given 
territory. Such an event might include total dismemberment of 
an existing state, secession, decolonization of a part of a 
state, merger of existing states and partial cession or 
annexation of state territory.
Succession is generally described to be either universal 
or partial. Universal succession takes place in the following 
circumstances, as A.K. Pavituran has stated: 1) when one state 
is completely absorbed by another as a result of annexation or 
conquest; 2) when several states agree to merge into a federal 
state or union; 3) when one or more states are formed, or one 
or more international persons take the place of another 
international person, by division of a former single state or 
international person, each of the independent states becomes 
a successor state. Partial succession normally applies to the 
cases of either: a)succession, when a new state is established 
by a part of the territory breaking off from the parent state
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and thereby gaining independence; or b)cession, when one state 
acquires a part of the territory of another state and assumes 
sovereignty over the portion so acquired; or c)dismemberment, 
when a full sovereign state loses part of its independence 
through incorporation into a feudal state or coming under the 
suzerainty or protectorate of a strong power.3
In the case of succession, whether the successor state 
still continues to be bound by the treaties of its predecessor 
depends on various factors. According to D.P. O'Connell, a 
leading international law scholar, "When the sovereignty of 
one state replaces that of another state, whether the 
successor state still continues to be bound by the treaties of 
the predecessor is dependent on the purpose that the treaties 
sought to achieve, and on the extent to which it relates to 
the territory over which the state has lost control."4 
Obviously, in the case of state succession, the successor 
state may not be bound by its predecessor.
The relationship between the People's Republic of China 
and previous governments does not appear to fit any of these 
categories of state succession. The People's Republic never 
denied the continuity of the Republic and the Qing Dynasty in 
terms of state. What happened in 1949 was a change of 
government on the mainland. It is generally accepted that it 
is the state itself —  not its government —  which is subject 
to international law. States are the parties to treaties, and 
therefore treaties remain in force in spite of changes in the
3See, A.K. Pavituran, Substance of Public International 
Law: Western and Eastern, N.M. Tripathi Private Ltd, 1965;
pp.191-192 .
4D. P. O'Connell, Law of State Succession, Cambridge 
University Press, 1956, p.15.
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form of the government. A successor government is required by 
international law to perform the obligations undertaken on 
behalf of the state by its predecessor. This principle applies 
even to complete changes in the constitutional form of
government, whether a monarchy or a republic, an oligarchy or 
a dictatorship.
Britain's stand on state succession has been consistent. 
In 1921, an official communication from the British government 
to Mr Krassin, the agent of the Soviet Union in London, 
stated:
"The first [question] is that of the acceptance by the 
Soviet government of the obligations which had been entered 
into and were binding upon previous governments in Russia. The 
accepted rule among civilized states is that contracts made by 
and debts incurred by a government are to be regarded as the 
obligations of the nation it represented and not as the 
personal engagements of the ruler. Although the form of
government may change, the people remain bound."5
More than half a century later, the British government 
still held the same view. In September 1982, the British 
Premier, Mrs Thatcher, reiterated that the nineteenth-century 
treaties concerning Hong Kong could be altered but not
abrogated. On 27 September, at a conference in Hong Kong, she 
said it was "very serious" if countries tried to abrogate 
internationally-binding treaties. She also argued that a 
country which would not stand by one treaty would not stand by 
another.6
General international law regarding the invalidity of 
treaties is quite restricted. The Vienna Convention of
Treaties, Article 46 states:
5See, D. P. O'Connell, State Succession in Municipal Law 
and International Law, Cambridge, 1967, vol. II; pp.4-5.
6South China Morning Post, 25 September, 1982.
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1. A state may not invoke the fact that its consent to be 
bound by a treaty has been expressed in violation of a 
provision of its internal law regarding the competence to 
conclude treaties as invalidating its consent, unless that 
violation was manifest and concerned a rule of its internal 
law of fundamental importance.
2. A violation is manifest if it would be objectively 
evident to any state conducting itself in the accordance with 
normal practice and in good faith.
More precisely, at the Vienna Conference in 1966 it was 
agreed that under the following circumstances, treaties may 
be invalid: a) a representative's lack of authority; b)
corruption of a state representative; c) error; d) fraud; e) 
coercion of a state; f) conflict with a peremptory norm of 
general international law; g) unegual treaties.7
The notion of unequal treaties was discussed by some 
classic Western law scholars, such as Grotius, Putendorf, 
Gentilis and Vattel, as a historical phenomenon from the era 
of colonialism when the European colonial powers concluded 
many 'treaties' with local rulers and native tribes in Africa, 
Asia and the Americas, particularly with some traditionally 
independent and sovereign states —  namely China, Persia and 
the Ottoman Empire. These treaties could be classified as 
unequal treaties, yet, they were also regarded —  at least by 
the colonial powers -- as treaties governed by international
7|,The Vienna Convention of Treaty" -- Text in Ian 
Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, Clareadon 
Press, Oxford, p.611.
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law.8
At various international conferences, in particular the 
Vienna Conferences, the question of unequal treaties has been 
discussed. This discussion has often reflected the opinion of 
communist countries as well as many new states in Asia and 
Africa that emerged in the 1960s. They argued that the 
treaties concluded under force or under the threat of force 
were in violation of the principles of the United Nations 
Charter and, therefore, should be considered invalid. For 
instance, in the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly of 
the United Nations in 1966, a Polish representative stated 
that "all unequal treaties obtained by pressure and force, or 
disregarding the principle of sovereign equality of states, or 
containing provisions contrary to principles of modern 
international law, such as the right of all peoples to self- 
determination, or non-intervention, should be illegal and 
void. "9
Nevertheless, the term "unequal treaties" has so far not 
been addressed fully by those texts accepted as authoritative 
on international law. The Vienna Convention of Treaties which 
came into force in 1982 does not include the notion of unequal 
treaties. The unequal treaties doctrine is generally opposed 
by Western jurists and governments as being "vague and 
subversive of the fundamental principle of pacta sunt
8See Werner Morvay: "Unequal Treaties", in Encyclopedia
of Public International Law, Published under the Auspices of 
the Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public International 
Law under the Direction of Rudolf Bernhsrdt, Elsevier Science 
Publishers B.V., Amsterdam, 1984, vol.7, pp.514-517.
9Sources in Detter, Ingrid "The Problem of Unequal 
Treaties" -- International and Comparative Law Quarterly Vol. 
15, 1966. p.1083.
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servanda" and as a "political tool rather than a principle of 
international law."10 The Soviet Union, which has supported 
the doctrine of unequal treaties, has been attacked by Western 
jurists for its reluctance to abolish various treaties signed 
by the Tsarist government with neighbouring countries, such as 
China. These treaties can been regarded as classical cases of 
unequal treaties. Although many Third World countries have 
invoked the doctrine of unequal treaties, seldom have they 
applied the doctrine to abolish pre-existing treaties.
The PRC's attitudes and understanding of international law 
were heavily affected by the Soviet Union, and therefore, it 
is worthwhile examining Soviet attitudes to existing 
international law, particularly regarding law of state 
succession and the notion of 'unequal treaties'. It should be 
noted that the emergence of the Soviet Union as a world power, 
and the formation of the socialist-bloc after the Second World 
War, added some new elements to the discussion on state 
succession. The Bolshevik Revolution indeed created a new 
state with a new ideological-orientation and belief-system, 
and it posed a threat to the existing international system, 
including the fundamental rules of law —  Western in origin —  
established to govern that system. On the question of state 
succession, the focus of the Soviet argument was the notion of 
fundamental change. The Soviet government claimed:
"The Revolution of 1917 completely destroyed all old 
economic, social and political relations, and by substituting 
a new society for the old one with the strength of the 
sovereignty of a revolting people, has transferred the state 
authority of Russia to a new social class. By so doing it has 
severed the continuity of all civil obligations which were
10See Bledsoe, Robert L. & Boczek, Boleslaw A., The 
International Law Dictionary, ABC-Clio,Inc, California, 1987, 
p.275.
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essential to the economic life of the social class and which 
have fallen with it."11
In an official reply to European powers on 11 May, 1922, 
the Soviet government stated that "governments and systems 
thatspring from revolutions are not bound to respect the 
obligations of fallen governments".12
On a more recent occasion in 1960, a Soviet representative 
stated at a meeting of the International Law Association that 
a new state should not be bound by obligations which were not 
in its political and economic interests. Universal succession 
was rejected, he claimed, "first, when a new state appears as 
the result of separation from another; second, when a state 
emerges from the status of dependency by succession from a 
metropolitan country in assertion of the right of self- 
determination; and third, when a new type of state appears as 
the result of social revolution."13
The notion of 'unequal treaties' is accepted and defended 
by Soviet scholars. They claim that "unequal treaties are 
legally worthless" at all times, and that the repudiation of 
an unequal treaty cannot be considered a violation of 
international law.14
According to the Soviet view, there are several types of 
unequal treaties. The first type is the "unequal treaty of
nSee, "Memorandum of the Soviet Doctrine and Practice 
with Respect of the Law of Treaties", U.N. International Law 
Commission Document, A/CN.4/37,p.28. Also see, Richard J. 
Erickson, International Law and the Revolutionary State, 
Oceana Publications, Inc. New York, 1972, p.81.
12Soviet reply on May 11, 192 2, Paper Relating to the
International Economic Conference, in Erickson, ibid, p.81.
13Lukashuk of the U.S.S.R., "Addressing the International 
Law Association", 52nd Report (1966), p.562.
14See, Erickson, ibid., p. 77.
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economic dependency, either to secure colonial privileges or 
to create economic dependency out of economic vulnerability”. 
A second type is that of "military assistance and granting of 
military bases". A third type is the unequal treaty "forced 
upon a newly independent nation as the price of freedom or as 
the price for continued freedom".13
The above three types would seem to have been designed by 
the Soviet Union for anti-Western propaganda purposes, since 
all the instances are linked with Western powers, such as the 
Marshall Plan and the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian treaty permitting 
British troops to be stationed in the Suez Canal Zone. The 
fourth type, and probably the most significant, is the unequal 
treaty of the type imposed by Czarist Russia, based on 
"territorial expansion, seeking economic and security 
advantages, and resorting to the use of force in order to gain 
a privileged position at the expense of weaker nations".16 The 
nations concerned were Turkey, Persia and China. The Soviet 
government, in its early years, declared that it would 
abrogate all unequal treaties, including the ones bearing on 
China. For instance, in a note to the Chinese government on 27 
September, 192 0, the Soviet government sought to conclude a 
new treaty with the Chinese government. The treaty was 
supposed to confirm that all agreements concluded by the 
former Russian regime with China were no longer in force. It 
would renounce seizures of Chinese territory, give up Russian 
concessions in China, and return to China, unconditionally,
15Erickson, ibid., pp.78-79.
I6See, Kazimierz Grzybowski, Soviet Public International 
Law: doctrines and diplomatic practice, A.W. Sijthoff, Leyden, 
1970, p.445. See also, Erickson,ibid, p.78.
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all that had been taken away from it by the Tsarist government 
and the Russian bourgeoisie.17
Yet, these various declarations remained essentially good 
intentions. In practice, the Soviet Union did not always carry 
out its promises made in the early years of the Revolution. No 
agreement was ever made regarding the rectification of Russian 
territorial acquisitions at the expense of China.18 On the 
contrary, the Soviet Union regained, by the secret Yalta 
agreement and the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1945, its former 
rights in Manchuria which Imperial Russia had lost during the 
Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905.
2-2 China's interpretation of the international law of state 
succession and the law of treaties
China was, for a long time, a victim of the expansion of 
the colonial powers. China was not treated as an equal 
sovereign country by the powers and was forced to conclude 
various treaties, by which the powers enjoyed non-reciprocal 
extra-territorial rights and privileges. The treaties laid 
down a special status for several 'concessions', 'settlements' 
and 'treaty ports'. They established a system of consular 
jurisdiction under which the nationals of the foreign powers 
were exempted from Chinese territorial jurisdiction but 
subject to the jurisdiction of their respective consuls, both 
in civil and criminal cases. In the field of trade, travel 
rights for foreign merchants were specified and a maximum 
limit for customs and tariffs on imports to China was laid
17See, Grzybowski, ibid., p.446, p.452n.
18Grzybowski, ibid., p.446.
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down. Concessions were granted to foreign enterprises in the 
fields of mining, railways and shipping. Through several 
treaties, China had to cede or to lease territory to foreign 
powers, including Great Britain.19 These treaties came to form 
the bases of territory and boundary disputes between China and 
those countries which acceded to the treaties.
The Opium War of 1840 is commonly cited as the event
dividing the tribute era from the treaty era, Chinese
dominance from Western dominance.20 In some Western scholars' 
view, both the Qing Dynasty government and Chinese people 
helped in creating the treaty system. John K. Fairbank, for 
instance, has suggested that the treaty system in its early 
decades, from the 1840s to the 1860s, "was , not merely a
Western device for bringing China into the Western world; it 
may equally well be viewed as a Qing device for accommodating 
the West and giving it a place within the Chinese world".21 
But for modern Chinese patriots, including the Nationalists 
and Communists, the treaty system was an intolerable 
humiliation, and they were strongly motivated to eliminate the 
system and regain China's 'lost territories'.
As it will be discussed in the next chapter, most 
privileges and special rights enjoyed by the foreign powers 
through the treaty system were disbanded before 1949, and the 
Kuomintang government managed to recover most of the 
concessions. When the Communists established the People's
l9Werner Morvay, ibid., p. 515.
20See John K. Fairbank: "The Early Treaty System in
Chinese World Order", in Fairbank edited, The Chinese World 
Order, Harvard University Press, 1968, pp.257-258.
21Fairbank, ibid., p. 258.
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Republic in 1949, the problems the new government inherited 
from the Qing Dynasty government and the Kuomintang government 
included the special rights enjoyed by the Soviet Union in 
Manchuria, the questions of Hong Kong and Macao, the position 
of Outer Mongolia, and boundary issues between China and its 
neighbouring countries. All these matters stemmed from 
treaties signed by either the Qing government or the 
Kuomintang government.
PRC law scholars, following Soviet Marxist-Leninist 
doctrine, consider that the superstructure of a state, 
including its legal system, reflects the economic base of the 
society of that state and serves the interests of the state's 
ruling class. Therefore, they consider that laws and the legal 
system possess a class character. It has been claimed by some 
Chinese law scholars that international law serves the 
external policy of a country. It is impossible, they argue, 
for capitalist countries and socialist countries -- having 
fundamentally different external policies -- to apply in all 
respects the same international law. Countries with different 
social systems could still reach agreements, but only by a 
hard struggle between bourgeois international law and 
socialist international law.22
A more general Chinese view, however, holds that there 
exist two different social systems in the international 
community, but that the possibility and, indeed, reality, of 
coexistence and cooperation between states with different
22Ho Wushuang & Ma Chun, "A Criticism of the Reactionary 
Viewpoint of Chen Tiqiang on the Science of International 
Law,” CFYC, no. 6:35-38 (1957). English text in Cohen & Chiu 
edited, People's China and International Law, a document 
study, Princeton University Press, 1974. pp.33-35.
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systems makes possible the existence and fulfilment of a 
single general system of international law. There are a number 
of norms of international law which are recognized as binding 
by both capitalist countries and socialist countries, such as 
respect for state sovereignty, non-intervention in other 
countries' internal affairs, equality of states, inviolability 
of each other's territory, and various conventions of war and 
rules of diplomacy. Chinese scholars holding this view argue 
that "modern international law norms are the commonly observed 
legal norms created by agreements among states of different 
systems, in the course of their struggle and cooperation in 
adjusting their mutual relations. They do not express the will 
of the ruling class of a single state, but rather the will of 
the ruling classes of states with different systems. 
Therefore, the formula of the single class character of 
domestic law cannot be arbitrarily applied to international 
law."23
Chinese scholars' views on international law have become 
less ideologically centred since the end of the Cultural 
Revolution. The modern view acknowledges the existence of a 
general international law, and no longer talks about two 
different kinds of international law -- socialist 
international law and capitalist international law. The modern 
law books, textbooks and articles have clearly been affected 
by Western views.24
23Chu Chiwu, "Looking at the Class Character and 
Inheritable Character of Law from the Point of View of 
International Law," Guangming Ribao (13 May, 1957), p.3. 
English text in Cohen & Chiu, ibid. p.50.
24See text books on international law published in 1980s,
i.e. International Law (Guo Ji Fa), published by Beijing 
University Press, 1982. Relevant articles include Pan Baocui,
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Yet, on the question of state succession and the law of 
treaties, China's interpretation still differs from that of 
Western countries in some respects and still shares the Soviet 
view. Although the PRC government regards itself as the 
successor government of the continuing state of China, it 
particularly rejects -- or would at least seek to modify —  
the principle that a successor government is required by 
international law to perform the obligations undertaken on be­
half of the state by its predecessor.
PRC lawyers and scholars argue that even though the PRC, 
being subject to international law, has taken over from the 
previous state of China and is not new in that respect, the 
foundation of the People's Republic started a totally new 
state in terms of the nature of class and of social system, 
and therefore it is appropriate for the government of the PRC 
to consider the international responsibility and commitment 
borne by previous Chinese governments as a question of state 
succession. Zhou Gengsheng, a leading Chinese professor in 
international law, has stated:
"The People's Republic, on the one hand, is the successor
government of the continuing state of China and is naturally
subject to international law, but on the other hand, with its 
socialist characteristic, the PRC does not only change the 
form of government, but also establishes a new country so that 
the People's Republic should not recognize an international 
responsibility which is incompatible with the criteria of the 
new system. To those treaties imposed by imperialist
countries, the new China has absolutely no obligation to 
accede. "25
The fact that after the establishment of the People's
Republic, the Kuomintang government still continued to exist
"On the Scientific Character of International Law"(Guo Ji Fa 
de Hexuexi Tantao), Law Studies, 13 May 1985.
25Zhou Gengsheng, International Law (Guo Ji Fa), Beijing 
People's Press, 1981, pp.157-158.
61
/
in Taiwan and was, for a long time, recognized by many 
countries, particularly those in the Western bloc, as the 
legitimate government representing China, gave the PRC an 
additional ground for not following the general principles of 
international law.
There is also an ideological argument. According to 
Chinese lawyers, during the era of imperialism, when the 
bourgeoisie was particularly reactionary and disregarded the 
democratic principle of international order, international 
treaties were tools for arbitrary expansion and the means of 
direct violence against and oppression of weak and small 
nations. These lawyers argue that "in accordance with Marxist- 
Leninist principles, there are equal and unequal-treaties, and 
therefore, progressive people take fundamentally different at­
titudes towards different kinds of treaties. Equal treaties 
should be strictly observed. Unequal treaties are in violation 
of international law and without legal validity."26
Yet, the PRC objects only to particular aspects of the 
general theory of state succession. Its territorial claims and 
positions on border questions are actually based on rights of 
succession from past dynasties -- notwithstanding that these 
were feudal. In the cause of defending their claims, the 
Chinese government and Chinese scholars have never felt 
embarrassed to use historical materials and records from the 
18th and 19th centuries, when imperial China also conducted an 
expansionist policy against tributary states, seeking economic 
and security advantages and territorial expansion. They have
26Wang Tieya, International Law (Guo Ji Fa) Beijing 
University Press, 1982,p.212; Wang Tieya was one of the most 
distinguish law scholars in China.
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normally regarded conflicts between imperial China and these 
tributary states as a 'national contradiction' within a big 
'Chinese family'. The relations of the Chinese with 
neighbouring areas were indeed different from general 
international relations based on the idea of the nation-state 
and sovereignty. China's foreign relations were coloured, as 
John K. Fairbank has described, by the concept of Sino- 
centrism and an assumption of Chinese superiority. Such 
relations continued until the Western powers intruded into 
East Asia in the middle of the 19th century.27 Fairbank has 
argued that both Nationalist and Communist China "have 
inherited a set of institutionalized attitudes and historical 
precedents not easily conformable to the European tradition of 
international relations among equally sovereign nation 
states" .28
However, China's reluctance to integrate such relations 
was also due to the fact that China itself became a victim of 
the expansionist policy of Western powers, and was forced to 
enter a treaty system in which unequal relations were 
established with the foreign powers. Nevertheless, the PRC 
appears to be flexible in establishing its territorial claims 
and positions based on both the concept of China's traditional 
order and the concept of modern international law —  seemingly 
contradictory notions.
A recently published textbook on international law further 
declares that all legal treaties, in principle, should be
27See, John K Fairbank: "A Preliminary Framework", in
Fairbank edited, The Chinese World Order, Traditional China's 
Foreign Relations, Harvard University Press, 1968, pp.1-19.
28Fairbank, Ibid., p. 4.
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observed, but that the abolition of unequal treaties is 
lawful. It argues that, according to international law, 
unequal treaties are treaties of plunder and enslavement and 
are in violation of other states' sovereignty and territorial 
integrity. The victimized state has the legal and moral right, 
it argues, to demand their abolition.
China normally attributes those particular treaties 
bearing on China to the unjust wars waged by imperialist 
countries against China, and therefore regards them as 
unequal. But, to press the claim of the invalidity of 
treaties, it sometimes also uses more internationally 
acceptable reasoning to support its arguments, such as the 
coercion of a state's representative or a representative's 
lack of authority. For instance, the case of the 1878 Sino- 
Russian negotiations on Yili (a territory occupied by Russia 
in 1871) is put into the category of coercion of a state's 
representative. The representative of the Qing Dynasty 
government, it is argued, was under the coercion of the 
Tsarist government and signed the agreement whereby Russia 
undertook to return Yili to China, but with the conditions 
that China would pay five million roubles' compensation and 
cede another piece of land to the Russians. The agreement 
became invalid and even the Qing Dynasty government refused to 
accept it.29
Regarding a representative's lack of authority, a treaty 
signed by the Tibetan government and the British government on 
the Sino-Indian boundary dispute has been cited as a standard 
example. The Chinese government has claimed in this case,
29International Law (Guo Ji Fa) , Law Press, Beijing, 1981, 
P.271.
which took place in the early twentieth century, that Britain 
had no right to conduct separate negotiations with Tibet, 
since Tibet was merely a region of China. It has argued:
"The exchange of letters carried out secretly between 
Britain and Tibetan local authorities in order to fabricate 
the so-called McMahon line was completely illegal.... Treaties 
are agreements between states which should be formally signed 
by the plenipotentiary representatives of the states 
concerned. Tibet, however, is only a part of Chinese 
territory, and the representative of the Tibetan local 
authorities could not represent the Chinese government. 
Therefore, the letters he exchanged secretly with the British 
representative could absolutely not constitute an agreement 
between the Chinese and British governments."30
China has insisted on the existence of unequal treaties 
and that these unequal treaties are in violation of 
international law and without legal validity. The government 
of the PRC classifies all treaties signed by previous Chinese 
governments and foreign governments into two major categories- 
-equal and unequal. According to their contents, as already 
stated, the government has determined either to recognize, 
abrogate, revise, or renegotiate them. However, neither the 
Chinese government nor Chinese legal scholars have presented 
clear guidelines as to under what conditions and how these 
unequal treaties should be abandoned. Yet there are cases 
where China has had to touch on the matter of unequal 
treaties. It is necessary, therefore, to examine these cases 
in order to discover how the Chinese government actually 
handled the issues.
2-3 China's practice in handling pre-existing treaties
International law has been viewed in China as an 
instrument of foreign policy. "International law", as one
30Cohen & Chiu, ibid., p. 1240
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Chinese legal scholar has described it, "in addition to being 
a body of principles and norms which must be observed by every 
country, is also, just as any law, a political instrument; 
whether a country is socialist or capitalist, it will to a 
certain degree utilize international law in implementing its 
foreign policy."31
The existing treaties regarded by the PRC as equal were 
mainly multilateral ones. In the 1950s, the PRC adhered to 
several multilateral agreements to which its predecessor had 
agreed. In July 1952, after the Chinese government had 
recognized the "protocol for the prohibition of the use in war 
of asphyxiating poisonous, or other gases, and of 
bacteriological methods of warfare", Foreign .Minister Zhou 
Enlai made this statement: "The central people's government
considers that the said protocol is conducive to the 
strengthening of international peace and security and is in 
conformity with humanitarian principles, and, therefore, has 
decided to recognize the accession to the protocol, provided 
that all the other contracting and acceding powers observe it 
reciprocally."32 In a similar way, the PRC recognized the 1930 
Convention on Load Lines in 1957, to which the nationalist 
government had acceded in 1935. In the same year, she also 
accepted the International Regulations for Preventing Colli­
sions at Sea, which the nationalist government had signed in 
1948 .
In the cases of bilateral treaties, the most interesting
3IZhou Fulun, "On the Nature of Modern International Law", 
English text in Cohen & Chiu, ibid., pp.33-34.
32"Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai's Statement on China's 
Recognition of the 1949 Geneva Conventions", 13 July, 1952. 
English text in Cohen and Chiu, ibid., p.123.
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was probably the PRC's recognition of the Mongolian People's 
Republic. Outer Mongolia was under China's sovereign control 
before it claimed independence in 1921. In 1924, the Soviet 
Union and the Chinese government signed an agreement under 
which the former recognized Outer Mongolia to be "a component 
of the Chinese Republic" under Chinese sovereignty while the 
Chinese side acknowledged Moscow's de facto control there.33 
In January 1946, the nationalist government withdrew from its 
previous stand of non-recognition and recognized "Outer 
Mongolia" as an independent state, on condition that a 
referendum was held under international supervision. Such a 
referendum was, indeed, held in 1946. However, since 1949, 
when it was defeated on the mainland, the Nationalist 
government which moved to Taiwan has withheld recognition of 
the Mongolian People's Republic, claiming the 1946 referendum 
was manipulated by the Soviet Union.
Before 1949, the Communists had made no formal statement 
on the issue of Mongolia, although Mao's stand was clear. In 
1936, he had forecast that, once the revolution was 
victorious, Outer Mongolia would of its own accord join the 
Chinese federation.34 In 1939, he defined the frontier of 
China so as to include both Outer and Inner Mongolia. After 
the establishment of the People's Republic, the Chinese 
Communists adopted a foreign policy "leaning to one side" and 
saw close Sino-Soviet relations as essential for safeguarding 
China's security. Mao visited Moscow in December 1949 and 
concluded the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Alliance and Mutual
33See, The China Year Book, 1924, pp. 1192-1200.
34See, Edgar Snow, Red Star Over China, Grove Press, Inc., 
19 61, p.96.
Assistance (signed in February 1950). Mao later admitted that 
he had a difficult time in his two months of negotiations with 
the Russians, which had been "a struggle" with them.35 The 
Chinese government made considerable concessions, including 
the recognition of the independence of the Outer Mongolian 
Republic. At a press conference in September 1965, the Chinese 
Foreign Minister, Chen Yi, observed that in 1945, Chiang Kai- 
shek's government had concluded a treaty with the government 
of the Soviet Union, which recognized the Mongolian People's 
Republic. The new China followed that commitment and 
recognized Mongolia as a socialist country, establishing 
diplomatic relations in October 1949.
Thus, like the Kuomintang, the Communist Party was 
obliged to accept the reality, under pressure from the Soviet 
Union. Yet, the new China did not want to be seen as 
responsible for the "cession of territory" and the loss of 
Outer Mongolia and, therefore instead of directly recognizing 
Mongolia, used the principle of succession. But the PRC's 
stand was still ambiguous. In a talk to a group of 
parliamentary deputies from Japan, Mao said that in 1954, when 
Khrushchev visited to China, "we took up the Mongolian 
question, but he refused to talk to us". Mao raised the issue 
again with Khrushchev in 1957, insisting that China had 
sovereign rights over the country. According to the Soviet 
version, the Chinese leaders attempted to reach agreement with
35Mao Zedong, "Speech to the Eighth Central Committee of 
the Chinese Communist Party", in Selected Works of Mao Zedong, 
Foreign Language Press, Beijing, vol.V.
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Khrushchev to make Outer Mongolia into a Chinese province.36
The PRC's policies on unequal treaties are more complex. 
The PRC justifies its rejection of automatic succession to 
pre-existing treaty obligations by resorting to the concept of 
revolutionary change of government, and it has fixed its basic 
policy in Article 55 of the Common Programme. After the 
Communist victory on the mainland, and following the new 
regime's foreign policy of the so-called "fresh start", all 
existing special rights and privileges which had been in force 
between the Nationalist government and the treaty powers 
vanished, with the single exception of those concerning Soviet 
Union. The new regime had to deal with the issues of frontiers 
and territories such as Hong Kong and Macao. Its counterparts 
had also changed -- the newly-developing countries of India, 
Burma and Pakistan had all inherited treaties regarded by the 
PRC as unequal -- except in the cases of Britain, Portugal 
and, again, the Soviet Union.
a) The case of the Soviet Union
The Soviet Union is a country that shares the same social 
system as the PRC. When the Chinese communists established a 
new government on the mainland, the Soviet Union had to make 
a decision on how to handle its special rights in China's 
Manchuria, including 'preeminent interests' in the 
internationalized free port of Dairen, the naval base (leased) 
at Port Arthur, and control of the Chinese Eastern Railway and 
the South Manchurian Railway.
When the two communist giants entered negotiations in 1949
36Sekaishuko. Tokyo, 11 August, 1964. English text in 
Doolin, Dennis J, Territorial Claims in the Sino-Soviet 
Conflict, Stanford, California, Hoover Institution on War, 
Revolution and Peace, 1965, pp.42-44.
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towards an alliance, the Soviet Union agreed to abandon all 
special rights inherited from the previous treaty with the 
Kuomintang. But the PRC invited the Soviet Union to stay on, 
because of “consideration of the existing international 
situation and the need to counter the imperialists11.37 In 
accordance with the eventual agreement between the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics and the People's Republic of China, 
China accepted a continued Soviet presence in Port Arthur and 
Dairen until 1952. Zhou Enlai later formally requested Stalin 
to stay on after the deadline. The two ports were returned to 
China in May 1955, following the withdrawal of the Soviet 
army.
The reasons behind this Chinese tolerance-of the Soviet 
presence were various. First, the PRC considered the Soviet 
Union as the first and leading socialist country and Stalin as 
the greatest Marxist after Lenin., Secondly, it hesitated to 
take any action for fear of provoking much greater problems. 
When the Korean War broke out in June 1950, the PRC was even 
more desperate for Soviet economic aid. The Soviet aid became 
particularly significant when the United States and its allies 
placed an embargo on China. Thirdly, the Soviet presence in 
Port Arthur and Dairen challenged American naval superiority 
in the waters off Northern China, providing a counter to 
American military threats during the Korean War. A reference 
to this important factor was made in a communique issued by 
the USSR and the PRC after the Korean War which said that, 
with regard to the changes that had taken place in the
37See, Dangdai Zhongguo Wei jiao (The Contemporary 
Diplomacy of China), edited by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
of the PRC, Published by World Knowledge Press, Beijing, 1987; 
pp.25-26.
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international situation in the Far East, the Soviet Union had 
agreed to withdraw its military units from Port Arthur and 
Dairen.
A more complicated and deeply embedded problem between the 
two countries concerned their border. The boundary issue 
between China and the Soviet Union had been in abeyance since 
the establishment of the Chinese Communist government. It came 
to the fore only as relations between the two countries 
deteriorated. The major disputed territories were in the Far 
East —  north of the Amur (Heilong) river and east of the 
Ussuri (Wusuli) river, which had become part of the Chinese 
empire in the 17th century as a result of the Manchu conquest 
of China. From the 18th century, Tsarist Russia began to 
expand across Siberia to the Pacific and southward into 
Central Asia and the Far East, at the expense of the weak 
Manchu Dynasty that ruled China. The 1858 Treaty of Aigun, 
which was imposed on China by the Tsarist government at a time 
when the country had been weakened by a war with Britain and 
France in 1856-58, gave Russia sovereignty over 230,000 square 
miles (600,000 sq. km.) north of the River Amur and placed
150,000 square miles (390,000 sq km) east of the Ussuri under 
joint Sino-Russian control. Under the Treaty of Beijing 1860, 
Tsarist Russia further annexed the territory east of the 
Ussuri.
During early the 1950s, the PRC maintained good relations 
with the Soviet Union. At the same time, it collaborated with 
the Soviet Union in a friendly manner in conducting affairs 
along their common border and refrained from making public 
expressions of disagreement on territorial problems. Chinese 
and Soviet boats traded across the Argun, Amur and Ussuri
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rivers in a friendly atmosphere. In 1951, the Joint Sino- 
Soviet Commission for Navigation on Boundary Rivers was 
established to set up navigational procedures and to supervise 
shipping along the border rivers. In August 1956, the two 
countries negotiated an agreement on the joint investigation 
and comprehensive utilization of natural resources in the Amur 
valley, including the planning and building of a 13-million 
kilowatt hydroelectric power system. In December 1957, a new 
agreement was signed, aimed at simplifying the rules governing 
commercial navigation and shipping on border rivers and lakes. 
Such differences on border issues that may have existed were 
not pursued by either side and the Amur River was described as 
the "River of Friendship". Zhou Enlai even said in 1960 that 
those sections of the Soviet-Chinese frontier on which 
agreement had not been reached were "insignificant 
discrepancies in the maps, easy to solve peacefully".38
The Sino-Soviet territorial dispute was first aired 
publicly on 3 March, 1963 when the Chinese government charged 
that the Soviet Union had carried on "large-scale subversive 
activities in the Li region of Xinjiang and enticed and 
coerced several thousands of Chinese citizens into going to 
the Soviet Union in April and May 1962".39 In February 1964, 
the two countries decided to enter negotiations to settle the 
boundary issues. During the negotiations, the Chinese 
delegation insisted that the relevant treaties signed by the 
Chinese Qing Dynasty government and the Tsarist government in
38"The Note of the Soviet Government of 29 March, 1969"; 
English text in Day, Alan T edited, China and the Soviet Union 
1949-1984, Longman 1985, p.95.
^People's Daily. 6 September, 1963.
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1858 and 1860 were unequal, but at the same time offered to 
take them as a basis for determining the entire alignment of 
the boundary.40 China also suggested that uany side, which 
occupies the territory of the other side in violation of the 
treaties" should return it "wholly and unconditionally to the 
other side". It added that this "does not preclude necessary 
readjustments at individual places on the boundary by both 
sides". According to the Chinese view, the area illegally 
seized by the Soviets beyond the stipulation of the 'unequal 
treaties' included 600 of the 700 islands in the Ussuri and 
Amur rivers (about 1,000 sq km, or 400 square miles), and
30,000 sq km (or 12,000 square miles) of the Pamir mountain 
sector adjacent to the southern corner of China's Xinjiang 
province.
The 1964 border negotiations were broken off without any 
tangible results, because the Soviet side refused to accept 
China's position, while China also found the Soviet position 
unacceptable.41
Tension along the borders greatly increased during the 
early stages of the Chinese Cultural Revolution. Armed clashes 
between Soviet and Chinese frontier guards took place on 2 
March and 15 March, 1969, on the Ussuri river, and continued 
to take place thereafter. During the summer of 1969, a series 
of new armed clashes broke out on the Ussuri and Amur rivers 
as well as on the Xinjiang border. The border clash of 1969
40"Letter of the Central Committee of the CPC of February 
29, 1964, to the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.", English
text in Beijing Review. 8 May, 1964, pp.12-18.
41"Chenpao Island has always been Chinese Territory", by 
Information Department of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, in 
Beijing Review, 14 March, 1969.
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represented the climax of the Sino-Soviet dispute. However, in 
spite of the serious charges and countercharges, both sides 
tried to avoid a full-scale war. The PRC was particularly 
concerned about a possible attack from the Soviet Union on its 
nuclear base. On 29 March, 1969, Moscow called on Beijing to 
take part in talks towards normalizing the border situation. 
After few months' delay, Beijing announced on 7 June that it 
accepted the Soviet proposal to reopen meetings of the joint 
Sino-Soviet Commission for Navigation on Boundary Rivers at 
Khabarovsk.42 But the border clashes continued until 
September, when Soviet Premier Aleksei Kosygin made an 
unannounced detour and held an airport consultation in Beijing 
with Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai on 11 September, 1969. Zhou 
and Kosygin agreed to resume boundary negotiations and to take 
other steps to ease frontier tensions.43 On 7 October, 1969, 
Beijing announced that the PRC had reached an agreement with 
the Soviet Union to open negotiations aimed at resolving their 
border conflict.44 China's position for entering negotiations 
had been made in a statement on 24 May, 1969:
"[It] must be confirmed that the treaties relating to the 
present Sino-Soviet boundary are all unequal treaties imposed 
on China by Tsarist Russian imperialism. But taking into 
consideration the fact that Tsarist power was in the hands of 
neither the Chinese people nor the Russian people...the 
Chinese government is still ready to take these unequal 
treaties as the basis for determining the entire alignment of 
the boundary line between the two countries and for settling
42The NCNA dispatch, 7 June, 1969.
43Dangdai Zhongguo Waijiao, ibid., pp. 125-126.
44"Statement of the Government of the PRC", People' s 
Daily, 8 October, 1969/ English text in Beijing Review. 10
October, 1969.
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all existing questions relating to the boundary."45
The Chinese government also put forward the following 
points for the negotiations:
1. There should be a distinction between rights and wrongs 
in history and a confirmation that the treaties relating to 
the present Sino-Soviet boundary were unequal;
2. In consideration of the actual conditions, these 
treaties should be taken as the basis for an overall 
settlement of the Sino-Soviet boundary question.
3. China does not demand the return of the Chinese ter­
ritory which Tsarist Russia annexed through these treaties.
4. Any side which has occupied the territory of the other 
side in violation of these treaties should, out'of principle, 
return it unconditionally to the other side.
5. A new and equal Sino-Soviet treaty should be concluded 
to replace the old unequal ones and to return to the status 
quo ante.46
Such attitudes on China's part seemed in contradiction 
with its principles. According to Beijing's interpretation, 
the unequal treaties were in violation of international law 
and without legal validity, thus giving China the legal 
justification to demand the return of all 1,500,000 square 
kilometres of disputed territory. Yet China made it clear -- 
and has since continued to make it clear —  that it had no 
intention of claiming back that vast territory. Instead, China
45,lStatement of the Government of the PRC", People' s 
Daily. 25 May, 1969; English text in Beijing Review no.22, 30 
May, 1969
46,1 Statement of the Government of the PRC", People's Daily 
7 October, 1969. The English translation is reprinted by China 
Reconstruct, October, 1969.
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adopted a prudent approach that did not, in fact, challenge 
the status quo. Although Beijing claimed that China had no 
intention of demanding the return of the whole 'lost 
territory', it insisted that the Soviet Union must acknowledge 
for the record that the treaties signed by the Chinese Qing 
government and the Czarist government on the Sino-Russian 
boundary were unequal and, therefore, illegal. Beijing also 
asked for a new treaty to replace the old one. Such a position 
on China's part was unacceptable to the Soviet Union, whose 
leaders possibly feared that the Chinese government might 
later use a Soviet acknowledgment of the 'unequal and illegal' 
nature of the treaties to lay claim to large parts of Siberia 
in order to solve China's population problem. For the Chinese, 
an immediate advantage could be obtained by accepting the 
unequal treaties as a basis for negotiations and by demanding 
the Kremlin's acknowledgement of the 'unequal treaties', since 
by so doing, China demonstrated that it had made a significant 
compromise, something which could strengthen its position in 
an eventual settlement of the actual disputed territories. The 
disputed territories comprise about 21,000 sq km (8,100 square 
miles) and this area -- in China's view —  is occupied by the 
Soviet Union in violation of the unequal treaties. The Chinese 
leaders also acknowledged that China was not strong enough to 
recover all the 'lost territories' and, therefore, decided to 
seal the issue in a 'historical record' and to leave room for 
flexibility for future Chinese leaders. Obviously, the notion 
of 'unequal treaties' was not simply a matter of morality or 
for the clarification of historical facts, but contained 
considerable substance.
The border negotiations opened in Beijing on 20 October,
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19 69, and continued with a number of breaks until July 1978. 
No official statements were issued on the progress of the 
talks. China's approaches were refused by the Soviet Union. In 
return, Moscow suggested a treaty renouncing the use or 
threat of force between the two countries. It also denied the 
existence of any disputed zones and proposed to conduct talks 
"without any preliminary conditions". It was not until the 
late 1980s that both sides were able to record significant 
progress in their negotiations, due to the changes both in the 
international situation and in the domestic situations in 
China and the Soviet Union.
In the early 1960s, through direct negotiations, the PRC 
concluded frontier agreements with other newly-developing As­
ian countries such as Burma, Nepal, Pakistan and Afghanistan. 
The Sino-Burmese and Sino-Indian negotiations would appear to 
be the most interesting of these.,
b) The case of Burma
Bilateral agreements were signed by the Qing Dynasty and 
British-controlled Burma in 1886, 1894 and 1897, which led to 
the demarcation of much, but not all, of the Sino-Burmese 
frontier. In 1941, taking advantage of the critical situation 
in which China was placed during the war of resistance to the 
Japanese, and using the closure of the Yunnan-Burma road as a 
pretext, Britain effected -- in an exchange of notes with the 
Kuomintang government on 18 June -- an advantageous
demarcation in the Kaawa area. This was called the "1941 
Line".
In the early 1950s, the PRC was confronted with urgent, 
major problems both at home and abroad. In the domestic sphere 
it was necessary to consolidate political power and to get the
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economy running again. The Korean War became the dominant 
issue, and China was unable to make comprehensive and 
systematic preparations for the settlement of boundaries with 
its neighbours, including Burma.
With the cessation of the Korean War and the 1954 Geneva 
Conference, in which China played an important role as an 
independent power, China started to develop new foreign policy 
initiatives which showed its intentions of playing a more 
positive role in shaping international affairs. To do this, it 
was essential to establish good relations with its neighbours. 
Negotiations towards the settlement of boundary questions were 
given a high priority, and the Sino-Burmese talks began in 
October 1956.
During the negotiations, the PRC made it clear that all 
existing treaties and agreements were unequal and the result 
of imperialist aggression. At the, same time, China indicated 
a willingness to accept the previous treaties as a basis for 
negotiations. On 9 July, 1957, Zhou Enlai stated in a report 
on the boundary line between China and Burma : "It was the
opinion of our government that, on the question of boundary 
lines, demands made on the basis of formal treaties should be 
respected according to general international practice."47
The Sino-Burmese boundary agreement was finally concluded 
on 28 January, 1960. It was believed that the PRC had made 
significant concessions and it accepted without modification 
the major part of the British-made boundary. China surrendered 
its residual sovereignty in the Namwan perpetual-lease area
47Zhou Enlai: Report on the Work of the Question of the 
Boundary Line between China and Burma", 9 July, 1957, at the 
Fourth Session of the First National People's Congress; Text 
in People's China, no. 15, 1957.
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and mining privileges in the Lufang silver mines. In return, 
China gained only 122 sq km (47 square miles).
Burma is a small and weak country. It seemed at the time 
that the PRC was in a strong bargaining position and that it 
could have gained more. However, if one considers the peculiar 
situation at that time, the PRC's concessions were 
understandable.
Bilateral relations between the PRC and Burma had been 
close and friendly. The premiers of the two countries had 
exchanged visits in 1954 and 1956. A series of bilateral 
agreements had been signed, including a treaty of friendship 
and non-aggression. Good relations provided a favourable 
atmosphere for negotiations through which the PRC could 
demonstrate to the world that a settlement that was fair and 
reasonable to both sides was possible, even between large and 
a small countries. ,
The settlement of the Sino-Burmese border issue gave China 
an opportunity to develop close relations with its 
neighbouring countries at a time of isolation. The Chinese 
leadership realised the significance of the Sino-Burmese 
negotiations on the border issue and regarded the settlement 
as a breakthrough both in diminishing the suspicion of 
neighbouring countries and in establishing good bilateral 
relations with them. Beijing also viewed the settlement as an 
important counterbalance to American influence on China's 
neighbouring countries. Zhou Enlai believed that "the 
imperialist countries hope that China will have conflicts with 
its neighbours and that they can take advantages of such 
conflicts". He considered the best way to weaken the 
imperialist position was to settle the Sino-Burmese border
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issue through peaceful negotiations and to set a model for 
solving similar problems with other countries.48
c) The case of India
While Beijing was negotiating with Rangoon, Sino-Indian 
relations were worsening, due to a border dispute. Shortly 
after the Sino-Burmese agreement, Beijing was able to ne­
gotiate boundary agreements with other neighbouring countries 
such as Nepal, Pakistan, Afghanistan and the People's Republic 
of Mongolia. This flurry of boundary settlements served the 
PRC's purpose of embarrassing and putting pressure upon India. 
This was spelled out in Beijing's note of 31 May, 1962 to 
India, which stated:
“Since the Burmese and Nepalese governments can settle 
their boundary questions with China in a friendly way through 
negotiations, and since the government of Pakistan has also 
agreed with the Chinese government to negotiate a boundary 
settlement, why is it that the Indian government cannot 
negotiate and settle its boundary question with the Chinese 
government?".'49
The PRC, however, failed to reach an agreement with India. 
As with the Sino-Burmese dispute, the differences over the 
Sino-Indian border dated back to British intrusion into the 
border lands of northern India, China and China's Tibet region 
in the 19th century. The boundary can be divided into three
48See Yao Zhongming:“Premier Zhou Enlai's Outstanding 
Achievement on Settling the Sino-Burmese Border Issue" (Zhou 
Enlai Zongli Jiejue Zhong-Mian Bianjie Wengti de Guanghui Ye 
ji), in Pei Jienzhang edited Research on Zhou Enlai
diplomatic thinking and practice (Yanjiu Zhou Enlai —  Waijiao
Sixiang yu Shijian), World Knowledge Press, Beijing, 1989, 
pp.94-96. Yao was the chief representative of Chinese side of 
the Sino-Burmese Border Joint Committee during the Sino- 
Burmese negotiations.
49Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged and Agreements 
Signed between the Governments of India and China; White Paper 
Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, New Delhi, 
1961, 1963; vol.VI, p.101; also see, Neville Maxwell, India's
China War, Penguin Books, 1970, p.226.
80
sectors, western, eastern and central, of which the eastern is 
known for the controversial McMahon Line which covers a 
contested area of about 33,000 85,000 sq km (square miles). 
The McMahon Line was a product of the Simla Conference of 
1913-1914, and the result -- which in China's view Britain 
manipulated —  was not even accepted by the Nationalist 
government.
The PRC regarded the McMahon Line as illegal on the 
grounds that China exercised full sovereignty over Tibet at 
the time and that Tibet had no right to decide its boundary 
with foreign country. In his letter to Indian Prime Minister 
Jawaharlal Nehru of 23 January, 1959, Zhou stated:
"...the McMahon Line was a product of the British policy 
of aggression against the Tibet Region of China, and it 
aroused the great indignation of the Chinese people. 
Juridically, too, it cannot be considered legal...It has never 
been recognized by the Chinese central government."50
However, the PRC government's attitude towards the McMahon 
Line was a realistic one in practice. The PRC was willing to 
accept it as the basis of negotiations, particularly while 
there were good relations with India. During his goodwill 
visit to India in 1956, Zhou took the initiative on the 
McMahon Line, expressing the opinion that China had accepted 
it as the boundary with Burma, even though as it had been 
established by the British the line was not fair. Zhou stated 
that "because of the friendly relations which existed between 
China and the countries concerned, India and Burma, the 
Chinese government was of the opinion that it should give
^"Premier Zhou Enlai (Zhou Enlai)'s Letter to Prime 
Minister Jawaharlal Nehru", People's Daily, 8 September, 1959; 
English text in Beijing Review, no.37, 15 September 1959.
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recognition to the McMahon Line".51 In early 1959, he still 
held the view that, since India and Burma had attained 
independence and had become friendly with China, the Chinese 
government found it necessary to take a realistic attitude 
towards the McMahon Line.52
Had there been no differences over the western and 
central sectors of the Sino-Indian border, the PRC might have 
fixed the border with India on the basis of the McMahon Line, 
just as it had done with Burma. However, when relations 
deteriorated, the PRC's attitude hardened. Thus, in a note 
from the PRC's Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Indian 
embassy in Beijing on 2 6 December, 1959, the PRC changed its 
earlier stand. After accusing the British o.f imperialist 
aggression against Tibet and of a conspiracy to encourage 
Tibet to break away from China, it stated:
"The Indian people, who treasure peace, can in no way be 
held responsible for all the acts of aggression committed by 
Britain with India as its base. It is, however, surprising 
that the Indian government should claim the boundary line 
which Britain unlawfully created through aggression against 
Tibet, and which even includes areas to which British 
authority had not extended as the traditional customary 
boundary line, while previously describing the true 
traditional customary boundary line pointed out by the Chinese 
government on the basis of objective facts as laying claim to 
large tracts of Indian territory."53
Zhou Enlai, who had previously told Nehru that China 
would recognize the McMahon Line because of the friendly 
relationship between the two countries, now asked: "How could 
China agree to accept under coercion such an illegal line
M"Nehru in Rajya Sabba on 9 October 1950", in Neville 
Maxwell, India's China War, Doubleday, New York, 1972, p.88.
52Ibid. , p . 89 .
53A full English text in The Sino-Indian Boundary Question, 
Foreign Language Press, Beijing, 1962; pp.51-59.
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which would have it relinquish its rights and disgrace itself 
by selling out its territory —  and such a large piece of 
territory at that."’4 The Chinese Foreign Affairs Ministry 
also denied that Zhou had made any remarks indicating China's 
recognition of the McMahon Line.55
Yet, in spite of such a changed attitude, the Chinese 
government still wanted an overall settlement of the boundary 
question between the two countries, taking into account the 
"historical background and the present situation". In his 
visit to India in April 1960, Zhou Enlai suggested that the 
Chinese government would accept the McMahon Line in the east 
in exchange for India's acceptance of China's position in the 
western section. He told the press in New Delhi:
"We have asked the Indian government to adopt an attitude 
towards this western area similar to the attitude of the 
Chinese government towards the area of the eastern sector; 
that is, it may keep its own stand, while agreeing to conduct 
negotiations and not to cross the line of China's 
administrative jurisdiction as shown on Chinese maps."56
Thus, it became clear that China's concession was not 
without conditions and the acceptance of the 'illegal' McMahon 
Line was a part of the whole package in settling the boundary 
question. Refuting the McMahon Line in the first place was 
supposed to be an important step in establishing China's 
bargaining position, and the acceptance of the Line 
subsequently could further strengthen its positions on other 
sectors. China realised that it would be difficult to gain the 
whole disputed territory and, therefore, considered certain
54See, footnote 50.
55See, footnote 53.
-^"Premier Zhou's Press Conference in New Delhi", see, 
Beijing Review, no. 18, 3 May 1960, p.20.
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concessions necessary.
2-4 The position of Hong Kong
Treaties bearing on Hong Kong were signed between the 
Chinese Qing Dynasty government and the British government in 
1842, 1860 and 1898.
The Treaty of Nanking of 1842 was the first international 
instrument by which a foreign power imposed unilateral terms 
on China. Following Britain's example, the Americans and 
French demanded and obtained similar treaties. The various 
privileges obtained by each power accumulated and formed the 
basis of the system of unequal treaties which developed during 
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In. this respect, 
the Opium War of 1840-1842 and the signature of the Treaty of 
Nanking have been regarded by the PRC as a turning point 
marking the change in China from a feudal society to a semi­
colonial and semi-feudal society.
The Western countries were dissatisfied with what they had 
gained through the treaties signed between 1842 and 1844. A 
joint paper was presented to the Qing government in 1854 by 
the ministers of France, Britain and the United States, 
demanding that the earlier treaties be revised. In the ensuing 
Second Opium War of 1856-60, the imperial government was 
incapable of any significant resistance to the French and 
British. One result of the Chinese weakness was an extension 
of the territory of Hong Kong by the cession of the Kowloon 
peninsula and Stonecutter Islands.
Following the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95, in which China 
suffered another humiliating defeat, foreign powers again took 
advantage of the weakness of the Chinese government, and the
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British were able to enlarge their possessions in Hong Kong. 
In July 1898, the British government signed a treaty with the 
Chinese government under which it obtained a ninety-nine year 
lease on the New Territories in the north of the Kowloon 
peninsula and the neighbouring islands, thus adding 376 square 
miles (947 sq km) to the 75 sq km (29 square miles) of the 
original Hong Kong colony.
All the wars concerned have been constantly regarded by 
the Chinese as wars of aggression against China and thus 
unjust. All treaties signed afterwards, in the Chinese view, 
were consequently unequal. Thus, the existing treaties bearing 
on Hong Kong and Macao have been regarded as unequal by the 
government of the PRC, just like the treaties.governing the 
Sino-Burmese and Sino-Indian boundaries. This has been made 
clear by China on a number of occasions.
On 8 March, 1963, the People's Daily, in response to 
criticisms from the Communist Party of the USA, stated: 
"Questions such as those of Hong Kong and Macao relate to the 
category of unequal treaties left over by history, treaties 
which the imperialists imposed on China."57
In September 1964, at a World Youth Forum in Moscow, a 
resolution was passed calling for the elimination of colonies 
in Asia. Tabled by the Ceylonese (Sri Lankan) delegate, it put 
Hong Kong and Macao on a par with Timor Island, Papua, Oman
and Aden, and demanded the end of colonial rule in the two
places in accordance with the United Nations declaration on 
decolonization. The Chinese delegate condemned the resolution 
and pointed out that Hong Kong and Macao were Chinese
^People's Daily, 8 March, 1963; also see, Beijing Review.
15 March, 1963.
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territories occupied by British and Portuguese imperialists on 
the strength of unequal treaties.38
Again, on 10 March, 1972, when the UN General Assembly's 
Special Committee on Colonialism included Hong Kong and Macao 
in its list of colonial territories, Huang Hua, Beijing's UN 
representative, handed a memorandum to the committee stating: 
"As is known to all, the questions of Hong Kong and Macao 
belong to the category of questions resulting from the series 
of unequal treaties left over by history, treaties which the 
imperialists imposed on China. Hong Kong and Macao are part of 
the Chinese territory occupied by the British and Portuguese 
authorities. The settlement of the question of Hong Kong and 
Macao is entirely within China's sovereignty and does not at 
all fall under the ordinary category of colonial 
territories. 1,39
Most recently, in September. 1982, after Mrs Thatcher 
reiterated that the nineteenth century treaties concerning 
Hong Kong could be altered but not abrogated, a Chinese 
Foreign Ministry spokesman said that the treaties signed by 
the British and the Qing Dynasty governments were unequal and 
had never been accepted by the Chinese people.60
The PRC's stand on Hong Kong has been consistent since 
1949, but the government's statements have been ambiguous in 
some respects. They have never distinguished, in legal terms, 
between the Treaty of Nanking of 1842, the Treaty Convention 
of Peking of 1860 and the Convention of Peking of 1889. The
58People's Daily. 27 September, 1964.
59English text in Joseph, Y.S. Cheng edited, Hong Kong, in 
search of a future, Oxford University Press, 1984; p.54.
60People's Daily, 1 October, 1982.
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terms "cede” and "cession" as used in the Treaty of Nanking 
and the Convention of Peking of 1860 are different from the 
term "lease", as used in the Convention of Peking of 1898. 
"Cession" is usually defined in general international law as 
the formal procedure for changing sovereignty over a certain 
territory. In other words, Hong Kong Island and Kowloon are 
territories obtained by Britain in a legal transfer of the 
entire rights in respect of those territories from China's 
sovereignty to Britain's sovereignty. The Treaty of Nanking of 
1842 stated:
"...His Majesty the Emperor of China cedes to Her Majesty 
the Queen of Great Britain, etc., the Island of Hong Kong, to 
be possessed in perpetuity by Her Britannic Majesty, Her heirs 
and successors, and to be governed by such laws and 
regulations as Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain, etc., 
shall see fit to direct."61
The Convention of Beijing of 1860 stated:
"With a view to the maintenance of law and order in and 
about the harbour of Hong Kong,, His Imperial Majesty the 
Emperor of China agrees to cede to Her Majesty the Queen of 
Great Britain and Ireland, and to Her heirs and successors, to 
have and to hold, as a dependency of Her Britannic Majesty's 
Colony Hong Kong, . . . 1,62
It seems that there is no doubt, so far as general 
international law is concerned, that the above articles 
allowed Britain to enjoy full sovereign rights over Hong Kong 
and Kowloon. However, the term "lease", as used in the 
Convention of Beijing of 1898, has a different legal meaning. 
Lease means "a contractual arrangement between states whereby 
a portion of one state's territory is provided to another 
state for the latter's use. . ..Leases usually have time limits
61See, The Maritime Customs, treaties, conventions, etc, 
between China and foreign states, Second edition, Shanghai, 
1917, vol.l, pp.351-356.
62Ibid. , p. 43 3.
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attached to them and do not imply transfer of sovereignty to 
the leasing state, only the temporary transfer of 
administrative control and use of the territory for a 
specified period."63
The British government, especially the Colonial Office, 
was determined to integrate the New Territories as far as 
possible with Hong Kong and therefore declared in London on 20 
October 1898 that the leased lands were ". ..part and parcel of 
Her Majesty's Colony of Hong Kong in like manner and for all 
intents and purposes as if they had originally formed part of 
the said Colony."64 Shortly after the declaration, all laws in 
force in Hong Kong were also enforced in the New Territories. 
The British government has since that time exercised sovereign 
rights not only in Hong Kong and Kowloon, but also in the New 
Territories. Nevertheless, Britain's title to exercise power 
of any kind in Hong Kong island and Kowloon will automatically 
be terminated on 30 June 1997, since it considers itself bound 
by the terms of the Convention of 1898.
In the Chinese government's statements referred to above, 
instead of using the terms "cede" and "lease", the terms 
"occupy" or "occupation" were used. Occupation is a formal 
legal term. It applies to the case of "acquisition by a state 
of title to territory belonging to no state, through its real, 
permanent and effective control upon a territory to which it 
lays claim, in order to make final the inchoate title which it
63Bledsoe & Boczek, ibid., p. 149.
^"The New Territories Order in Council", text in Laws of 
Hong Kong (1964 ed.), vol. 24, IV, pp.11-12.
acquired through discovery."65 This obviously does not to 
apply to the case of Hong Kong. What seems more applicable is 
the term "belligerent occupation". Under "belligerent 
occupation", a territory is temporarily administered by the 
occupant who may issue laws and regulations, but the 
legitimate government retains its sovereignty and its laws 
still apply when superseded by those imposed by the occupying 
power. However, belligerent occupation is a type of military 
occupation under a hostile army exercising military authority 
subject to rights and duties. Hong Kong has been governed by 
a civil colonial government and China and Britain have not 
been in hostile relations during most of the period. Thus, 
even though belligerent occupation provides that the occupant 
does not enjoy sovereignty and that a division of the 
territory or its conversion into an independent state are 
illegal, it does not entirely apply to the case of Hong Kong.
What is clear in these statements -- apart from the 
references that these treaties belong to the category of 
unequal treaties -- is China's intention of retaining Hong 
Kong's status quo. Decolonization became popular and many 
former colonial territories achieved their independence in the 
1960s and 1970s, but statements from China made it clear that 
the question of Hong Kong and Macao did not fall into the 
ordinary category of colonial territories. Any change of Hong 
Kong's status, such as its following the process of general 
decolonization and becoming an independent state, would not 
have been accepted by the Chinese government.
65Parry Clive, The Encyclopedic Dictionary of 
International Law, Oceana Publications Inc., New York, 1986, 
pp.272-273.
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Thus, although China has expressed its position that Hong 
Kong is part of China, the Chinese government and its agencies 
treat the Hong Kong government as the lawful government of the 
territory. In various ways the Chinese government appears to 
respect the regular exercise of extensive legislative, 
judicial and executive powers by Britain. The boundary between 
Hong Kong and the mainland is treated as an international 
frontier. China has never protested against the conclusion of 
bilateral and multilateral agreements reached by the United 
Kingdom on behalf of Hong Kong with third states. Many Chinese 
state-owned corporations have branches in Hong Kong which are 
registered in accordance with the Hong Kong Companies 
Ordinance. Even the New China News Agency, . the official 
representative organ of the Chinese government, has registered 
under the "Representations of Foreign Powers (Control)11. In 
order to justify its realistic .policy on Hong Kong, the 
People's Daily published an editorial on 8 March, 1963, in 
which it stated that on the question of unequal treaties, the 
Chinese government took different circumstances into con­
sideration and made distinctions in its policy in dealing with 
various imperialist countries. It also declared that there was 
no need for the Chinese people to prove their courage in 
combating imperialism by making a show of force on the ques­
tion of Hong Kong and Macao, since they had already 
demonstrated these qualities against US imperialism in the 
Korean War.66
However, the crucial question was always how the PRC would 
choose to handle Hong Kong. This puzzled many people right up
66People's Daily, 8 March, 1963.
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to 1984, when Beijing and London concluded the Joint Declara­
tion on Hong Kong's future.
The case of Goa and the case of the Falkland Islands may 
be taken as examples somewhat analogous to the Hong Kong 
situation. Goa was a former colony of Portugal. On 18 
December, 1961, India launched a military attack on the 
Portuguese enclave. India stressed that Goa was part of its 
territory and had been illegally occupied by the Portuguese 
for 450 years. Relations between China and India at the time 
were about to worsen because of differences over their own 
common boundary, but the Chinese government still openly 
supported the Indian position. Two days after Indian troops 
occupied Goa, the Chinese government stated:
"Goa is an inalienable part of Indian territory. To oppose 
colonialism and safeguard national independence and the unity 
of their country, the Indian people have for a long time been 
demanding the recovery of Goa and have waged an unremitting 
struggle for this purpose. The action of India in recovering 
Goa reflects the just demands of the Indian people. The 
Chinese government and people express their resolute support 
for it. 1,67
China did not only support India's sovereign rights over 
Goa, but also supported the means used by India to recover the 
territory, though such a use of armed force was an act clearly 
forbidden by the UN Charter.
China's response to the Falklands conflict was more 
complicated. On 1 April, 1982, the People's Daily reported: 
"The Falkland Islands, also called Malvinas Islands, have been 
Britain's dependent territory since they were occupied by the 
British in 1833. But Argentina considers that the islands are
67"Statement of the Government of the PRC", in Beiiing 
Review no.51, 2 December, 1961, pp.10-11.
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its territory."68
Two days later, the same newspaper reported the historical 
background to the dispute, using the name Malvinas Islands 
rather than Falkland Islands.
Over the following days, the People's Daily published 
several editorials, considering the Malvinas Islands as a 
leftover from colonial times, and stressing that any attempt 
which relied on "gun-boat" policy to force Third World 
countries to submit would not succeed. On 18 June, 1982, the 
People's Daily stated:
"The Chinese people have constantly opposed imperialism, 
colonialism and hegemonism and supported the just struggle of 
Third World countries and people to defend their sovereignty 
and territorial integrity. The resolutions of non-aligned 
countries and of the Organization of American States 
supporting the sovereign rights of Argentina should be 
respected and fulfilled."69
China's policy in the cases of Goa and the Falklands 
reflected its general stand of supporting Third World 
countries' demands for sovereign rights over certain 
territories governed by colonial rule. The difference between 
the two was that in the case of Goa, China was in favour of 
military action while in the case of the Falklands it was not. 
In the Anglo-Argentine dispute, China chose to back the 
Argentine position, but with a certain caution. It was not in 
favour of the military action taken by Argentina and also 
considered that Britain's action could only make thing worse. 
In Beijing's view, the dispute could be solved through 
peaceful negotiations. China was also careful in the tone and 
vocabulary it used to describe the situation, avoiding
68People's Daily, 1 April, 1982
69People's Daily. 18 June, 19 8 2
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provoking either side. Such an attitude on China's part was 
significant in relation to the question of Hong Kong, since 
the issue of 1997 was attracting great attention at that time.
Conclusion
China has adopted a selective policy towards international 
law, so far as state succession and the law of treaties are 
concerned. The PRC has regarded itself as the successor to 
past Chinese dynasties and even the Nationalist government on 
some questions, but not on others. In the handling of specific 
cases, the Chinese government has tended to maintain a 
flexibility of action, in order to achieve its foreign policy 
goals. It is its self-interest, its strategic considerations 
and its perception of the existing international situation 
that have determined whether to recognize or abrogate pre­
existing treaties.
The examples discussed in this chapter suggest that 
Beijing's practical approach towards so-called unequal 
treaties was prudent. Although the PRC always held that it was 
not bound by these treaties, it nonetheless never directly 
challenged their validity before negotiated settlements were 
reached. There were conscious attempts to maintain at least a 
semblance of consistency on these issues and to follow general 
international practice.
The Sino-Soviet boundary conflict suggested that although 
the government of the PRC openly stated that its policy 
towards socialist countries was fundamentally different from 
its policy towards imperialist countries, on the question of 
sovereignty and territorial integrity it was national interest 
that shaped China's attitude and policy. When there existed
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common interests in maintaining communist unity, the PRC chose 
to adopt a low-key attitude towards its differences with the 
Soviet Union. However, territorial issues could always be 
important seeds for confrontation.
The Sino-Burmese and Sino-Indian examples indicate that 
where there were good and friendly bilateral relations, China 
was willing to negotiate boundaries even on the basis of old 
treaties which it regarded as unequal. Under such conditions, 
concessions were possible, as the Sino-Burmese agreement 
showed, but in other cases a hard line might be adopted, as in 
the Sino-Indian dispute. Yet, there were also other important 
reasons for concessions -- such as the need to raise China's 
international prestige, in the case of Burma, or the need to 
strengthen its bargaining position.
In general, when China felt a stable agreement was impos­
sible to achieve, it preferred to maintain the status quo 
rather than make quick and possibly irrational decisions, such 
as in the case of Hong Kong. When Beijing found it necessary, 
it chose to settle matters through negotiations. The PRC had 
settled boundary questions by means of negotiations with 
Burma, Pakistan, Nepal and Afghanistan and tried to achieve a 
similar solution with India. Presumably, a similar approach 
would have been applicable in the case of Hong Kong.
The difference, however, was that Britain was still oc­
casionally regarded by the Chinese as an imperialist country, 
which ought to bear responsibility for humiliating China with 
its unequal treaties in the 19th century. According to 
Communist principles, the PRC ought not to have tolerated the 
continued British presence in Hong Kong. There was indeed 
tension between Beijing and London, but it was never as
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serious as in the Sino-American or Sino-Soviet conflicts. 
First the United States and then the Soviet Union were 
regarded by the PRC as the principal enemy —  against which 
China felt it had to use almost every means available. 
Britain, by contrast, never become a serious enemy of Beijing. 
According to a Chinese saying, "work should be done in order 
of importance and urgency". Not until the 1980s did Beijing 
consider the time ripe to solve the question of Hong Kong. 
China had previously been preoccupied by other more important 
and more urgent problems.
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Chapter Three
The Formation of the PRC’s Hong Kong Policy
This chapter examines the factors contributing to the new 
government's tolerance of the existence on its doorway of a 
British colony, and the establishment of its Hong Kong policy. 
Considerable attention is paid to the emergence of the 
Nationalists and the Communists and their attitudes towards 
foreign powers, and to the issue of unequal treaties. The 
efforts made by the Kuomintang government to regain sovereign 
rights are examined, providing an alternative background to 
the Communist government's policy on the same issue.
3-1 The status of Hong Kong before 1949
Britain acquired Hong Kong from China in three stages. 
Victoria island was ceded by the 1842 Treaty of Nanking —  as 
a result of the First Opium War of 1840-1842. Kowloon and 
Stonecutter Island were ceded in the aftermath of the Second 
Opium War of 1854-60. Following the scramble for concessions, 
precipitated by Japan's victory over China in the war of 1894- 
95, northern Kowloon and a large area of the mainland —  
together with 235 small islands and a large body of sea around 
Hong Kong, known collectively as the New Territories -- were 
leased to the British Crown for 99 years under the Beijing 
convention of 1898. The extension of the territory was stated 
to be "for all proper defence and protection of the colony".
Ever since its initial establishment as a British colony 
in 1842, Hong Kong has survived successive changes of regime 
on the mainland. However, its existence has always been a 
great national humiliation for the Chinese. Indeed, foreign
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imperialist expansion in China, rivalry among the foreign 
powers at China's expense and the corruption and incompetence 
of the Qing Dynasty, all promoted a sense of shock and extreme 
crisis in the Chinese people. Consequently, a rapid 
development of nationalist feeling emerged among those Chinese 
who feared a loss of national identity. Demands for the 
abrogation of unfavourable treaties signed by the Qing Dynasty 
and foreign countries arose before and particularly after the 
1911 Revolution which led to the establishment of the 
Republic.
At the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, Chinese 
representatives appealed for the first time to the 
international community for specific agreements which would 
lead towards full Chinese sovereignty. These included the 
return of the New Territories. At the time of the Washington 
Conference in 1922, the Chinese again appealed for the return 
of the foreign acquisitions. However, these efforts achieved 
nothing, merely demonstrating China's political impotence. 
Nevertheless, the diplomatic failure further stimulated the 
Chinese people's anti- imperialist mood and a powerful 
movement emerged rapidly in China.
At that time, the Chinese government was under the control 
of the northern warlords. The most influential nationalist 
figure, Dr Sun Yat-sen, had no power over the government. Sun 
devoted his life to the cause of national revolution in order 
that China might abrogate all unequal treaties and enjoy 
equality with other nations. Before 1911, all his efforts were 
directed against the Manchu regime, which he condemned for 
sacrificing national interests to foreigners and signing 
various unequal treaties. The 1911 Revolution overthrew the
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Manchu regime and produced a republican form of government, 
but it failed to bring about a. strong and united China. 
Warlords, backed by foreign powers, ruled the northern part of 
the country. Naturally, they had no interest in seeking to 
revoke the unfavourable treaties. Sun Yat-sen tried several 
times to organize military expeditions to unify the whole of 
China, seeking the support of Western powers, but he failed.
At this time, the Chinese Communist Party was also 
fighting the warlords by means of demonstrations and strikes. 
These efforts culminated in a general strike by the railway 
trade unions in 1923. Suppressed by the northern warlords with 
a massacre in which 44 trade unionists died, the Communists 
learned that, without a large and well-organized national 
movement, it would be impossible to overthrow the warlords. 
Such a movement would need to encompass various classes, 
parties and political organizations with a common interest.
Both the Communists and Nationalists acknowledged their 
need to act together and so began their first collaboration 
under an anti-imperialist and anti-warlord banner. The 
Nationalist Party —  the Kuomintang —  was transformed into a 
highly efficient organization which was joined by a number of 
Communist Party members. A modern army, trained by Soviet 
instructors, was also established. In the manifesto of its 
First Congress, the Kuomintang declared that the abrogation of 
all unequal treaties was the first priority of its foreign 
policy. It stated that "all unequal treaties, such as foreign- 
leased territories, foreign consular jurisdiction, foreign 
control of customs duty and other special foreign rights, 
encroach on China's sovereignty and therefore must be 
abrogated. New treaties based on mutual respect for
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sovereignty should be concluded. 1,1
The immediate impact of Nationalist-Communist cooperation 
was the country-wide spread of anti-imperialist feeling led by 
demands for the abolition of all unequal treaties. There was 
no doubt that all Chinese were agreed on the desirability of 
the nation's re-establishing itself as a strong power in Asia. 
This feeling was not simply nurtured in Communist or left-wing 
circles. The entire Chinese nation felt aggrieved by the 
unequal treaties.
After the October Revolution, Soviet Russia showed a 
willingness to give up special rights and privileges in China 
—  the first foreign power to do so. In May 1924, the Soviet 
Union and China concluded new treaties in which the Soviet 
government stipulated the abolition of unfavourable treaties 
signed by the Tsarist regime and the Qing Dynasty. This was 
the first time since the Opium War-that China had been able to 
conclude an equal treaty with a foreign power, although the 
Soviet Union did not fulfil its promises.
All other treaty powers, including Britain, were reluctant 
to give up their acquisitions in the way the Soviet Union had 
done. They continued to be associated closely with the 
northern warlords' government and despised the existence of 
the southern nationalist regime.
In July 1926, the National Revolutionary Army —  the joint 
Nationalist-Communist army —  launched the "Northern 
Expedition" aimed at overthrowing the warlords. With the 
advance of the Revolutionary Army, a radical anti-imperialist
lThe Collected Documents of the Modern History of China 
(Zhongguo Xiandaishi Ziliaoji), People's Press, Beijing, 1982, 
vol.II, no.I, p.45.
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movement developed in Hunan, Hubei and Jiangxi provinces. The 
masses took action with support of the army, directly 
challenging foreign presences in these areas. The most 
significant event was the regaining of the British concessions 
at Hankou and Jiujiang. The British were forced to accept the 
Revolutionary regime's demands and they relinquished their 
concessions.
The Nationalists' efforts achieved a measure of success in 
their frontal attacks on warlords and foreign imperialism so 
long as the Nationalist-Communist coalition held together. 
However, the initial cooperation between the two parties did 
not last long. It ended after Chiang Kai-shek's merciless 
repression of the workers' movement in Shanghai an April 1927. 
A new, "united" Nationalist government was set up in Nanking 
that September, tightly controlled by the Kuomintang. The 
Communist Party was declared iLlegal and Communists went 
underground or out to remote mountainous districts.
Immediately after the establishment of the government, the 
Kuomintang changed its strategy in dealing with foreign 
powers. Chiang secretly ordered the abolition of anti­
imperialist slogans and promised Westerners that his 
government would never use force to change the status quo.2 
The re-establishment of full national sovereignty remained an 
objective for the Kuomintang government, however. This 
included the recovery of tariff autonomy, the termination of 
extra-territoriality, the restoration of sovereign control 
over foreign concessions in the treaty ports, and the 
acquisition of the Manchurian railways.
2The Collected Documents of the Modern History of China/ 
vol.II, no.I, pp.147-149.
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Some gains were made by the Nationalist government through 
negotiations. In 1929, the British gave up their concessions 
at Chongqing, Amoy and Weihaiwei, and the Belgians turned over 
their concessions at Tianjin. In the same year, China 
successfully abrogated existing treaties with Belgium and 
Denmark by unilateral action and thus terminated extra­
territoriality for the nationals of those countries. In a 
series of treaties signed between 1928 and 1930, the 
government won the agreement of the foreign powers on Chinese 
tariff autonomy, and sovereign control in this area was re­
established in 1930.
However, as far as the spheres of influence and extra­
territoriality generally were concerned, the Kuomintang 
government was less successful. The rights still enjoyed by 
the treaty powers were extensive. The nationals and companies 
of these powers were exempt from the jurisdiction of Chinese 
criminal courts, being subject instead to consular courts 
which also heard some civil cases. Their houses, ships and 
other property could not be entered or searched by the Chinese 
police or other authorities. Some of the treaty powers had the 
right to station substantial military guards at their 
legations in Peking, or to send warships along the Chinese 
coast and up the Yangtze River. In some cities, foreigners 
enjoyed concessions, and there were other areas where 
foreigners could lease and acquire land ruled by a foreign- 
controlled municipal council.
The Second World War provided China with a favourable 
chance of improving its international status. In December 
1941, when Japan went to war with Britain and the United 
States, China found itself part of an alliance which offered
101
the possibility of recovering full sovereignty. On 10 October, 
1942, the British and American governments announced, in 
recognition of their friendship and solidarity with China, 
that they would take part in negotiations for the abolition of 
extra-territorial rights and privileges. The following year, 
China signed new treaties with the United States and Great 
Britain. Both countries promised to give up their extra­
territorial rights and other privileges. Britain also 
surrendered its concessions in Tianjin and Canton, and gave up 
its rights in the Shanghai and Amoy international settlements. 
Nearly all the other Western powers soon entered into similar 
agreements, abandoning the special rights they had acquired 
under earlier treaties.
It would appear that, as long as the Chinese government 
had remained powerless to enforce its will, nothing had been 
achieved. The war had demonstrated Chinese determination to 
resist the Japanese invasion. This improved China's 
international prestige and bought an upsurge of sympathy from 
the West. The era of unequal treaties thus came to an end. The 
treaty powers, however, Britain in particular, had not 
completed the process. There was no solution in sight on the 
issue of Hong Kong.
Several times, the Kuomintang had raised the subject. Its 
first national convention in 1924 urged the cancellation of 
all unequal treaties, including the 1898 leasehold agreements. 
During the 1920s, the colony was subjected to strikes and 
boycotts. Chiang Kai-shek stated in his book, China's Destiny, 
that the New Territories and Hong Kong island were 
geographically interdependent and that their status must be
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settled simultaneously.3
During the negotiations to end extra-territoriality, the 
Chinese government's reply to the first British draft proposal 
insisted upon the return of the New Territories. Sir Anthony 
Eden declared the matter outside the scope of the treaty, but 
said he was willing to discuss it after the war. After the 
treaty had been signed, the Chinese Minister for Foreign 
Affairs wrote to the British Minister in Chungking: "The early 
termination of the treaty of June 9, 1898, by which the said 
lease was granted, is one of the long-cherished desires of the 
Chinese people. If effected on the present occasion, it would 
go far, in the opinion of the Chinese government, to emphasize 
the new era which the Treaty concluded today is intended to 
inaugurate in the relations of our two countries."4
But the British had no intention of allowing a hand-over. 
During the Cairo Conference of 1943, Chiang agreed that the 
post-war Hong Kong should become an international free port, 
but under Chinese sovereignty. Chiang's idea was supported by 
President Roosevelt. However, the British government stated 
that it did not contemplate any modification in the 
sovereignty of British territories in the Far East. Churchill 
was adamant in his refusal to consider the surrender of the 
territory: "Hands off the British Empire is our maxim and it 
must not be weakened or smirched to please sob-stuff merchants 
at home or foreigners of any hue."5
3Chiang Kai-shek, China's Destiny, Roy Publishers, New 
York; 1947, p.154.
4 Documents o f  th e  Modern H is to ry  o f  China, P e o p le ’ s Press, 1984, p . 56 .
5"Summary of Assurances Given by HMG since 1942 about the 
Future of Hong Kong", F0371 75839/1061/10, British Public
Record Office, Foreign Office Files.
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There was nearly a direct confrontation between the two 
countries in 1945. On 16 August, 1945, immediately after the 
Japanese capitulation, a spokesman at Chungking announced that 
the Chinese government would accept the surrender of Hong 
Kong. It was reported that British and Chinese forces were 
racing against each other to take over from the Japanese. On 
22 August, the United States Secretary of State, Mr Byrnes, 
stated that the question of Hong Kong would be discussed at 
the forth coming London conference of foreign ministers of the 
Alliance. On the same day, the Japanese terms of surrender to 
the Chinese provided for Hong Kong as one of the areas to be 
reoccupied by Chinese troops.
At the same time, the British government -made it clear 
that arrangements were being made for the Japanese surrender 
in Hong Kong to be accepted by a British commander. On 24 
August 1945, however, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek announced 
that China would not send troops to accept the surrender of 
Hong Kong lest this should arouse allied misunderstanding. 
Thus, the British returned to Hong Kong with no further 
Chinese challenge. But Chiang declared that, now other leased 
territories had been returned to China, the New Territories 
should not remain an exception.6
No solution was reached. Hong Kong and the New Territories 
did remain an exception. The Nationalist government did not 
make further demands and there were just two or three 
unofficial demonstrations against British occupation of the
6See, Evan Luard, Britain and China, Chatto & Windus, 
London, 1962, pp.181-182.
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territories. The Kuomintang was not strong or determined 
enough to press its claims and was also too preoccupied by the 
civil war against the Communists. When a new and more powerful 
government emerged in 1949, the issue of Hong Kong became more 
pressing.
3-2 The Communist victory and the position of Hong Kong
In 1948, after three determined victories over the 
Nationalists, Communist forces were about to win the control 
of the mainland. The people of Hong Kong had watched the 
Communist advance with great caution. A Communist victory 
could end the civil war and a Communist government might bring 
China political stability and economic recovery'. However, the 
possibility of a Communist victory also created great 
uncertainty over Hong Kong's own position. Thousands of people 
flooded into Hong Kong from Shanghai, Tianjin and Guangdong, 
many of them regarding the British colony as a temporary 
refuge on their way to the United States, Western Europe or 
even Taiwan. The most important daily topic was whether the 
Communists would cross the border. In order to assure Hong 
Kong, the British government reinforced the garrison there 
making it clear that Britain was determined to carry out its 
responsibility. Yet many people knew that the colony was 
facing a much more powerful regime. When the People's 
Liberation Army (PLA) was approaching the southern part of 
China, the total strength of forces available to the British 
to defend Hong Kong was at most 25,000.7
7,,Approach to Our Commonwealth Government Asking Support 
of Hong Kong Policy" by Commonwealth Relations Office, 27 May, 
1949, in F0311 75873 F7961/B/G.
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It was most unlikely that the island could have been 
defended for more than a few days against an attack from the 
Communist forces. The Communists could also have used their 
supporters in Hong Kong in a guerrilla war or, alternatively, 
have simply blockaded the colony as was done in 1923 in an 
anti-imperialist demonstration, since the island was dependent 
on the mainland for food and raw materials. It would have been 
possible, of course, for the British to obtain supplies 
elsewhere, but a blockade would largely have limited the 
colony's economic development and hindered further investment. 
The price of maintaining the status quo would have been too 
high. Under direct pressure from the Communists, the British 
government would have little alternative but ' to accede to 
their demands.
Obviously, the Communist attitude towards the existence of 
Hong Kong as a British colony became significant for the 
island's survival. In November 1948, Qiao Mu, the Chinese 
Communist spokesman in Hong Kong and the head of the New China 
News Agency, in an interview with the Reuters correspondent in 
Hong Kong, H.C. Bough, assured the British government that a 
future Communist government in China would not cause any 
trouble in Hong Kong. He indicated that the Chinese Communists 
could have perfectly normal relations with the United Kingdom 
and suggested that the status of Hong Kong was only a minor 
diplomatic issue. Qiao also suggested that the Hong Kong 
question should be settled only at the highest level and that 
it would be considered by the Communists as an integral factor
106
in Communist-British relations.8
Another source proved Qiao's statement. The Consul-General 
at Beijing was informed on 24 September by L.K. Tao (known to 
Ambassador Stuart), that he had recently met with Lo Lung-chi 
who had a conversation on 2 0 September with Mao Zedong. Mao 
had told Lo that the position of Hong Kong could presently be 
considered safe, since it had been decided by the CPC that all 
treaties signed before the Nationalists came to power would be 
accepted, while those signed after that period would be made 
the subject of study.9
In September 1949, the Communist newspaper Guangming Ribao 
published an article on Hong Kong. The article saw Hong Kong 
as a colony of British imperialism in its economic, military 
and political aggression against China. However, there was no 
indication that the Communists would destroy the base. 
Instead, the article reminded the colonial authorities of Hong 
Kong that a new China was appearing and that Chinese people 
abroad were no longer to be ignored. It warned the British 
that the colonial form of treatment of the Hong Kong Chinese 
and their detested exploitation should come an the end.10
According to British intelligence sources, the documents 
captured in Hong Kong yielded much secret evidence of
8|lThe Consul General of Shanghai (Cabot) to the Secretary 
of State", 17 December, 1948; in Foreign Relations of the 
United States (FRUS) , vol. VII (1948); the United States
Government Printing Office, Washington, 1973, p.66. Also see, 
F0371 75779/f124.
9"The Consul General at Peiping (Clubb) to the Secretary 
of State", 27 September, 1949, FRUS, vol.VIII, 1978, p.539.
10Yong Pei-hsin: "Hong Kong As British Economic Aggressive 
Base", in Economic Weekly Supplement of Kwang Ming Jih Pao. 
Peiping, 2 September, 1949, English Text in F0371 75839
F14913.
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Communist plans for the organization of Communist activities 
in South East Asia, but no evidence of any kind was discovered 
that even hinted at a decision to attack Hong Kong. The 
Communists were well organized for many kinds of activities, 
but not for taking over Hong Kong.11
It was the Fourth Army that conducted the battle of 
Guangdong. When its regular force arrived at Shenzhen on the 
Chinese side of the frontier on 17th October, to many people's 
surprise, it stopped. The frontier was quiet and no incidents 
were reported. It was obvious that the troops were well 
disciplined and also clearly ordered not to make trouble.12 
General Cao Ying, a commander at the time in the Fourth Army, 
later recalled that on the way into Guangdong the troops were 
ordered to stop at the frontier and were not allowed to enter 
Hong Kong territory, even for purely military actions to fight 
the retreating Nationalist troops’.13
It was believed initially that the People's Republic of 
China was determined to take radical, and even military, steps 
to take over Hong Kong. In the wake of their own liberation, 
the Chinese harboured strong anti-imperialist and anti­
colonialist sentiments. Regarding itself as the genuine 
leading power in the Chinese anti-imperialist and anti­
colonialist movement, the Communist Party had no conflict of 
principles towards a takeover of the British colony, which
n,,Draft Paper for Joint Intelligence Committee on 
Communist Intentions towards Hong Kong by Foreign Office”, 18 
July, 1949, in F0371 75877 F10527/g.
12"Extract from the House of Commons", 19 October, 1949, 
in F0371 75837 F15827.
13Interview with Cao Zhemin, son of general Cao Ying in 
May in Beijing. Cao Zhemin is a senior official of the NCNA.
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would have wiped out the humiliation that the nineteenth- 
century treaties represented. The CPC did not recognize the 
treaties bearing on Hong Kong and, therefore, it did not 
consider itself bound by them. Thus, from a legal point of 
view, it could justify its actions. Given that there was no 
universally-accepted interpretation of international law and 
no sufficiently authoritative international body, China's 
position was consistent and would at least win support from 
the Communist bloc. Moreover, a takeover could increase the 
new China's prestige among Third World countries. In this 
context, a People's China editorial stated in 1950 that "the 
Chinese people's victory not only provides indirect assistance 
to all colonially-exploited peoples by laying down a proven 
pattern for successful struggle; it also provides direct and 
concrete assistance to them, for it has shaken the whole 
colonial system to its foundations."14
Yet, there were several reasons to explain the new China's 
tolerance of the existence of Hong Kong as a British colony in 
the early stages. Firstly, the CPC was aware of the importance 
of Hong Kong as a unique place to communicate with overseas 
Chinese people and the outside world as a whole. Hong Kong had 
been used by the Communists before it seized national power as 
an important place to conduct its propaganda and make contact 
with overseas Chinese people. Many Communists and Communist 
sympathizers, including Zhou Enlai, had taken refuge in Hong 
Kong and had been treated correctly by the Hong Kong 
authorities. At this point, Qiao Mu was satisfied with the 
Hong Kong government's policy of "neutrality in China's civil
l4People's China, vol. 1, no.4, Feb. 16, 1950, p.3.
war and the hospitality extended to the Communists in Hong 
Kong. 1,15
Secondly, in the early years of the People's Republic, 
Beijing might have considered the capture of Hong Kong by 
force. Hong Kong, however, was a very vulnerable island, and 
could easily have been taken a few years later, once China's 
situation had stabilized. The Communist leaders acknowledged, 
however, that the new government would face great difficulties 
in rebuilding the country's crumbling economy and in 
stabilizing Communist control. In addition, while the new 
regime was determined to unify the whole China, it was 
preoccupied with the Kuomintang's occupation of Taiwan and the 
offshore islands. Thus, when Beijing entered into negotiations 
with Britain over the establishment of diplomatic relations in 
the spring of 1950, China simply reminded the British that 
they should remember that Hong Kong had been ceded as a result 
of an unjust war. China, though, did not claim the return of 
the colony. In contrast, it was said in public speeches that 
the People's Liberation Army had liberated the entire area of 
China except Tibet and Taiwan, so apparently excluding Hong 
Kong as well as Macao.16
Thirdly, although the CPC leaders decided to lean to the 
Soviet side and regarded Sino-Soviet relations as the 
cornerstone of the new government's external policy, they did 
not intend to become a Russian satellite or shut the door to 
Western countries, not even the United States. Zhou Enlai once
15”The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of 
State”, 27 December, 1948. FRUS, vol.VII, 1948, 1973 p.660.
i6See, "Colonial Office Report on Communist Situation in 
Hong Kong”, 15 March, 1950; in F0371 83260 FC10112/25.
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hinted to the United States: "We are going to lean to one
side, but how far depends on you." It was believed that 
Beijing had decided deliberately to avoid external conflicts 
as it desired to present a good front to the world generally, 
and it was therefore important not to challenge openly the 
British role in Hong Kong.
Fourth, the new government well acknowledged the British 
determination to defend Hong Kong, which was possibly backed 
by a joint American-British defence plan. The Chinese leaders 
certainly believed in the existence of such an agreement. Zhou 
Enlai asked the Communist agencies to discover the detailed 
arrangements of how it worked. Indeed, from time to time, the 
British government kept informing Washington of its Far East 
policy and its intention to defend Hong Kong. In September 
1949, for instance, in a discussion with officials dealing 
with Asian affairs in the US State Department, the British 
Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, said that Britain considered 
that the necessary conditions for a discussion on the future 
of Hong Kong did not exist at that time, and therefore, until 
conditions changed, it intended to remain in Hong Kong, and 
would so inform the United States.17 However, when the 
Americans were asked whether they were going to fight with the 
British in Hong Kong, they replied vaguely, saying that the 
United States would do what it was obliged to under the United 
Nations Charter.18 The joint chiefs of staff even recommended
17"Memorandum of Conservation, by the Secretary of State 
with Mr Bevin on the Far Eats", 15 September, 1949, FRUS, 
vol.IX p .83.
18"Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State 
with Mr Bevin on Far East", 17 September 1949, FRUS, vol. IX, 
p. 91.
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to the President that "the United States will not provide 
military support to the British for the defence- of Hong Kong 
in the event of a Communist military attack."19
It is clear now that the United states was reluctant to 
commit itself to the defence of Hong Kong and that there 
existed no joint plan to do so. Nevertheless, for the Chinese, 
it is significant that they believed in the existence of such 
a plan. It meant that had they resorted to force to recover 
Hong Kong, they would have confronted two big Western powers. 
China obviously did not want take such a risk and give the 
Western powers an excuse to intervene in China's internal 
affairs, and in particular, help the Kuomintang back to the 
mainland.
Thus in the initial stage, the Chinese leaders decided not 
to touch the issue of Hong Kong, considering that such an 
action would create great difficulties for them in handling 
more urgent problems at home, and would add uncertainty to 
China's international position.20
3-3 The impact of the Korean War
The People's Republic was anxious to avoid external 
conflicts, but less than one year after the Communist 
takeover, it became involved in an all-out confrontation with 
the United States when the Korean War broke out. The Korean 
War largely shaped China's international position, and from 
then on the Chinese leaders were very much preoccupied by an
19"Memorandum by Mr Troy L. Perkins, of the Office of 
Chinese Affairs, Washington", 5 November, 1949; FRUS, vol.IX; 
p.170.
20Interview with Cao Zheming.
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American military threat.
The Chinese Communists' image of a hostile, menacing 
America can be traced back to the civil war between the 
Communists and the Nationalists. When the Communists tried to 
win the United States over their side Washington chose to 
remain allied to the Nationalists, and provided them with 
substantial material and training assistance. In order to gain 
security for its new state, Beijing moved closer to its 
ideological allies in Moscow. But at the same time it was 
unsure of American intentions and therefore did not shut the 
door firmly on the United States, although it continued to 
condemn US support for the Nationalists.
Washington initially hoped that there would be ample 
ground for a sharp Sino-Soviet disagreement to emerge in East 
Asia in the not-too-distant future. It also hoped to exploit 
such a conflict in such a way as to establish an Asian power 
balance favourable to American interests. Nevertheless, the 
outbreak of the Korean War, and China's entry into the war in 
1950, radically changed American strategy towards China. As 
a result, the United States decided that it had no choice but 
to contain China, and any kind of improvement in Sino-American 
relations became impossible.
Shortly after the outbreak of the war, President Truman 
ordered the US Seventh Fleet to protect Taiwan against 
possible attack by Communist forces, on the grounds that a 
Communist occupation of the island would threaten US forces in 
the Pacific area. Three months after China's entry into the 
war, Washington signed the Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement 
with the Nationalist government in Taiwan. During the war, the 
United States launched a campaign aimed at isolating China.
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Starting in December 1950, it issued, first, controls, then a 
blockade on exports of strategic commodities to China. In May 
1951, largely through the efforts of the United States, the 
United Nations passed an American proposal for a complete 
trade embargo with China.
China understandably, saw the United States as the most 
aggressive imperialist country and thought that it was ready 
to launch a direct attack on China. Beijing stated:
"The United States was to make use of Taiwan as a spring­
board for the invasion of the Chinese mainland... Her plan is 
to invade China after her complete occupation of Korea. The 
United States is now arduously rebuilding and rearming 
Japan....The aim of. the United States is to utilize Japanese 
military forces as the United States' advance guard in the 
American invasion of the Far East."21
It was crucial for the Chinese to focus on how to deal 
with the American threat. In order to counter such a perceived 
American threat, it was thought sensible and wise not to open 
another battlefront via-a-vis Hong Kong, both for military 
and diplomatic reasons. Peng Zhen, a member of the Politburo 
of the CPC, stressed in 1951:
"To take Hong Kong now would not only bring unnecessary 
technical difficulties in the enforcement of our international 
policy, but also increase our burden....it is unwise for us to 
deal with the problem of Hong Kong rashly and without 
preparation. 1,22
The war indeed imposed a serious drain upon the Chinese 
economy and diverted scarce industrial and transport 
resources from its economic construction. The complete trade
21See, Zhou Enlai, "Supporting Korea to Resist American
and Defending Peace" (Kangmei Yanchao, Baowei Heping) - Report
to the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference on
24 October, 1950; in Selected Works of Zhou Enlai, People's 
Press, Beijing, 1984; pp.50-52.
""Colonial Political Intelligence Service", C0371 4789 
March 1951, British Public Record Office, Colonial Office 
Files.
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embargo further added to the young state's difficulties. As a 
result, during the war, China had to direct its trade sharply 
away from the non-Communist world and towards the Communist 
countries. It was against this background that Hong Kong 
became the most important single market for China's exports 
outside the Communist bloc, and the principal source of its 
foreign exchange. In particularly, largely due to the efforts 
of pro-Beijing business people, it became one of China's most 
important sources of supply for products such as medicine and 
medical equipment which were needed desperately for the 
battlefield in Korea.
In addition, up to early 1953, Beijing could not get 
direct shipments from Europe to China because of the blockade 
imposed by the Nationalist navy and the American efforts. All 
cargo had to be shipped to Hong Kong and then forwarded to 
China under a separate bill of lading.
Hong Kong's role in China's commercial relations with the 
non-Communist world became magnified. In 1950, more than one 
half, and in 1951 more than two-thirds of China's imports from 
non-Communist countries were obtained through Hong Kong —  a 
sum of $255.7 million in 1950, and $305 million in 1951. These 
imports declined to $91 million in 1952 and $94.6 million in 
1953 , but they still represented large amounts.23
It should be noted that the above figures did not include 
smuggled goods. The British authorities "openly and frankly" 
admitted that there were no water-tight controls which could 
prevent completely United States exports into Hong Kong from
23Hong Kong Department of Commerce and Industry, Hong Kong 
Trade Bulletin, 1954.
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reaching China in one form or another.24 The smuggled goods 
included steel, petroleum and cotton. The Americans were 
critical of the fact that what they considered to be vital 
commodities to the Communists were reaching China when Chinese 
forces were fighting American troops in Korea. The United 
States government was thus forced to suspend export licences 
for all strategic materials to Hong Kong and Macao.
Britain followed the American policy of an embargo on 
trade with China, but was reluctant to restrict its trade with 
China Hi* severely as the Americans would wish, and continued 
to maintain trade with China in non-strategic goods. Britain 
also placed a great deal of importance on Hong Kong's 
position, considering that any drastic or sudden reduction or 
redirection of Hong Kong's commercial activities would cause 
considerable unemployment, economic distress and hardship. 
That, in turn, would have rendered the island more vulnerable 
then ever to infiltration by the Chinese Communists, and would 
have enabled them to attain their objectives more easily.
Beijing, in any case, seemed to understand the British 
position, and during the period it did not cut off its exports 
to Hong Kong as a reaction to the embargo on China. China's 
exports to Hong Kong at that period accounted for 21% of the 
island's total imports -- including food, raw materials and 
goods for Hong Kong's entrepot trade. This in turn, of course, 
helped China to earn a considerable amount of foreign currency 
which was important for supporting the war in Korea.
24"Foreign Office Minutes 24", 15 January, 1951; "Trade
with China through Hong Kong, Colonial Office Minutes", 30 
April, 1951; F0371 FLC1121/105; "Sanction against China: note 
by the Colonial Office", F0371 92276 FC1121/113.
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3-4 The impact of Britain's China policy
Britain's China policy after the Second World War differed 
from that of the United States. As a result of the war, 
Britain's international position was weakened and it was 
preoccupied by interests elsewhere. Britain had been seen by 
the Chinese as the main Western imperialist power exploiting 
their country, but this picture was replaced by the growing 
status of the United States since it had entered the Pacific 
War. During China's civil war between the Communists and the 
Nationalists, London supported American efforts at mediation 
between the two sides in order to prevent the war and promote 
a possible coalition government, but it did not take a 
positive role. While the United States bound -itself to the 
fate of the Nationalist government, Britain adopted a flexible 
approach towards the Communist advance. When the Communist 
victory was inevitable, the British government decided on a "a 
foot in the door" policy.
London's considerations reflected its commercial interests 
in and trade with China, as well as the question of Hong 
Kong's status. The British did not expect that the Communist 
regime would build up friendly relations with the West, but it 
was afraid that by being too obdurate the West would drive the 
Chinese Communists into Russian hands.25
Britain's concern over Hong Kong was crucial in its policy 
towards the People's Republic. Hong Kong, in London's view, 
was the inevitable nerve centre of the Far East which was not 
only natural port for the entire South China region, but also 
within easy reach of Japan, Korea, the Philippines, Indochina,
25"The Consul General at Peiping (Clubb) to the Secretary 
of State", 25 January, 1949, FRUS, vol.VIII, p.83.
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Borneo and Singapore. At that time, 15% of the total imports 
into Hong Kong came from the United Kingdom, which was second 
only to the United States. Hong Kong was a supreme oriental 
shop window and the principal doorway for British goods to 
reach the vast potential market of China and the Far East. In 
a message to the British troop reinforcements to Hong Kong in 
July 1949, the Hong Kong government stated:
"Two things are certain. The first is that without this 
vital Asiatic market the extent to which Britain could export 
her goods in the Far East would be greatly diminished, and 
this in its turn would inevitably mean to England the lowering 
of output and, worse still, the dismissal of those markets 
whose employment indirectly depends upon our Far East 
markets.... The second point is that it is the presence of a 
British government and of British troops in Hong Kong which 
are alone responsible for the city's present flourishing 
condition and its maintenance as a free port which, in fact, 
constitutes its value as a commercial centre."2-
Britain at the same time had to pay great attention to its 
position in Singapore and Malaya in which the nationalists had 
started to emerge as a powerful challenge to the British role 
and the Communists, much stimulated by the Communist victory 
in China, were resorting to force to seize power. Hong Kong 
was thus a crucial point in the Far East. If things had gone 
wrong, Britain's determination to resist Communist aggression 
would have been seriously shaken. The Colonial Office pointed 
out:
"If we are to be forced out, the effects would be 
incalculable and unless the peoples of South East Asia and the 
Far East are convinced of our determination and ability to 
defend Hong Kong, we cannot hope eventually to align them in 
a common front to resist communist expansion."27
The British government perceived that the Communist
26"Why Hong Kong? A Message form Hong Kong Government to 
the British Reinforcements", 25 July, 1949; F0371 75877
F11171.
27"Outward Telegram from Commonwealth Relations Office", 
27 May, 1949, F0371 75873 F7961/C.
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government might attempt to discuss the future of Hong Kong, 
and decided that it would not be prepared to discuss the 
matter unless the new government were friendly, stable, and in 
control of a united China. "We would not agree to negotiate 
with an unfriendly government," the Cabinet decision stated, 
"since we should not be negotiating under duress. Unless there 
were a stable government we could not rely on it to preserve 
Hong Kong as secure free port and place of exchange between 
China and the rest of the world. We should not be willing to 
discuss Hong Kong with a China which is not united because its 
future would be likely to become a pawn in the contest between 
conflicting factions."28
London realized how important it was - to maintain 
reasonably good relations with the new Communist government. 
It carefully managed to avoid outright hostilities towards the 
new regime. The Cabinet made the decision to send 
reinforcements to Hong Kong, as proposed by the Ministry of 
Defence, but without a public announcement, so as not to give 
the impression that Britain "is spoiling for a fight."29
For the British, the problem was to strike a balance 
between military necessity and the need to keep Hong Kong as 
a trading centre. They worried that if Hong Kong remained 
safe, but with trade no longer be conducted profitably from 
there because of military security measures, then the Chinese 
interest in the preservation of Hong Kong would diminish and
28"Summary of assurances Given by HMG since 1942 about the 
Future of Hong Kong", F0371 75839 F13676/1061/10.
29"From Shanghai (HM's Consul) to Foreign Office", 7 June, 
1949, F0371 75874 F8312/g.
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possibly even disappear.30
The British government carefully weighed the advantages 
and disadvantages of a recognition of the Communist regime. 
London clearly acknowledged that Britain had considerable 
commercial interests in and trade with China and it had to 
consider the position of Hong Kong. After several months of 
diplomatic exchanges with Commonwealth and Western European 
countries, and particularly with the United States, the 
British government extended de jure diplomatic recognition to 
the Central People's Government of the PRC in January 1950, in 
spite of strong pressure from the United States. Britain's 
decision reflected its interpretation of obligations of 
international law and the nature of diplomacy. It stated that 
its action was "an acknowledgement of fact and not a mask of 
approbation". However, London also officially notified Beijing 
that it had severed relations with the Nationalist government 
in Taiwan and agreed that diplomatic relations between the two 
countries should be established on the basis of equality, 
mutual benefit and mutual respect for territory and 
sovereignty.31
The Chinese seemed to understand the British motivation in 
recognizing the new China. An editorial of New Construction in 
January 1950 stated:
"Britain has her objectives. The political objectives are 
not unimportant, such as the appearance of criticism from 
progressive opinion inside Britain, the creation of listening 
stations in China in order to maintain her initiative in the 
East, and even the illusion of driving a wedge in Sino-Soviet 
relations or of looking after American interests in China. All 
these objectives may have been in the mind of Britain, but the
30See, "Mr M.E. Dening to J.J. Paskin, Colonial Office", 
23 May, 1949, F0211 75872 F7609/g.
31People's China, January 1, 1950, p.4.
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most important objective is, perhaps, economic."
It saw the crisis in the British economy as increasing 
daily, and considered that the only obvious way out was to 
exploit trade possibilities with China. The editorial pointed 
out:
"With no threat of competition from the United States, 
France, Germany or Japan for the time being, this is a god- 
sent opportunity which Britain will certainly not ignore or 
let pass."32
Beijing regarded London's statement about "acknowledgement 
of fact and not a mark of approbation" as an attitude of 
hostility, but it saw the British decision to recognize China 
as at least containing an element of realism.33 As one of the 
most influential countries in the Western bloc, Britain's 
recognition of the PRC must have made a favourable impression 
on Beijing, in particular when all other important Western 
countries remained hostile. Although Britain and China failed 
to establish full diplomatic relations because Britain 
abstained from voting on the question of the PRC's right to 
representation in all United Nation organizations, and because 
of its unfavourable attitude towards the two airlines, contact 
was set up at charge d 'affaires level, which provided a useful 
channel for both sides to acknowledge each other's intentions 
and solve their differences in a rational way.
During the Korean War, Britain followed the American line 
in general, but differences between the two countries were 
visible. The United Kingdom accepted that Chinese interests in 
the Far East should be respected and hoped to reach a general 
agreed settlement by agreement with Beijing. As regarded the
32The English text in F0371 83327 FC1051/2.
33Peoole's China 6 January, 1950.
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blockade, London's attempt was to limit the conflict. It 
considered that a total naval blockade of China would be 
ineffectual towards China in the immediate term and it also 
saw no objection to trade between China and non-Communist 
countries, except in strategic materials.
More significantly, after President Truman's remarks about 
the possibility of extending the war to Manchuria and of using 
the atomic bomb, the British Prime Minister, Clement Attlee, 
immediately warned the President of deep British and European 
anxiety. It was evident that Ernest Bevin was particularly 
anxious to secure an assurance that no decision would be 
reached on either of these questions without consultation with 
all the powers whose forces were engaged in Korea.34
Beijing took advantage of these differences and drew a 
clear distinction between the United States and Britain, in 
spite of their close relationship. Despite the fact that 
Britain supported the United States' solution and had supplied 
United Nations troops, Beijing did not condemn Britain 
directly. London was seen only as the American aggressor's 
follower.
Towards the end of the Korean War, China found it 
necessary to adjust its policy towards the outside world. At 
the 1954 Geneva Conference, China adopted a positive attitude, 
playing for the first time a considerable role in finding a 
settlement to the Indochina disputes. The Geneva Conference 
also provided opportunities for Zhou Enlai to talk to the 
British Foreign Minister, Anthony Eden, in terms of an
34See, Luard, ibid., pp.94-95; also see, "Memorandum by 
the Deputy Director for Strategic Plans, Joint Staff (Bradley) 
to the Joint Chiefs of Staff", 23 October, 1952; FRUS, 
vol.XII, pp.234-235.
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Indochina settlement and the bilateral relations between China 
and Britain. It should be noted that the change of government 
from Labour to Conservative in 1951 did not change Britain's 
China policy very much. The Labour government's decision to 
recognize China was also supported by the Conservatives. 
Winston Churchill, as leader of the Conservative opposition, 
said in November 1949: "Recognising a person is not
necessarily an act of approval... One has to recognise lots of 
things and people in this world of sin and woe that one does 
not like."3'’
This statement of Churchill's was similar to the Labour 
government's stand. Indeed, despite the change of government, 
the official policy and thinking on China stayed fairly 
constant. At the Geneva Conference, Beijing again exploited 
the differences between the United States and Britain, 
attributing the success of the Geneva Conference partly to the 
good offices of the delegation of the United Kingdom, while at 
the same time constantly attacking the American policy.36
Britain's different attitudes on the Taiwan question were 
also clearly noted in Chinese newspapers. For instance, on the 
front page of the People's Daily of 22 August, it was reported 
that Britain disapproved of the United States' Taiwan policy, 
and considered that this policy would add to the risk of war 
in the Far East. China saw the South East Asia Treaty 
Organization (SEATO) as a trick on the part of the US, which 
aimed at getting more countries, including France and Britain, 
to go along with its aggressive actions. It therefore
35House of Commons Debates, vol. 4 69, 17 Nov 1949,
col.2225.
36PeopIe's China. 16 August, 1954, p. 5.
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criticized the UK's signature of the treaty in only a moderate 
way.37
The relaxation in relations between China and Britain 
after the Geneva Conference became evident also in the 
improvement of the status of the British charge d'affaires in 
Beijing. He was able to discuss outstanding problems with 
officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to an extent 
hitherto impossible. China's press refrained from attacks, and 
after a British passenger aircraft had been shot down by 
Chinese military aircraft off Hainan, the Chinese government 
issued apologies and agreed to meet Britain's claim for 
compensation of £367,000.
The improvement of relations was also illustrated by the 
exchanges of visits, especially by the visit of a British 
Labour Party delegation, accompanied by representatives of 
British newspapers of various shades of political opinion. 
Zhou Enlai, in an interview with Morgan Phillips, General- 
Secretary of the British Labour Party, in July 1954, described 
the government and the people of China as sincerely desiring 
further improvements in Sino-British relations on the existing 
basis, and as willing to make joint efforts with the British 
government and people to develop economic and cultural ties 
between the two countries.38
The relatively favourable attitude adopted by the PRC 
towards Britain did not contradict Beijing's strategic 
considerations. According to its interpretation, in waging 
the struggle in the international arena, "the proletariat must
37People's Daily, 18 August, 1954.
38iVev China News Agency Daily Bulletin, no. 1095, 21 July, 
1954, English text in F0371 110246 FC1052/42.
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unite with all those who can be united in the fight, depending 
on the particular historical period, so as to develop the 
progressive forces, win over the middle forces and isolate the 
diehards" .39
Britain was put into the category of a "middle force" 
which could be won over. It was clear to the Chinese leaders 
that there existed severe contradictions between the 
imperialist powers. In 1956, Mao made a statement on the Suez 
Canal incident:
"...In the Middle East, two kinds of contradictions and 
three kinds of forces are in conflict. The two kinds of 
contradictions are, first, those between the imperialist 
powers, that is, between the United States and Britain and 
between the United states and France; and second, those 
between the imperialist powers and oppressed nations. The 
three kinds of forces are, first, the United States, the 
biggest imperialist power; second, Britain and France, second- 
rate imperialist powers; and third, the oppressed nations."40
Beijing believed that, in the early post-war years, 
Western European countries had to submit to US control, but 
later the struggle against this control would emerge. Hence, 
China should take advantage of such struggles and isolate the 
United States, which, until the late 1960s, had been regarded 
as China's most dangerous enemy. Such strategic considerations 
in Beijing obviously helped to improve Sino-British relations. 
Correct Sino-British bilateral relations thus became the most 
important safeguard for maintaining Hong Kong's status quo.
39"Chairman Mao's Theory of the Differentiation of the 
Three Worlds is a Major Contribution to Marxism-Leninism", 
People's Daily Editorial, 1 November, 1977; English text in 
Beijing Review, no.45, 4 November, 1977.
40Mao Zedong, "Talks at a Conference of Secretaries of 
Provincial, Municipal and Autonomous Regions Party 
Committees", Selected Works of Mao Zedong, vol.IV; Foreign 
Language Press, Beijing, 1978.
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3-5 The affair of CNAC and CATC
CNAC, the China National Aviation Corporation, and CATC, 
the Central Air Transport Corporation, were former airline 
agencies of the Nationalist government. CATC was an official 
agency controlled by the Nationalist government. The 
Nationalist government also had 80% of CNAC's share while the 
remaining 20% was held by Pan American Airways. In early 1949, 
when the Communist forces were approaching Shanghai, CNAC and 
CATC applied to the Hong Kong government to station the eighty 
civil aircraft they had purchased under American lend-lease in 
Hong Kong airport. The governor foresaw the possibility that 
the British government could soon be giving de jure 
recognition to the Communist government, and therefore felt 
the Hong Kong government had no option but to hand over the 
aircraft to the mainland if the Chinese government should 
claim them. He then suggested to Pan American to take the 
aircraft to Taiwan.41
In November 1949, just one month after the establishment 
of the new government, the managing directors of CNAC and CATC 
flew to Beijing with eleven aircraft, and they -- and four 
thousand employees -- claimed that the remaining aircraft were 
the property of the new Chinese government. Zhou Enlai, the 
Prime Minister and Foreign Affairs Minister, quickly announced 
that these aircraft were the property of the People's Republic 
and that the Chinese government would not allow them to be 
damaged or moved. He stressed that the Hong Kong government 
should respect China's property and warned that if any damage 
or move took place, the Hong Kong government would assume
41Alexader Grantham, Via Ports, from Hong Kong to Hong 
Kong, Hong Kong University Press, 1965, p.162.
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complete responsibility.42
The issue became more complicated when the United States 
government put pressure on London to stop these aircraft 
falling into Communist hands —  at the same time as the 
British government was expressing its desire to establish 
diplomatic relations with the People's Republic. On 12 
December, the Nationalist government signed a contract with 
General Claire Chennault and Whiting Willauer, selling them 
all the assets of CNAC and CATC. Chennault had served in the 
US Air Force during the war and had close links with the 
Nationalist government. He was also closely associated with 
the China lobby, which had made great efforts to assure 
United States backing of the regime in TaiwanChennault and 
Willauer, in turn, sold their interests to an American 
Company, Civil Air Transport Incorporated(CAT Inc), in which 
they held a controlling share. , Shortly afterwards, they 
registered the aircraft with the US Civil Aeronautics 
Administration. With the support of the United States 
government, CAT Inc pressed the British government and the 
Hong Kong authorities to influence court proceedings and to 
take executive action in its favour.
In February 1950, the Chief Justice of Hong Kong ruled 
that the aircraft were the property of the People's Republic, 
based on the fact that the Nationalist government had ceased 
to be the de facto government at the time they were disposed 
of. However, London found it extremely difficult to resist 
American pressure. On various occasions, the British 
government was warned that if it failed to keep the aircraft
42The People's Daily, 3 December, 1950.
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in the colony, the continuance of Marshall Aid and the 
Military Assistance Programme might be seriously endangered.43 
Consequently, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in 
London reversed the judgement on appeal in July 1952, and the
planes were finally handed over to CAT Inc.
The Chinese government's reaction was surprisingly mild, 
although it had made it clear that the unfriendly British 
attitude towards CNAC and CATC was one of the major obstacles 
to the establishment of Sino-British diplomatic relations. It 
issued an official protest, to the effect that the British
government's action was an unfriendly act towards the People's
Republic.
The governor of Hong Kong considered that Beijing had 
legitimate grounds for claiming the aircraft, and felt unhappy 
at the way in which London had handled the matter. He 
understood that London was "more scared of what the US might 
do to Britain, than of what China may do to Hong Kong."44 But 
apart from that, Beijing did not directly blame the Hong Kong 
authorities and nothing occurred to incite trouble. In the 
whole matter, China did not intervene in the dispute in a 
hostile manner, but instead relied on normal diplomatic 
channels and legal procedures through two Hong Kong lawyers.
The most important reason for China's mild reaction 
concerned its policy towards Western interests. In the early 
years of the PRC, Beijing decided to permit the continued 
existence of the private sector of the Chinese economy,
43,,Memorandum by the Colonial Secretary and the Minister 
of State at the Foreign Office", 3 April 1950, CAB129/39
CP(50)61.
44Grantham, ibid., p. 163.
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including Western enterprises, on the grounds that the private 
sector could help rebuild the war-damaged economy. However, 
China was also determined to expel all Western interests from 
China, especially such vital concerns as Shanghai's British 
and American enterprises. When the Korean War broke out, the 
Chinese government quickly requisitioned all American 
property, but at the same time there was no immediate takeover 
of property belonging to other Western countries. Beijing 
undoubtedly wanted a favourable international reputation and 
therefore tried to avoid any unreasonable actions in dealing 
with the major Western countries.
The affair of CNAC and CATC thus provided China with a 
good excuse to carry out its policy of getting rid of Western 
interests, on the grounds of reciprocity. In April 1952, the 
military authorities in Shanghai requisitioned the two main 
British-owned dockyards. In November, the Shanghai water, gas 
and electricity utilities and a . big shipping company, all 
British-owned, were seized. Similar requisitions of British 
property took place in Guangzhou and Tianjin.45
3-6 The position of the New China News Agency
For a long time before the establishment of the People's 
Republic, the Communists found Hong Kong a useful place from 
which to conduct their propaganda and to mobilise overseas 
Chinese people. In 1937/ Yanan sent its representatives to 
Hong Kong to set up a formal post. Sir Archibald Clark-Kerr, 
the British Ambassador in China, was advised by Zhou Enlai 
that the purpose of setting up a Communist agency in Hong Kong
4:>The People's Daily, 6,8,9, April, 19 52.
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was to collect materials, medicine and funds supplied by 
overseas Chinese people for the Eighth Army and the Fourth 
Army. "Please inform the governor," said Zhou, "to take care 
of the matter."46
The agency was set up in January 1938 and had reasonable
relations with the Hong Kong authorities. When the Japanese
invasion approached, the Hong Kong government even discussed 
how to conduct military cooperation with the agency, though 
no solution was reached because of the rapid advance of the 
Japanese troops. The agency ended its mission when Hong Kong 
fell into Japanese hands. After the war, Hong Kong returned to 
British control, but a civil war took place on the mainland. 
All Communist posts in Nationalist-controlled areas had to 
close, and Hong Kong again became an ideal place for the 
Communists to carry on their work.
A branch of the New China News Agency (NCNA) was 
registered in Hong Kong in March 1947 and started its
operation in May of the same year. Qiao Mu was appointed to be 
the first head of the NCNA. As the NCNA was a representative 
body of the CPC, its major task was to conduct external 
propaganda, but it was also authorized to communicate with the 
Hong Kong authorities on behalf of the CPC.
Before 1949, the Nationalist government had a diplomatic 
representative in Hong Kong, with the title of Special
Commissioner, who withdrew in January 1950 -- two days after 
the British recognition of the new government. Beijing found 
it necessary to set up a similar official position in Hong
46Liang Shangyuan: The Chinese Communist in Hong Kong
(Zhonggong zai Xianggang) Wide Angle Publisher, Hong Kong, 
1989, p. 81; Liang was a senior official of the NCNA in Hong 
Kong.
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Kong for the purposes of communication with the Hong Kong 
government. It therefore broached the idea with the British 
government. However, Beijing's approach was rejected by the 
British, who were very much concerned to avoid dual 
authorities in Hong Kong. The British, in turn, suggested to 
Beijing to establish a General Consulate. This suggestion was 
viewed by the Chinese government as contradicting its own 
principles. Setting up a General Consulate in Hong Kong would 
have meant that China accepted Hong Kong as a British colony 
but not as Chinese territory.
Since there was no diplomatic representative of the 
People's Republic in Hong Kong, special efforts were made to 
handle the situation. Consular duties, such' as those of 
handling visas and emigration, were dealt with the Bank of 
China and the China Travel Service; local problems, such as 
railways and border incidents, were handled by the authorities 
of Guangdong province and the Hong Kong authorities; 
diplomatic communications, such as protests and explanations, 
were carried out by contact between the charge d 'affaires in 
Beijing and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.47 The role of the 
NCNA in Hong Kong became more important than it had been and 
its tasks included collection of information, conduct of 
propaganda and supervision of communist activities. The last 
function, understandably, was kept highly confidential.
The Hong Kong government found the NCNA sometimes 
difficult to deal with because of its ill-defined duties, 
status and authority. Thus the possibility of closing down the 
NCNA was considered carefully, especially after the British
47See, Gary Catron: "Hong Kong and Chinese Foreign Policy, 
1955-60" in China Quarterly No.51 July/September 1972.
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Information Service in China had been closed by the Chinese 
authorities in 1950.
According to the Hong Kong law, the "Representations of 
Foreign Powers (Control) Ordinance No. 472" of 1949, which 
came into force in July 1951, "no organization which is 
politically associated with or controlled by the government of 
any foreign state may function in the colony without the 
consent of the governor". This Ordinance thus embraces all 
agencies of foreign powers whether diplomatic, commercial or 
otherwise.48 The NCNA had been formally set up in March 1947, 
and had already received official permission to operate from 
the Hong Kong government. It refused to register under the 
Representation of Foreign Powers (Control) Ordinance when it 
was required by the Hong Kong government to do so in July 
1951. Instead, it asked for immunity on the grounds that it 
was an official agency of the People's Republic and, according 
to international usage, it was not bound by decrees of the 
government of the place where it operated.49
If the British had accepted the NCNA's claim of immunity 
there would have been no provision under Hong Kong law 
compelling the NCNA to register. The Colonial Office was 
concerned that by insisting on the Hong Kong law, the 
"Representation of Foreign Powers Ordinance", it would cause 
some form of retaliation from China, while the Foreign Office 
also feared that the negotiations between the two countries 
towards the establishment of diplomatic relations would be
48For the key points of the Ordinance, see, F0371 83260 
FC10112/16.
49The NCNA Daily News, 21 August, 1951, also see, F0371
92351.
affected.30
On the other hand, if the British authorities had let the 
NCNA have its way, they might have found it even more 
difficult to handle the NCNA's activities, which could have 
posed a challenge to British dominance in Hong Kong. After a 
series of exchange of notes between the Colonial Office, the 
Foreign Office and the Hong Kong government, the British 
finally decided to force the NCNA to register. A final warning 
was made on 4 June by the Hong Kong government to the 
director of the NCNA, stating that the Agency must register in 
accordance with the provisions of Hong Kong law within a 
fortnight, or be compelled to close. A similar warning was 
also sent the following day to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
by the charge d'affaires in Beijing.
Beijing faced a dilemma. To give in to the pressure would 
mean a great loss of face and would lower the NCNA's prestige 
as its official agency, especially as China considered Hong 
Kong part of its own territory. But the cost of having to 
close down the agency would be too much to accept, since it 
was the most important propaganda post outside China and it 
would be difficult to find an alternative place. In the end, 
Beijing chose to yield. On 19 June, the director of the NCNA 
replied to the Hong Kong government, stating that as the Hong 
Kong branch was recognized as a state agency he was prepared 
to register under the Ordinance, and he did so shortly 
afterwards.
^"Minutes of Colonial Office", 13 February, 1952, F0371 
99362 FC1672/2.
31,1 Minute of Foreign Office by C.H. Johneston", 30 May,
1952, F0311 99362 FC1672/32.
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Britain saw the registration of the NCNA as a "small but 
definite success for a policy of cautious firmness with the 
Chinese."52 The registration of the NCNA was significant 
because it also indicated that the PRC respected, though with 
great caution, British rules in Hong Kong and accepted rather 
than challenged British control of the colony.
China's action, however, was not particularly in 
contradiction with its general tactics in conducting struggle 
in non-communist controlled areas. China realised that it was 
important to establish its existence first, and then to 
develop strength, and therefore a temporary concession was 
necessary which would do good in the long term. As will be 
seen, in later years the NCNA not only coexisted with Hong 
Kong's laws, but also managed to build up an almost 
unchallenged power in Hong Kong.
3-7 The impact of the "Bandung Spirit"
China continued its efforts to develop a more positive 
form of diplomacy after the Geneva Conference. It considered 
that as a result of the armistice in Korea and a cease-fire in 
Indochina, international tension had somewhat relaxed, and 
that fresh hope had been brought to the people of the whole 
world, and particularly to those of Asia. China was motivated 
by the consideration of breaking the American encirclement and 
of extricating itself from international isolation, and 
therefore it was important to establish friendly relations 
with neighbouring and other newly-independent countries. Such 
a policy became clear in its relations with India. In April
52Ibid. , F0371 99362 FC1672/32.
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1954 , Beijing signed an agreement with India on the issue of 
Tibet. The agreement also formally set forth the famous "five 
principles of peaceful coexistence". During his tour to India 
and Burma in 1954, Zhou Enlai repeated that all nations in the 
world could peacefully coexist, no matter whether they were 
big or small, strong or weak, and no matter what kind of 
social system each of them had.53 .
The 1955 Bandung Conference —  the first Conference of 
Afro-Asian countries -- offered an opportunity for Beijing 
further to conduct the Third World dimension of its foreign 
policy. Zhou Enlai claimed that China was willing to deal with 
all governments regardless of their political form, and to 
solve all problems with moderation and diplomacy.
It was against this promising background that the governor 
of Hong Kong, Alexander Grantham, made a tour to Beijing in 
October 1955, despite the Kashmir Princess incident.
The incident had taken place earlier that year, when an 
Indian airliner called the Kashmir Princess, carrying eight 
Communist Chinese journalists, two Polish journalists, and a 
North Vietnamese delegate to the Bandung Conference, had 
crashed off Borneo with the loss of fifteen lives. The 
previous day, Beijing had warned the British charge d 'affaires 
that Nationalist agents might try to make trouble for the 
Chinese delegation. On 13 April, the Chinese government 
presented a note to Britain, alleging that the plane had been 
sabotaged by US and Nationalist agents who had hoped to 
assassinate Zhou Enlai and other members of the Chinese 
delegation. The note charged the British government with
53"Documents Concerning Premier Zhou Enlai's Visit to 
India and Burma", Supplement to People’s China. 14 July, 1954.
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"grave responsibility for not taking adequate heed of the
warning that had been given.
The governor's visit was based on the grounds that there 
was a desire in Hong Kong to be on friendly terms with the 
government of China, and that an informal visit by the
governor might be regarded by Beijing as a friendly gesture 
that would rebound to the benefit of the colony.55 Although
the governor's visit was "entirely private", he paid a
courtesy call on the Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs and was 
also invited to meet Zhou Enlai, together with the British 
charge d'affaires, Con O'Neill.
It seemed that the both sides deliberately avoided the 
issue of Hong Kong. The only thing that came .up about Hong 
Kong during their three hours of talks was the matter of the 
Kashmir Princess. Zhou seemed to accept the governor's 
explanation on this issue. Of more interest was that the 
governor found himself in the role of mediator when Zhou 
raised the question of Portuguese preparations for the four 
hundredth anniversary celebrations of the founding of Macao as 
a Portuguese colony. Zhou told the governor that the Chinese 
government and the Chinese people did not approve of these 
celebrations, nor would the Chinese in Macao and Hong Kong. 
The governor shared the same view, but suggested a one-day 
celebration. In the end, Zhou agreed with the governor and 
said that a one-day celebration would be unobjectionable. When 
the Governor returned to Hong Kong he apparently told the 
governor of Macao of what had passed between him and Zhou.
54People's Daily. 13 April, 1955.
55Grantham, ibid., p. 182.
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Wisely, the Portuguese authorities cancelled the entire 
programme, thus avoiding serious trouble which could have 
spread to Hong Kong as well. The way in which Zhou had handled 
the matter through Grantham was undoubtedly an encouraging 
sign that the Chinese government was willing to cooperate with 
the Hong Kong authorities for the purpose of preventing 
possible trouble.
In the atmosphere of the Bandung Spirit, and also as a 
result of the governor's visit to Beijing, the Chinese 
government launched a campaign of what the governor called 
"sweetness and light. ,,:>6 The attitude towards Hong Kong 
changed from one of hostility to friendliness, even though, as 
the governor felt, it remained somewhat stiff. China made 
considerable efforts to win the people over and to present 
China in a favourable light. Prominent people were invited to 
visit to China with all expenses paid. Cultural exchanges 
flourished. A group of Hong Kong teachers visited China, and 
Beijing sent a dance team to Hong Kong after a series of 
successful performances in London.
At an official level, negotiations between the Chinese 
authorities and British railway officials were held, in an 
attempt to restore a through passenger service between Canton 
and Hong Kong. Actually, there had been direct contacts 
between the two sides to resume the Canton-Kowloon railway 
service as early as 1950, when after an exchange of letters, 
the general manager of the British section visited China and 
was "cordially received" by the Chinese railway authorities. 
They reached agreement to restore both freight and passenger
^Grantham, ibid.,
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services, but there was no solution on through passenger 
services. Passengers thus had to get off their train on one 
side of the border, walk across the bridge, pass through 
customs and immigration, and board another train before 
continuing their journey.37
The negotiations on a through passenger service continued 
with both sides cooperative and trying to find an acceptable 
agreement.
The implementation of China's new aspects of foreign 
policy, therefore, had special significance in that it helped 
stabilise Hong Kong's position. Chinese leaders wanted to be 
seen as peace-loving and thus chose not to touch on the issue 
of Hong Kong. Beijing hoped that in doing so it would reduce 
the suspicions of its neighbouring countries, since most of 
them had gained independence from former colonial powers, and 
their frontiers with China were bound by treaties which 
Beijing regarded as unequal. These countries, including Burma, 
Korea and Vietnam, were China's dependencies before the 18th 
century. As Mao Zedong stated in an article entitled The 
Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party:
"...After having inflicted military defeats on China, the 
imperialist countries forcibly took from her a large number of 
states tributary to China, as well as a part of her own 
territory. Japan appropriated Korea, Taiwan, the Ryukyu 
islands, the Pescadors, and Port Arthur; England took Burma, 
Bhutan, Nepal, and Hong Kong; France seized Annam; even a 
miserable little country like Portugal took Macao from us."58
The Communist victory in China undoubtedly caused great 
anxiety in those countries about the new government's
-^ Gary Catron, ibid.
38Mao Zedong, "The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese 
Communist Party" (Zhongguo Gemin yu Zhongguo Gongchandang), in 
Selected Works of Mao Zedong, People's Press, Beijing, 1969; 
p.591.
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intentions, and in India as well. The Chinese leaders
understood those countries' concerns. Mao was more discreet in 
the revised edition of his works after 1949, in referring to 
the states situated around China's border that were formerly 
under her tutelage, by avoiding the term 'tributary state'. In 
listing the territories taken by the imperialists, he omitted 
all the former dependent countries, which in the initial
edition he interspersed with portions of China's own
territory.59 During the Bandung Conference, Zhou Enlai made 
special efforts to ease the tension between China and its 
neighbouring countries, emphasizing that China shared a common
history of colonialism with them and a common need to have
mutual understanding and mutual respect and support.
Thus in its efforts to win friendship from the newly
independent countries, China's attitude and policy toward Hong 
Kong not only stemmed from the economic considerations, but 
also was bound up with its general foreign policy.
3-8 The establishment of China's Hong Kong policy
The relaxation between the mainland and Hong Kong in the 
Bandung spirit was disturbed by the "Double Tenth Riots" of 
1956, when the island found itself once again involved in a 
political conflict between the Communist mainland and 
Nationalist Taiwan. The riots were a factional fight between 
supporters of the Nationalists and the Communists which 
erupted over the flying of nationalist flags on 10 October,
the Republic of China's national day.
The riots lasted about two days. A Nationalist-led mob
59Stuart R. Schram, The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung, 
Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, New York, 1969, p.375.
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raided the offices of pro-Beijing trades unions and the 
official premises of Chinese government organizations. 
Altogether 51 people were killed, including the wife of the 
Swiss consul, whose car was burned by a mob. Several hundred 
people were injured and HK$5 million worth of damage was 
caused to property.60 An official statement announced that 
"there is no evidence whatever to suggest that the riots in 
Kowloon were planned beforehand...those taking part were 
agents of no-one but themselves; people of Nationalist 
persuasion were egged on by criminals bent on personal power 
and gain. 1,61
But Beijing did not share that view. On 13 October, Zhou 
expressed his "indignation and concern" at the riots, which he 
attributed to Kuomintang agents. He demanded that the Hong 
Kong government should take immediate steps to bring them to 
justice and to provide protection for the Chinese population 
and Chinese government organizations. At a press conference 
the next day he said that the Chinese government would "not 
permit such disorders on the doorstep of China." He rejected 
the British explanation that gangsters were responsible. He 
alleged that the Hong Kong authorities had planned to use 
Nationalist agents to weaken the influence of the People's 
Republic in Hong Kong, and added that the Chinese authorities 
were watching to see what attitude the British took towards 
the Kuomintang agents, and whether the British were capable of
60Hong Kong Government Report on the Riots in Kowloon and 
Tsuen Wan, October 10 to 12, 1956, Hong Kong, Government
Printer, 1957.
61Jbid, p. ii .
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maintaining order in Hong Kong and Kowloon.62
Beijing certainly had reason to complain. In retrospect, 
the Hong Kong government's reaction during the riots seemed 
to have been slow and ineffectual. The official explanation 
was that in dealing with a population whose cooperation was 
necessary in normal times, the police had to use a minimum of 
force, and that government forces were not sent in quickly 
enough to the affected industrial towns in the New 
Territories.63
Nevertheless, the Hong Kong government realized that it 
was essential to prevent the colony becoming an anti-mainland 
base. Beijing's warning that it would send troops into the 
island to protect "innocent Chinese citizens"- may not have 
been just empty talk had another similar incident taken place. 
The Hong Kong authorities took a chance in launching the 
arrests of leaders of the triads, most notably the "14K", 
whose connection with the Kuomintang dated from the late 
1940s. Legislation was passed to give the Executive Council 
power to order the detention of any person against whom a 
deportation order had been made and who could not be deported. 
A special detention centre was also set up. The Hong kong 
government then showed its determination efficiently to deal 
with the triads and secret societies, which were usually 
closely associated with the Nationalists in Taiwan.
For Beijing, a pressing matter was to restrain those pro- 
Communist factions and Chinese government organizations that 
were keen to seek revenge and even a takeover by Beijing of
62Peoole's Daily, 13 October, 1956.
63Hong Kong Government Report on the Riots in Kowloon and 
Tsuen Wan.
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Hong Kong. However, what Beijing needed was the stability of 
Hong Kong and not a takeover. It found that its strategy and 
policy were not understood as well as it had expected by the 
pro-Communist elements and their organizations. A meeting was 
held in Guangzhou attended by Zhou Enlai and other senior 
Chinese officials shortly after the riots. The meeting 
discussed the consequences of the riots and China's Hong Kong 
policy. The policy referred to as "Making long-term plans for 
and fully using Hong Kong" was finally laid down.
Beijing made it clear to its people that China still 
regarded Hong Kong as part of China, but as long as the 
British authorities were able to prevent Hong Kong becoming 
a base used by the Nationalists and Americans against China, 
and as long as the mainland's trade with Hong Kong remained 
profitable, the Chinese government would not change Hong 
Kong's status quo and would not challenge British authority.64
In the meantime, Beijing strengthened its official body, 
the NCNA. A new head and several deputy heads were appointed 
after two years of the positions being vacant. The function of 
the agency was also broadened and its major task was no longer 
to deal with news matters but to supervise the fulfilment of 
Beijing's policy.
After China had clearly defined its Hong Kong policy, the 
relaxation of relations and cooperation between Hong Kong and 
the mainland became more visible. The Chinese press remained 
low-key, for instance, towards the deportation of two leaders 
of a radical farmers' organization in March 1959, and towards
^Interview with Mr Szeto Keung in April, 1989 in Hong 
Kong. Szeto has worked for the NCNA in Hong Kong since 1950s 
and now is depute director of the Department of Foreign 
Affairs of the NCNA in Hong Kong.
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the withdrawal of a government subsidy to leftist schools in 
June of the same year. There were no official complaints at 
all from Beijing concerning these matters. On various 
occasions, Chinese leaders showed a positive attitude in a new 
era of cooperation. The issue of the water supply was a 
remarkable example of this.
Hong Kong was confronted with a serious shortage of water. 
In its total land area of 1, 030 sg km (398 square miles), 
there are no natural lakes, nor any rivers of a size 
sufficient to provide an assured supply of water. There is an 
average annual rainfall of around 223 cm ( 88 inches), but 
three quarters of this falls during summer months of May to 
September.6-' As the Hong Kong government described it:
"A visitor to Hong Kong will very quickly meet the 
problem, if he comes during the dry winter months. Arriving at 
his hotel, tired and uncomfortable after an air journey half­
way round the world, a traveller's first thought will be to 
turn on the taps, step into a bath.and relax in the comfort of 
deep, warm water. The chances are that he will discover a 
notice which is displayed in every hotel bathroom. This warns 
visitors of the restricted hours of supply, and of the 
penalties incurred by those who waste water, and of the 
dangers of leaving taps "on" when there is no water in 
them. 1,66
For the great majority of Hong Kong's 3,200,000 population 
(at the time), water restrictions were a grievous and constant 
hardship. Hong Kong's flourishing industry also needed water, 
sometimes in large quantities. Although the Hong Kong 
government tried to provide an assured and constant supply for 
industry wherever possible, this was very uneconomical in 
those urban areas where housing and industry intermingled, and 
some factories had to provide their own wells or install large
65Hong Kong Annual Report, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 
1960, pp.5-6.
66Ibid, p. 6.
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storage tanks.67 The problem of water supply became the major 
obstacle to Hong Kong's further development.
China was well aware of Hong Kong's difficulty and made 
the initial suggestion to help solve the problem. In February 
1959, Tao Zhu, the governor of Guangdong province, in a speech 
to a group of Hong Kong tourists, indicated that China would 
supply water to Hong Kong on the same basis as it was already 
being supplied to Macao (China had built a reservoir to supply 
water to Macao free of charge under an agreement reached with 
the general manager of Macao's water-works) ,68
The first semi-official intimation that the Chinese 
authorities were prepared to supply water from a reservoir 
near Shenzhen, about 4 kilometres away from the border, was 
made in January 1960. The governor of Hong Kong responded 
positively to the approach, saying that "we are anxious to 
obtain additional supplies of water as soon as possible, and 
I very much hope, therefore, that we can come to an 
arrangement with the Chinese authorities, whereby supplies 
from this source can be made available to Hong Kong. 1,69
In April that year, Hong Kong sent a delegations to 
Shenzhen to meet the Chinese authorities from Bo An county. 
After a series of meetings to discuss arrangements for the 
supply of water, an agreement was signed at Shenzhen on 15 
November 1960. Under the agreement, China would supply about 
22,730,000 cubic metres of water a year to Hong Kong from the 
Shenzhen reservoir, the greater part being drawn during the
61 Ibid., p. 5.
68Ta Kuna Pao, Hong Kong; 11 February, 1959.
69Hong Kong Annual Report, 1960, p. 26.
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dry season when it was most needed.
The water supply agreement marked the start of a new 
period of cooperation between Hong Kong and the mainland, and 
demonstrated a positive start for China's recently defined 
Hong Kong policy. The South China Morning Post, a conservative 
English-language paper in Hong Kong, commented that the 
agreement was encouraging and that the people of Hong Kong had 
reason to believe it was reached in a friendly atmosphere.70 
Some people, understandably, were worried that to rely on 
Communist China's water supply might damage the colony's 
stability, since Beijing might use it as a form of pressure on 
Hong Kong.
Conclusion
China's attitudes toward Hong Kong in the early stages of 
the People's Republic were affected by its preoccupation with 
domestic problems, such as how to ensure Communist control and 
to stabilise the badly-damaged economy. China chose to 
maintain Hong Kong's status quo, and in doing so it managed to 
avoid creating extra difficulties. China kept a flexible 
posture while its international position was uncertain. The 
Korean War and the US policy to isolate China helped further 
to illustrate Hong Kong's importance as a unique place from 
which China could obtain Western information and certain 
strategic goods, conduct trade with non-Communist countries 
and communicate with the overseas Chinese community.
In order to counter American encirclement Beijing applied 
its 'united front' strategy in external relations and
7QSouth China Morning Post (SCMP) 17 November, 19 60.
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developed a Third World policy, which was marked by the 
intention of solving differences by diplomatic negotiations 
with all countries, regardless of their social systems. In its 
policy of good-neighbourliness, which aimed at establishing 
friendly relations with all its neighbouring countries, 
China's policy towards Hong Kong correlated with its overall 
foreign policy orientations. Beijing was well aware of 
Britain's role in the Western world and acknowledged the 
differences between the United States and Britain in their 
respective Far Eastern policies. China made appropriate use of 
such differences and tried to maintain reasonably good 
relations with Britain in order to improve its international 
position.
Britain, on the other hand, was largely concerned about 
its commercial interests in China, as well as the position of 
Hong Kong, and therefore adopted \a foot-in-the-door' policy. 
The two sides were motivated by different reasons to maintain 
Hong Kong's status quo. For the Chinese side, such a policy 
had begun in the late 1940s, but it was not until the 1950s 
that the policy became fully developed and firmly established, 
and based on more profound considerations of how to make use 
of Hong Kong.
Thus, the formulation of China's Hong Kong policy was 
basically determined by strategic and economic factors, rather 
than the underlying Communist ideology. Although the Chinese 
Communists harboured strong anti-imperialist and anti­
colonialist sentiments, such attitudes seldom appeared in the 
government's external policies, including the policy applied 
to Hong Kong.
The formulation of China's Hong Kong policy also showed
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how Beijing handled an issue which raised important principles 
of sovereignty in a flexible way. The existence of Hong Kong 
as a British colony undoubtedly was for the Chinese people a 
great humiliation left over from the past, but all the same, 
the Chinese leaders were not attracted by the idea of a simple 
takeover. They acknowledged the great importance of Hong Kong 
under British rule and carefully avoided taking any radical 
actions to change its status. However, it should be noted that 
Beijing never retreated from its stand that Hong Kong was part 
of China, a stand that was also not openly challenged by the 
British government. It seemed that from the very beginning the 
Chinese government and British government had a tacit 
agreement not to challenge to each other's positions.
In addition, in the formulation of its Hong Kong policy, 
Beijing applied its basic tactics -- such as making use of 
contradictions, not striking in all directions and making 
compromises if necessary. China's exploitation of Anglo- 
American differences, its handling of matters such as the CNAC 
and CATC, and the position of the New China News Agency, were 
all evidence of these tactics.
The issue of Hong Kong has always been sensitive and 
China did not find it easy to stick to its policy of allowing 
Hong Kong to exist as a British colony. The next chapter will 
focus on the development of China's foreign policy during the 
Cultural Revolution, and will explore how the Chinese 
government exercised its Hong Kong policy against this changed 
and particularly difficult background.
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Chapter Four
The Cultural Revolution and China’s Hong Kong Policy
The drastically changed political climate in Beijing in 
the early years of the Cultural Revolution had an important 
impact on China's external relations. The Cultural Revolution 
involved a series of power struggles between the moderates and 
the radicals that resulted at one point in 1967 in a temporary 
take-over of the Foreign Affairs Ministry by the Red Guards; 
an increased influence of ideology on China's foreign policy, 
particularly regarding overseas Chinese; and a rigid style of 
conducting external relations. These factors were strongly 
reflected in the case of Hong Kong, and China's carefully 
cultivated Hong Kong policy was thus put under serious 
challenge.
This chapter will discuss the way in which China's Hong 
Kong policy was affected by the Cultural Revolution and how 
Beijing handled the difficulties that arose. The case of Macao 
is also examined, because China's attitude and policy towards 
this enclave were similar to those regarding Hong Kong. The 
general impact of the Cultural Revolution on China's external 
policy, particularly on the overseas Chinese policy, will also 
be discussed, providing a relevant background for the study of 
the cases of Hong Kong and Macao.
The Cultural Revolution was formally declared at an end in 
1976, after the arrest of the so-called "Gang of Four". 
However, with regard to foreign policy, the influence of the 
Cultural Revolution was more limited in terms of both time and 
scope. It was from 1968 onwards that Beijing began to make 
efforts to adopt a more subtle and realistic manner of dealing
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with the outside world. In this chapter, the focus will be on 
the period between 1966 and 1968; the subsequent Hong Kong 
policy of China will be discussed in the next chapter.
4-1 The Cultural Revolution and China's overseas Chinese 
policy
The increasing significance of ideology, and, in 
particular, the extension of the campaign of Mao's thoughts 
into the field of foreign policy, were of major importance in 
the development of the Cultural Revolution. Up to 1965, Mao's 
thought was regarded as the application of the universal 
truths of Marxism-Leninism to the concrete practice of the 
Chinese revolution. With the intensification within China of 
the cult of Mao and of Mao's thoughts, the Cultural 
Revolution's leadership attempted to establish a basis on 
which it could justify itself to its own people and maintain 
its position. It was claimed that the attitude toward Chairman 
Mao and Mao Zedong Thought was the "touchstone", the "dividing 
line", between the revolutionaries and the pseudo­
revolutionaries, and between the true Marxist-Leninists and 
the counter-revolutionary revisionists. Not only was Mao 
proclaimed as the greatest leader of the Chinese people, but 
he was positively hailed as the greatest leader in the entire 
world. The most important objective of China's foreign policy 
was to promote throughout the world the recognition that Mao 
Zedong Thought was a universal mentor and guide.
China's foreign policy was thus re-evaluated. It was now 
claimed that there were struggles between the revolutionary 
foreign policy formulated by Mao and the revisionist foreign 
policy of Liu Shaoqi (Liu was at the time president of the
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People's Republic and vice-chairman of the CPC) . Criticisms of 
him included the charge that he was in favour of abandoning 
the struggles with the United States and the Soviet Union, and 
that he did not give enough support to revolutionary movements 
in the developing countries. Liu's foreign policy line was 
summed as the "three surrenders and one abolition" —  that 
was, surrender to imperialists, revisionists and 
reactionaries, and the abolition of national liberation move­
ments in the Third World.1
However, there was no evidence to suggest that Liu had 
different views from Mao on China's foreign policy issues. 
Although Liu did not fully agree with Mao in the way he 
handled the PRC's relations with the Soviet Union in the 
1960s, he did not make any attempt to challenge Mao's 
authority.
Clearly, these criticisms deliberately exaggerated the 
differences between Mao and Liu, and were used by the radicals 
in their attempt to take control over the ministries concerned 
with external affairs and to challenge Zhou Enlai's authority. 
In this context, Foreign Minister Chen Yi, a close ally of 
Zhou, was openly criticized for his efforts in implementing 
Liu's foreign policy line. All Chinese ambassadors and charges 
d 'affaires were recalled to Beijing, the only exception being 
Huang Hua, China's ambassador in Cairo. In order to "proclaim 
the emergence of a new revolutionary situation", a nation-wide 
seizure of power began, following the first such seizure of 
power at provincial level in Shanghai in January 1967.
]Waishi Fenglei. in Red Guard Publications, Part I, 
vol.13, Reprinted by Center for China Research Materials 
Association of Research and Libraries, Washington D.C., 1975.
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Consequently, the foreign ministry, like all other
ministries, was temporarily taken over by the Red Guards. The 
change of power at the foreign ministry inevitably created 
further chaos in China's external relations.
The most important effect of the Cultural Revolution on 
China's external policy, so far as China's Hong Kong policy 
was concerned, was the radicalization of the policy towards 
overseas Chinese. Such a shift became evident when the idea 
of peaceful coexistence was replaced by the more militant 
concepts of revolution and people's war. There was a call for 
socialist countries to support people's struggles in Asia, 
Africa and Latin America. Beijing advocated increased support 
for liberation movements, solidarity with revolutionary 
struggles and the cultivation of stronger relations with 
communist parties.
Most of the overseas Chinese had settled in South East 
Asia long before the establishment of the People's Republic. 
There were about 12 million overseas Chinese in that region in 
the 1950s, many of them harbouring strong patriotic feelings 
towards China. However, most overseas Chinese lacked political 
enthusiasm. They had emigrated largely for economic reasons, 
and thus their patriotic feelings were far from being 
revolutionary or idealistic. Professor Wang Gungwu, a leading 
authority in the study of the overseas Chinese in South East 
Asia, suggested that there were three distinct political 
groupings as far as their attitudes to politics in China were 
concerned. The first group kept in close touch with events in 
China, either directly or indirectly, and was concerned to 
identify with the destiny of China.
The second group consisted of the majority of the Chinese,
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who were more concerned with the indirect politics of trade 
and community associations. They were modest in their aims and 
were seen as non-political.
The third group was a small mixed group with no clear 
identity, but generally committed to some sort of loyalty to 
the countries they had adopted. Professor Wang concluded that 
these groups were not rigid. This argument was based on the 
premise that the Chinese wanted to remain culturally 
distinguishable, and that they were drawn in this century both 
towards nationalism in China and towards embracing local 
loyalties, by the pressures of modernization and the erosion 
of traditional values.2
The Chinese in South East Asia played a significant role 
in the 1911 Revolution aimed at overthrowing the Manchu regime 
and in the war of resistance against the Japanese invasion in 
1937-45, both in terms of financial assistance and in 
manpower. But other events, such as the Kuomintang and 
Communist revolutions, having no clear external targets, 
attracted little enthusiasm among them. The struggle between 
the Nationalists and Communists, which took the shape of civil 
war in 1945-49, seemed irrelevant to most of them. 
Nevertheless, when the Communist victory ended the civil war 
and a strong and stable China began to emerge, this was 
cautiously welcomed by the overseas Chinese.
China's overseas Chinese policy was designed to be subor­
dinate to its major foreign policy goals. The PRC leadership
2Wang Gungwu, "Political Chinese: an aspect of their
contribution to modern Southeast Asian history" (unpublished 
paper, Seminar on Southeast Asia in the Modern World, Hamburg, 
197 0) . Also see by the same author, Community and nation: 
essays on Southeast Asia and the Chinese, Heinemann 
Educational Books (Asia) Ltd, Singapore, 1981. pp.180-181.
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inherited from previous Chinese regimes the idea that all 
people of Chinese blood and culture, wherever they resided, 
were a part of the national entity of China. The leadership 
held the position that the government of the PRC had a 
responsibility to protect the interests of the overseas 
Chinese. Such a position was stressed from time to time, 
particularly in the years immediately following the 
establishment of the PRC. In late 1951, for instance, Zhou 
Enlai declared:
"The lawful rights and interests of these people, as a 
result of unreasonable discrimination and even persecution on 
the part of certain countries, have been seriously infringed. 
This cannot but arouse the serious attention and deep concern 
of the Chinese people."3
However, such statements from Beijing, with their 
threatening tone, actually achieved little in terms of 
protecting the interests of the overseas Chinese, or 
strengthening the PRC's own position in the region. When 
Beijing adopted a good-neighbour policy during 1954-1955 —  
aimed at cultivating good relations with South East Asian 
countries -- its overseas Chinese policy began to focus on how 
to develop state-to-state relations.
The position of South East Asia was important in China's 
strategic considerations. China felt threatened as the US 
influence increased in the region, and made considerable 
efforts to break the American encirclement. In addition, the 
Chinese leadership hoped increasingly to assert its power and 
influence in Asia. China's overseas Chinese policy, 
undoubtedly, became an important aspect of the broader change
3Zhou Enlai, "Political Report" made on 23 October, 1951, 
to the National People's Congress, in People's China, 
November, 1951.
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in its external policy. It was in this context that Zhou Enlai 
said in September 1954 that the PRC hoped that the South East 
Asian countries would not discriminate against overseas 
Chinese and would respect their legitimate rights and 
interests. He also promised that "for our part, we are willing 
to urge the overseas Chinese to respect the laws of the 
governments and the social customs of the countries in which 
they live."4
The Chinese leaders recognized the usefulness of the 
overseas Chinese, both in terms of providing financial support 
for China's economic development and of serving the PRC's 
foreign policy. They also realised the difficulties created by 
the question of the overseas Chinese in their relations with 
South East Asia. On many occasions after 1954, the government 
of the PRC stated officially that the Chinese abroad should 
obey local laws and respect local customs and habits, doing 
everything publicly and lawfully. Beijing urged the overseas 
Chinese to contribute to trade, and to technical and cultural 
exchanges between China and the countries of their residence. 
But it discouraged involvement in politics and criticism of 
the internal affairs of the local governments. Zhou Enlai made 
it clear, for instance, in his visit to Burma in 1956, that 
overseas Chinese should not participate in Burmese political 
activities, such as political parties and elections. He also 
promised that China would not develop any kind of political 
organisations among the overseas Chinese.5
4Zhou Enlai, "Report on Government Work", made on 24 
September 1954 to the National People's Congress, People's 
China. October 1954.
5The Documents of Overseas Chinese Affairs (Qiaowu Zhengci 
Wenjian), The People's Press, Beijing, 1957. pp.7-8.
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Beijing carefully avoided involvement in the internal 
conflicts of neighbouring countries, especially those 
maintaining good relations with the PRC. It made considerable 
efforts to disclaim any intention of using the overseas 
Chinese as an instrument of subversion, and regarded any 
encouragement of Beijing-oriented revolutionary activity among 
the Chinese in South East Asia as likely to damage the 
government-to-government relations between China and the 
countries of the region, particularly in the period of 
peaceful coexistence.
China's pragmatic policy towards the overseas Chinese was 
also illustrated in its handling of the question of dual 
nationality of ethnic Chinese abroad. Beijing realised that 
the question of dual nationality was an important obstacle 
between China and the countries concerned, and it thus 
abandoned the concept of jus sanguinis in 1954, which had been 
accepted by Chinese government since 1949. It also urged the
overseas Chinese to choose the nationality of their resident
countries, pledging their loyalty to those countries. China 
made efforts to reducing the dimensions of the problem, 
proposing to enter into treaties on the question of
nationality to resolve the matter. In April 1955, China signed 
a treaty with the government of Indonesia on dual 
citizenship.6
To sum up, the Chinese government tended to adopt a more 
or less rational policy on the overseas Chinese after 1954, 
which aimed at avoiding irritating other governments in the 
region, impairing diplomatic relations, or arousing the
6Dangdai Zhongguo Waijiao, Ibid., p.154.
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suspicion that the Chinese government was manipulating the 
overseas Chinese to conduct subversion. China's overseas 
Chinese policy was reiterated by Beijing in its broadcasts to 
overseas Chinese and in Chinese leaders' speeches on various 
occasions in the period between the mid-1950s to the mid- 
1960s. It was Zhou Enlai who took the major responsibility for 
formulating the policy, and the Overseas Chinese Affairs 
Committee, led by Liao Chenzhi, was the organ which 
implemented it.
Yet, such a rational and flexible approach seemed in 
contradiction with the CPC's commitment to support the 
communist movement and communist parties in South East Asia. 
While the Chinese leaders claimed that the PRC government's 
policy differed from the CPC's policy, they failed to provide 
any strong assurances of this to the leaders of South East 
Asian countries. Even within China, there were powerful 
radical elements who were strongly committed towards 
international revolution and certainly did not support such a 
moderate policy.
Thus, during the Cultural Revolution, China's overseas 
Chinese policy and the Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission 
were immediately subjected to unprecedented criticism. Liao 
Chenzhi was named by the radical Red Guards as "the top party 
person in authority taking the capitalist road in the Central 
Commission for Overseas Chinese Affairs", and as "a black 
fighter posted in the Commission by Liu Shaoqi, faithfully 
implementing Liu's policy of three surrenders and one 
abolition". The charges against Liao included one that he had 
adopted Liu Shaoqi's "philosophy of survival", urging overseas 
Chinese to do whatever necessary to live in peace and harmony
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in their local environments. He was also criticised for having 
ordered the dissolution of organisations set up to educate and 
organise overseas Chinese and engage in patriotic activities.7
All the activities with which Liao was charged bore a 
strong resemblance to the actual policy which had been 
carefully cultivated by the Chinese government in conducting 
overseas Chinese affairs, and for which Zhou Enlai should have 
taken major responsibility. Indeed, Zhou himself was also 
criticised by some Red Guards. Although Zhou managed to 
restore his authority, he failed to protect Liao from being 
humiliated. Liao was dismissed from his post and the 
Commission came to a standstill.
There was also criticism and persecution of overseas 
Chinese and their families residing within China for their 
various privileges and external links. Overseas Chinese abroad 
were regarded as bourgeois and, therefore, it was claimed that 
to continue to maintain connections with such bourgeois 
elements was ideologically undesirable, providing a basis for 
the emergence of bourgeois tendencies.
In October 1969 a conference in Guangdong was held to deal 
specially with the "foreign connections" of Party cadres. The 
"six regulations" were imposed by this conference on Party 
cadres, requiring the total severance of any ties with rela­
tives in Macao, Hong Kong and abroad. The "six regulations" 
included: "Firstly, all Party cadres who have connections with 
overseas Chinese of any profession and have refused to sever 
connections with them politically and economically, even after
7Pi Liao Zhanbao. in Red Guard Publications, ibid. vol.11, 
also see Stephen Fitzgerald: Overseas Chinese Affairs and the 
Cultural Revolution in China Quarterly Oct.-Dec. 1969, no. 40 
pp.103-104.
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being told to do so, will be seriously punished; secondly, we 
should look into all specific cases and carry out necessary 
criticism and education. The serious cases should be told to 
resign from their Party posts. Thirdly, from now on, we must 
not recruit those who have connections with overseas Chinese 
abroad, in Hong Kong or in Macao, to posts of Party cadres."8 
Since Party and state officials could not avoid being 
suspected, common people with family relations abroad were 
even more vulnerable and indeed the resulting discrimination 
was intensive.
The spilling over of the Cultural Revolution into China's 
foreign affairs and, in particular, the criticisms of China's 
overseas Chinese policy, undoubtedly caused great confusion 
among those overseas Chinese who had been closely associated 
with Beijing. The temporary seizure of power at the Foreign 
Affairs Ministry and its subsidiary organs, including the 
Commission of Overseas Chinese Affairs, added encouragement to 
ultra-leftists overseas. Thus, in 1967, many incidents took 
place involving Chinese people in Macao and Hong Kong, and in 
Mongolia, Burma and Cambodia, affected and stimulated by the 
Cultural Revolution.
The involvement of overseas Chines in local politics 
became visible in the first place through their propaganda 
activities --wearing Mao badges and studying Mao's works. 
Chinese embassy personnel, many of whom had recently returned 
from China after being immersed into the Cultural Revolution 
and instructed in revolutionary diplomacy, openly disseminated 
Mao's works and conducted study sessions. This propaganda,
8See, Chang Chak Yan, "Overseas Chinese in China's 
Policy", in China Quarterly, no.82, June 1980, pp.281-303.
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representing the official Chinese line, helped to inspire the 
radical overseas Chinese, while at the same time certainly 
provoking local governments and local people, in places such 
as Burma, Nepal and Indonesia. In January 1967, the Burmese 
government responded by banning the wearing of badges or 
buttons other than those authorised by the government, but 
this order was ignored by many Chinese students. Inevitably, 
a series of clashes took place between ethnic Chinese and 
Burmese in Rangoon. The Burmese government chose to back the 
anti-Chinese sentiment and activities. In turn, the Chinese 
government responded strongly, censuring the Burmese 
government for "carrying out frantic anti-China and anti- 
Chinese activities with the obvious aim of fanning up class 
contradictions".9
The People's Daily even denounced the Ne Win government as 
reactionary and fascist, praising the revolutionary successes 
of the Burmese Communist Party against the "oppressive 
government of Burma". It also declared that Burma's national 
democratic revolution had taken a new and important step 
forward.10 In a message to the Chinese community in Burma, the 
Commission of Overseas Chinese Affairs —  then under the 
control of Red Guards -- proclaimed that "the masses of 
patriotic overseas Chinese" in Burma would close ranks with 
all forces which could be united against the enemy and form 
the broadest united front in the anti-persecution struggle.11 
This line indicated a considerable change in China's position
9Beiiing Review, no.46, 10 November, 1967.
10The People's Daily. Beijing 30 June, 1967.
nNCNA Daily Bulletin. 1 July, 1967.
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from earlier years, when China had discouraged overseas 
Chinese political activities.
In the case of Cambodia, the encouragement of Red Guard 
activities among the overseas Chinese created a serious 
disturbance in the once friendly Sino-Cambodian relations. 
Prince Norodom Sihanouk, the President of Cambodia, denounced 
the "export" of the Cultural Revolution and China's 
interference in Cambodian internal affairs. The Cambodian 
government ordered the closure of five Chinese-language 
journals in Phnom Penh, and the Sino-Cambodian Friendship 
Association was dissolved. On 13 September, 1967, the Prince, 
speaking before a mass rally outside the royal palace, 
announced his intention to withdraw Cambodian embassy 
personnel in Beijing, leaving the embassy to one or two 
caretakers.12
Moreover, through the direct, influence of the Cultural 
Revolution, China cultivated ties with insurgent communist 
parties in Thailand, Malaysia, Burma, Indonesia and the 
Philippines. Besides endorsing the call for armed struggle 
against the central government in those countries, Beijing 
frequently provided material support to some of these parties 
and set up clandestine radio stations on Chinese territory to 
serve them. Overseas Chinese were encouraged to participate in 
revolutionary activities, especially during 1966-67. Such a 
shift in China's foreign policy and the radicalization of its 
overseas Chinese policy also affected Beijing's policy on 
Macao and Hong Kong. A series of riots took place in the two
12Melvin Gurtov, China and Southeast Asia —  the politics of 
survival; a study of foreign policy interaction, The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, Baltimore 1975. p.121.
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territories, which in some way typify the events which 
happened elsewhere.
4-2 Demonstrations and riots in Macao
Macao lies across the Pearl River from China, about 64 
kilometres (40 miles) west of Hong Kong. The area of the ter­
ritory is about 16 square kilometres (six square miles). The 
population in December 1966 was approximately 300,000, over 
96% of which were Chinese.
After their arrival in the Indian Ocean in 1498 and a 
short period of operation in southern India, the Portuguese 
established the administrative and political centre of their 
Asian empire at Goa. Shortly afterwards, the Portuguese in 
Asia were confident that they could initiate political and 
economic relations with China. They were the first Europeans, 
at the end of the 15th century, to explore Macao. Several 
Portuguese adventurers came to this tiny set of islands 
between 1497 and 1553. By the mid-1550s, Ming officials 
permitted the Portuguese to use sites on the Guangdong coast, 
first Sahang-Ch'uan, then Lampacau and finally Macao. 
Gradually, Portuguese traders, missionaries and merchants came 
to build houses and establish residence. At that time the 
Portuguese paid symbolic rent to the Chinese government for 
their land. According to the official Chinese historical 
records, in 1774 and 1778, the civil administration of Macao 
was under the jurisdiction of a senior magistrate, who stayed 
at Wanghia to execute the imperial ordinances.
In 1887, when China was facing great internal turmoil, the 
Portuguese were in a position to make demands on China. On 26 
March 1887, the Chinese Qing Dynasty government signed an
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agreement with the Portuguese government, known as the 
Protocol of Lisbon. Its principal provisions were:
Article 1: A treaty of friendship and commerce with a
most-favoured-nation clause would be concluded and signed at 
Peking.
Article 2: China confirmed the perpetual occupation and 
government of Macao and its dependencies by Portugal, as any 
other Portuguese possession.
Article 3: Portugal engaged never to give up Macao or its 
dependencies without prior agreement with China.
Article 4: Portugal engaged never to cooperate in opium
trading in Macao in the same way as England had done in Hong 
Kong.
On 1 December, 1887, the Sino-Portuguese treaty was signed 
in Beijing, confirming in entirety all the provisions of the 
Protocol of Lisbon by yielding all rights to Portugal.13 
Since that time, Macao has had relatively correct relations 
with China. During the Second World war, the Nationalist 
government abolished several unequal treaties with France and 
Great Britain, but did not challenge the Lisbon treaty. In 
recognition of this de facto situation, the Nationalist 
government continued to maintain an office for the 
“Commissioner of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs" in Macao. 
After the establishment of the People's Republic on the 
mainland in 1949, Portugal--unlike Great Britain— refused to 
recognise the Communist government and continued to maintain 
diplomatic relations with the Nationalist government, allowing
l3Chinese Maritime Customs, Treaties, Conventions, etc. 
between China and Foreign States, Shanghai, 1917. vol. 1, 
p. 273.
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the Nationalists' "commissioner of foreign affairs" in Macao 
to function normally.
However, Portugal's non-recognition of the PRC and the 
continued residence of the Nationalist commissioner in Macao 
seemed not to affect its presence in Macao. Macao maintained 
reasonably good relations with the mainland, although several 
border incidents took place between the two sides. The most 
serious such incident between the Portuguese garrison and 
Chinese guards occurred in July 1952, in which 39 Chinese were 
killed. Beijing, however, did not apply direct military 
pressure on the Portuguese, but chose instead to cut off all 
supplies. Macao was virtually blockaded. After several weeks 
of negotiations, the two sides reached an agreement. The Macao 
government stated: "...there was damage to both sides and this 
will be carefully examined and considered in order to 
establish compensation within a great spirit of conciliation 
and understanding and by agreement between both sides."14
A New China News Agency press release in Guangdong said 
that "the Macao government had given a written apology and a 
guarantee against the recurrence of any similar events". It 
was reported that the Portuguese had undertaken to withdraw 
certain sentries from beyond the Barrier Gate, and to make 
other adjustments to their defence, including turning around 
some ancient bronze cannons so that they no longer menaced 
China. A compensation by the Portuguese was also paid.15
Another important public protest on Macao was made by China
14Anthony R. Dicks, "Macao: Legal Fiction and Gunboat
Diplomacy" in Goran Aijmer edited, Leadership on the China 
Coast. Curzon Press London and Malmo, 1984, p. 95.
15Dicks, ibid. p.96.
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in 1963. Nationalist Chinese had carried out guerrilla raids 
in Guangdong province and had fled on the high seas. They were 
picked up by Portuguese naval forces and imprisoned in Macao. 
The Guangdong provincial government demanded the return of 
seven alleged Nationalist saboteurs, accusing the Portuguese 
of perpetrating a Mvery unfriendly act in sending a boat to 
pick them up in China's territorial waters".16
It would seem that the Chinese government seldom made 
official protests -- rarely, even acknowledging publicly the 
existence of the Portuguese authorities in Macao. When 
necessary, Beijing preferred to use non-public channels. This 
was the case in 1956, at the time of the Portuguese 
celebration of the four hundredth anniversary of the founding 
of the colony. At that time Zhou Enlai told the governor of 
Hong Kong, Sir Alexander Grantham, that the Chinese government 
and Chinese people did not like these celebrations, nor would 
Chinese people in Macao and Hong Kong. The message was passed 
by Grantham to the governor of Macao, and apparently all 
celebrations were cancelled. Grantham believed that "the Macao 
government, or at any rate some of the personnel, had better 
back-door contacts with the Chinese authorities than [the 
British] had, despite the fact that Portugal did not recognize 
Peking and that a diplomatic representative of the Nationalist 
government resided in Macao". He thought the reason for this 
was that "the Anglo-Saxon is more rigid and less subtle than 
is the Latin".17
16Far East Economic Review (FEER) , 8 December, 19 66,
p. 503 .
17Alexander Grantham, Via Ports -- from Hong Kong to Hong 
Kong, Hong Kong University Press, Hong Kong, 1965. p.181.
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Macao's existence after that incident was stable, for 
there were no further serious disturbances in its relations 
with China until the Cultural Revolution. The primary reasons 
for China's continued tolerance of Macao existing as a 
Portuguese colony were similar to these that applied to Hong 
Kong. Macao was an important window for China to the outside 
world and an important source for China's foreign currency.
More significantly, Beijing was concerned that Hong Kong 
might be destabilized as a result of any upheavals in Macao. 
China's position over Macao was that "when conditions are
ripe", the Macao issue "should be settled peacefully through
negotiations and that, pending a settlement, the status guo
should be maintained."18
This policy was shaken by the Cultural Revolution in late 
1966, when a confrontation between local leftist Chinese 
elements and the Macao police provoked civil disturbances. The 
trouble first broke out in November on Taipa island, one of 
the two small islands which form part of Macao. A Chinese 
school on Taipa had applied to the local government for
permission to demolish an old building, but had failed to 
obtain a response from the Portuguese bureaucracy. The school 
authorities therefore took matters into their own hands, and 
began the work without a permit. On 15 November, 1966, when 
Macao policemen tried to stop the construction, fighting broke 
out between the workmen and the police. Ten policemen and 65 
workers were involved, and about 2 0 Chinese workmen and three 
policemen were injured. Most of the workers belonged to the 
pro-Beijing trade union in Macao, and they then called for
18People's China and International Law--A Document Study 
p.380.
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support on leftist students who were indoctrinated in the 
Cultural Revolution and Mao's thought.19
Next day, a leftist association sent representatives to 
present the following five demands for the settlement of the 
affair: 1) Major Antunes, assistant commandant of police, and 
Senhor Andrade, district officer of the island, should be dis­
missed and punished for their part in the incident; 2) the 
Macao government should make a public apology for the 
incident; 3) all police truncheons should be burnt; 4) 
compensation should be paid to people wounded or disabled in 
the incident; 5) the government should give an undertaking 
that Chinese residents would not be assaulted again.20
The Portuguese authorities did not take immediate action 
on the demands. From 16 November to 1 December, 1966, small 
demonstrations against the Portuguese continued. By 2 
December, large-scale riots had occurred in the streets and 
even the governor's office was invaded. The rioters were 
primarily young students and'workmen. Some of them wore red 
armbands, shouted Communist slogans and carried small red 
books containing quotations from Mao Zedong. When the rioting 
was at its height, Portuguese troops intervened, which only 
further incited the Chinese demonstrators. The riot led to 
eight people being killed, 212 injured and 61 arrested.21
After 4 December, there was no more rioting, and an 
eighteen-hour a day curfew was imposed by the police and army, 
who patrolled the streets in force with armoured cars,
l9FEER, 8 December, 19 66.
20Beiiinq Review, no. 50, 9 December, 19 66.
llMacao, Asia Yearbook, 1968, p. 230.
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allowing only a few hours each day for people to go out and 
besiege the food shops.22
China's initial response to the incident was a broadcast 
statement, declaring that "the Portuguese authorities have 
remained insolent and unreasonable, and have delayed their 
reply to the Chinese community's demands."23
China's intervention became more obvious and direct after 
8 December, partly because the leftist leaders in Macao were 
in some disarray. On 8 December, a mass rally was held across 
the border in Guangdong province, attended by several senior 
officials, including the vice-governor of the province, at 
which the Portuguese were accused of "premeditated fascist 
atrocities against Chinese nationals". On two days, 8 and 9 
December, several Chinese gunboats steamed backwards and 
forwards in formation outside the harbour mouth near the path 
of the hydrofoils, "implying Chinese refusal to recognize that 
Macao's waters were under Portuguese jurisdiction."24
The following demands were put forward by the director of 
the foreign affairs bureau of the Guangdong provincial 
government in the name of the Chinese government: 1) the
Portuguese authorities must immediately and unconditionally 
accept the demands of the Taipa residents, put forward on 18 
November; 2) they must immediately and unconditionally accept 
the demands of the Macao Chinese Students' Federation, put 
forward on 5 December; 3) they must immediately offer 
apologies to all Chinese residents for their mistakes, and
22Dicks ibid. p. 110.
23Dicks ibid. p. 108.
24FEER, 16 December, 1966, pp. 543-44.
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punish the commandant of the armed forces, the commandant and 
assistant commandant of the police, and the district officer 
of Taipa; and 4) they must effectively guarantee that no 
Kuomintang agents would ever again be allowed to operate in 
Macao, and immediately return the seven Kuomintang agents 
taken by Macao after the Portuguese gunboat had intruded into 
Chinese waters in June 1963 .25
Under such strong internal as well as external pressure, 
the Portuguese authorities found it difficult to resist these 
demands. Thus, on 12 December, the governor, Brigadier General 
de Carvalho, declared that the Macao government was prepared 
to accept all the demands made, of it. The governor was 
reported to have said: "It has long been the main concern of 
the government to maintain and develop Sino-Portuguese 
friendship and foster the mutual understanding developed over 
the centuries. Therefore, in accordance with the wishes of the 
Macao residents, the government has resolved to accept fully 
the demands put forward by the foreign affairs bureau of 
Guangdong Province."26
Negotiations began between the Macao government and repre­
sentatives of Macao's Chinese leftists soon after the 
governor's statement. The issues to be negotiated included the 
question of compensation, the Nationalist presence in Macao, 
repatriation of Chinese who had fled from the mainland, and 
punishment of the Portuguese officials responsible for the 
incident. A final agreement was reached on 29 January 1967. 
Under a huge portrait of Mao Zedong, Governor de Carvalho, on
25Dicks, ibid. p. 112.
26Dicks, ibid. pp.114-115.
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behalf of Portugal, signed the capitulation agreement. The 
Portuguese agreed to four main points: they would take full 
responsibility for the December riots; they would punish 
responsible officials; they would compensate the victims to 
the tune of over HK$2 million; and they would ban the 
Kuomintang organisations from Macao.27
A Chinese-language newspaper in Hong Kong reported that 
Portugal had consented to deport.eight prominent Kuomintang 
leaders from Macao, to ban seven pro-Kuomintang organisations 
involving teachers and trade unionists; to hand over to 
Guangdong any Kuomintang agents found operating in Macao in 
the future; and to deal likewise with all illegal immigrants 
from China. Above all, Portugal yielded to Beijing's demand 
that the "seven agents of the Chiang Kai-shek gang" who had 
been in Macao's custody, be turned over to the PRC for 
"disposition", in spite of repeated protests from the 
Nationalist government in Taipei.28
The Portuguese capitulation marked an overwhelming victory 
for the Chinese leftists in Macao. The New China News Agency, 
in its news release of 31 January, commented that: "...the
Chinese residents in Macao, armed with the thoughts of Mao 
Zedong, carried out a broad mass action against the Portuguese 
authorities, beginning on 25 January... The Portuguese 
authorities in Macao soon found themselves helpless in the 
vast ocean of concerted sanctions by the 200,000 and more 
Chinese residents. Having had their heads knocked hard by the 
Chinese compatriots in Macao, the Portuguese authorities were
21FEER, 2 February, 1966.
28Ibid . , p.151.
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at last forced openly to admit their guilt before the Chinese 
residents in Macao."29
The major reason that the Portuguese yielded to every 
demand was that they perceived a possible PRC military 
intervention, which they could not have resisted. Portugal had 
a garrison of less than a thousand troops,/ and neither 
Portugal nor any other country could send any substantial 
military assistance to defend Macao. In addition, the 
Portuguese troops in Macao, as well as the police, had very 
little expertise in riot control and, it was therefore 
difficult for the government to control the situation, 
especially when a striking show of popular support was 
organised by the radical leftists.
China played an active role during the whole affair. Not 
only did it publicly express support for and encouragement of 
the leftists, but it also manipulated the leftists' 
negotiations with the Macao government. It was believed that 
Ho Yin, Chairman of the Chinese chamber of commerce in Macao 
and a pro-Communist leader there, made a trip to the mainland 
to ask for instructions from the Chinese government before 
entering negotiations with the Portuguese. It was clear that 
in accordance with the then current Cultural Revolution line, 
China's involvement was more direct. On the other hand, 
Beijing also exploited the event and achieved its major goal 
of eliminating the Kuomintang presence from Macao.
However, China did not over-exploit the disturbances. To 
maintain the status quo in Macao was still China's major 
concern. In Beijing's view, Macao, as well as Hong Kong, was
29Dicks, ibid., p. 124.
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more significant for China's commercial interests than for its 
political interests. In Macao, politics still took second 
place to economics. Such a strategy was reflected in China's 
refusal to accept Portugal's offer to abandon Macao. It was 
reported that following the riots, the governor had told Ho 
Yin that the Portuguese would be more than willing to 
surrender Macao permanently, provided 1) that they were 
requested to go by China, so that no embarrassing precedent 
was created in respect of other Portuguese possessions, and 2) 
that they were given a reasonable time to withdraw.30
China was not ready to accept such a dramatic offer, 
apparently because it would have damaged China's commercial 
interests and, more importantly, because such- a change in 
sovereignty would have been immediately felt in Hong Kong, 
adversely affecting its prosperity and stability. If Beijing 
had taken Macao, the next logical step would have been to take 
Hong Kong, but because of international complications and 
possible British resistance, such an action would have been 
too risky at that time.
The confrontation between Chinese leftists and the Macao 
authorities was thus resolved as a result of the Portuguese 
yielding to all the Chinese demands. Consequently, Beijing 
firmly consolidated its position in influencing Macao's 
affairs. On the other hand, the victory of the leftists in 
Macao had a strong impact on Hong Kong. When a similar 
incident took place in Hong Kong, China was faced with an even 
more difficult situation and its carefully pieced together 
policy was thus placed under serious challenge.
30Dicks, ibid., p. 116.
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4-3 Hong Kong
Having successfully intimidated the Portuguese in Macao, 
the pro-PRC left-wing Chinese thought a similar campaign in 
the British colony would be equally successful. At that time, 
with the upsurge of xenophobia and an anti-foreign and anti­
imperialist mood, particularly among the Red Guards, Britain 
was being singled out as a special target. From February 1967 
onward, the Chinese government repeatedly asked the British 
government not allow American naval servicemen to take their 
leave in Hong Kong. The pro-communist students occasionally 
held meetings at the City Hall, where lectures on Mao Zedong 
thought were given. The governor of Hong Kong, Sir David 
Trench, was criticized by the pro-Communist Chinese papers in 
Hong Kong, Ta Kung Pao and Wen Hui Pao, for aiding American 
and Kuomintang elements in their "criminal activities". Sir 
David was also criticized for his participation in a golf 
tournament ceremony during which the flags of the United 
Kingdom and Nationalist China were flying together in Hong 
Kong. The Chinese newspapers regarded such actions as an 
indication of British support for the "Two-China Policy".31
The incident, which led to a full-scale political campaign 
organized by pro-Communist banks, trade unions, commercial or­
ganizations and schools, was a minor labour dispute in a 
factory called Hong Kong Artificial Flower Works. The original 
dispute arose in April 1967, over the wages of 650 workers. 
When the Labour Department of the Hong Kong government failed 
to mediate between the workers and the employers, the factory
31Stephen Pan and Raymond J de. Jaegher, Peking's Red 
Guards -- the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, Twin 
Circle Publishing Company, New York, 1968, p.319.
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was closed and the workers were dismissed.32
On 6 May, a group of dismissed workers tried prevent the 
removal of goods by the management and the police finally 
stepped in and 21 men were arrested. The pro-Communist trade 
unions organized supporting demonstrations over the following 
days and there were further clashes with the police. There was 
serious rioting, with the rioters shouting Communist slogans 
and reading quotations from Mao Zedong. Mobs also attacked the 
police, burned cars, overturned buses, set fire to buildings 
and plundered property. Anti-riot squads were sent to stop the 
disturbances and a curfew was imposed in the affected areas. 
On 17 May, the British government issued a statement 
supporting the Hong Kong government, which read:
"Her Majesty's government fully supports the Hong Kong 
government in fulfilling its duty, both in maintaining law and 
order and in the efforts it is making to bring about a 
settlement of the industrial dispute."33
The Hong Kong government's hard-line policy in dealing 
with the disturbances was challenged by a campaign of 
intimidation. An "All-Circles Anti-Persecution Struggle 
Committee" was set up, with representatives from all the pro- 
Communist organizations in Hong Kong, and the pro-Communist 
press launched a propaganda war against the British 
authorities.
Shortly after the demonstrations and strikes in Hong Kong, 
anti-British demonstrations were held in China. Demonstrators 
marched into the British consulate in Guangzhou and Shanghai 
and into the office of the British charge d ' affaires in
32Hong Kong, Report for the Year 1967, Hong Kong 
Government Press, 1968. p.3.
33"Hong Kong: Kowloon Disturbances." Text of Statement
issued by Commonwealth Office, 17 May, 1967.
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Beijing. On 15 May, the Chinese Foreign Affairs Ministry 
(which was in a situation of chaos, with almost all senior 
officials under attack from the Red Guards) issued a statement 
protesting against the action of the British authorities 
against Chinese residents in Hong Kong. The statement demanded 
that the Hong Kong government accept immediately the just 
demands of Chinese workers and residents in Hong Kong; cease 
all fascist actions; release all arrested people; punish those 
responsible for the bloodshed; apologize to the victims and 
pay compensation; and guarantee that similar incidents would 
not reoccur.34
The People's Daily published a series of editorials and 
commentaries, accusing the Hong Kong authorities in harsh 
terms of provoking Chinese people. On 18 May, a rally was held 
in Beijing attended by some senior Chinese leaders from the 
CPC and the government, including Zhou Enlai and Chen Yi. 
Further protests were made by the Chinese Foreign Affairs 
Ministry. On 15 June, Beijing delivered a strongly-worded note 
to the British charge d'affaires, Donald Hopson, presenting 
its "most urgent and strongest protest" to the British 
government and the Hong Kong government for their "fascist 
atrocities" against Chinese residents. Beijing also accused 
the Hong Kong authorities of allowing Hong Kong to be used by 
the "American imperialists" as a base for the Vietnam war. The 
protest stated:
"It must be pointed out that these large-scale bloody 
atrocities perpetrated by the British authorities in Hong Kong 
are the result of long premeditation and are an integral part 
of the British government's scheme of collusion with US im­
perialism against China. On the one hand, in coordination with 
the US imperialist war being escalated in Vietnam, the British
34Peoole's Daily. 15 May, 19 67.
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government is continuing to provide the United States with 
Hong Kong as a base for aggression against Vietnam, in 
disregard of the repeated solemn warnings of the Chinese 
government, and on the other hand, it is steadily stepping up 
various hostile measures against China in Hong Kong... 
Particularly since the unfolding of the Great Proletarian 
Cultural Revolution in China, the British authorities in Hong 
Kong have carried out repeated military and police manoeuvres 
hostile to China and aimed at the .bloody suppression of 
Chinese residents in Hong Kong, vainly attempting to exclude 
the great influence of China's Proletarian Cultural Revolution 
by high-handed tactics.,|3;)
In the sensitive area of the land frontier with China there 
was a propaganda war carried out on the Chinese side of the 
border. On 24 June, 1967, there was a clash between Chinese 
peasants and the Hong Kong police in the border town of Sha 
Tau Kok. A crowd of about 200 people, using stones, knives and 
sticks, attacked the police post in the town, but were finally 
dispersed by gas shells. On 8 July, there was a further 
demonstration and riot against the British in Sha Tau Kok. The 
demonstrators from over the border were supported by Chinese 
militiamen. A detachment of the British army was called out to 
assist the police, and the troops used tear gas and riot guns 
firing wooden projectiles at the demonstrators. The incident 
left five policemen dead and another eleven wounded.36,
The British charge d'affaires in Beijing protested to the 
Chinese Foreign Affairs Ministry, but the protest was 
rejected. However, in the eyes of the Hong Kong government, 
the incident was not an attempt at armed invasion of the 
colony, as there were no regular units of the Chinese army 
involved.37
The border remained unsettled and some Chinese farmers
35Beiiincf Review, no.22, 26 May, 1967.
36Hong Kong/ Report for the Year 19 67, ibid., p. 12.
37Ibid. , p. 12 .
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living on the Chinese side occasionally took the opportunity 
to cross the border to make trouble. The border was therefore 
closed by the British authorities, except for the railway 
service through Lowu. Inhabitants on both sides were thus 
prevented, from crossing the border.38
China protested against Britain's action, but did not 
exploit the matter further, stressing the importance of re­
opening the border. It said that the closure of the border 
meant: "...sabotaging the customary intercourse along the
entire border, adversely affecting productive labour and 
normal life of the inhabitants on both sides of the border and 
encroaching upon their traditional rights and interests."39
However, Beijing's support of Hong Kong leftrwing elements 
remained largely limited to moral support, though the pro­
communist press in Hong Kong interpreted them in a more 
positive way. In fact, in July, Zhou Enlai, presumably 
concerned about Hong Kong's stability and China's long-term 
interests, made efforts to restrain Red Guard style activities 
in Hong Kong. Some prominent members of pro-Communist 
organizations and senior officials of the New China News 
Agency were called back to Beijing and received by Zhou, who 
told them that Hong Kong was not Beijing, and that wall 
posters were not appropriate for Hong Kong's situation. He 
also urged them to re-study China's Hong Kong policy formed in 
the 1950s, and to pay more attention to how to conduct long­
38Ibid. , p. 13 .
i9NCNA Daily Bulletin, 15 August, 1967.
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term struggle.40 Thus, although the pro-Communist press 
continued a stream of inflammatory propaganda, Communist or­
ganizations began to moderate their activities.41
Meanwhile, the Hong Kong government perceived the 
moderation of Communist activity to be a result of its own 
hard-line policy. With the approval and support of the British 
government to "take all necessary measures to maintain peace 
and security in Hong Kong", the Hong Kong authorities decided 
to adopt an even harder attitude. On 12 July, the government 
announced that it was determined to maintain the initiative of 
not yielding to Communist demands. The government also decided 
to search for Communist hide-outs and arsenals, the action 
beginning on 12 July, 1967. On that day and on the days 
following, large groups of police, backed up by military 
units, raided the principal Communist strongholds, including 
union premises and schools. Home-made weapons and explosives 
were found. Thirty-two people were arrested and their weapons 
seized. From 12 July to the end of that month, Hong Kong 
policemen searched more than 20 pro-Communist labour 
organizations and 20 private residences. About 1,000 people 
were arrested, 400 of whom were imprisoned.42
Further action against pro-Communist newspapers was taken. 
In July and August, three employees of the New China New 
Agency in Hong Kong were arrested for taking part in an 
illegal assembly. In August, three pro-Communist newspapers
40Interview with Szeto Keung in April 1989, Szeto is a 
senior member of the NCNA in Hong Kong, and has worked for the 
NCNA since 1950s.
41Interview with Szeto.
42Hong Kong, Report for the Year 19 67, ibid., p. 15.
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were suppressed and two of their editors prosecuted for 
sedition. On 7 September, 1967, a court decided that they were 
guilty and sentenced them to from two to three years in 
prison.43
The severe action taken by the Hong Kong authorities 
against the pro-Communist journalists and newspapers 
inevitably provoked a reaction in China. On 20 August, 1967, 
Beijing delivered a 48-hour ultimatum to Donald C. Hopson, 
British charge d'affaires in Beijing, demanding that the 
British release all three employees of the NCNA and withdraw 
action against the newspapers and their editors. It warned 
that the British would bear the consequences if the demands 
were not met. But the note was rejected on the spot by the 
British diplomat on the grounds that it was couched in 
"grossly offensive language".44 On 22 August, a demonstration 
attended by 10,000 people was held in Beijing outside the 
office of the British charge d 'affaires. Red Guards bombarded 
the British chancery with bottles of petrol, setting it 
aflame. Hopson was forced to confess to his "sins". Chinese 
troops eventually arrived to rescue the diplomats, but the 
building was burnt down.4:>
In the mean time, the British government undertook several 
retaliatory measures against the Chinese diplomatic mission in 
London. The diplomatic mission was kept under a close and con­
stant police watch. In August, two clashes between Chinese 
diplomats and the British police took place in which two
43Ibid. , p. 14.
44Daily Telegraph, London 21 August, 1967.
45The Guardian, London, 2 3 August, 1967.
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policemen and three Chinese diplomats were injured. The 
clashes, in the eyes of the British government, were a 
deliberate attempt by the Chinese to provoke the British 
authorities to violence, in order to justify Chinese action 
against the British mission in Beijing.46
In return, Beijing accused the British government of 
instigating police violence against Chinese diplomats. As a 
retaliatory measure, it announced that members of the British 
diplomatic mission would be confined to their office buildings 
and to their flats in a nearby compound. In addition, no 
Britons would be allowed to leave China without permission 
from the Foreign Affairs Ministry, and all exit permits 
already issued to Britons would be cancelled.47 Diplomatic 
ties between the two countries were thus close to breaking 
point.
Although the burning down of^  the office of the British 
charge d 'affaires became the turning point for Zhou Enlai to 
regain his control over China's external policy, the incident 
caused great confusion among the leftists in Hong Kong. They 
received news of the burning down of the British office as an 
encouraging signal for more radical action against the Hong 
Kong authorities.48 Consequently, the confrontation entered a 
new phase of indiscriminate "bomb" attacks--a type of urban 
guerrilla warfare involving placing of bombs in public areas. 
Bomb attacks -- essentially part of a propaganda campaign to
46John Cooper, Colony in Conflict: The Hong Kong
Disturbances May 1967-January 1968, Swindon Book Company, Hong 
Kong, 1969. p.263.
47"Chinese Government's Protest to British Government", in 
Beijing Review, no.37, 8 September, 1967, p.29.
48Interview with Szeto.
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stimulate flagging mass support by a show of strength—  
continued as an almost daily occurrence until the end of 
December 1967. There were 8,074 suspicious bombs dealt with by 
the police and bomb experts. Fifteen people were killed by 
bomb explosions, including two members of the police, an army 
sergeant and an officer of the fire service.49
Several incidents also took place along the border between 
the mainland and Hong Kong. On the morning of 4 August, a 
large group of peasants rushed to the Hong Kong border from 
the Chinese side to demonstrate, massing around the 
immigration office. British soldiers responded with tear gas 
and several peasants were injured.50 About a week later, on 11 
August 1967, another Chinese Red Guard mob crossed the Hong 
Kong border from China, captured a border post, seized its 
weapons, and forced Trevor Bedford, a British official, to 
sign a paper agreeing to remove the barbed wire barricade and 
to pay compensation to a Chinese peasant who had been wounded 
by a mine placed by the British authorities at the barricade. 
The seized weapons, together with the British hostage, were 
returned to the British.'’1
However, these two incidents appeared to have been 
organized locally by Red Guards. The People's Liberation Army 
not only did not help the demonstrators cross to the British 
side, but made efforts to prevent further incursions. Indeed, 
Beijing's attitude towards the disturbances throughout was a 
reactive one. The top level leadership showed no intention of
49Hong Kong, Report for the Year 1967, ibid., pp.15-16.
50Ibid. , p. 13.
51Mincr Pao, Hong Kong, 1 December, 1967.
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initiating a crisis. Beijing's policy toward Hong Kong 
remained fundamentally unchanged. It rejected a demand from 
the local military region to station troops on the Sino- 
British border.52
Beijing's support for the Communist community was largely 
restrained in terms of materials and money. Even at the 
beginning, no serious moves were contemplated against Hong 
Kong, though there were some attempts to pressure the British 
into accepting the demands of Hong Kong leftists. The burning 
down of the office of the British charge d 'affaires in Beijing 
was organized by radical Red Guards and was not the decision 
of the top level leadership.'*3
During the whole period, Beijing never used its most 
effective weapon— to cut the water supply and blockade the 
colony. On the contrary, it honoured the existing water supply 
agreement, so far as the consumption of normal supplies was 
concerned, on the date due, although no reply was made to Hong 
Kong's request for additional supplies. There were occasional 
disruptions to food supplies, but these were apparently 
carried out solely on local initiatives, partly because of 
action taking place on the mainland. A large part of China's 
frozen food industry, for instance, was located at Wuhan, 
scene of some the country's worst disturbances. In the first 
five months of 1967, Hong Kong imported a monthly average of 
175,000 live pigs, 99% of which came from China. Supplies 
dropped sharply in August and September, and some days these 
were down to 30% of normal. However, the Chinese authorities
52Interview with Zhen Weirong in April 1989, in Hong Kong. 
Zhen was an official at the time at the NCNA in Hong Kong.
53Dangdai Zhongguo Waijiao, ibid., p. 211.
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made strong efforts to maintain supplies.54 Troops were sent 
to keep the trains running across the border in order to 
ensure a continuing and profitable trade. Beijing's support 
for the strikes in Hong Kong thus remained purely declaratory. 
For instance, during the strike in the fish markets organized 
by the radical trade unionists in October 1967, food continued 
to reach Hong Kong by sea and by land from the mainland at a 
rate of 2,000 tonnes per day.55
Again in October 1967, all the top officials appointed by 
Beijing to work in Hong Kong were recalled for consultations. 
Beijing made it clear that the violence had gone far enough 
and that they should now concentrate on serving China's 
economic interests. They should regard the campaign against 
the British as a long-term affair which would require 
extensive preparatory work.-’6 Hong Kong left-wing leaders were 
told to make efforts to ensure that there would be no trouble 
during the Guangzhou Trade Fair. The Fair could not be held on 
its original date of 15 October because of disturbances within 
Guangdong province, and was held instead after a month's 
postponement, indicating that Beijing was aware of the need to 
restore international trade.57 Within Hong Kong, China's 
department stores and other commercial institutions also 
launched a campaign to win back their customers, with the 
peaceful slogan, "Love the Motherland--Buy National
S*FEER 14 September, 1967, pp. 536-537.
55Ma Ming edited, The Riot in Hong Kong, Sky Hoarse Book 
Co., Hong Kong, 1967, p.136.
56FEER, 9 September, 1967, p. 694.
57Ibid . , p . 69 5 .
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Products" .38
Beijing's desire for more normal relations with Hong Kong 
was also illustrated in its negotiations with the Hong Kong 
authorities to settle border problems. Talks initiated by the 
Chinese side were held in November 1967 between Hong Kong and 
Chinese border officials. By the end of the month, the two 
sides had reached an agreement. The British agreed partially 
to reopen the border to permit Chinese peasants to work on the 
Hong Kong side, and even compensated them for lost time when 
the border was closed. The Chinese authorities agreed to 
release two Hong Kong policemen back to the colony. These two 
policemen, who had inadvertently crossed the border while off- 
duty, had been forcibly detained by Chinese ,militiamen in 
September.39
China was determined to maintain Hong Kong's status quo. 
Clearly, economic reasons played an important role in such 
decision. Hong Kong was again was the most important place for 
Beijing to earn foreign currency and to conduct external 
trade. Chinese sales to Hong Kong before the disturbances 
amounted on average to US$ 1.5 million a day. Through the Hong 
Kong-registered firm, China Resources Ltd, the Chinese state 
trading corporations carried on a trade with Hong Kong which 
had developed rapidly since China's initial Hong Kong policy, 
formulated in the 1950s. China did a large part of its 
business with merchants in Western countries. In 1966, China's 
foreign exchange earnings in the colony were estimated as
™FEER, 9 September, 1967. p.694.
39Interview with Sir David Akers-Jones in April, 1989. Sir 
David was a senior member of the government of Hong Kong in 
1960s.
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follows:
HK$million
Exports to Hong Kong, minus imports.... 
Profits from importing and distribution
Profits from banking..................
Water charges.........................
Other economic activities.............
2 , 700
690 
.50 
. 14 
540
Total 3,994
These estimates, according to the Far East Economic 
Review's view, were minimum figures because they did not cover 
all items in the accounts. China's favourable balance of trade 
with Hong Kong was 17 percent in 1965, which rose by a further 
20 percent in 1966.60
By taking advantage of Hong Kong as a convenient com­
munications centre, China Resources Ltd maintained contact 
with nearly fifty governments which had official trade or 
political representation in the colony, among whom less than 
a third were represented in Beijing. The importance of Hong 
Kong as a place for China to purchase Western technology and 
equipment increased after the Soviet Union ceased its 
technological cooperation with China. Moreover, through Hong 
Kong, Beijing could obtain political as well as economic 
information from Western countries and even from Taiwan.
Thus, the maintenance of Hong Kong's stability was.still 
China's major consideration. Presumably, if law and order 
could not be maintained in the colony, business confidence, 
investment and the tourist trade would be curtailed and 
China's foreign exchange reserves would consequently be 
greatly decreased. Unfortunately, Beijing's reasoning was not 
fully understood by its representatives or by the pro-
60FEER, 7 June, 1967.
184
Communist community in Hong Kong. The disturbances had begun 
with a series of industrial disputes where the workers had 
justifiable reasons for complaint.61 But, afraid of being con­
sidered guilty of "economism" —  a Cultural Revolution term, 
the local cadres dropped the industrial and labour issues and 
shifted to a purely political level. Even the Far East 
Economic Review observed that there was "...a first class 
reservoir of discontent which could have been exploited by 
left-wing revolutionaries who had the people's good at heart, 
and who could have mounted a useful and constructive attack on 
the Hong Kong government's failures in the fields of 
education, recreation, medical services and welfare 
legislation, using all the frustrations which can simmer and 
occasionally boil over in over-crowded urban areas."62 The 
local cadres did not even try to exploit the presence of large 
numbers of US servicemen and a "spying" American consulate to 
arouse latent Chinese nationalism.
There existed difference between Zhou who wanted stability 
in Hong Kong and the radicals who did not. However, Zhou took 
every possible opportunity to persuade the communist 
organizations in Hong Kong to concentrate on mobilizing people 
and not to isolate themselves.63 However, the radical leaders 
of the pro-Communist community barricaded themselves into 
various shops, offices and schools, cutting themselves off 
from all contact with the Hong Kong masses. More importantly, 
once the issues of higher wages and better working conditions
6lFEER, 3 August, 1967.
62FEER, 3 August, 19 67.
63Interview with Szeto.
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had been ignored by the left-wing leaders, their programme 
became irrelevant for most workers. Political challenge to the 
Hong Kong authorities and an escalation of the violence had no 
real relevance to the Hong Kong situation and inevitably led 
to further confrontations with the forces of law and order.
As it was, the main burden of economic disruption caused 
by the disturbance fell on Communist-owned business 
enterprises. The pro-Communist left-wing department stores 
closed down for a strike and business dropped off. The 
Communist-controlled banks had to increase their financial 
advances to left-wing firms which took part in the "anti- 
suppression" campaign, and there was thus little commercial 
return on this money. These organizations made, contributions 
to the campaign funds out of profits that they would normally 
remit to China. The demonstrators and strikes had their wages 
made up by left-wing organizations. All this was a further 
drain on China's foreign exchange resources. In addition, in 
the first nine months of 1967, Hong Kong bought $1,610 million 
worth of goods from China--19% less than the previous year.64
What, then, caused the 1967 disturbances in Hong Kong? 
First of all, as has been discussed earlier, the origins of 
the disturbances stemmed directly from the Cultural Revolution 
on the mainland. The Cultural Revolution created among its 
adherents a fervent patriotism and an intense adulation of Mao 
Zedong and his teachings. It was claimed that the world had 
entered a "new phase of Mao Zedong thought, and conducting the 
propaganda of Mao's teachings became a central task of China's 
external policy. Hong Kong, as a British colony with a
mFEER, 14 September, 1967. p.537.
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capitalist system, was an affront to revolutionary doctrine 
and an obvious target for anti-imperialist zeal. In Hong Kong, 
China's influence was very strong and the Communists 
controlled considerable parts of Hong Kong's press, trade 
unions and schools. With the whole mainland involved in the 
revolution, the pro-Communist community in Hong Kong saw the 
time as ripe to carry out similar activities. Their aim was to 
bring pressure on the colonial authorities in Hong Kong and to 
achieve a swift Macao-style victory.
China's top leadership was aware of the importance of 
maintaining Hong Kong's stability, but Beijing's policy 
decision-making process was affected by the radicalization of 
the political situation. In fact, the authorities in Beijing 
were themselves in trouble during the turmoil of the Cultural 
Revolution and had no alternative but to come out in support 
when local Communists waged , struggle against British 
imperialism. Zhou Enlai claimed that the Central Committee was 
under great pressure at the time to take over Hong Kong.65 In 
Hong Kong, there was clear evidence that the local "soft- 
liners" among the pro-Communist community were inhibited by 
the hard core determined to assert their Maoism as required by 
the overspill of the Cultural Revolution. The soft-liners were 
regarded as Liuists and had no authority to influence 
tactics.66
It seemed that some of the radical leaders aimed at more 
than self-preservation and, considering that the time was 
ready for a take-over, attempted to exploit the situation.
65Interview with Mr Szeto.
6(,FEER, 20 June, 1967.
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They even declared that the PLA was already gathering on the 
border, which was not true.67
The British and Hong Kong governments judged that China 
would not intervene directly in Hong Kong's internal affairs 
and that it had no intention to take over Hong Kong. Although 
there were several rallies attended by senior Chinese leaders, 
there was no indication from the top that any further radical 
actions would be taken by the Chinese authorities.68
Therefore, the government of Hong Kong, from the beginning 
of the disturbances, adopted a hard-line policy, considering 
that a Macao-style solution of accepting Communist demands 
would only damage British domination of the colony. In dealing 
with the pro-Communist leftists, the Hong Kong authorities had 
the advantage of having witnessed what had happened in Macao 
when concessions were made namely, that the demands then 
escalated. The disturbances were firmly dealt with and no 
concessions were made. At the same time, both the British 
government and the Hong Kong government avoided involvement in 
any direct confrontation with the Chinese government. In the 
various open statements made the senior officials of the 
government of Hong Kong, the role played by Beijing was 
deliberately ignored.
The British succeeded in control the situation in Hong 
Kong. According to the Hong Kong government, there was no 
significant disruption in any of the major sectors of industry 
and trade. It stated that "industrial production was not af­
fected, exports continued at substantially higher levels than
67Interview with Szeto.
68Interview with Sir David Akers-Jones.
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in previous years and the tourist trade continued 
satisfactorily in spite of alarmist headlines in some overseas 
newspapers. 1,69
However, China and the pro-Communist community in Hong 
Kong suffered considerable losses, and probably also learned 
from the experience, as Liang Shangyun, then the deputy head 
of the NCNA in Hong Kong, later admitted:
"The struggle had no clear aim and cannot be said to have 
had a convincing basis. It was not necessarily advantageous to 
the leftists, but on the contrary, was very costly. More 
seriously, the leftists lost popular sympathy and support. The 
struggle aroused considerable disappointment among the Hong 
Kong people because the majority of them wished to maintain 
Hong Kong's stability and prosperity."70
Conclusion
Throughout its whole course, the Cultural Revolution 
affected China's domestic policies. Some radicals, whose 
influence lay in intellectual, , ideological and cultural 
affairs, continued to occupy positions of considerable 
importance. However, the most radical aspects of the Cultural 
Revolution were seen in the period of 1966-1968. After that 
time, those who had been responsible for national security, 
economic development and foreign relations returned to power 
and restored their authority over China's external decision 
making.
Beijing's efforts to normalise its diplomacy first became 
evident with Zhou Enlai's speech to a conference on China's 
foreign relations held in January 1968. In his speech, Zhou
69Hong Kong, Report for the Year 19 67, pp. 18-19.
70Liang Shangyun, Zhonggong zai Xianggang (The Chinese 
Communist Party in Hong Kong) Guang Jiao Jin Press, Hong Kong 
1986, p.109.
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emphasised the importance of conducting a correct policy and 
he criticised the error of "ultra-left trends" in China's 
foreign affairs. He also urged the strengthening of discipline 
among the diplomatic service.71
It is important to note that the basic guidelines of 
China's foreign policy, inherited from the period before the 
Cultural Revolution, were not modified, though there were some 
shifts, showing that the Cultural Revolution did have a 
certain impact on the country's external relations. However, 
the influence of the Cultural Revolution on Beijing's external 
policy was limited, both in terms of time and scope. Beijing's 
attitude towards the riots in Macao and Hong Kong suggested 
that the Chinese leaders, especially the top ones, were able 
to make a reasonably sober estimate of the situation even amid 
the turmoil of the Cultural Revolution, and were aware of 
China's fundamental interests. The ideological component in 
Chinese foreign policy was much more visible during these 
years, but Beijing managed to avoid making any actual 
revolutionary commitments, and its militant pronouncements 
normally went no further than general principles. Beijing was 
under strong pressure from the radicals in Beijing and Hong 
Kong to take over Macao and Hong Kong. Yet evidence suggests 
that Beijing, far from being committed to any substantial in­
volvement in the disturbances in Macao and Hong Kong, had no 
intention of regaining, for ideological reasons, sovereignty 
over Macao and Hong Kong and that it made clear that the 
existing status of Macao and Hong Kong suited China's 
intermediate as well as long-term goals.
1]Dangdai ZhonggGuo Waijiao, pp. 211-212.
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In the late 1960s, Chinese leaders became aware of the 
serious international pressures on China. Beijing particularly 
feared a Soviet military attack, which became more of a threat 
following the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and 
the enunciation of the Brezhnev doctrine justifying Soviet 
interference in the internal affairs of another socialist 
country. In March 1969, an armed clash between China and the 
Soviet Union took place on the disputed island of Zhen Bao 
(known as Damansky by the USSR). This clash further added to 
China's concerns. Thus, after 1968-69, Chinese leaders 
regarded the Soviet Union as the main military threat to their 
country, and to the world as whole, while they viewed the 
United States as a somewhat defensive power. .A strategy of 
anti-superpower hegemonism was set up which viewed the 
countries of Western Europe as an important counterbalance to 
the perceived Soviet threat. In this respect, Mao emphasised 
the need to win over these countries, such as Britain, France 
and West Germany. This strategy helped to improve Sino-British 
relations.
By October 1969, two important steps had been taken to 
lift Sino-British relations out of the earlier troubles of the 
Cultural Revolution. The Chinese and British governments each 
removed the additional restrictions which had been placed on 
the movement of the other's personnel in 19 67; and Anthony 
Grey, the Reuters correspondent in Beijing who had been 
arrested by Chinese authorities in July 1967, and the NCNA 
journalists in Hong Kong, were all released. At a special 
gathering, Zhou expressed his regrets to the British charge 
d ' affaires over the 1967 incident. He said that it occurred 
against the wishes of the Chinese government and the Communist
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Party; the crowd in Beijing had been angered by the arrest of 
the employees of the NCNA in Hong Kong, but it was the ubad 
elements" which had incited the attack on the British 
building.72
The disturbances in Hong Kong were largely a spill-over 
from the turmoil when the early part of the Cultural 
Revolution ended and when the top leadership led by Zhou Enlai 
regained control over China's external policy. The pro- 
Communist organisations in Hong Kong were then urged to take 
care of China's commercial interests and not to challenge the 
British role in the colony. No more incidents took place after 
1968 which could have shaken British authority, and Hong 
Kong's relations with the mainland remained reasonably calm.
The post-Cultural Revolution years saw dramatic changes in 
China's domestic policies. Economic development was recognized 
by the Chinese leaders as the main priority, and they were 
more concerned about Hong Kong's stability and prosperity than 
ever before, aware that the territory could make an extremely 
important contribution to the mainland's modernization. In 
this respect, it seemed to them that maintaining the status 
quo, with Hong Kong under British rule, would serve China's 
interests best.
72The building was reconstructed. Zhang Wenj in, then 
assistant to the Foreign Minister was told by Zhou Enlai to 
apologize to British charge d 'affaires in the reception of the 
reopening of the building. There were many people at the 
reception and Zhang failed to find a proper opportunity to do 
so. Zhang was criticized by Zhou for being "affected too 
deeply by left-wing trends". Zhou called the charge d'affaires 
and apologized to him for what had happened. See, Zhang 
Wenjin, "Recalling on Zhou Enlai", People's Daily. 5 March 
1991; Also see, Dangdai Zhongguo Waijiao, ibid., p.212.
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Chapter Five
China’s Programme of Modernization and 
its Impact on Hong Kong
After late 1978 the CPC tried to steer China into a large- 
scale restructuring of its political practices and its 
economic system. This new era has been described as the 
”Second Revolution” because it saw a fundamental changes in 
China's domestic and external policies.1
This chapter will first discuss the implications of the 
campaign entitled: "Practice is the only standard for
evaluating truth”. The campaign reflected the political crisis 
in the post-Mao period and helped bring about the emergence of 
China's pragmatic leadership. Ideologically, the campaign was 
the first major attempt to develop a standpoint which could 
justify flexibility and the re-orientation of ideology in the 
cause of economic development. The chapter will then proceed 
to examine the process by which the CPC shifted its focus from 
class struggle to modernization, and how this change shaped 
China's external policies -- leading to a new "independent 
foreign policy”. In parallel with its domestic changes, China 
adopted the open door policy as a major component of its 
international economic strategy, admitting the need for other 
countries' experience and foreign.investment. As part of this 
strategy, China introduced the policy of setting up special 
economic zones. The chapter will examine how China re-oriented 
its development programme by both reforming the internal 
economic system and opening the country to foreign influence 
and investment. Finally, there will be a consideration of the
‘See, Harry Harding, China's Second Revolution, Brookings 
Institute, Washington D.C., 1987.
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impact of China's modernization campaign on its Hong Kong 
policy and the resulting position of the British colony.
5-1 Ideological debate and the emergence of a more pragmatic 
leadership and policy
The fall of the "Gang of Four" marked the end of the Cul­
tural Revolution, but the legacy of the period remained. It 
was clear that China's development needed a break with the 
past, particularly from the legacy of the Cultural Revolution. 
Thus, a campaign emphasising the importance of practice was 
launched by those in the Party critical of the policies of the 
Cultural Revolution. It was led by Deng Xiaoping, a victim of 
the Cultural Revolution and a powerful political rival of Hua 
Guofeng -- Mao's successor.
The campaign was intensified in 1978. Conferences were 
held to explore its significance and authoritative articles 
were published which defended and amplified the anti-dogmatic 
stance. Throughout the summer and autumn of 1978, the first 
secretaries of the various provinces and the regional military 
commanders all contributed articles to the People's Daily on 
the importance of practice in seeking truth. Many 
organisations and provinces held educational conferences for 
cadres and the campaign developed beyond the ideological field 
into one of high political intensity. As the First Party 
Secretary of Jiangxi province told local cadres: "the current 
discussion on the 'criterion of truth' issue deals not only 
with the issue of theory, but also involves great as 
ideological and political question." He also warned of 
opponents who had "seriously" impeded the implementation the 
party's current policy and who, he said, should be dismissed
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from the party.2
The campaign emphasising practice as the only criterion 
for evaluating truth has had an important impact on China's 
policies in the post-Mao period. Politically, the campaign 
helped Deng Xiaoping to strengthen his position and promote 
his supporters. The changes of officials were important 
because they marked the rise of the reformers. These were 
people who favoured a sharper and more decisive break from 
both Maoism and the Soviet model, re-evaluating Mao's role in 
the post-1949 period. They also favoured a reduction in the 
role of ideology in politics and in economics, and the 
maintenance of the central state plan as the basic framework 
for conducting China's economy. Beneath this framework, 
though, they were prepared to see the role of market forces in 
the economy considerably expanded, particularly in the 
distribution of agricultural products and smaller consumer 
goods. They called for greater autonomy for factory managers, 
especially in determining levels of output and methods of 
production, and they wanted local governments given greater 
authority to make decisions about investments. The reformers 
were also prepared to increase the private ownership of small 
service enterprises in the cities, and of household management 
of agriculture in the countryside. In external relations, the 
reformers wanted to open China's doors to the outside world in 
order to absorb foreign investment and technology.3
As a result of the emergence of the pragmatic leadership
People's Daily. 29 September, 1978.
3Herry Harding made a profound discussion on the change 
of CPC leadership in the post-Mao China; See, Herry Harding, 
China's Second Revolution, Brookings Institute, Washington 
D.C., 1987.
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in the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Party Central 
Congress, the CPC decided on a fundamental shift in its work 
from class struggle to economic development. It also 
acknowledged fundamental changes in China's class situation 
and decided that after nearly 30 years of struggle and 
education, most members of the 'exploiting classes' had been 
transformed into working people earning their own living in 
socialist society.4
The shift in attention to the practical problems of
stimulating productive forces demanded a reinterpretation of 
the role of politics. Indeed, there was an intense debate 
among Chinese leaders and Chinese theoreticians on the
relationship between politics and economics. The debate 
centred around the question of the primacy of economics and 
whether or not politics could be decisive under certain
conditions. Chinese theoreticians regarded politics as the 
central expression of economics and considered that in a class 
society, economic interests were the most fundamental inter­
ests of the various classes. However, they argued that with an 
end to "the large-scale, turbulent class struggles", the major 
attention of politics in China should shift to socialist 
construction, in other words, to "carrying out the four 
modernizations". Party cadres were urged to "free themselves 
from the mental fetters of small producers". Ideological and 
political work was still stressed because it occupied a "place 
of prominence in all the work of the Party", but more 
attention was given to the integration of economic work and
4See Huang Guofeng: "Report on the Work of the Government 
to the Second Session of the Fifth National People's
Congress", People's Daily, 19 February, 1979; English text in 
Beijing Review.no.46. 16 November 1979.
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ideological and political work. In this context, a People's 
Daily editorial in May 1979 stated:
11. . .Ideological and political work in the new period means 
educating, mobilizing and organizing the masses to work for 
the modernizations, wholeheartedly and with one mind. We must 
help the masses understand that the four modernizations 
represent the fundamental interests of our country, our nation 
and our 800 million people, and are the only way forward."5
Since 1978, the role of the market in China's economy has 
been recognised, particularly as determining output and 
motivating producers. Leading Chinese economists have urged 
the government to make greater use of the market and reduce 
reliance on administrative planning. Consequently, with 
respect to producer goods, factories are being permitted to 
market their above-plan output directly, to vary prices of 
industrial goods within specific limits, and to purchase 
materials directly from other factories, by-passing the state 
distribution mechanism. In 1982, about 15 percent of gross 
industrial output value was "manufactured according to market 
demand. 1,6
The change of ideology after the Third Plenum also led to 
certain concessions to what used to be condemned as 
manifestations of capitalism. Private enterprises which, 
during the Cultural Revolution, were regarded as 
'capitalistic', gained a legitimate position and a role in 
'supporting the socialist economy' which was recognised by the 
authorities. Before 1966, there were some 2 million small in­
dividual producers providing goods and services to meet the
5"Strengthening Ideological and Political Work", Beijing 
Review, no.19, 11 May 1979.
6Ten Years of China's Economic System Reforms (Shinina 
Zhongguo Jingji Tizhi Gaige), The State Commission for 
Restructuring the Economic System, Beijing, 1988.
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market demands that the state-owned economy failed to deliver. 
These individual producers disappeared during the Cultural 
Revolution. After 1979, these private enterprises 
individual vendors, hawkers, restaurants, and shopkeepers —  
reemerged. Some 3 00,000 small private enterprises were 
reported to be operating in cities in 1979 and the number
increased to over 810,000 at the end 1980, and 2.6 million in
1983.7
The CPC also made efforts to rectify its policies
regarding the expatriate bourgeoisie and the returned overseas 
Chinese. Although Mao Zedong announced as early as 1956 that 
"members of the bourgeoisie have become administrative
personnel in joint state-private enterprises and are being 
transformed from exploiters into working people living by 
their own labour", they were actually never treated as 
"working people". During the Cultural Revolution, the 
expatriate bourgeoisie was regarded as a class enemy and their 
property and bank deposits were confiscated. As has already 
been discussed, Beijing's policy on overseas Chinese was 
seriously damaged during the Cultural Revolution.
The post-Cultural Revolution Chinese leadership realised 
that both the expatriate bourgeoisie and returned overseas 
Chinese constituted a vital link in the establishment of 
trade, joint ventures and international credit operations and, 
therefore, could play important roles in the country's 
modernisation. The expatriate bourgeoisie were given back 
their confiscated property and bank deposits. They were also 
offered various posts where they could use their expertise.
7X bid.
Since December 1977, overseas Chinese affairs have once 
again become an important issue on China's political agenda. 
A special authority, the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office, was 
established at the end of 1977 under the direction of Li 
Xiannian and Liao Chengzhi. Both the central and provincial 
authorities issued regulations ordering that houses and other 
property of overseas Chinese seized both during as well as 
before the Cultural Revolution be returned to their rightful 
owners. It has been repeatedly stated by the Chinese leaders 
that a thorough rehabilitation of the overseas Chinese and 
their relatives in China who were victims of frame-ups and 
false charges during the Cultural Revolution should be 
undertaken. The PRC's 1978 Constitution formally stated that 
"the legitimate rights and interests of the overseas Chinese 
and their relatives will be protected". It seems that this 
clause was more applicable to provide legal protection to the 
relatives of overseas Chinese within China and to prevent the 
recurrence of the Cultural Revolution. The CPC also stressed 
that overseas Chinese could play an important role in China's 
four modernisations. For example, a People's Daily editorial 
of 4 January 1978 stated that overseas Chinese and returned 
overseas Chinese "make up a significant force in China's 
social revolution and construction".8
It was clear that with the focus on economic development, 
the technical skills, management expertise, as well as 
industrial and trade connections which overseas Chinese could 
provide were valuable to the PRC.
Although the PRC's overseas Chinese policy during the
8People's Daily, 4 January 1979.
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post-Mao period was not fundamentally different from that of 
before the Cultural Revolution, there were some changes in its 
focus. Beijing wanted not only to raise its foreign exchange 
earnings through overseas remittances but also to encourage 
overseas Chinese to invest in the mainland's technological and 
managerial skills, and to make contributions to the 
reconstruction of their native towns.
The broad policy came under the framework of the 
'patriotic united front', which aimed at developing close 
contacts with the Huaqiao (Chinese citizens residing in other 
countries), Huayi (Chinese with foreign citizenship) and 
Tongbao (Chinese in Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan). The CPC was 
clearly intent on utilising overseas Chinese in the task of 
national unification. The 'four modernisations' appeared more 
attractive and less ideological than the earlier slogan 
'construction of the socialist motherland'. Nationalism and 
patriotism were used by Beijing to mobilize the overseas 
Chinese.
5-2 The 'open door' policy
The post-Mao Chinese leadership has seen economic modern­
ization as a precondition for long-term political, military 
and cultural security. The opening up of China's economy to 
the outside world, in foreign trade and investment, has become 
a key part of China's modernization programme. The campaign 
emphasizing practice contributed to the formulation of the 
policy of opening up China to the outside world. It also 
provided ideological legitimacy for a more flexible attitude 
towards the principle of self-reliance and a framework under 
which China could participate in the world economy in a more
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positive way.
The principle of self-reliance, which has its roots in 
China's exploitation by foreign powers, meant that "the main 
resources for development should be found within the unit 
concerned" and "external relations are not ruled out, but are 
limited to a subsidiary role". Self-reliance as a component of 
economic development included the following characteristics: 
1) the full utilisation of domestic resources, including 
labour and skills; 2) the rejection of indiscriminate imita­
tion of foreign methods in favour of accumulating indigenous 
experience suited to Chinese conditions; 3) reliance upon 
domestic saving for financial capital accumulation; and 4) the 
establishment of a comprehensive industrial system in China.9
In the Chinese view, political sovereignty and 
independence are inseparable from independence of the national 
economy; China should depend mainly on its own resources in 
economic development and beware of becoming too dependent on 
foreign trade and foreign finance. In theory, the principle of 
self-reliance does not mean economic isolationism. Mao 
stressed: "We have put forward the slogan of learning from
other countries... We must firmly reject and criticize all 
decadent bourgeois systems, ideologies and ways of life in 
foreign countries. But this should in no way prevent us from 
learning the advanced science and technology of capitalist 
countries and whatever is scientific in the management of
9Chiang Chenyun, "Study Chairman Mao's Regeneration 
Through Our Own Efforts", in Economic Study CJingii Yaniiu). 
English text in Riskin, China's political economy, p.207.
201
their enterprises."10 It is important, therefore, to note that 
at no time was self-reliance defined as autarchy.
Nevertheless, the principle of self-reliance was distorted 
by ultra-left elements as a justification for economic 
isolationism, particular during the Cultural Revolution when 
there existed the combination of an unfavourable international 
environment and xenophobic tendencies on the part of some 
Chinese leaders. Thus, a correct understanding of the 
principle of self-reliance was essential for the 
implementation of the "open door" policy. Hu Qiaomu, then 
President of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, put 
forward a new definition of self-reliance in 1978, stating 
that learning advanced things from foreign countries was 
actually "a condition of self-reliance which required the 
merger of the superiority of the socialist system with the 
advanced science and technology of the developed capitalist 
countries. "1
Such an interpretation of self-reliance came to be 
accepted by the Chinese leadership. Hence, China's prime 
minister, Zhao Ziyang, also defined self-reliance in a 
flexible way when he stated in 1981 that:
"Expansion of exchange is a basic feature of large-scale 
socialized production, and it extends from internal trade in 
China to trade with the world at large. By linking our country 
with the world market, expanding foreign trade, importing 
advanced technology, utilizing capital and entering into dif­
ferent forms of international economic and technological co­
operation, we can use our strong points to make up on our weak 
points...Far from impairing our capacity for self-reliant
10Mao Zedong, "On the Ten Major Relationships", Selected 
Works of Mao Zedong, Foreign Languages Press, Beijing, 1977. 
vol.5, p .3 05.
nHu Qiaomu, "Observe Economic Laws, Speed up Four 
Modernizations", in Beijing Review, 10 November 1978, p.11.
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action, this will only serve to enhance it."12
At the Sixth Plenum of the Eleventh Party Congress, the 
CPC adopted a new official interpretation of the history of 
the CPC since 1949, entitled the 'Resolution of certain 
questions in the history of the Party since the founding of 
the PRC'. The 'Resolution' concluded that self-reliance was 
one of the three basic points which had benefited the CPC. 
However, the 'Resolution' also stated:
"...China's revolution and national construction are not 
and cannot be carried on in isolation from the rest of the 
world. It is always necessary for us to try to win foreign aid 
and, in particular, to learn all that is advanced and 
beneficial from other countries. Closed-door policies, blind 
opposition to everything foreign, and theories or practice of 
great-nation chauvinism are entirely wrong."13
China's 'open door' policy began to emerge during 1977 and 
1978. The communique of the Third Plenum announced that China 
would be "actively expanding economic co-operation on terms of 
equality and mutual benefit with other countries" and would be 
"striving to adopt the world's advanced technologies and 
equipment".14 The communique also stated that the purpose of 
such a policy was to meet the needs of modernization.
On 8 July 1979, the Chinese government promulgated its new 
'Law of the PRC on joint ventures using Chinese and foreign 
investment'. The Law states: "With a view to expanding
international economic co-operation and technological 
exchange, the PRC permits foreign companies, enterprises, and
12Zhao Ziyang: "The Present Economic Situation and the
Principles for Future Economic Construction", People's Daily. 
1 December, 1981; English text in Beijing Review, no.51, 12
December 1981, p.23.
13"Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of the 
Party since the Founding of the CPC", People's Daily. 27 June; 
English text in Beijing Review, no 27, 6 July, 1981.
l4See, People's Daily. 22 December, 1977.
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other economic entities or individuals... to incorporate 
themselves, within the territory of the PRC, into joint 
ventures with Chinese companies, enterprises or other economic 
entities...on the principle of equality and mutual benefit and 
subject to authorization by the Chinese government."15 The 
promulgation of the Law on Joint Ventures was seen as a major 
symbolic step towards implementing the open-door policy.
As part of the open-door policy, Beijing introduced the 
idea of creating 'special economic zones'. The idea was 
initially put forward by the Guangdong provincial authorities 
in 1979, who argued that if the province was allowed to make 
certain modifications to state policies on foreign trade and 
economic management, then, given the advantageous location of 
the province, the local economy would be boosted.16 In July 
1979, the CPC Central Committee and the State Council jointly 
decided that both Guangdong and Fujian were to be authorized 
to carry out a special policy and to adopt flexible measures 
in external economic activities, including the establishment 
of four Special Economic Zones -- in Shenzhen, Zhuhai and 
Shatou(Guangdong province), and Xiamen(Fujian province).
The Special Economic Zones, according to China's official 
definition, are "certain areas of land where a more open ap­
proach is adopted towards the administration than in other 
inland areas -- and where China, may use various forms of 
economic cooperation with the industrial and commercial world, 
including foreign friends, overseas Chinese, and compatriots
,5A full English text of the law in Beijing Review, no. 28, 
13 July, 1979.
16Beiiing Review's special report from Shenzhen, see, 
Beijing Review. 26 November, 1984, p.19.
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in Hong Kong and Macao."17
The prime purpose of the establishment of Special Economic 
Zones was to attract foreign funds, advanced technology, 
equipment and managerial expertise. The Special Economic Zones 
would, Chinese economists claimed: 1) serve as bridges for
introducing foreign capital, advanced technology and 
equipment, and as classrooms for training personnel capable of 
mastering the advanced technology; 2) promote competition 
between regions, between trades and within a certain trade, 
according to market demands, improve the quality of goods, 
develop new products and reduce production costs; and 3) serve 
as experimental units in economic structural reform and as 
schools for learning the law of value and the , regulation of 
production according to the market economy.18
The 'open door' policy and the creation of special 
economic zones caused some political and ideological problems. 
Opening up, however, could be seen as similar to the open 
door' policy in the China of before 1949; foreign investment 
was no different from 'imperialist capital invasion'. To 
defend the opening up policy, Chinese scholars argued that in 
the past, China had been forced by imperialist powers to open 
its doors and, by means of capital investment and unequal 
treaties, foreign powers controlled China's economy. Now, 
however, the Chinese government had full control of the 
decision to adopt an opening up policy and to utilize foreign
17Liang Xiang: "Shenzhen, Opening to the World", in
Beijing Review, no.4, 23 January 1984, pp.24-25; Liang was
vice governor of Guangdong province and mayor of Shenzhen; 
Also see China Business, March-April 1984, p. 14.
18Xu Dixin: "China's Special Economic Zones", in Beii inq
Review. no.50, 14 December 1981, pp.14-15.
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capital. Opening up to the outside world was seen as an 
important policy to modernize China and foreign investments 
only played a supplement role to China's national economy.19
A more difficult problem raised by the 'opening up' policy 
was the influence of Western politics. The CPC leadership was 
cautious towards the Western political system and ideology. 
For most of the CPC leaders, opening up was to be based on the 
concept of Zhongxue Weiti, Xixue Weiyong (Chinese learning for 
the essence and Western learning for practical applications) - 
- an old formula applied by some Qing Dynasty reformers in the 
late 19th century. Thus, the 'open door' policy was introduced 
so that China could absorb foreign capital and managerial and 
technological skills. However, with the implementation of this 
policy, it appeared inevitable that there would be a growing 
influence of Western ideas and the Western way of living 
within China.
The CPC leaders found it difficult to convince Chinese 
people to accept that the 'socialist system was superior to 
the capitalist system'. Chinese intellectuals, particularly 
the younger ones, tended to analyse in a more comprehensive 
way China's backwardness and sought alternative options for 
China's modernization. To many of them, China's reforms 
required further changes in political and institutional 
relationships. The CPC leaders, particularly those with a 
rigid way of thinking, saw this as a challenge to their 
authority.
The CPC leadership was also deeply concerned about the
19See Wang Shouchun edited, China's External Relations 
(Zhongguo Duiwai Guanxi), External Trade Education Press, 
Beijing, 1988, pp.67-69.
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dependence of China's economy on foreign trade and the world 
market. It recognized the necessity to open up with great 
caution to the outside world, and continually stressed the 
importance of self-reliance. The prime aim for China's 
modernization has been to develop its own industry. China, 
with over one billion people, represents a vast market, but 
the priority of this market is to support domestic 
industries. Fear of dependence has strongly affected China's 
notion of development, though there has been a considerable 
relaxation towards the interpretation of self-reliance. This 
is why China has always favoured importing advanced equipment 
and technology. Zhao Ziyang clearly explained this policy when 
he said:
"It will be necessary for us to import certain means of 
production and consumer goods which are badly needed or are in 
short supply in the domestic market. But we should not 
stimulate domestic consumption by importing too many high- 
grade consumer goods. We should make every effort to produce 
them so as to protect and stimulate the development of 
domestic industries."20
Part of the consideration in establishing special economic 
zones was to test whether these economic reform policies might 
be too controversial or too radical. For the purpose of 
limiting undesirable side-effects, a new customs barrier was 
established between the zones and the inland areas. However, 
the policy of establishing special economical zones was 
severely criticized. They were seen as similar to the old 
concession areas of the despised Qing Dynasty and an 
infringement of China's sovereignty. Some party officials were 
worried that the zones would turn into colonies. They also
20Zhao Ziyang: "Report on the Work of the Government",
delivered at the First Session of 6th NPC on 7 June 1983, 
English text in Beijing Review, no.27, 4 July, 1983.
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feared that the nature of the zones was capitalistic. It was 
widely reported that a senior party leader, after a tour to 
Shenzhen, commented that only socialist thing in Shenzhen was 
a 'Five Star Red Flag', and the CPC there had become an 
'underground organization'.
China's Special Economic Zones policies, compared with 
other export processing zones around the world, are more 
favourable in many respects, and the structure of the zones 
and their management are basically 'capitalist', particularly 
in Shenzhen. However, Chinese economists in favour of the 
policy of special economic zones tried to defend them by 
insisting that China's Special Economic Zones were 
fundamentally different from those in other countries. They 
argued that in capitalist countries, "there are no 
contradictions between the nature of the state and the nature 
of its Special Economic Zones", but in socialist countries 
like China, "Special Economic Zones, in nature and in 
function, have a dual relationship which is both contradictory 
and unified with the state", and "state-owned enterprises must 
serve as the pillars of the economy in these Special Economic 
Zones."21 The first Party secretary of Shenzhen Special 
Economic Zones insisted that the Special Economic Zones were 
"exactly the same as the rest of the nation in politics, cul­
ture and other aspects of the superstructure". 22
In the early 1980s, Chinese theoreticians and ideologues 
tended to rely on Lenin's ideas on concessions and state
21Xu Dixing: "China's special Economic Zones", ibid,
pp.14-15.
22Zhou Erkang: "On Shenzhen Special Economic Zones", in
Beijing Review, no.48, 26 November 1984, p.20.
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capitalism as the ideological framework and basis for the 
development of the Special Economic Zones. The major theme of 
Lenin's that was used was the policy of inviting foreign 
capitalists to obtain concessions, which was endorsed by the 
Soviet government during the period of the New Economic Policy 
in the early 1920s. Since 1983, official discussion of the 
legitimacy of Special Economic Zones has adopted Deng 
Xiaoping's concept of "China-style socialism".23
The argument admits that "there is no thesis in Marxist- 
Leninist literature about the Special Economic Zones" and that 
Lenin's special economic policies "are mainly composed of 
joint ventures and foreign-owned enterprises with close ties 
to the international market". Thus, to establish Special 
Economic Zones in socialist countries was a "Chinese 
creation" .24
Deng Xiaoping's tour to the Special Economic Zones in 
February 1983 was significant. Deng's visit resulted in a 
personal affirmation of the Special Economic Zones policy, and 
he used his authority to settle the debate. It was reported 
that after an inspection tour of the Special Economic Zones in 
Guangdong and Fujian provinces, Deng said that China "should 
implement its open-door policy on a broader scale instead of 
retreating from it".2;)
With Deng's approval and with a further relaxation of 
political control and ideological influence in China's
23See Thomas Chan: "China's Special Economic Zones:
Ideology, Policy and Practice", in Y.C. Jao edited, China's 
Special Economic Zones, Oxford University Press, 1986, p
24Wang Dacheng: "Special Economic Zones Why an
Experiment", in Beii ing Review. no.39, 30 September 1985, p.4.
25Beiiing Review, no. 19, 7 May, 198 4.
209
economic field, certain aspects of the Special Economic Zones 
came to be regarded to be as applicable at national level. 
Thus, by 1984, the Special Economic Zones had become an 
integral part of the national economic reforms and were 
closely associated with the approach of Deng and the pragmatic 
reformers. In April 1984, a 12-day forum was jointly convened 
by the Secretariat of the CPC Central Committee and the State 
Council. The forum decided that flexible economic policies 
similar to those already practised in the Special Economic 
Zones would be introduced in 14 coastal cities and on Hainan 
island. The decision, which was made after "a careful 
consideration of the experience gained in the four Special 
Economic Zones", would provide overseas investors with more 
preferential treatment in taxation, market and other 
conditions, and give local authorities more power.26
Nevertheless, the dilemma highlighted by the open-door 
policy in terms of 'ti' and 'yong', in other words, how to 
balance Western technology and Western values, still remains 
without a clear answer. Chapter Six will further analyse the 
problem.
5-3 Adjustment of China's foreign policy in the 1980s
The growing Soviet military pressure in the late 1960s, 
especially after the border conflict between China and the 
Soviet Union in early March 1969, led Beijing to seek an 
alignment with the West. China realised that it was essential, 
in its efforts of counterbalancing the Soviet threat, to 
develop good relations with many Third World countries, and
26Jin Qi: "China Expands Flexible Policies", in Beii ino
Review, no.19, 7 May 1984, p.4.
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simultaneously to establish ties with the industrialised 
countries, and even to open the door to detente with the 
United States. Beijing hoped that Sino-American detente could 
end the US containment of the PRC and also reduce China's 
concern over US support for the Taiwan regime.
During the negotiations that led to the normalization of 
diplomatic relations between the PRC and the United States, 
Beijing insisted that three conditions be met before the final 
step of formal mutual diplomatic recognition could be taken: 
1) the US was to break diplomatic relations with the Republic 
of China on Taiwan; 2) the US was to terminate its mutual 
defence treaty with Taibei; and 3) all US troops were to 
withdraw from the island and its associated territories.27 All 
three . conditions were finally accepted by the Carter 
Administration. However, the Taiwan issue remained.
Successive US governments since the Nixon administration 
have recognized that friendly Sino-American relations are in 
the national security interests of the United States. However, 
a total abandonment of the security obligation on Taiwan was 
a difficult decision for the US to take, and the intervention 
of the US Congress made the issue even more complicated. In 
March 1979, the US Congress passed a bill which became known 
as the 'Taiwan Relations Act'. The Act's primary purpose was 
"to help to maintain peace, security, and stability in the 
Western Pacific and to promote the foreign policy of the 
United States by authorizing the continuation of commercial, 
cultural, and other relations between the people of the Unite 
States and the people on Taiwan." The Act further states that
21Dangdai Zhongguo Waijiao, ibid. p. 225-226.
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"the United States would provide Taiwan with arms of a
defensive character; and maintain the capacity of the United
States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coer­
cion that would jeopardise the security, or the social or 
economic system, of the people of Taiwan."28
According to Beijing's view, the Taiwan Act was "another 
version of the old one China, one Taiwan plot." Beijing argued 
that: "Taiwan was the crucial issue obstructing normalization 
of relations between China and the United States for a long
time...The adoption of the Taiwan Relations Act by the US
Congress has again made the Taiwan issue a major obstacle to 
the development of Sino-American relations." China also warned 
that "if the United States stubbornly adheres .to the Taiwan 
Relations Act in its actions, then normal relations between 
China and the United States would "certainly be gravely 
impaired" .29
Sino-American relations were particularly strained by the 
Taiwan arms sale issue. The difficulties arose partly from the 
Carter administration, with the initial authorization for 
American aircraft companies to discuss with Taiwan the sale of 
an advanced jet fighter, labelled the FX, and partly from the 
granting of diplomatic immunity to members of the unofficial 
Taiwan agency in Washington, the Coordination Council for 
North American Affairs. What also worried China was candidate 
Ronald Reagan's statement in August 1980 that he wished to 
make relations with Taiwan official. After the Republican
28A full text of the Act in Louis W. Koenigs, James C. 
Hsiang and King-yuh Cheng, edited, Congress, Presidency and 
the Taiwan Relations Act, Praeger, New York, 1985.
29China and World, edited by Beijing Review, Beijing,
1982 .
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victory, the new administration continued to explore expanded 
arms sales to Taiwan despite mounting Chinese protests.
Beijing insisted on its sovereignty over Taiwan and 
regarded the US arms sale to Taiwan as a serious obstacle to 
its efforts in unifying Taiwan. In this connection, Beijing 
argued:
"With regard to the sale of US weapons to Taiwan, there is 
a view among some people that China will acquiesce because it 
is afraid of the Soviet Union and therefore needs US help... 
This view is completely wrong. China is not afraid of the 
Soviet military threat. Although its weapons and equipment are 
somewhat backward, China has a tradition of defeating enemies 
armed with advanced weapons."30
China also made it clear that the "selling of weapons by 
the United States to Taiwan will constitute an encroachment on 
China's sovereignty and an interference in its internal 
affairs. Such an action will be an obstacle the return of 
Taiwan to the motherland and the peaceful reunification of the 
country."31
In response to the US Taiwan policy, Beijing began to 
dissociate itself from previous assertions of parallel 
security concerns with the United States and adjust its 
strategic formulations. In an article published in Foreign 
Affairs in 1981, Huan Xiang, then vice-president of the 
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and a senior adviser to the 
CPC Central Committee on foreign affairs, talked of the impor­
tance of "clarifying the nature of relations between the two 
countries". Describing what should be done to give substance 
to Sino-American relations, Huan Xiang called for more
30See, Journal of International Studies, Beijing, no.2,
1982, English translation in Beijing Review, 1 April, 1982.
31 Jbid.
213
exchanges between officials, as well as between the two 
peoples, in order to facilitate mutual understanding; more 
trade and economic cooperation, and an expansion of 
scientific, technical and cultural cooperation. Apparently, 
strategic cooperation between the two countries was not 
mentioned.32
On another occasion, China's senior leader, Deng Xiaoping, 
made it even more clear:
"The United States thinks that China is seeking its 
favour. In fact, China is not seeking any country's 
favour...China hopes that Sino-American relations will further 
develop rather than retrogress. However, this should not be 
one-sided... Even if the United States causes a regression in 
Sino-American relations, it is nothing serious. If the worst 
comes to the worst and relations regress to those prior to 
1972, China will not collapse."33
In the early years of the 1980s, China shifted its 
attention to domestic economic development and began to revise 
its global outlook. These changes led Beijing to a foreign 
policy orientation which differed from those policies that had 
been the basis of Sino-American relations in the 1970s. 
However, the Chinese leadership continued to make considerable 
efforts to improve Sino-American relations. In Beijing's view, 
good Sino-American relations were central to China's economic 
development. Given the fact that, aside from Hong Kong, the 
United States was China's most important source of investment, 
US transfer of technology to China became a significant 
element in China's modernization plans and the United States 
became China's third largest trading partner. In this context, 
Zi Zhongjun, director of the Institute of American Studies of
32Huang Xiang: "On Sino-American Relations", in Foreign
Affairs. Fall 1981, pp.50-52.
33"Deng Xiaoping Talk to Ming Pao Director" on 18 July 
1981; English text in FOIS-China, 25 August, 1981.
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the Academy of Social Science, commented that Chinese people, 
in the course of modernization, naturally regarded the United 
States as an important model. He said that although there 
existed "great differences in their national conditions, the 
ways of development, social systems and cultural backgrounds", 
the Chinese people were still attracted by "the highly 
developed science and technology, education and culture, and 
abundant economic strength of the United States, to which they 
believed that China could learn about.34
The considerable decline in the significance of strategic 
cooperation between the PRC and the United States was 
accompanied by a detente between the Soviet Union and the PRC.
Two major obstacles had made China oppose detente with the 
Soviet Union before 1977. One was ideological, the other 
strategic. The Soviet Union had been seen as "restoring 
capitalism" and "betraying Marxism." However, having replaced 
revolutionary zeal with a determined emphasis on economic 
development, post-Mao Chinese leaders had much less concern 
about Soviet "revisionism." Ideological differences, so 
important to the origin and early development of the Sino- 
Soviet dispute, largely disappeared. The second barrier to 
detente was strategic. China's concern about possible military 
action by Moscow was at its height in the late 1960s and early 
1970s. After 1977, however, the Chinese leaders perceived a 
lessened Soviet threat and concluded that Moscow was not 
interested in a large, territory-acquiring invasion of China
34Zi Zhongjun: "Convergence of Interests: the Base of
States Relations" (Liyi de Huihe: Guojia Guanxi de Jicu), in 
Ten Years of Sino-American Relations, edited by Institute of 
American Studies of the Academy of Social Science, The 
Commercial Press, Beijing, 1987, p.26.
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or even in a nuclear attack. Moreover, the failure of the 
Soviet Union to conquer Afghanistan added to China's 
confidence of dealing with a possible Soviet invasion. 
According to China's view, Afghanistan was a "poor Third World 
country" and its people lacked arms, but the might of the 
Soviet superpower was unable to crush them. The People's Daily 
concluded:
"The militarily and technologically superior aggressor may 
be able to overrun an Asian country, but it is impossible for 
it to exercise effective and long-term control over it. ...The 
war waged by the Afghan people against the Soviet invaders 
fills the world with confidence that their struggle is 
invincible. The resistance fighters of Afghanistan are telling 
the world loud and clear that Soviet expansion can be 
effectively countered."35
Both China and the Soviet Union had important reasons to 
improve their mutual relationship. For the Chinese, a peaceful 
and stable international environment was essential for its 
efforts to modernize. Beijing needed a reduction in Soviet 
pressure in the border area. In view of the security and 
defence burden that the Soviet Union imposed on China in the 
1970s, a reduction of tension made good sense. Economically, 
it was also important to improve relations with the. Soviet 
Union -- a country with a similar social and economic system. 
Detente would not only foster more trade between the two 
countries, it could also promote a political environment 
wherein China could concentrate its limited resources on 
development and at the same time feel more secure. Moreover, 
Beijing saw an increasingly unreliable American foreign 
policy, and growing signs of American back-tracking on the 
Taiwan question.
35People's Daily, 27 December, 1981; English translation 
in Beijing Review, no.l, 3 January, 1982, p.10-11.
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Thus, although Soviet troops were still massed at the 
Chinese border, Beijing began to explore the possibility of 
easing tension with the Soviet Union. Beijing started with 
low-level contacts and carefully measured the pace of detente 
in order not to provoke the West. However, except during the 
early 1979 Indochina conflicts and the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan in December 1979, the trend since 1977 has been 
toward a less rancorous and less volatile Sino-Soviet 
relationship. China made a rather cautious statement on 
Brezhnev's Tashkent speech in March 1982 —  a major policy 
address calling for normalisation of Sino-Soviet relations. A 
Chinese foreign ministry spokesman was quoted as saying that 
the Chinese attached more importance to the Soviet Union's 
actual deeds than to Brezhnev's rhetoric. Chinese leaders 
reiterated that Sino-Soviet relations could move towards nor­
malisation if Moscow took practical steps to lift its threat 
to China's security. What China regarded as Soviet threats 
included the huge deployment of Soviet troops along the 
Chinese border, support for Vietnam and the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan. Nevertheless, series talks between the two sides 
began in 1982, with many unofficial, unannounced visits back 
and forth. Apart from political visits, in June 1982, a team 
of Soviet athletes took part in a track and field meet in 
Beijing, the first bilateral athletic exchange since 1965. In 
October 1982, China and the Soviet Union started high-level 
talks in Beijing aimed at improving relations. Leading the 
Soviet delegation was Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Leonid 
Ilyichev. Heading the Chinese team was Vice-Foreign Minister 
Qian Qishen. It was reported that the talks were held in a 
good atmosphere.
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In November 1982, China sent the foreign affairs minister, 
Huang Hua, to the funeral ceremony of Soviet leader Leonid 
Brezhnev. In an interview with the official New China News 
Agency, Huang Hua said: "Peace and friendship between the two 
countries completely conform to the interests not only of the 
two countries and the two peoples, but also of peace in Asia 
and the world as a whole." Huang also stated that "China and 
the Soviet Union are two countries sharing a long boundary", 
but instead of recalling the fighting at various parts of the 
6, OOO-kilomatre border in 1969, he said: "Not long before his 
death, President Brezhnev in several speeches expressed the 
wish to work for improvements in Sino-Soviet relation." He 
expressed the hope that the new Soviet leader, the Soviet 
Communist Party and the government would "make new efforts" to 
improve relations with China.36
The effort to create detente- with Moscow was part of a 
shift in China's foreign policy. The shift, which had been 
taking place since 1981, involved some distancing from the 
United States as well as attempts to normalise relations with 
the Soviet Union. In this context, Beijing proclaimed an 
"independent" foreign policy at the CPC's Twelfth Congress in 
August 1982.
Chinese leaders paid great attention to the impact of its 
global strategic involvement on China's modernization. Beijing 
thus chose to highlight an independence from the superpowers, 
and lumped the United States and the United States together. 
The label "hegemonists" was no longer reserved for Moscow, but 
was extended to include Washington as well. In addition, China
36FEER, 19 November, 198 2, p. 9.
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sought to strengthen its identity as a developing country, 
while distancing itself from the United States. In an article 
on foreign policy, Huan Xiang wrote: "China is different from 
certain countries, especially the superpowers, which on the 
pretext of safeguarding their own security and interests, have 
pushed national egoism and hegemonism and wilfully encroached 
upon other countries' independence and sovereignty." Both the 
United States and the Soviet Union were condemned, as they 
were seen to threaten China's security. "The Soviet Union," 
wrote Huan Xiang, "has placed a million troops along China's 
border, invaded Afghanistan and given support to Vietnam's 
aggression against Kampuchea, forming an armed encirclement of 
China. The United States government has reneged on promises it 
made when it established diplomatic relations with China. 
Saying that to do so was vital to its interests, it passed the 
Taiwan Relations Act and continued to sell arms to Taiwan and 
treat Taiwan as an independent political entity, in an attempt 
to undermine the cause of China's unification."37
The Chinese leadership has argued that there was nothing 
new about Chain's independent foreign policy. However, the 
economic development priorities that the Chinese leadership 
established made Beijing pay more consideration to promoting 
a peaceful international environment and minimizing the 
country's vulnerability by expanding foreign policy options. 
In this context, Beijing continuously made efforts to improve 
its relations with Second World countries, especially the 
United Kingdom.
Chinese Premier Hua Guofeng's visit to Britain, from 28
37Huang Xiang, "Adhere to Independent Foreign Policy", in 
Beiiing Review, no.46, 15 November, 1982, p.21-23.
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October to 3 November, was the first such visit by a Chinese 
prime minister. Mrs Thatcher went personally to the airport to 
welcome Premier Hua and she also attended banquets or 
receptions for him on three occasions. At the return banquet 
given by Premier Hua on 2 November, the British Prime Minister 
stressed that the visit, "which one can truly describe as 
historic, has raised the interests we have in common to a new 
high level."38 Premier Hua said his visit had been a complete 
success and would contribute to a more "extensive development 
of the friendly relations and cooperation between China and 
Britain in the years to come."39
In 1978, China and Britain signed an agreement on 
scientific and technological cooperation and another on 
economic cooperation. During Premier Hua's visit to Britain, 
the two countries signed agreements, on 1 November, on 
education, culture and civil air transport.
The five-year agreement on educational and cultural 
cooperation provided measures for cooperation in the fields of 
education, culture, publishing, public health and medicine, 
the media, youth activities and sport. The two countries would 
promote direct contacts and exchanges between universities and 
other institutions of higher education, and facilitate visits 
and exchanges of university and other teaching staff.
Under the agreement on civil air transport, the two sides 
agreed to establish scheduled air services between their 
respective territories.40
38Beiiinq Review, no.45, 9 November, 1979.
*Beii inq Review. no.45, 9 November, 1979 .
’Beii inq Review, no.4 5, 9 November, 1979 .
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It seemed that both sides were satisfied with their 
cooperation in the political, economic and cultural fields. 
The PRC in particular stressed the common interests of the two 
countries and claimed that although China and Britain were far 
apart geographically and had different social systems, there 
was no conflict of fundamental interests between them. A 
People's Daily editorial commented:
’’Britain and China share many interests which require, as 
world peace does, that both handle and develop bilateral 
relations from a global point of view. The steady expansion of 
friendly relations and cooperation will help promote national 
construction in the two countries, and moreover will be a 
powerful factor in the defence of world peace."41
Bilateral visits between the two sides by high officials 
continued in the early 1980s. Important visits included the 
one by the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Carrington, to 
Beijing in April 1981, and the one by a British parliamentary 
delegation to China in March 1982 -- the first British
parliamentary delegation to visit China since the 
establishment of diplomatic relations between the two 
countries.
Yet although the Chinese leaders continued to maintain 
that the PRC shared similar views with Britain on many issues, 
they found it difficult to avoid being questioned on sensitive 
issues, such as the position of Hong Kong, which could affect 
Sino-British relations. The question of Hong Kong was in fact 
discussed during Hua's visit to Britain in 1979, but there was 
no detailed discussion on the question of Hong Kong and both 
sides decided to let the matter rest.42
41People's Daily, 3 November, 1979.
42Beiiinq Review, no.43, 9 November 1979, pp.8-11.
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5-4 Hong Kong and China's modernization
With the implementation of China's modernization programme 
and the changes in the country's internal politics, the 
importance of Hong Kong in the mainland's development has 
increased. The governor of Hong Kong, Sir Murray Maclehose, 
visited China in March 1979 -- the first official visit by a 
governor since the revolution of 1949 —  and his visit was 
seen as a significant step in improving relations between the 
territory and its "motherland". The Chinese press in Hong Kong 
maintained that as the invitation was addressed to "the 
governor of Hong Kong," China was "showing consent" to Hong 
Kong's status.
Sir Murray's visit followed one to Hong Kong in December 
in 1978 by Chinese Foreign Trade Minister Li Qiang, during 
which Li made a remarkable statement that stressed the "major 
role" of Hong Kong in China's modernization programme. This 
was the first time that a Chinese official at ministerial 
level had openly admitted the importance of Hong Kong. During 
his short stay in Hong Kong, Li extended the invitation to Sir 
Murray and a leading member of the Chinese community, Sir 
Yuet-keung Kan, who was also the senior unofficial member of 
Hong Kong's ruling body, the Executive Council.
During his visit, the governor had frank discussions with 
senior Chinese officials about relations between Hong Kong and 
the mainland. The authorities of Guangdong province expressed 
their hope way that Hong Kong would play an important role in 
China's drive towards modernization, particularly in the 
development of Guangdong province. Tourism, investment, 
China's water supply to Hong Kong and communication links were 
among the economic topics discussed.
222
The governor's meeting with Deng Xiaoping was significant. 
It was reported that the issue of Hong Kong's future was 
raised, though there is still no information on how the 
question was discussed. Nevertheless, Deng specially requested 
Sir Murray to tell investors in Hong Kong to "put their hearts 
at ease."43 Deng's statement was widely reported in Hong Kong 
and was seen as the highest-level assurance up to then of 
Beijing's interest in maintaining a healthy investment climate 
in Hong Kong.
However, such a statement did not mean much to those 
concerned about Hong Kong's future and wanting clear answers 
from Beijing. Sir Murray has consistently denied that he 
obtained any clear indications from Deng or .other Chinese 
officials about China's intention on Hong Kong's future.44
It seemed that most Hong Kong people were attracted by 
China's new image and its modernization programme. The 
governor's visit was regarded as something of a breakthrough, 
since he was invited under his official title, and not in a 
purely personal capacity. The governor's visit was successful 
in terms of promoting cooperation between Hong Kong and the 
mainland. At the press conference Sir Murray said: "At all
levels, they (the Chinese officials) constantly reiterated the 
same theme, namely the importance to them of the role which 
Hong Kong is playing and will play as a result of the high 
level of its industrial, commercial and financial development 
of China's needs, but one can also read into it a most
43FEERf 20 April, 1979, pp.42-44.
^Sir Jact Cater, then the acting governor, said that he 
did not hear any suggestion from the governor about China's 
intention. Sir Jact was interviewed by the author in April 
1989 .
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encouraging message." The Far East Economic Review commented 
that the degree of recognition which the governor received 
during his visit to China was an encouraging sign of China's 
desire to let Britain continue administering the colony as it 
saw best, pending a final solution of the territorial 
problem.45
After the governor's historic visit to China, the exchange 
of visits of officials from both sides became regular. The 
important visits included that of the First Party Secretary of 
Guangdong province, Ren Zhongyi, in October 1981. Ren stated 
during his stay in Hong Kong that: "During our visit, we have 
seen that there exist indeed very close links between 
Guangdong and Hong Kong. Hong Kong's prosperity can benefit 
Guangdong and Guangdong's prosperity can benefit Hong Kong." 
He stressed the wider and longer-term cooperation and links 
between the two places.
Hong Kong continuously enjoyed strong advantages in its 
relations with China, these strengthened further. As China's 
trade with other foreign partners expanded, so did Hong Kong's 
role as an outlet for transhipped products. Hong Kong's 
facilities as an entrepot -- an excellent harbour with 
modernized container terminals, and an efficient international 
network of transport communications and commercial ties—  
helped China conduct its external trade. The value of re­
exports originating from the mainland passing through Hong 
Kong was about HK$2,492 million in 1977; it increased to 
HK$5,663 million in 1979, HK$8,394 in 1980 and HK$12,834 in
1981. Most of these went to Asian destinations, notably Japan,
*SFEER, 20 April, 1979.
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Indonesia, Singapore, Taiwan, the Philippines, Australia, 
Macao, South Korea and Thailand. Moreover, goods re-exported 
from Hong Kong to China over the same period also increased 
rapidly, reaching HK$8,044 million, a 334% increase over the 
year of 1977. China's transport, communications and 
infrastructural systems were still backward and could not meet 
the needs of the country's fast-developing external trade, 
though much effort was made by the Chinese authorities to 
improve the country's trade facilities.
Thus, Hong Kong continued to act as the main support base 
for commercial activity in China and its port facilities 
enabled it to play an increasing role in servicing China's 
growing external trade. Moreover, as China, and particularly 
Shenzhen, developed and Hong Kong involvement over the border 
grew, Hong Kong's importance as a focus of international sea 
and air routes was also likely to increase, binding the two 
sides in a web of joint activity.
Hong Kong was China's biggest trade partner after Japan. 
Bilateral trade increased rapidly after 1977. Hong Kong's 
imports from China reached a record US$3,328 million in 1979, 
representing a 40% increase over 1978. They continued to 
increase, reaching US$5,174 million in 1981 and US$5,381 
million in 1983. Hong Kong's exports to the mainland were 
US$74.69 million in 1978, reaching US$569 million in 1980, 
US$1,107 million in 1982 and US$1,313 million in 1983.46
Since 1978, the PRC has developed with extraordinary speed 
in its economic cooperation with the outside world, particular 
Western countries. The establishment of the Shenzhen special
46FEER, 20 April 1979.
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economic zone created a belt of manufacturing concerns and 
tourist resorts which could be reached easily from Hong Kong. 
Bordering on Hong Kong, Shenzhen enjoys unique geographical 
advantages. Chinese leaders openly stated that they welcomed 
investment which would take advantage of the low cost of land 
and labour in China. Hong Kong businessmen showed great 
enthusiasm in expanding economic relations with the mainland 
and the government of Hong Kong also encouraged such 
activities. Hong Kong has led the way in attracting investment 
to the mainland, particularly in the Shenzhen special economic 
zone. Hong Kong businessmen, because of their long experience 
in doing business with the mainland and their cultural links 
with China, have not been deterred by China's inefficiency and 
economic backwardness. In 1979, when Westerners were still 
reluctant to invest in China, there were more than 300 
projects involving Hong Kong and Macao interests being 
processed for Guangdong province, according to a report from 
provincial delegates to the National People's Congress. Since 
then, Hong Kong has been the largest investment resource for 
Shenzhen. Hong Kong and Macao businessmen are reported to have 
been involved in 90 percent of the investment contracts.47
Among these joint projects, the most significant one was 
the power plant by a joint venture between the Guangdong 
Electric Co. and Hong Kong's China Light and Power Co. The 
plant, powered by two 900MW pressurised-water reactors, will 
be located near Daya Bay in the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone
47Until the end of 1989, there were about 2400 investment 
contracts ($20 billion) between Hong Kong businessmen and 
Shenzhen which occupied 90 per cent of the total foreign 
investment. See The People's Daily, 29 January 1991. Also see 
Shenzhen Yearbook, 1985.
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north of Hong Kong. China Light and Power's deal with the 
mainland authorities was expected to bring in some HK$34 
million (US$ 7 million) annually for the 40-megawatt supply, 
and was the first-ever deal of its kind. It marked an 
important step in the gradual merging of the economises of 
Hong Kong and Guangdong, which the company's chairman, Sir 
Lawrence Kadoorie, regarded as the best solution to the 
problem of Hong Kong's political status. The plant was one of 
the largest foreign investment projects in China to date.48
For Hong Kong business people, to invest in China was 
profitable. With Hong Kong wage rates for unskilled and semi­
skilled labour three or four times higher than rates in China, 
the advantages of using mainland workers for assembly, packing 
and other mainly manual tasks were clear to Hong Kong 
businessmen. Such deals did not necessarily call for 
investment in plant or construction by the Hong Kong 
investors; goods could be sent in, processed, and returned to 
Hong Kong for export or local sale. The proximity of the 
Shenzhen special economic zone meant the ready availability of 
cheaper parts for Hong Kong products, which would otherwise 
have lost their competitive edge in overseas markets as local 
factory rents and wage level continued to rise.
On the other hand, cheap land and labour gave China a 
considerable competitive edge over Hong Kong's manufactured 
goods. But here too the Chinese were re-assuring. Chinese 
Foreign Trade Minister Li Qiang said: "The development of
industries in China for export will not undermine Hong Kong's 
prosperity through competition in world markets." This
4iFEER, 27, August, 1982, pp. 41-42.
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constituted a promise that the Chinese would not deliberately 
duplicate Hong Kong's domestic exports.49
The increased links between Hong Kong and China during the 
post-Cultural Revolution period were also reflected in China's 
involvement in Hong Kong's economic activities. The PRC state- 
owned bank -- Bank of China -- together with its twelve 
'sister banks', became more involved in Hong Kong's financial 
affairs. By the end of 1981, the Bank of China group had some 
198 branch offices within Hong Kong, the second largest 
network in the colony. In addition, the PRC had control of 13 
wholly-owned deposit taking companies, five insurance 
companies and two joint venture merchant banks (also at the 
end of 1981) . China also expanded its investments in Hong 
Kong, which ranged from banks and property to manufacturing 
industries, with a growing number of wholesale and retail 
outlets. In the property field, it signed agreements with 
major Hong Kong developers, and purchased a number of sites, 
either through China Resources Ltd or through proxies financed 
by the Bank of China. The setting up of the Hong Kong branch 
of the China International Trust and Investment Corporation 
and the appointment of three Hong Kong Chinese businessmen as 
its directors, was seen as yet another sign of China's 
intentions to capitalise its most important overseas Chinese 
base through compatriots.
Conclusion
This chapter has described the importance of the political 
and theoretical campaigns representing practice as the sole
49FEER, 21 March, 1981.
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criterion of truth. The campaigns were based on the premise 
that the future of China would be brighter if there were a 
more flexible application of ideology. Consequently,
ideological orthodoxy gave way to the needs of economic 
development, and the Chinese leadership became more inclined 
to the old slogan, "seek truth from facts," as justification 
for its more pragmatic policies. Class struggle was seen as an 
obstacle to economic development. All the same, political 
stability and unity were continually stressed. Anything which 
challenged political stability and unity, and particularly 
the CPC's domination, would be intolerable. Up to the present 
time, ideology still remains as a source of legitimation for 
the CPC's leadership and for policy innovation,, though it has 
become much less rigidly formulated and less clearly 
articulated.
Before 1978, neither foreign trade nor foreign investment 
was important in China's economic life, reflecting China's 
desire to be self-sufficient and self-reliant. However, in the 
quest for modernization, foreign trade and foreign investment 
became of the utmost importance. The leadership perceived the
need to open up —  though in a cautious manner —  to the
outside world, to ensure the acquisition of advanced
technology, management skills and foreign capital. The 
creation of special economic zones was significant, both in 
promoting foreign trade and foreign investment and in 
providing experience for reforms for the whole of China. Among 
the already established special economic zones, Shenzhen has 
attracted the most attention because it is the largest and the 
closest to Hong Kong and Macao.
The changes in China's domestic policies have had an
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important impact in shaping the country's foreign policy. In 
the 1980s, China saw a diminishing Soviet threat and a more 
secure international environment in general. The anti- 
hegemonism strategy, whose major target had been the Soviet 
Union, became less relevant to China's economical development. 
A more flexible foreign policy was thus implemented, focusing 
on promoting a more stable and peaceful international 
situation. The threat from the two superpowers had always 
dominated China's foreign policy. In the 1980s, neither the 
Americans nor the Russians were perceived as hostile. Striking 
a more independent posture between the two superpowers, the 
PRC conducted its external policies more on the merits of each 
issue.
Under China's new economic policy, the links between Hong 
Kong and the mainland became even closer. China had always 
regarded its interests as inextricably tied up with the 
prosperity of Hong Kong, but the equation was no longer as 
simple as it used to be. For the past few decades, the colony 
has served two main functions from Beijing's point of view: it 
has been a source of foreign exchange for the current account 
and reserves, and a point of contact with the capitalist 
world, which has enabled China to do business in a normal 
fashion without employing all the cumbersome mechanisms of 
socialism.
During the post-Cultural Revolution period, China cal­
culated Hong Kong's changing role in the overall pattern of 
the Chinese economy. In implementing its modernization 
programmes, the importance of Hong Kong has been stressed by 
China's senior leaders and leading economists. Ma Hong, then 
director of the Institute of Industrial Economics of the
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Chinese Academy of Social Science, wrote in an article for 
senior Chinese cadres, that China should make full use of Hong 
Kong's facilities in the Four Modernizations programme. These 
facilities included the Hong Kong market, Hong Kong's capital, 
Hong Kong's advanced technology and Hong Kong's management 
expertise.^
The increasing links between Hong Kong and China's special 
economic zones were significant. The dominant source of 
external investment in the mainland's special economic zones 
was Hong Kong, providing 91 percent of total investment. The 
development of the mainland's special economic zones, especial 
Shenzhen, was seen as an important guarantee for Hong Kong's 
stability.
Since economic modernization was the top priority of the 
post-Mao Chinese leadership, and with the diminishing 
influence of orthodox ideology on Beijing's external policies 
and the improving bilateral relations between the PRC and the 
United States, Beijing might have modified its policy on 
reunification, displaying a more pragmatic stance on the 
issues of the future of Taiwan and Hong Kong. Beijing 
continued to stress that China faced three major tasks: 
modernizing the economy, combating hegemonism and reunifying 
the whole nation. However, while combating hegemonism became 
less important in China's external policies, nationalism 
became correspondingly more so.
™FEER, 21 March, 1981.
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Chapter Six
The Unexpected Challenge of Having to Settle 
the Future of Hong Kong
The post-Mao political changes and economic reforms had an 
important impact on China's development. In the new era of 
modernization, Hong Kong's role was highly valued by the 
Chinese leadership. Beijing was satisfied with the continued 
existence of Hong Kong as a British colony and did not want to 
see any major changes there. Beijing's decision to establish 
special economic zones was made on the basis of recognizing 
the status quo of Hong Kong. In addition, through its 
invitation to the governor of Hong Kong to visit the mainland 
in 1979, China formally indicated its recognition of Hong 
Kong's position. In their talks with the governor, the senior 
Chinese leaders merely focused on how to utilize Hong Kong to 
serve the mainland's modernization. When Britain raised the 
question of 1997, China suddenly faced an unexpected dilemma. 
On the one hand, maintaining the state quo of Hong Kong could 
be seen as best way to serve China's interests in modernising 
the country. On the other hand, the Chinese leadership was 
bound by a strong commitment to defend the country's 
sovereignty and unify the whole nation.
From September 1982 to September 1984, China's external 
relations were thus dominated by the negotiations with Britain 
over Hong Kong's future. The negotiations offered a striking 
test of China's attitudes and policy towards Hong Kong, and 
provided a chance to see how China balanced its principles of 
territorial integrity, sovereignty and unification with its 
pragmatic goals of economic development and modernization.
This chapter begins by examining how the question of 1997
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became a major item on the agenda in relations between the PRC 
and the United Kingdom, and China's initial response to the 
issue is discussed. Following a detailed discussion of several 
factors which were central in shaping China's policy-making, 
the chapter then focuses on the process of the negotiations 
themselves, with considerable attention given to the way in 
which China maintained a balance between principle and 
flexibility. A more detailed account of the Sino-British 
agreement, and of the framework that China designed to resolve 
Hong Kong's future, is to form the subject of the next 
chapter.
6-1 The raising of the issue of 1997
The year 1997, when Britain's lease on the New Territories 
expires, had been a potential source of uncertainty regarding 
Hong Kong's long-term future ever, since the establishment of 
the People's Republic of China in 1949. However, it became a 
diplomatic issue only in September 1982, when the PRC and the 
United Kingdom decided to enter formal negotiations to settle 
the issue.
Since the PRC put the question of Hong Kong into the 
category of unequal treaties left over from history, and the 
unequal treaties, according to Beijing's view, were invalid, 
the lease date of the New Territories was irrelevant to 
China's formal position. But, for the United Kingdom, the 
lease was central because it laid the legal base for British 
administration over the territories. For Hong Kong's economic 
development, too, the lease was important. The normal minimum 
term for repaying international commercial loans was 15 years. 
When the year 1997 began to approach, unless some new
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guarantee was granted, the land in the New Territories would 
become valueless and the colony would be unable to raise 
capital abroad for major infrastructure and industrial 
projects. Colin Stevens, chief executive of Barclay's Bank, 
remarked in April 1980 that: "It is going to be difficult to
persuade any international lenders to lend against property as 
the date approaches. Unless China recognizes this fact, 
confidence will start to be sapped."1
Stevens' remark clearly represented the concern of Hong 
Kong business. By 1979, this concern in business circles had 
increased substantially, as had that of the British government 
and the Hong Kong government. The Chinese government at the 
time did not, apparently, have any clear policy on the issue. 
Its top priority was to make use of Hong Kong to benefit 
China's modernization, and the existing arrangement seemed to 
suit both sides. When the Chinese leaders, in the early 1980s 
set the unification of the whole of China as one of the major 
tasks in the 1980s, they were not including Hong Kong.
Britain, however, was anxious to know China's real 
intentions over the issue of 1997. The visit by the governor 
of Hong Kong to Beijing in March 1979 provided the first 
official opportunity for Britain to start discussions on "the 
specific question of land leases expiring in 1997". The 
governor also broached the idea of renewing the lease. As the 
issue had not been placed on the agenda, nor had the Chinese 
side been informed in advance of the governor's intention, the 
Chinese leaders were unprepared for a formal talk on the 
matter and thus the discussions did not result in moves to
1International Herald Tribune, 19 February, 1981
234
solve the problem. Deng Xiaoping rejected the governor's 
suggestion to renew the lease, and asked him instead to pass 
a message to the Hong Kong business community. This message —  
put your minds at ease —  was intended to reassure Hong Kong 
business; it stated that the Chinese leadership was serious 
about China's modernization and that China needed Hong Kong's 
expertise and financial assistance.
Shortly after the governor's visit, the Chinese deputy 
foreign minister, Song Zhiguang, when asked about the future 
of Hong Kong and Macao told a foreign newspaper correspondent: 
MA solution to these problems will come later. Hong Kong's 
lease expires in 1997. We have 18 years to settle the problem 
and we are not in a hurry. The British government is attending 
to the matter. Not long ago the governor of Hong Kong visited 
China. We told him that Hong Kong was part of China's 
territory and on the expiry of the lease we would settle the 
problem in an adequate manner."2
Indeed, at the time of the governor's visit, Beijing was 
becoming increasingly aware of the importance of Hong Kong in 
contributing towards China's economic development, and it 
therefore wanted to maintain the status quo of Hong Kong. 
Nevertheless, Deng's message was insufficient for Hong Kong 
investors, who wanted a more secure guarantee. Thus, after the 
governor's visit, Britain continued to send delegations to 
Beijing to sound out opinion on a possible settlement from the 
Chinese leaders, as did the anxious Hong Kong business 
community.
In November 1979, the then Chinese Prime Minister, Hua
2Documents on 'One Country, Two Systems', edited by the 
Taiwan Affairs Office of Shanxi Province, 1988, p.54.
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Guofeng, visited the United Kingdom. The question of Hong Kong 
was discussed between Hua and Mrs Thatcher, and both sides 
agreed to keep in contact on the matter. The foreign minister, 
Huang Hua, indicated China's attitude at a press conference: 
"The lease is due to expire in 1997, so there is still time. 
The basic attitude of the Chinese government in this matter is 
that when the time comes for its resolution we will take into 
consideration the interests of investors, so that these 
interests will not be hurt."3
The series of visits by British officials included one by 
the then British foreign secretary, Lord Carrington in April 
1981. During his talks with Deng Xiaoping and other Chinese 
leaders, Lord Carrington pressed the question, again 
reflecting the growing realisation by the Hong Kong government 
and the mercantile community, that some clarification of the 
future of Hong Kong would be increasingly necessary as 1982 
approached. From 1982 to 1997 there would be only 15 years, 
the period which accountants and lawyers —  whose advice 
weighs heavily with businessmen -- consider necessary to 
amortise a large investment.
Lord Carrington made little progress, apart from a 
repetition of the assurance that Hong Kong and those who 
invested in it should rest easy, and that the British should 
not worry. However, Deng Xiaoping told Lord Carrington to 
watch China's Taiwan policies which had just changed 
dramatically.4
3,lHuang Hua Answers Reporters's Questions", Beijing 
Review, no. 45, 9 November,197 9
4Interview with Zhen Weirong, a senior Chinese diplomat 
who participated the Sino-British negotiations.
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China's seemingly ambiguous statements led to various 
assumptions as to its real intentions. The most popular one 
was that because China had a vested interest in Hong Kong's 
continued capitalist prosperity -- it earned one-third of its 
foreign exchange from the colony, which also acted as a key 
entry , port and centre for expertise —  the Chinese leaders 
would not change Hong Kong's status quo by taking it over. 
There was indeed some evidence to back up this optimistic 
assumption. This included the existence of special economic 
zones on the borders next to Hong Kong and Macao at Shenzhen 
and Zhuhai.
Because of their geographic location close to Hong Kong 
and Macao, Shenzhen and Zhuhai attracted a great deal of 
investment from Hong Kong. Actually, the major external 
financial source for these special economic zones was Hong 
Kong, and many joint ventures between Hong Kong investors and 
the special economic zones authorities were scheduled to run 
long after 1997. Contracts for houses and apartments were 
normally for 50 years from the date of purchase. It seemed 
that the special economic zones could not operate unless Hong 
Kong maintained a free port and free trading area, as well as 
a financial centre and a place where expertise in the 
commercial sphere could be obtained.
Moreover, China's involvement in Hong Kong's economic 
development after the Cultural Revolution had become more 
visible and its increasing investment in Hong Kong involved 
land deals and property ventures as well as industrial and 
commercial projects. Presumably, China's growing economic 
activities in Hong Kong could be seen as some kind of 
commitment by Beijing towards the continuing existence of Hong
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Kong as a British colony. There were also other developments 
indicating China's intention, such as the establishment of a 
new visa office by the Chinese foreign affairs ministry —  a 
diplomatic organ usually set up in a foreign country —  and 
the replacement of three-year visiting cards by ten-year ones. 
These are cards that Hong Kong Chinese use as visas to visit 
the mainland. The first period for these cards was given as 
from 1982 to 1993, and the second from 1993 to 2004 —  the 
lease date of 1997 not being mentioned.
In addition, from 1979 onwards, Chinese leaders continued 
to consult on the question with Hong Kong's leading business 
figures. The roles of the left-wing trade unions and China- 
controlled trade companies in Hong Kong, and even the working 
committee on Hong Kong and Macao Affairs —  which previously 
had an important say in China's Hong Kong policy —  became 
much less important and their voices were less heard.5 This 
provided a sign that Beijing was paying more consideration to 
business opinion, which clearly tended to the maintenance of 
Hong Kong's status quo under British rule. Even the pro- 
Beijing Hong Kong media, which always reflected China's 
official position, were optimistic. For instance, Jin Bao 
predicted that the Chinese government would reach an 
understanding about the issue of 1997 with the British 
government. The British government, it thought, would make an 
arrangement using its own constitutional system about the 
lease, and China would tacitly approve such a change.6
interview with Szeto Keung, a senior official at the NCNA 
who has worked there since 1950s.
6Zhao Fenglei: "On the Settlement of the 1997 Issue in
Hong Kong" (Guan Yu 1997 Xiang Gang Jie Jun Fang An), Jin Bao, 
no.45, April, 1981, pp.18-21
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The Chinese leadership, at this point, also began to 
realize that the question of 1997 could not just be 
overlooked. Thus, a working group was set up in 1980. By mid- 
1981, three general principles had been established —  to 
recover the sovereignty of Hong Kong in 1997, to maintain Hong 
Kong's stability and prosperity, and to make use of Hong Kong 
to serve China's four modernizations. But Beijing's concrete 
policies were still under deliberation.7
It seemed that the Chinese leaders were cautious of making 
clear public statements on China's official position. In 
January 1982, when the then British deputy foreign secretary, 
Humphrey Atkins, visited Beijing, he raised the question in 
his talks with Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang. Zhao said that it 
was in the interests of all parties that Hong Kong should 
continue to function as a free port and an international 
finance centre. He also confirmed that the treaties which had 
established Hong Kong were not recognized by Beijing, and that 
China was intent on establishing the fact of its sovereignty 
over the territories. However, Zhao avoided talking in detail 
of China's specific arrangements as to how to achieve the two 
basic goals.8
The Chinese leadership was clearly in a dilemma -- how to 
continue to benefit from Hong Kong's unique position while at 
the same establishing its sovereignty. The question of Hong 
Kong was not only a diplomatic issue, but an issue involving 
different interested groups. Apart form the foreign affairs 
ministry, other ministries also participated in the decision­
7Interview with Zhen Weirong.
8Official Report,Parliamentary Debates, Commons, vol. 17, 
Feb 1-12, pp.83-84.
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making process. These ministries included the foreign trade 
ministry, which was in charge of trade relations with Hong 
Kong and which controlled several key trade corporations in 
Hong Kong; the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office, responsible 
for formulating China's Hong Kong policy, and its related body 
the Xinhua News Agency, which implemented Beijing's Hong Kong 
policy; and the ministry of defence, which was supposed to be 
responsible for Hong Kong's defence after 1997. Guangdong 
province, with its close economic relations with Hong Kong, in 
the special economic zones, also had some influence on 
Beijing's policy regarding Hong Kong's future. In order to 
maintain a coherent stand in dealing with Britain, the top 
Chinese leadership needed time to co-ordinate the differences 
among these ministries.
6-2 The impact of the 1981 British Nationalities Act and the 
Falklands War of 1982
In December 1979, the British government put before 
parliament a proposal on nationality. In March 1981, the 
United Kingdom issued its New Nationalities Bill. The most 
noticeable difference in the Bill compared with the previous 
one was the change in status of citizenship for the British 
colonies and dependent territories. Hong Kong, containing over 
two million people with British passports, was obviously the 
major concern behind this change.
According to the new rule, "former United Kingdom citizens 
whose main connection has been with a British colony become 
British Dependent Territories citizens (BDTCs). From 
commencement this becomes an entirely separate citizenship 
from British citizenship." The Act stipulated that citizenship
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of British Dependent Territories "does not confer right of 
abode in the United Kingdom. Such citizens will only be able 
to enter the United Kingdom subject to the immigration rules 
of the day." It also stated that "there is no general freedom 
of movement for BDTCs within the boundaries of all territories 
dependent on the United Kingdom." 9
On 2 2 July of the same year, the House of Lords in the 
British parliament passed an amendment giving the 27,000 
people of Gibraltar -- another British colony which was listed 
in the New Nationalities Act together with Hong Kong -- the 
right to British citizenship. The fate of two million Hong 
Kong people was not taken into account.10
Britain chose a crucial moment to issue the New 
Nationalities Bill. It came at a time when in Hong Kong 
anxiety about the island's future had intensified. Officials 
of the British and Hong Kong governments stressed that the 
objective of this law was not to prevent Hong Kong-born 
Chinese from emigrating "en masse to Britain, but, rather the 
Act aimed to remove inconsistencies in British laws governing 
the right of various kinds of subjects to enter and live in 
Britain."11 However, the Act caused great concern among Hong 
Kong people about Britain's real intentions over Hong Kong's 
future, and was seen as "a step along the road to an eventual 
hand-over of the colony to Beijing."12 A prominent Hong Kong 
Chinese.spokesman, former executive council member, Sir Yuet-
9Text in Laurie Framsman, British Nationality Law and the 
1981 Act, Fourmat Publishing, London, 1982. p. 42.
l0FEER, 14 August, 1981.
UFEER, 14 August, 1981. p.40.
nThe Guardian, 1 March, 1981
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keung Kan, described the amendment which gave only 
Gibraltarians the right to British citizenship as "another 
nail in our coffin."13
It was widely believed in Hong Kong that the governor's 
visit to Beijing in April 197 9' was directly linked with the 
British government's decision to renew the nationalities 
issue. One of the main issues the governor discussed with 
Chinese leaders was the question of the expiry of land in 
1997, and on this matter Deng Xiaoping indicated that China 
would recover Hong Kong. But the governor denied in a press 
conference held in Hong Kong after his visit that he had 
discussed the lease problem with Chinese leaders. In early 
1981, members of the Hong Kong executive council (Exco) and 
legislative council (Legco), realizing the significance of the 
New Nationalities Bill, decided to send a delegation to London 
to lobby members of parliament.
This suggested delegation was vetoed by the governor, who 
promised to take full responsibility to represent the people 
of Hong Kong. The Nationalities Bill was passed in the House 
of Lords by the slender majority of three votes. It was 
possible that, had there been a chance to lobby the 
Parliament, the Bill would not have passed.
Whether or not the 1981 New Nationalities Act was a 
deliberate arrangement to prevent Hong Kong people from 
emigrating to Britain when the colony was eventually returned 
to China, its consequence was at least clear —  the door was 
closed on millions of Hong Kong people from entering Britain. 
Britain had taken the necessary legal steps to prevent the
bFEER, 2 6 November, 198 2. p.24.
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worst happening before or after 1997. Thus, in October 1982, 
shortly after the announcement by China and Britain that they 
were about to enter formal diplomatic negotiations on Hong 
Kong's future, Malcolm Rifkind, a Minister of State of the 
Foreign Office, spoke in the House of Commons. In answer to a 
question about how many people resident in the Colony were 
able to claim admission and residence in the United Kingdom, 
he said that immigration status was unchanged by the British 
Nationalities Act of 1981, and that some 19,000 patrials in 
Hong Kong would become British citizens on 1 January 1983. He 
also reported that there was an unknown, but probably small, 
number of other persons with the right of admission or 
readmission under the rules of the Immigration Act.14
With a powerful group of right-wing Conservatives in 
parliament who were prepared to fight any substantial 
immigration, and with popular reluctance in Britain to admit 
new-comers, British policy on immigration had become 
increasingly restrictive. However, people in Hong Kong did not 
necessarily understand the intricacy of British politics, and 
many of them regarded the New Nationalities Act as a signal 
that Britain would withdraw from Hong Kong. Sir Murray 
Maclehose, previously regarded as the most successful governor 
in Hong Kong, was no longer trusted by Hong Kong people who 
believed that he, like any other governor, would put British 
interests before the interests of Hong Kong. This lack of 
confidence in turn weakened London's bargaining position with 
China. With the new Act fresh in the minds of the people of 
Hong Kong, and with the pro-Beijing Hong Kong media trying to
14Official Report, Parliamentary Debates, Commons, vol. 
29. October 18-28, 1982, pp.40-41.
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use the Act to weaken Britain's position, it was difficult for 
the British government to convince the people that it really 
represented their interests. Another consequence of the Act 
was that Beijing concluded that Britain would hand over Hong 
Kong to China, and a hard-line attitude on its part would 
hasten this end.15
While Britain was sounding out China's intentions over the 
question of the lease, it became involved in a serious 
confrontation with Argentina over the disputed Falklands 
Islands (or Malvinas, as Argentina called them).
The problem between the two countries over the islands was 
long-standing, with both Britain and Argentina claiming that 
they had sovereignty over them. The United Kingdom had 
continuously occupied the islands and conducted their 
administration since 1823, until a sudden invasion by 
Argentina in April 1982. Argentina, on the other hand, had 
never ceased to protest against the British occupation and ad­
ministration of the islands. The two countries had tried to 
settle their dispute by negotiation, particularly after the 
United Nations' Resolution of 1965 which invited them to start 
discussions leading to a peaceful solution. Argentina 
considered that sovereignty over the islands was the most 
important question. It claimed they had been Argentinean since 
the independence of Argentina and had been occupied by 
Argentina, and that Britain's capture of the islands by force 
in 1833 was illegal.
Britain refused to recognize Argentina's position and was 
unwilling to talk about sovereignty. Although the British
15Interview with Zhen Weirong.
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government also claimed that the Falklands and its 
dependencies were sovereign British territories, its position 
in international law was by no means water-tight. The most 
that could probably be said, according to some historians, 
including British ones, was that neither the United Kingdom 
nor Argentina had a particularly good case.16 Britain also 
stressed that the inhabitants of the island desired to remain 
British subjects and that their wishes had to be respected.17
However, the British government also realized that the is­
lands were barely defended and that Argentina could easily 
occupy them by force. Britain, therefore, made several 
proposals to the Argentineans for a settlement. These included 
the one for a "sovereignty freeze" for a minimum of 30 years, 
after which time, allowing for improved relations between the 
islands and Argentina, the islanders would be free to choose 
between British or Argentine rule. The core of the various 
British proposals was that any transfer of sovereignty would 
have to be subject to the wishes of the islanders.18
In general, the nearly 2,000 inhabitants of the islands, 
despite their differences on other matters, shared a strong 
dislike of Argentina and a strong attachment to their 
'Britishness'. Britishness became a bond to help to avoid any 
serious and continuing schisms among themselves. On the 
question of a possible settlement of the dispute between 
Britain and Argentina, about 50 percent favoured the idea of
16See Lawrence Freedman, Britain and Falklands War, Basil 
Blackwell, 1988. p.20.
17See Fritz L. Hoffmann, Sovereignty in Dispute, the 
Falklands/Malvinas, 1493 - 1982, p.104.
18See G.M. Dillon, The Falklands: Politics and War,
Macmillan, 1989, p.2.
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a lease-back -- a proposal which meant that Britain would 
recognize Argentina's claim on sovereignty and Argentina in 
turn would lease the islands to Britain for a certain period. 
The other 50 percent flatly refused to consider that there was 
any international dimension to the dispute at all. For them, 
the islands belonged to Britain, and there was therefore no 
point in making any settlement with Argentina.19
Clearly, Britain held a strong card in dealing with 
Argentina. The islanders' wishes were a necessary condition 
for the British government to get public support within the 
United Kingdom and to win international support. Colonialism 
was acceptable only if a colonized people thought it was.
The seizure of the islands by force by Argentina in April 
1982 was a clear act of aggression and it was carried out in 
disregard of the principle of peaceful settlement of 
international disputes. As a victim of the action, Britain 
held a favourable diplomatic position. Britain was determined 
to take action and its objective, as the Prime Minister, Mrs 
Thatcher announced, was to see that the islands were freed 
from occupation and returned to British administration and 
sovereignty.20 In order to achieve these goals, the British 
government adopted all possible methods to retrieve the 
islands —  political isolation, economic sanctions, diplomatic 
mediation as well as military force. Britain's diplomatic 
efforts were first granted by a United Nations resolution 
demanding an immediate cessation of hostilities and an 
immediate withdrawal of all Argentine forces from the islands.
19Dillon, ibid., p.67.
20Dillon, ibid., pp.130-131.
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The resolution thus assured Britain a valuable diplomatic 
advantage. The EEC also agreed economic sanctions against 
Argentina -- including a six-week import ban and a suspension 
of trade preferences.21
Even more importantly, Britain's position was further 
strengthened with the United States backing economic sanctions 
against Argentina and military assistance to Britain. The 
United States also had a close relationship with Argentina, 
which played a major role in the US's Latin American policy. 
The United States tried to mediate between its two allies. 
However, when these diplomatic efforts failed, the United 
States eventually tilted towards Britain.
The Falklands crisis subsided with the recapture of the 
islands by British forces. The successful conduct of the war 
on the one hand punished Argentina for its original aggression 
and, on the other, helped the United Kingdom gain national 
pride and enhanced its international standing. As a result of 
the war, Mrs Thatcher's own prestige was also increased.
The Hong Kong media widely reported the Falklands crisis, 
with considerable attention on its impact on the question of 
Hong Kong. There are indeed some similarities between the 
situation of the Falklands and Hong Kong. Both places are 
British colonies and are geographically remote from Britain —  
but close to Argentina and China respectively. Britain has 
continuously had sovereign rights and an administration over 
the two places. With the issue of Hong Kong's future 
intensifying at the time, what happened in the Falklands was 
naturally linked with the situation of Hong Kong.
21Freedman, ibid, p.41.
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The Far Eastern Economic Review, for instance, commented 
that "the Falklands situation has indirectly complicated the 
Hong Kong situation by raising new issues of sovereignty, as 
well as strengthening Mrs Thatcher's nationalistic instincts." 
The Review also noticed that "the Falklands crisis could prove 
eventually to have been a blessing in disguise by forcing both 
sides to concentrate their minds on some fundamentals."22
A pro-Beijing magazine, the Wide Angle, examined Britain's 
strategy in handling the crisis and found that Britain had two 
strong cards -- sovereignty and public opinion. However, the 
magazine also pointed out that the same cards might not work 
in the case of Hong Kong.23
The Wide Angle's view indeed had some justification, 
because, apart from the similarities, there were also great 
differences between the situation of the Falklands and that of 
Hong Kong. The differences can be listed as follows:
1. On the question of sovereignty, although the United 
Kingdom had certain grounds for claiming sovereign rights over 
the Falklands, there were no treaties to define its position. 
But in the case of Hong Kong, there were three treaties which 
clearly provided a legal foundation for Britain's presence 
there. One of these three treaties was to expire in June 1997, 
after which Britain would have to leave the New Territories 
unless a new arrangement was made.
2. The islanders of the Falklands were bound by their 
"Britishness", and they supported Britain's position on the
22Philip Bowring and Mary Lee, "Trend Softy, Iron Lady", 
in FEER, 17 September, 1982, pp.23-24.
23Guang Jiao Jin (Wild Angle), Hong Kong, May, 1982 , pp.4-
5.
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question of sovereignty. For the majority of the people of 
Hong Kong, however, there was no question but that they were 
Chinese and Hong Kong was part of China's territory. While 
most Hong Kong people wanted the status quo to continue under 
a British administration, they were reluctant to commit 
themselves to an indefinite British sovereignty.
3 . The relations between the Falklands and the Argentinean 
mainland were not close, and the islands were quite isolated 
from the outside world —  politically, economically and 
socially. The islands' economy depended almost exclusively on 
the production and export to Britain of high-quality wool from 
sheep. Because of the dispute over the sovereignty and a lack 
of enthusiasm from the islanders, it was not until 1971 that 
Britain and Argentina issued a joint declaration for measures 
leading to the establishment of communications between the 
islands and the Argentinean mainland. However, there had 
always been strong links and great interdependence between 
Hong Kong and the Chinese mainland. Hong Kong's survival and 
development largely depended on its relations with the 
mainland. In other words, Hong Kong's position was far more 
vulnerable in terms both of survival and development than that 
of the Falklands. This also meant that Britain's options in 
Hong Kong would be limited.
The Falklands crisis also provided an opportunity to 
examine China's response to an issue similar to that of Hong 
Kong. Initially, China reported the Falklands crisis in a 
neutral manner. For instance, on 1 April, the People's Daily 
reported that: "The Falklands Islands, also called Malvinas,
have been Britain's dependent territory since they were 
occupied by the British in 1833. But Argentina considers that
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the islands are its territory."24
However, two days later, the same newspaper used Malvinas 
rather than Falklands as the name of the islands in its 
reports on the dispute. It published several editorials, con­
sidering the islands as a left-over from colonial times, and 
stressing that any attempt which relied on "gun-boat" 
diplomacy to force Third World countries to submit would not 
succeed. On 18 June, the paper claimed that: "The Chinese have 
constantly opposed imperialism, colonialism and hegemonism and 
supported the just struggle of Third World countries and 
people to defend their sovereignty and territorial 
integrity."25
At the United Nations, the Chinese delegation abstained 
from voting on the resolution drafted by the British UN 
delegation, denouncing the Argentine invasion and calling for 
an immediate withdrawal of all Argentine troops. The Chinese 
ambassador stated that, considering the stand adopted by non- 
aligned countries on the question of sovereignty over the 
islands, the Chinese delegation could not support the British 
resolution.26 Clearly, between Britain and Argentina, China 
chose to back the latter's position. However, Beijing did not 
approve of the military action taken by Argentina and called 
on the two sides to settle their differences by peaceful 
negotiations. Such an attitude on China's part was significant 
in relation to the question of Hong Kong, since the issue of 
1997 was attracting great attention at that time. The Chinese
24People's Daily. 1 April 1982.
25People's Daily. 3 April 198 2.
26Guang Jiao Jin, Hong Kong, May 1982.
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media did not openly link the question of the Falklands with 
the situation, but, through Hong Kong's pro-China media, 
Beijing gave some indications that the Falklands crisis would 
have an impact in China's policy on settling Hong Kong's 
future.
6-3 The Change in Beijing's Taiwan policy
When Deng Xiaoping suggested to Lord Carrington in April 
1981 that he should watch China's Taiwan policy, he was in 
fact indicating the possible direction of China's Hong Kong 
policy. In order to explore what Deng meant, it is useful to 
examine the development of China's Taiwan policy and, in 
particular, the change that took place after the normalization 
of Sino-US diplomatic relations in 1979.
The PRC had consistently taken the view that Taiwan was 
part of Chinese territory. Its fundamental position for many 
years was that the settlement of the question of Taiwan was a 
domestic issue in which no other country had the right to 
interfere. This position never changed, but what did change 
was the way in which the issue would be settled.
In early 1950, the PRC was intent on seizing Taiwan by 
force, encouraged by the successful capture of Hainan Island, 
36km from the mainland. However, the Korean War disrupted 
these plans and China became engaged in a major military 
confrontation with the United States. In order to "prevent an 
attack on Formosa" by the communist forces, the United States 
sent its Seventh Fleet to the Taiwan Straits. American forces 
were a major obstacle for the PRC's plan of military action to 
liberate Taiwan. After the Koran War, the United States 
further tightened it relations with Taiwan. On 2 December
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1954, the United States signed a Mutual Defence Treaty with 
the nationalist government on Taiwan. According to this 
treaty, Taiwan had an obligation to "grant rights to such 
United States land, air and sea forces in and about Taiwan and 
the Pescadors as may be required for their defence, as deter­
mined by mutual agreement." 27
Beijing considered the stationing of US military forces in 
the region around Taiwan and the US-Taiwan defence treaty as 
a serious provocation to the mainland. Later, Beijing 
repeatedly and consistently protested against the treaty and 
declared its determination to liberate Taiwan. For the 1950s 
and most of the 1960s, Beijing feared that the United States 
might use Taiwan as a launching pad for aggression against the 
mainland. Its major strategy was to put as much pressure as 
possible on the United States to withdraw from Taiwan. Beijing 
firmly believed that without American assistance Taiwan would 
not constitute a threat to the mainland, and might yield to 
Beijing's pressure. In early 1955, the PLA launched a series 
of military attacks on the offshore islands, in the first 
Taiwan Straits Crisis. After the capture of Jiang Shan Dao, a 
small island only a few kilometres from the mainland, the PLA 
was determined to seize the Dachen islands off the coast of 
Zhejiang province.
The United States wanted to avoid a direct involvement in 
a major Mainland-Taiwan armed conflict, and therefore advised 
the Nationalist government to withdraw from the Dachens, which 
were difficult to defend in the face of overwhelming communist 
forces. The Nationalist government accepted the US advice, but
21United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 248, pp. 214-216.
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with great reluctance, and evacuated all troops and civilians 
from the islands. The first Taiwan Straits Crisis ended with 
the capture of all main offshore islands, except Quemoy and 
Matsu, which are still occupied by the Nationalist forces.
Shortly after the first Taiwan Straits Crisis, the PRC 
began a campaign aiming at establishing a peaceful image and 
developing friendly relations with Asian and African 
countries. As part of the campaign, Beijing made an offer to 
ease the tension between China and the United States, 
particularly on the question of Taiwan. On 23 April 1955, Zhou 
Enlai stated that: "The Chinese government is willing to sit
down and enter into negotiations with the United States 
government, to discuss the question of relaxing tension in the 
Far East, and especially relaxing tension in the Taiwan area." 
While Zhou Enlai confirmed that it was China's sovereign right 
to liberate Taiwan, he also stated that the PRC was "willing 
to strive for the liberation of Taiwan by peaceful means so 
far as it is possible". He pointed out that the possibility of 
a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question hinged on the 
withdrawal of all American armed forces from the Taiwan area 
and the abolition of the US-Taiwan defence treaty.28
The PRC had always suspected that the United States was 
intent on creating "two Chinas", and it was uncertain about 
the Kuomintang's attitude towards such a policy. In August 
1958, the PRC suddenly began a massive artillery bombardment 
on Quemoy and Matsu. The bombardment was largely designed to 
test the strength of the American commitment to defend Taiwan. 
The United States responded to the action by sending
nDangdai Zhongguo Waijao, p.77.
253
reinforcements to the Taiwan Straits and the US navy helped 
escort the Nationalist forces. President Eisenhower declared 
that the offshore islands were more important to the defence 
of Taiwan than they had been in the first Taiwan Straits 
Crisis of 1955 because there was now a "closer interlocking" 
between the defence system of the islands and Taiwan.29
Nevertheless, the United States was also deliberating a 
possible deal with Beijing. One arrangement considered was 
that the Nationalist forces would withdraw from Quemoy and 
Matsu and the PRC would recognize the status quo of Taiwan 
with the presence of US forces in the region. The Kuomintang 
reacted anxiously to the American plan. It, too, insisted 
there was only one China, and it maintained that the 
Nationalist government was the legitimate government of the 
whole of China. Taipei considered that the American plan would 
damage its position and it therefore openly rejected it. 
Beijing concluded that there existed a common position between 
the Communist Party and the Kuomintang because the latter also 
rejected the American "two Chinas" policy. In this context, 
Beijing quickly made use of the difference between the US 
government and the Taiwan authorities. In a message to 
"compatriots" in Taiwan, the PRC defence minister, Peng 
Dehuai, stated: "Chinese problems can only be settled by us
Chinese. If they are difficult to settle for the time being, 
things can be talked over at length... There is only one 
China, not two, in the world. On this we agree. All Chinese 
people, including you and compatriots abroad, will absolutely 
not allow the American plot forcibly to create two Chinas to
29FRUS, 1955-57, vol.Ill, pp.293-294.
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come true."30 Beijing also announced an "even-day" cease-fire, 
in which Communist forces refrained from shelling Quemoy on 
even days. This remained in force until the end of 1978, when 
Beijing decided to end all shelling.
Thus, after 1958, Beijing's policy on Taiwan changed to a 
slow, political approach which was basically affected by the 
Kuomintang's one-China stand and by the US military presence 
in the region. On the one hand, the PRC continued to put 
pressure on the United States to withdraw its forces from 
Taiwan, and it considered that the acceptance by the US of 
China's position was a prerequisite for the establishment of 
diplomatic relations between the two countries.
On the other hand, Beijing kept the threat of the use of 
force as a deterrent, but backed away from putting too much 
military pressure on Taiwan, since it felt that outright 
military action might drive Taiwan towards total independence. 
Military action was therefore never taken, apart from the 
symbolic shelling of Quemoy. To take over Taiwan, or to unify 
the whole of China did not rank as a top priority in the PRC's 
external policies. Mao once said that: "We had better wait.
Let Chiang Kai-shek stay on Quemoy and Matsu. We shall get 
them back later, together with the Pescadors and Taiwan. Our 
territory is spacious, and for the time being we can get along 
without these islands."31 Mao's strategy was again reflected 
in his talks with President Nixon and Dr. Kissinger in 1972, 
when he considered that world affairs were much more important
30Ye Fei, "Bombardment on Quemoy" (Paohong Jingmen) , 
Xinhua Wenozai, January 1990. Ye Fei was the first party 
secretary of Fujian province and the Commander of the Fujian 
military region in 1958.
31Ye Fei, ibid.
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than the issue of Taiwan.
In China's view, the issue of Taiwan had always had two 
major aspects. One was related to the PRC's national security. 
Chinese leaders believed that Taiwan -- as a unsinkable 
aircraft carrier of US forces -- had an important role in 
serving America's global strategy and posing a threat to the 
PRC. The other aspect was linked with China's unification —  
a matter which Beijing regarded as China's internal affair, to 
be solved by the Chinese people, including those in Taiwan.
With the detente between China and the United States, 
Chinese leaders felt less threatened by the United States. The 
strategic aspect of the issue of Taiwan thus decreased. The 
normalization of Sino-American diplomatic relations in 1979 
further reduced the significance of the Taiwan issue in 
China's security, providing a favourable condition for the 
significant change in Beijing's Taiwan policy. In the joint 
communique, the American government formally declared that it 
recognized the PRC as "the sole legal government of China”, 
and that it would "sever diplomatic relations with Taiwan, 
terminate the Mutual Defence Treaty with Taiwan and withdraw 
all US forces from Taiwan." However, the United States also 
expressed its concern over the settling of the status of 
Taiwan, stating that it would "continue to have an interest in 
the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue”, and that it ex­
pected the Taiwan issue to be "settled peacefully by the 
Chinese themselves".32
China's fundamental position remained the same. At a press 
conference held in Beijing on 5 January 1979, Deng Xiaoping
32Joint Communique, the full text in Beijing Review, no. 
51 22 December, 1978, p.89.
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publicly acknowledged that the settlement of the Taiwan issue 
was entirely an internal Chinese affair and that the PRC could 
not restrict itself by renouncing the possibility of the use 
of force for the unification of Taiwan and the mainland. 
However, he said that "Beijing would take note of the United 
States' wish that the dispute be settled peacefully."33
The PRC then immediately launched a peace initiative. On 
1 January 1919, the National People's Congress issued a 
message to people in Taiwan calling for unification. The 
message said that the PRC's leaders would take existing 
realities in Taiwan into account in accomplishing the "great 
cause of reuniting the motherland"; they would respect the 
status quo of Taiwan and the opinions of people in all walks 
of life there; and they would adopt reasonable policies and 
measure in settling the question of reunification so as to 
avoid causing any loss to the people of Taiwan. On the same 
day, the PRC stopped the bombardment of Quemoy and the other 
offshore islands occupied by the Nationalist forces. Beijing 
also suggested to the Taiwan authorities to establish "three 
links" -- mail, trade and air and shipping services —  and 
"four exchanges" with Taiwan -- of relatives and tourists, 
academic groups, cultural groups, and sports representatives - 
- as a first step toward the ultimate goal of reunification.34
The PRC's Taiwan policy was continuously affected by its 
relations with the United States. In April 1979, President 
Carter set out the Taiwan Relations Act. This Act stated that
33PeopIe's Daily. 6 January, 1979.
34"NPC Standing Committee Message to Compatriots in 
Taiwan", People's Daily, 1 January, 1979; English text in 
Beijing Review, no.l, 5 January 1979, p.16.
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•'the United States' decision to establish diplomatic relations 
with the PRC rests upon the expectation that the future of 
Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means." It also 
considered "any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by 
other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes, 
a threat to the peace and security of the western Pacific area 
and of grave concern to the United States." The Act also 
sought to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character 
and to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist 
any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would 
"jeopardise the security, or the social or economic system, of 
the people of Taiwan. "3:)
After the Republican party's victory in the 1980 
presidential elections, the Reagan administration continued to 
undertake increased arms sales to Taiwan in spite of severe 
protests from Beijing. It was against this background that the 
PRC further developed its policy regarding Taiwan. Its purpose 
was to seek an assurance that US arms sales to Taiwan would 
terminate within a fixed period and to play down the 
significance of Taiwan's security. This change in policy was 
indicated in a speech by Marshal Ye Jianying, then chairman of 
the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, in 
September 1981. The essential parts of the nine-point proposal 
were as follows:
3) After the country is reunified, Taiwan can enjoy a high 
degree of autonomy as a special administrative region and it 
can retain its armed forces.
4) Taiwan's current socio-economic system will remain un­
35Congressional Record. House 125, no. 38 (March 16, 1979) 
H1668-7 0
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changed, as will its economic and cultural relations with 
foreign countries. There will be no encroachment on the 
proprietary rights over private property, or on foreign 
investments.
5) People in authority in Taiwan may take up posts in 
national political bodies and participate in running the 
state.36
China's proposal, of course, also reflected its desire for 
unification. The unification of Taiwan and the mainland had 
been one of the main tasks by the CPC. The Chinese leaders 
considered that the normalization of Sino-American relations 
and the further isolation of Taiwan in the international 
community provided a positive opportunity to engage Taiwan in 
talks. The terms of its proposal were more concrete and more 
responsive to the reality of Taiwan's situation than 
previously.
A further action on China's part was to insert a special 
article into its new constitution adopted at the fifth session 
of the fifth National People's Congress (NPC) in November- 
December 1982. This article stipulated that: "The state may
establish Special Administrative Regions where necessary. The 
systems to be instituted in Special Administrative Regions 
shall be prescribed by laws enacted by the NPC in the light of 
specific conditions." In December 1982, a NPC spokesman 
explained that Article 31, which created powers to set up 
"special administrative regions", had been drafted 
deliberately to enable national reunification. Clearly, since 
the question of Hong Kong's future was already under
3<sPeople's Daily, 30 September, 1981; English text in 
Beijing Review, no.41, 11 October, 1982 , p.20.
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negotiation between the PRC and the United Kingdom, the ar­
ticle also applied to the settlement of the Hong Kong 
question.37
The change in Beijing's Taiwan policy was of significance 
in relation to the issue of Hong Kong, both in terms of time 
and of content. From China's perspective, Hong Kong had 
considerable similarities with Taiwan in its political and 
economic system and social conditions. Hence, its Taiwan 
policy would be relevant to its resumption of sovereignty over 
Hong Kong. In the process of formulating its Taiwan policy, 
Beijing had not taken account of the fact of Hong Kong. 
However, in the face of pressure to make a decision regarding 
Hong Kong's future, Beijing naturally used the basic parts of 
its Taiwan policy for its policy on Hong Kong. The linkage 
between Beijing's Taiwan policy and its Hong Kong policy will 
be examined in detail in the next chapter.
6-4 China's position on entering negotiations
As has been mentioned, by mid-1981 the Chinese leadership 
had reached a three-fold set of general principles regarding 
the question of Hong Kong's future—  to recovery sovereignty, 
to maintain Hong Kong's stability and prosperity, and to make 
use of Hong Kong. These principles guided China's primary 
position in its dealings with Britain, and they should also be 
seen as goals that China intended to achieve.
Sovereignty in Beijing's view, means that "a state has the 
power, in accordance with its own will, to decide its own form
37Peng Zhen: "Report on the Draft of the Revised
Constitution of the PRC", People's Daily, 11 December, 1982; 
English text in Beijing Review, no.50, 13 December, 1982.
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of state, political system, and socio-economic system, and 
intervention by other states in these matters is absolutely 
not permissible.”38 The PRC also considers the principle of 
sovereignty to be one of the most important principles of 
international law. China has always been sensitive towards the 
question of sovereignty.
In the case of Hong Kong, before the Sino-British nego­
tiations began, Beijing had already acknowledged several times 
that Hong Kong was part of China's territory and that the 
settlement of the question of Hong Kong was entirely within 
China's sovereign rights. However, despite its non-recognition 
of the treaties, the PRC was tolerant of the existence of Hong 
Kong as a British colony and never challenged Britain's 
administration. Beijing held that no action would be taken 
until conditions were ripe.
With the development of China's reforms and its open-door 
policies after late 1979, the Chinese leadership had 
noticeably adopted a more flexible attitude towards the 
outside world. China's trade and economic relations with 
foreign countries developed rapidly. In particular, the 
creation of special economic zones and the introduction of a 
range of more flexible policies to some 14 coastal cities 
created a completely new situation, which needed not only a 
theoretical justification, but also legal codification.
The fundamental change in China's domestic politics and 
the shift in the CPC's focus from class struggle to economic 
development helped the emergence of a new pragmatism. This, in
38Yu Fan, "Speaking about the Relationship between China 
and the Tibetan Region from View Point of Sovereignty and 
security”, People's Daily, 5 June 1959.
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turn, enabled the Chinese decision-makers to be more flexible 
in dealing with sensitive issues such as economic relations 
and foreign investment. Beijing recognized to a considerable 
degree the theory of interdependence and international markets 
which, in previous years, had been regarded as a form of
imperialist encroachment upon the sovereignty of other states. 
However, the change was also accompanied by a growing 
nationalism in both China's domestic politics and its foreign 
policy. Nationalism, often in the name of patriotism, appeared 
to bolster the legitimacy of the CPC whose ideology, as a 
result of the repudiation of the doctrines of the past,
provided a less powerful source of enthusiasm and support.
China intended to accept the constraints, of increased 
commercial and military links with the outside world, while at 
the same time making efforts to preserve its sovereignty and 
autonomy. Beijing thus approached the reunification of the 
nation as one of the major tasks facing China in the 20th 
century. In this context, Peng Zhen, then chairman of the Na­
tional People's Congress, declared in a report in November, 
1981: "We stand firmly on the principle of defending
sovereignty, national unification and territorial 
integrity.1,39
There were several reasons why the Chinese leadership
chose to adopt this position on the question of sovereignty. 
Firstly, the top Chinese leaders were from the old 
revolutionary generation who had a long experience fighting 
foreign powers and foreign influence and who had participated 
in establishing the People's Republic. For them, the
39See, footnote 36.
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unification of the whole of China was particularly important 
and was a special task they determined to complete.
Secondly, any concessions on the issue of sovereignty 
would bring about great political damage to those who made 
them. Prior to the Sino-British negotiations, Deng Xiaoping 
was on the point of consolidating his leading position in 
China. However, his position was far from one of domination. 
He had to balance different factions within the party, 
particularly the reformers and the orthodox leaders. Deng 
himself had a reputation of being highly flexible, but he 
often seemed to exercise this flexibility within certain 
limits. Anything that went beyond these limits would become 
unacceptable to him. Politically, he put forward the "Four 
Cardinal Principles", namely, the people's democratic dic­
tatorship, Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong thought, and the 
leadership of the CPC.
These four principles, particularly the leadership of the 
Party, were designed to protect the existing political system 
from attack by movements for democracy and human rights, and 
clearly showed both Deng's limits and his legacy. Deng also 
set out the three major tasks, which included the unification 
of the whole of China. To remain firm on China's position on 
recovering sovereignty would add to Deng's national prestige 
and further consolidate his authority. Had he failed to stick 
to this policy, his position could have been challenged by 
more orthodox leaders.
Thirdly, the issue of sovereignty was a matter which 
applied not only to Hong Kong and Macao, but also had great 
relevance to the question of Taiwan and, potentially, also to 
the position of Tibet and other national minority regions.
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Beijing considered that any concession on its position on 
sovereignty would lead to a domino effect. Any concession on 
Hong Kong could carry forward to later negotiations on Macao 
and Taiwan, and weaken Beijing's bargaining position.
Stability and Prosperity Beijing was well aware of the 
importance of Hong Kong in China's four modernizations, and 
before the negotiations, the Chinese leadership had paid more 
attention to maintaining Hong Kong's stability and prosperity. 
It seemed that the question of sovereignty was simple and 
straightforward, but how to maintain Hong Kong's stability and 
prosperity appeared more complicated.
Beijing considered that stability was a prerequisite for 
economic development. In the case of Hong Kong, stability was 
closely linked with the maintenance of the status quo. The 
Chinese leadership appeared to be particularly interested not 
only to maintain Hong Kong's economic and financial system, 
but also its political and constitutional system. Although 
Beijing attributed Hong Kong's development to the great 
efforts of the Hong Kong Chinese people and to support from 
the mainland, it found it difficult to deny the fact that the 
social, political legal and economic framework provided by the 
British administration had also played an important role. 
Beijing had no intention of replacing Hong Kong's basic 
mechanisms because it regarded their retention as central to 
the island's stability and prosperity, and also because such 
mechanisms suited China.
In the British colony of Hong Kong, there is no adequate 
participatory democracy or self-government. In other words, 
there is no division of power, no checks and balances, no 
independent local government, no viable political parties, no
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independent parliament and no judiciary capable of restraining 
executive power. The concentration of all significant 
political power in the hands of the government is clearly 
stipulated by the constitutional arrangement in Hong Kong.
According to Hong Kong's constitution, the governor is the 
representative of the British monarch, though largely 
symbolic, and is appointed by the British government. The 
governor's authority is derived from the letters patent passed 
under the Great Seal of the United Kingdom. The letters patent 
create the office of governor and commander-in-chief of Hong 
Kong, and require him to observe its law and instructions 
given to him by the monarch or the Secretary of State. They 
also deal in general terms with such matters as the 
establishment of the Executive and Legislative Councils. The 
governor's powers relate to legislation, disposal of land, 
appointment of judges and public.officers, pardons, and the 
tenure of office of supreme and district court judges. The 
governor is the representative of the colonial power, 
"relaying the decisions of the British government and 
endeavouring to explain them and make them as acceptable as 
possible to the local population." However, he is also 
supposed to be the colonial spokesman to the British 
government, "putting the point of view of Hong Kong and 
attempting to safeguard its interests." He is also 
constitutionally entitled, in theory, "to ignore the advice of 
the Executive Council and the Public Service Commission; he 
could override any opposition in the Legislative Council by 
directing the official majority to repeal or pass any 
ordinances he wished; he could completely reverse past
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policies and set the whole colony in turmoil.1'40
The Executive Council (Exco) and the Legislative Council 
(Legco) are set up as advisory bodies. The Executive Council 
is formed by official and unofficial members, with the 
commander of British forces in Hong Kong, the Chief Secretary, 
the Attorney-General, the Secretary for Home Affairs and the 
Financial Secretary as permanent members. The Executive 
Council's role in the government of Hong Kong is similar to 
that of the cabinet in Britain, but the Governor has a 
stronger position than the Prime Minister and has the 
authority to decide whether to accept or reject a policy.
Under the Governor and his Executive Council there is a 
highly centralized public service -- some 48 departments and 
offices which carry out the day-to-day affairs of the 
government. The activities of all departments are supervised 
and coordinated by the government, secretariat.
The Legislative Council's members, except for the Governor 
and other ex-officio members, are appointed by the British 
monarch or the Governor on the instruction of the Secretary of 
State. None of them is democratically elected. According to 
the rules, the Legislative Council may have not more than 22 
official members and not more than 27 unofficial members. The 
primary functions of the Legislative Council are the enactment 
of legislation and control over the expenditure of public 
funds. However, the British monarch "has the power to disallow 
laws passed by the council and assented to by the governor", 
though this right has not been exercised since 1913.41
40Norman Miner, The Government and Politics of Hong Kong,
Oxford University Press, 1975, p.58-59.
A1Ibid.
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As a British colony, the administration of Hong Kong is 
completely subordinate to the Crown. Parliament is entitled to 
pass laws applicable in Hong Kong, or alternatively the Crown 
can legislate for the colony by issuing Orders in Council, 
particularly in the following situations:
1. where legislation is beyond the power of the local 
legislature, e.g., where it is for extra-territorial 
operations;
2. where the subject is of concern to more than one 
country and uniformity is desirable, e.g., the case of 
fugitive offenders; and
3 . where the matter is an important one of Commonwealth or 
United Kingdom concern, and therefore not merely of a domestic 
nature, e.g. matters such as defence, air navigation and 
international treaties.42
The governor is selected by the British government and is 
required to obey all instructions from the Secretary of State. 
All the most senior officials are formally appointed by the 
Secretary of State, as are the unofficial members of the 
Executive and Legislative Councils. Although, in practice, the 
colony is largely autonomous in conducting its internal 
affairs and the British government is inhibited from 
exercising most of its considerable legal powers, the 
potential power of the British government over Hong Kong is 
extensive.
Hong Kong's constitution provides a highly efficient 
bureaucratic system in which the professional administrative 
or elite plays a considerable role in setting out and
A2Ibid.
implementing rationally-designed collective goals. Such a 
system particularly suits the case of Hong Kong, where the 
majority of people lack political enthusiasm. The government 
of Hong Kong has traditionally been highly cautious towards 
any kind of political activity. Its attitude towards politics 
was summed up by the then governor, Sir Alexander Grantham, to 
the Legislative Council on 8 March, 1950: "We cannot permit
Hong Kong to be the battleground for contending political 
parties or ideologies. We are just simple traders who want to 
get on with our daily round and common tasks. This may not be 
noble, but at any rate it does not disturb others."43
The Chinese leadership thus had good reasons to be 
interested in maintaining the Hong Kong system of government. 
If this system of government remained unchanged, Beijing would 
presumably enjoy as much power as the British government had 
at the time. In such a situation, Beijing would be in a 
convenient position to influence, if not control, Hong Kong's 
situation. The British government must have been well aware of 
the fact that Beijing did not wish to see any major change in 
the existing system. From many years, all proposals for 
changes in a democratic direction were rejected by Britain on 
the grounds that China would object to such moves. Britain 
considered it necessary to heed China's view.
In January 1981, when the question of Hong Kong's future 
was receiving considerable attention in Hong Kong, the 
colonial authorities announced a new policy on district 
administration which provided for direct popular participation
43Hong Kong Hansard. 1950:41. Also see Lau Siu-kai, 
Society and politics in Hong Kong, Chinese University of Hong 
Kong Press, p.38.
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in local g o v e r n m e n t .  To this the Chinese government, through 
its representative body, the Xinhua News Agency, made it clear 
that it did not want to see any major changes in Hong Kong's 
existing system.44
China was not only intent on retaining the Hong Kong 
system of government but also its economic mechanisms. Since 
the early history of the colony in the 19th century, Hong Kong 
had been firmly committed to an economic doctrine of laissez- 
faire. The government of Hong Kong limits its economic 
functions to the provision of an economic infrastructure. Its 
principal role in the economy is to "ensure a stable framework 
in which commerce and industry can function efficiently and 
effectively with minimum interference." The government seldom 
intervenes in economic affairs, except in response to the 
pressure of economic and social needs. This policy has been 
justified as being in the common interest, and has been one of 
the most important factors attributed to Hong Kong's 
development. The Chinese leadership might not fully have 
understood how the Hong Kong government functioned in economic 
affairs, but it must at least have been aware that the 
mainland system could not possibly work in Hong Kong.
Thus, when Zhao Ziyang talked to the British junior 
foreign minister, Humphrey Atkins, in January 1982, he 
particularly emphasized that it was in the interests of all 
parties that Hong Kong should continue to function a free port 
and an international financial centre.45 Much the same advice
44Interview with Zhen Weirong.
45"Humphrey Atkins' Statement on His Visit to Beijing", in 
Official Report, Parliamentary Debates, Commons, vol.17 
February 1-2, pp.83-84.
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was also imparted to Hong Kong people, ranging from rich 
property developers to left-wing circles, who were summoned to 
Beijing for consultation.
6-5 The negotiations
The Sino-British negotiations on the future of Hong Kong 
began in September 1982 and reached final agreement in 
September 1984. The two years of talks were divided into two 
phases. The first phase, conducted by the British ambassador 
in Beijing and the Chinese foreign ministry, was very much at 
a stalemate when the Chinese side insisted to regain full 
sovereignty as against Britain's attempt to maintain the 
validity of the three treaties. Following a compromise by the 
British side on this question, on 1 July it was announced that 
the second phase of the talks would begin in Beijing on 12 
July 1983. The first few rounds of talks in the second phase 
focused on the British proposal to continue some British role 
after 1997, which was again rejected by the Chinese side. The 
talks then moved on to China's interest in how to maintain the 
stability and prosperity of Hong Kong after China had resumed 
its sovereignty, a matter which was explored by extensive 
discussions between the two sides. On 26 September 1984, the 
leaders of the two delegations initialled the final Chinese 
and English texts of agreement in Beijing.
Mrs Thatcher, the then British prime minister, visited 
Beijing in September 1982. Hong Kong was the main topic in the 
talks between her and the Chinese leaders, including Deng 
Xiaoping and Zhao Ziyang, then Chinese prime minister.
During her visit which took place not long after her 
triumphal conduct of the Falklands conflict, Mrs Thatcher
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publicly asserted that the treaties on Hong Kong were still 
valid, emphasising that they would continue to be in force 
until new treaties were signed by China and Britain to replace 
the old ones.46
It is true that the treaties had been the basis, both in 
international law and in British constitutional arrangements, 
for British the presence in Hong Kong, and for many years 
China had actually acknowledged the treaties de facto. 
However, China's position on the legality of the treaties on 
Hong Kong as part of China was also well known. Mrs Thatcher's 
attitude, according to the Far East Economic Review, aroused 
Chinese nationalist sensibilities, awakening memories of 
imperialist humiliation of China, and also gave an impression 
of greater differences between the two countries than perhaps 
really existed.47
Mrs Thatcher's stand also provoked the Chinese leaders, by 
breaking the tacit understanding between Britain and China of 
not openly challenging each other's position. The consequence 
was that the atmosphere of compromise and cooperation which 
could have been established was transformed to one of direct 
confrontation; in game theory, Mrs Thatcher turned a positive 
sum game to a zero sum one.
China's response was sharp. The Xinhua news agency 
deliberately added to its report of the final communique: "The 
Chinese government's position on the recovery of the whole 
region of Hong Kong is unequivocal and known to all". The 
Chinese government also issued the following statement:
46SCMP, 28, 29 30, September, 1984.
41FEER, 1 October, 1982, p. 10-11.
271
MHong Kong is part of Chinese territory. The treaties 
concerning the Hong Kong area signed between the British 
government and the government of the Qing dynast of China in 
the past are unequal treaties which have never been accepted 
by the Chinese people. The consistent position of the 
government of the PRC has been that China is not bound by 
these unequal treaties and the whole Hong Kong are will be 
recovered when conditions are ripe. Both the Chinese and 
British sides hope to maintain the prosperity and stability of 
Hong Kong, and therefore will hold discussion through 
diplomatic channels."48
It was seen as unwise for the British government to begin 
the talks by declaring the treaties valid. Such an attitude 
would have openly challenged China's well-known position —  
that the treaties were unequal and unacceptable while it also 
could have alienated Hong Kong people because they "could 
hardly be excepted to accept the proposition that Britain had 
the right to rule the territories because of some nineteenth- 
century gun-boat diplomacy conducted on behalf of drug 
dealers. 1,49
In the British Foreign Office, there are some old China- 
hands who achieved their experience either through dealing 
with the Chinese in earlier negotiations, such as the 
negotiations leading the normalization of bilateral relations, 
or by researching on China. At the beginning, though, Mrs 
Thatcher appeared not fully to trust the Foreign Office's 
advice, partly because of the poor performance of Foreign 
Office experts in handling the Falklands issue, and partly 
because of her own perception of the Hong Kong situation. Mrs 
Thatcher largely achieved her experience of foreign affairs 
from handling European issues, in which she was always tough 
and stuck to her principles. She seemed to behave similarly in
48Peoole's Daily, 30 September, 1982.
49See Ian Scott, Political Change and Crisis of Legitimacy 
in Hong Kong, Hawaii University Press, 1989, pl76.
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dealing with the Chinese, also sticking on matter of 
principle. -’0
On the other hand, it was also difficult to ignore the 
fact that it was primarily because on the three treaties that 
the United Kingdom had established its presence in Hong Kong 
and conducted the administration for so many years. It seemed 
that Britain had somehow to maintain the validity of the 
treaties, otherwise its presence and administration in Hong 
Kong would become invalid. Thus, maintaining the validity of 
the treaties became a natural focal point when London entered 
the negotiations with Beijing. Britain fully understood 
China's firm position on the question of the treaties. 
However, to establish a bargaining position by.sticking with 
the treaties was a useful start from which it might be 
possible to gain compromises from the Chinese side on some 
other substantial matters.
Nevertheless, in spite of the confrontation over the 
treaties, Mrs Thatcher's visit was significant. It confirmed 
that both countries would solve the problem through diplomatic 
negotiations. More importantly, the two countries acknowledged 
the existence of common ground -- the maintenance of Hong 
Kong's stability and prosperity —  which became the most 
important basis for the later negotiations.
Another consequence of her visit was that, at least on the 
British side, the foreign office,, particularly the old China 
hands, assumed an active role in the negotiations, and they 
adopted a more conciliatory approach than Mrs Thatcher's often
^Interview with Richard Margolis in April 1989. Margolis 
was the deputy political advisor to the governor of Hong Kong 
and member of British team in the Sino-British negotiations.
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confrontational style.
When Britain found Beijing's position on the question of 
sovereignty immovable, it not surprisingly made a compromise. 
In May 1983 , Mrs Thatcher sent a letter to Chinese Prime 
Minister Zhao Ziyang, indicating that Britain would accept 
China's stand on the question of sovereignty. This 
breakthrough led to the second phase of the talks. Britain's 
strategy was then to stick to its position, proposing a 
transfer of sovereignty over Hong Kong Island and the Kowloon 
Peninsular in exchange for the continuation of its 
administration after 1997. This proposal was also backed by 
economic arguments and by public opinion. Britain thought that 
China would agree that Hong Kong was too important for China's 
modernization, and its strategic value to China too great, for 
its separate identity to be changed. As far as public opinion 
was concerned, Britain argued that the great majority of Hong 
Kong people wished the British administration to remain and 
did not want to change the status quo. Any change in Britain's 
role would damage the confidence of Hong Kong people, it was 
argued, and in particular business people. This, in turn would 
damage China's own interests.
China's negotiating style was typical —  to seek an 
agreement on a general principle and then to go through the 
details for further negotiations. In the words of a British 
diplomat, China would build a wall in front of its opponents 
before detailed talks began. The consequence was that either 
the wall would break since it was too weak, or else the 
opposition would tire and yield because the wall was too
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strong.:>1
General principles, for China, are not simply an abstract 
stand, but reflect China's most important interests and its 
ideology. General principles can also be specific condition 
from which certain arrangements will follow. They are normally 
the focal point on which China's opponents disagree, and can 
easily become entangled in political or philosophical 
differences. A general agreement on a matter of general 
principle will usually create a good atmosphere for further 
talks, and can help build mutual trust and understanding. As 
Dr. Lucian Pye concludes in his book Chinese Commercial 
Negotiating Style, China certainly has other reasons to use 
this particular negotiating method. Firstly, the wording of 
general principles often makes it possible to extract 
concessions. Secondly, the Chinese side can sometimes quickly 
turn an agreement on principle into an agreement on goals and 
then insist that all discussion on detailed arrangements must 
be in line with those agreed-upon goals. Thirdly, the Chinese 
demand for an agreement on principle can be used later on to 
attack the other party for bad faith or for violating the 
spirit of the principles."’2
In the case of the Sino-British negotiations over Hong 
Kong, the general principle set up by the Chinese was the 
issue of sovereignty. From the very beginning of the 
negotiations, Beijing made its stand clear that it would 
recover its sovereignty over Hong Kong, and such a position
5,Interview with Richard Margolis in April 1989.
^Lucian Pye: Chinese Commercial Negotiating Style,
Oelgeschlager, Gunn and Hain Publishers, Inc. Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, 1982, pp.140-145.
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was not a subject for negotiation. In response to Mrs 
Thatcher's statement, made in Hong Kong after her visit to 
Beijing in September 1982, on the validity of the three 
treaties and on Britain's moral obligation to the Hong Kong 
people, a spokesman for the Chinese Foreign Affairs Ministry 
made the following statement:
"We maintain Xiang Gang (Hong Kong) is an issue involving 
the state sovereignty and national interests of the 1,000 
million Chinese people, including the Chinese residents of 
Xiang Gang. The government of the People's Republic of China 
alone is in a position to state that, as the government of a 
sovereign country, it has a responsibility and duty to the 
Chinese residents in Xiang Gang."'’3
On various other occasions, Chinese leaders made similar 
statements, and Beijing never appeared to draw back from this 
position, even when Britain put forward the proposal of 
exchanging sovereignty for continued administrative powers. 
Britain's proposal was seen by the Chinese as a "reactionary 
doctrine for encroaching on other countries' territory and 
sovereignty" and "incompatible with the principle of state 
sovereignty." Beijing insisted that sovereign rights could 
not be divided from administrative rights. It argued: 
"According to international practice, when a state recovers 
its occupied territory from another state, it automatically 
resumes the exercise of sovereignty, including administration, 
over the territory." Thus, the Chinese government's decision 
to recover Hong Kong in 1997 was "in full accord with 
international law", whereas the British proposal, "clinging to 
the colonialist position and attempting to perpetuate British 
occupation of China's Xiang Gang area," was "in violation of
53"The Government Statements of the PRC", People's Daily, 
30 September, 1982/ English text in Beijing Review, no.41, 11 
October, 1982, p.10.
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international law."'’4
China's attitude on the issue of sovereignty was indeed a 
very strong one, with the Chinese leaders maintaining that the 
PRC would never back away from its principles. China rejected 
Britain's proposal of a transfer of sovereignty in exchange 
for the continuation of its administration. The negotiations 
dragged on. Chinese leaders felt that Britain lacked sincerity 
and was playing for time. In August 1983, Hu Yaobang stated 
that China would take over Hong Kong on or before 1 July 1997. 
In the mean time, other Chinese officials urged Britain to 
avoid a rigid attitude in the Sino-British negotiations, and 
warned that if there was no agreement by September 1984 -- a 
date decided by Deng Xiaoping -- China would proceed 
unilaterally to announce its plans for Hong Kong.35
The financial markets of Hong Kong reacted nervously to 
the lack of any substantive progress in the negotiations, and 
confidence of Hong Kong people in a settlement over the 
territory was weakened. The downward trend of the Hong Kong 
dollar on the foreign exchange markets took continued during 
in the summer of 1983, against a background of rising 
political tensions. By middle of September, the exchange rate 
against the US dollar had further dropped from HK$ 6 to 
HK$7.89. When the talks in September ended, a two-paragraph 
announcement was issued, only setting the date for the next 
meeting. The markets responded with a further weakening of the 
Hong Kong dollar, which reached HK$9.55 to the US dollar on 
the week-end of September 2 3-2*4. At the same time, the stock
54Beiiing Review, no. 39, 26 September, 1983, p. 17.
55FEER, 2 5 August, 198 3.
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market suffered a 63.58 point fall to bring the Hang Seng 
index to 7 8 5. 4 8.'"’6
Chinese officials blamed the British and HK governments 
for failing to take appropriate steps to stabilize the 
situation, and they accused Britain of deliberately 
engineering a currency crisis in order to strengthen its case 
in the Beijing talks. Britain, on the other hand, urged China 
to adopt more positive measures towards Hong Kong's future. 
Sir John Bremrigge, the financial secretary of the Hong Kong 
government, openly blamed the Bank of China for buying heavily 
in US dollars, and declared that the slide of the Hong Kong 
dollar could not be arrested until "Beijing gives a positive 
sign about the progress of the talks".57
While there may be some truth in both sides' claims, the 
fundamental cause of the panic was a lack of confidence, 
reflecting profound apprehension about the uncertain future of 
the territory. The open confrontation between the two sides 
only worsened the situation.
Aware of the serious consequences of a collapse of the 
financial markets and the banking system, the government of 
Hong Kong abruptly reversed its financial stance from one of 
laissez- faire to active intervention. Various proposals for 
the stabilization of the currency were put forward. By the end 
of September, the currency crisis was under control, with the 
Hong Kong dollar pegged at $7.80 to the US dollar.'"’8
56SCMPf 24 September, 1983.
57Honcf Koncr Standard, 17 September, 1983.
58Jao, ibid., p.38-39
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By holding a large pool of its foreign currency reserves 
in Hong Kong dollars, China suffered a considerable foreign 
exchange loss as a result of the devaluation of Hong Kong 
dollar. Another important impact of the financial crisis was 
that both China and Britain realized the necessity to avoid 
serious confrontations. From then on, mutual accusations 
stopped. This change was especially noticeable on the Chinese 
side. Britain, for its part, gradually moved away from its 
position on exchange of sovereignty for administrative rights.
After China had been assured of its position over 
sovereignty, it turned out to be flexible on concrete and 
specific matters, and was willing to make compromises in the 
detailed talks. The negotiations from then went-on reasonably 
smoothly.
The Chinese side, though, were still reluctant to follow 
the British recommendations to flesh out China's principal 
position with much more specific details. The Chinese side 
lacked the experience and knowledge as to how Hong Kong was 
run, and it was therefore lift to the British side to provide 
the detailed provisions to be written into the agreement.
In spring 1984, as the negotiations made considerable 
progress, Beijing proposed a joint commission with 
representatives from Britain, China and Hong Kong, to exchange 
information and to consult over the implementation of the 
agreement. China's proposal was regarded with grave suspicion 
by Britain and Hong Kong. They saw the commission developing 
into an alternative source of authority, weakening the Hong 
Kong administration during the transitional period. This 
difference was believed to be the most serious obstacle 
towards reaching a final agreement in September -- a deadline
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set up by the Chinese side -- although some other problems 
also existed.
In July 1984, Sir Geoffrey Howe, the British foreign 
secretary, visited Beijing. He had already been in China in 
April the same year, when he had reached understanding on a 
number of substantive points with the Chinese leaders. Howe's 
visit in July was even more significant. He managed to reach 
agreement as well as an understanding with the Chinese side on 
almost all important matters. As result of his visit, the two 
sides agreed to set up a joint liaison group. The group's 
functions were defined as liaison, consultation on the 
implementation of the agreement and exchange of information.
However, Howe also gained "firm and specific assurances" 
from the Chinese leaders that the group would not be an organ 
of power, would have no supervisory role and would play no 
part in the administration of Hong Kong. In addition, Beijing 
agreed that after China resumed its sovereignty over Hong Kong 
in July 1997, the group would continue to work up to the year 
2000. Such a move represented an important concession on the 
part of China, since it had previously rejected any idea of a 
continued official British presence in Hong Kong after 1997 .59
Given that China's position in the negotiations was 
stronger that of Britain, China demonstrated remarkable 
flexibility towards the settlement of Hong Kong's future. Such 
flexibility can be explained in several ways. Firstly, it has 
already been mentioned that Beijing never recognized the three
59See SCMP, 29, 30, 31, July, 1984 ; For the leading
articles on Howe's visit see, David Lipsey and Michael Jones: 
"Typhoon Warning, on negotiations between Britain and China", 
in Sunday Times, 29 July, 1984 and, Jonathan Mirsky: "The Deal 
in the Manchu Palace", in Observer. 5 August, 1984.
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treaties, considering them as "products of British imperialist 
gunboat diplomacy towards China in the 19th century." Yet by 
setting 1997 -- the year when the lease on the New
Territories expired —  as the deadline for establishing 
China's sovereignty, the Chinese took note of the existing 
three treaties and at least partially recognized them.
Secondly, Beijing had always held to the position that the 
unification of the whole of China was a domestic matter and 
that no other foreign country had a right to interfere. 
Nevertheless, Beijing largely treated the settlement of the 
question of Hong Kong as a diplomatic issue between China and 
Britain. It not only regarded Britain as a negotiating
opponent, but also accepted that Britain should continue its 
administration until 1997. It considered it central to 
maintain good cooperative relations with Britain for the sake 
of Hong Kong's stability and development after 1997. China 
agreed in the Joint Declaration that the Sino-British Joint 
Liaison Group, which was established basically to ensure a 
smooth transfer of government in 1997, would continue its work 
.until 1 January, 2000.
Thirdly, China normally chose to settle certain 
complicated issues in a more or less general way so as to have 
some leeway in a changing situation. But in the case of Hong 
Kong, China accepted Britain's approach of making specific 
arrangements and avoiding ambiguity. In the detailed talks, it 
was the British side who, in fact, took much of the
initiative. The Chinese side appeared to respect Britain's 
knowledge and expertise on Hong Kong, and was receptive to 
Britain's insistence on certain specific matters.
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Conclusion
The Sino-British negotiations took place in a significant 
period when the post-Cultural Revolution changes in China were 
reaching a crucial point. Although the change in China's 
domestic politics provided scope for greater flexibility for 
the Chinese leadership in conducting external relations, 
policy-making in Beijing was still restricted by the growing 
ideological factor of nationalism. Nationalism legitimised and 
laid an ideological base for the CPC's policies, and was used 
as a major means for the party to mobilize people. Inevitably, 
Beijing's attitudes towards the sensitive issues of China's 
sovereignty and unification stayed cautious. Thus, while 
Beijing's proposals for unification with Taiwan were more 
responsive than previous ones to the reality of Taiwan's 
situation, its fundamental position -- that there was only one 
China and the central government of the PRC was the sole 
legitimate government representing the whole of China —  
remained unchanged.
The post-Cultural Revolution Hong Kong policy of the PRC 
was designed to make use of Hong Kong in a more positive way. 
The Chinese leadership was well aware of the importance of a 
continuously successful Hong Kong to the mainland's 
modernization. In this connection, maintenance of the status 
quo under British rule seemed to suit China's interests best. 
However, Britain had to face the fact that its administration 
over the New Territories would automatically end when the 
lease expired in 1997 and, unless some arrangement with the 
Chinese government could be reached, the confidence of Hong 
Kong business people would diminish considerably, which in 
turn could lead to a collapse of Hong Kong's economy.
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Initially, China tried to convince Hong Kong investors not 
to worry, but without offering any clear or authoritative 
commitments. In the end, the Chinese leaders found that they 
too had to deal with the same question that faced the British, 
and agreed with Britain to settle the issue by diplomatic 
negotiations.
China and Britain shared some important common interests: 
both wanted to maintain Hong Kong's stability and prosperity 
and both wanted better mutual relations. The question of 
sovereignty seemed to be the major issue on which the two 
countries differed. However, China's position on the issue was 
the firmer one. China could and was ready to take the risk 
even of sacrificing Hong Kong's stability and prosperity in 
order to recover sovereignty over Hong Kong. During the 
negotiations, the Chinese leaders made it clear several times 
that if Britain failed to reach an agreement with China, they 
would go ahead and announce their own solution for the 
settlement of the Hong Kong question. Britain took China's 
threat seriously, realizing that its own bargaining position 
was weaker than that of China because it could not take 
unilateral action. If it were to challenge or provoke China, 
Britain knew that it would be unable to handle the 
consequences effectively. In this context, Britain's 
concessions were inevitable, since it very much feared that a 
collapse of Hong Kong would create a serious problem of 
refugees for which Britain would have had to take the major 
responsibility.
China also made considerable compromises in order to 
maintain Hong Kong's stability. Under the framework of "one 
country, two systems", China tried to square its principle on
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sovereignty with its more pragmatic aims of making use of Hong 
Kong for the benefit of the mainland's economic development.
During the negotiations, there was a deep mistrust between 
the two governments. The British side believed that the PRC 
lacked the requisite experience and expertise to run Hong 
Kong. China, viewed Britain as the old imperialist power that 
had forced it to sign various unequal treaties. In the eyes of 
the Chinese leaders, Britain had special interests in Hong 
Kong and would want something away from Hong Kong. Britain was 
concerned that China would kill the goose that laid golden 
eggs, while China, in turn, believed that Britain would take 
away the golden eggs. The two sides found common ground for 
cooperation -- to maintain Hong Kong's stability and 
prosperity -- on the basis of which they eventually reached an 
agreement. However, the mistrust still remained, particularly 
as to how to achieve these objectives.
It seemed that both the Chinese and the British 
governments were under pressure to reach agreement before the 
end of 1984. The deadline was actually decided by Beijing in 
order to put pressure on the British side. However, this, in 
turn, also limited China's flexibility. The Chinese leaders 
seemed not fully to understand that it was also important to 
define in detail the obligations that Britain should incur 
during the transitional period. According to the Sino-British 
agreement, it was the British and Hong Kong authorities who 
would have the administrative power to run Hong Kong, and 
China would have no formal platform to express its opinions 
about Hong Kong affairs before July 1997. Theoretically, 
Britain had the right to run Hong Kong on whatever basis it 
considered proper. It was not clear from the Joint Declaration
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in what state Britain would restore Hong Kong to China, apart 
from handing back sovereignty over the territory. The 
governments of Britain and Hong Kong could take positive 
measures to maintain Hong Kong's stability and prosperity, or 
they could let Hong Kong's affairs slide. They could even 
withdraw from Hong Kong in advance, leaving the resulting 
situation to China to sort out.
The two sides agreed to set up a Joint Liaison Group 
(JLG) . The JLG's functions were to conduct consultations on 
the implementation of the Joint Declaration; to discuss 
matters relating to the smooth transfer of government in 1997, 
and to exchange information and conduct consultations on such 
subjects to be agreed by the two sides. The purpose of the JLG 
was to liaise. It would play no part in the administration of 
Hong Kong or the Hong Kong SAR, and would have no supervisory 
role over that administration.
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Chapter Seven
One Country, Two Systems
The concept of 'one country, two systems' was formally put 
forward by the Chinese government during the Sino-British 
negotiations on the future of Hong Kong. The Chinese 
leadership considered 'one country, two systems' as a 
framework for settling the issues of Hong Kong, Macao and 
Taiwan. Under this framework, ideally, the mainland would 
continue its socialist system while Hong Kong, Macao and 
Taiwan would maintain their capitalist systems within a 
unified China. The concept of 'one country, two systems' was 
also seen by the Chinese leaders as a good example of the 
peaceful settlement of issues left over by history. Deng 
Xiaoping stated that 'one country, two systems' was a new 
concept in the world, and a new way to solve conflicts, such 
as those between North and South Korea, or between East and 
West Germany.1
This chapter will first examine the development of the 
concept and its general definition, with reference to the case 
of Tibet. It will then analyse the respective positions of the 
mainland and Hong Kong, in relation to the characteristics of 
the mainland's socialist system and Hong Kong's capitalist 
system. There then follows a discussion about how China's 
leaders envisage relations between the central government and 
the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR), and how 
they expect China's sovereignty and Hong Kong's high degree of
lMDeng Xiaoping talks to Hong Kong", in Documents on 'One 
Country, Two Systems', edited by Taiwan Affairs Office of 
Shanxi Province, 1988; also see, Beijing Review, no.42, 15 
October, 1984.
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autonomy to fit into the framework of 'one country, two 
systems' . The chapter will also describe the major 
difficulties in fulfilling the concept of 'one country, two 
systems'. Finally, the position of Taiwan will be examined, as 
will the effect of a solution for Hong Kong on relations 
between Taiwan and the mainland, and the constraint that the 
factor of Taiwan placed on China's approach towards Hong Kong.
7-1 The development of the concept and the theoretical dilemma
The basic concept of 'one country, two systems' recognizes 
the reality existing in Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macao and seeks 
to continue the socio-economic systems there for a 
considerable period after the formality of reunification. 
Before the term was formally adopted by the Chinese, the core 
of the idea had already been seen in the change in Beijing's 
Taiwan policy after 1978. In November 1978, in an interview 
with the Washington Post correspondent, Deng Xiaoping said 
that after a peaceful reunification of the country, Taiwan 
might still retain its non-socialist economic and social 
system.2 In a meeting with the governor of Hong Kong in March 
1979, Deng again stated: "We have always taken the special
status of Taiwan into account. The social system there need 
not change and people's living standards need not be affected, 
and as a local government, it may have extensive autonomy and 
armed forces for its own defence."3
However, it was in the announcement made by the NPC
2"Deng On Maintaining Hong Kong Policy", in Documents on 
'One Country/ Two Systems', edited by Taiwan Affairs Office of 
Shanxi Province, 1988; see also, Beijing Review, no.l, 4-10 
January, 1988, p.17.
3Ibid., p.13.
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Standing Committee in September 1981, that the Chinese 
government formally stated that after reunification, Taiwan 
could enjoy a high degree of autonomy as a special 
administrative region and could retain its armed forces. This 
statement added that Taiwan's current socio-economic system 
would remain unchanged, as would its economic and cultural 
relations with other countries.4 Although the term 'one 
country, two systems' was not explicitly stated, the idea was 
already clear.
According to Wide Angle, a pro-Beijing Hong Kong magazine, 
it was Hu Yaobang, then CPC general secretary, who first used 
the term 'one country, two systems' in a meeting at Fujian 
province in autumn 1981, when talking of China's policy on 
Taiwan.5 It appeared to be Deng Xiaoping, who in a meeting 
with a foreign visitor in January 1982, openly adopted the 
term when he claimed that the NPC's statement in September 
1981 "embodies the 'one country, two systems' principle". He 
said that the existence of two systems was permissible, and 
that the one need not undermine the other.6
During the negotiations between China and Britain on the 
future of Hong Kong, the concept was further developed. The 
Chinese leaders reiterated the concept of 'one country, two 
systems' on various occasions. For instance, in his working 
report to the second session of the Sixth NPC on 15 May 1984, 
Zhao Ziyang, then Premier of the State Council, stated:
4"Chairman Ye Jianying's Elaborations On Policy Concerning 
Return of Taiwan To Motherland and Peaceful Reunification", 
Beijing Review, no.40, 5 October 1981, p.10.
5Wide Angle, Issue no.3, 1983.
6"Deng On Maintenance of Hong Kong Policy", Beii ing 
Review, no.l, 4-10 January, 1988.
"Proceeding from the fundamental interests of the country 
and the nation, and in view of historic experiences and the 
present state of affairs in Taiwan, we have put forward the 
idea of 'one country, two systems', to be put into practice 
after the reunification of the country."7
Beijing claimed that it was in accordance with the concept 
of "one country, two systems" that China had reached agreement 
with Britain on Hong Kong. A Beijing Review editorial stated: 
"the formula of 'one country, two systems', which forms the 
basis of the Hong Kong accord, is not someone's whim. It is 
solidly grounded on a theoretical understanding of the 
extended duration of the socialist transition period. When 
this is appreciated, lingering doubts about the durability of 
the present arrangements will disappear." The editorial went 
on to claim that the question of the reunification of Taiwan 
with the mainland would be resolved with the same formula.8
In the framework of 'one country, two systems', the 
relations between the mainland, where a socialist system will 
presumably continue, and Hong Kong, where a capitalist system 
will remain, are central. These relations are potentially 
sensitive, particularly as the gap between the two systems is 
still wide. The concept of 'one country, two systems' can be 
seen as an outcome of Beijing's pragmatic tendency in its 
decision-making, but there exist theoretical dilemmas here.
A first difficulty arises from the problem of how to 
interpret the socialist national constitution in conjunction 
with a local capitalist law. It seems to be a contradiction 
under a socialist constitution containing the 'four cardinal
7"Main Points of Zhao's Report to the Second Session of 
the Sixth NPC, People's Daily. 16 May, 1984; English text in 
Beijing Review. No.21, 21 May, 1984, p.17.
8"The Hong Kong Solution", Beijing Review, no.41, 8
October,1984, p.4.
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principles' that there should be room for the existence of a 
capitalist system.
This difficulty would seem to be solved by Article 31 of 
the Chinese constitution, which gives the NPC the right to set 
up special administrative regions in which different socio­
economic systems can be adopted. According to the Sino-British 
agreement, the NPC was to enact and promulgate a Basic Law of 
the Hong Kong SAR in accordance with the constitution of the 
PRC, "stipulating that after the establishment of the Hong 
Kong SAR the socialist system and socialist policies shall not 
be practised in the Hong Kong SAR and that Hong Kong's 
previous capitalist system and life-style shall remain 
unchanged for 50 years".9
Thus, from a constitutional point of view, with the 
special article in China's national constitution and the 
international agreement between China and Britain, the Hong 
Kong SAR's capitalist status has a legitimate basis and legal 
protection.
The second difficulty is ideological. The CPC has 
maintained that 'the four cardinal principles' constitute the 
fundamental prerequisite for achieving China's modernization 
on a socialist basis, and has claimed to perceive a great 
danger of "bourgeois liberalization" in any challenge to the 
four principles. The CPC leadership has insisted that 
socialism was "the historically correct choice of the Chinese 
people" and that it was socialism that had "saved China" and 
had helped China to remain strong politically and militarily, 
enabling the country to stand independently in the world. It
9See, Joint Declaration.
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has argued that if China gave up socialism, then the developed 
foreign capitalist economies would "occupy China's markets and 
destroy China's national economy," and politically, China 
would "fall under their control and lose its independence in 
foreign affairs".10
On the other hand, Chinese scholars have managed to find 
some justifications for the 'one country, two systems'. They 
have argued that although there was no such notion as 'one 
country, two systems' in the classical Marxist works or the 
works of Mao, the concept was actually not in contradiction 
with the principles of Marxism, since the core of Marxism and 
Mao Zedong thoughts was to 'seek truth from the facts'. The 
concept of 'one country, two systems' was a result of 
combining the basic principles of Marxism with the changed 
situation in order to solve a new problem.11
The scholars have suggested that the social system in the 
mainland was very advanced, but that the productive forces 
were poor. The gap between the advanced social system and the 
backward productive forces thus became the major contradiction 
in present-day China. Maintaining the current capitalist 
system in Hong Kong would, in the first place, help to develop 
Hong Kong's economy, since the capitalist system in Hong Kong 
still had room for the development of productive forces. 
Secondly, it could benefit the mainland's economic 
development, by providing financial assistance, advanced 
technology and management experience. Thus, 'one country, two
i°"Official Stresses the Four Principles", Beijing Review, 
No.3 19 January, 1987, p.4.
nLu Deshan, "On 'One Country, Two Systems'" (Lun 'Yiguo 
Liangzhi), in Journal of Social Science, Jilin University, 
China, March, 1986.
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systems' was in accordance with the ultimate aim of socialism 
—  to develop productive forces. The development of social 
productive forces was also the most important criterion for 
upholding socialist principles, and therefore, the
implementation of the concept of 'one country, two systems' 
itself meant the maintenance of socialist principles.12
Clearly, Chinese scholars tended to underestimate the
significance of the ideological differences between Hong Kong
and the mainland, by interpreting socialism in a pragmatic 
way. They suggested that Hong Kong was a small place with only 
5.5 million people and was therefore insignificant in
comparison with the rest of China. The implementation of a 
capitalist system, in such a small place would not, they 
thought, in any way, change or damage the true nature of 
socialism in the mainland.13 Some scholars further argued that 
it was nationalism and patriotism that were more relevant in 
the case of Hong Kong, since the majority of people in Hong 
Kong were Chinese and they accepted the fact that Hong Kong 
was a part of China. Indeed, patriotism is probably the only 
ideology which could bind Hong Kong to the mainland without 
harming Hong Kong's position. However, Beijing could use 
patriotism as a means of putting pressure on Hong Kong.
Yet, these arguments still lack profound analysis of the 
concept, and merely provide simplistic justifications for 
already-existing government policy. Since the 'one country,
12He Ren, "On 'One Country, Two Systems' and Upholding 
Socialist Principles" (Lun Yiguo Liangzhi he Jianchi Shehui 
Zhuyi Ruanze'), in Commentary of Law, Beijing, China, Feb., 
1985, pp.10-13.
13He Ren, "On 'one country, two systems' and Upholding 
Socialist Principles", Commentary of Law, Feb., 1985,
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two systems' concept has been regarded as the best formula by 
the Chinese government to settle the issue of Hong Kong, Macao 
and Taiwan, it has become a highly sensitive subject. All 
openly published materials and articles on this subject have 
had to be consistent with the government line. Thus, it is 
difficult for Chinese scholars further to develop the concept 
within the mainland.
7-2 A relevant case study
Countries with different social systems manage to co-exist 
for long periods, because they acknowledge the principle of 
sovereignty and non-interference in each other's internal 
affairs. Within a single country, where the central authority 
has the absolute power to conduct its internal affairs and no 
external country is in a position to intervene, it is 
questionable whether the government can maintain two distinct 
social systems. The CPC had always considered that the 
principle of peaceful coexistence was applicable only to 
international relations, and that it was not applicable to the 
"relations between oppressed and oppressor nations", between 
"oppressed and oppressor countries", or between "oppressed and 
oppressor classes". It had also held that so long as "the 
state remains a state, it must bear a class character" and 
"there must exist class struggle".14
With the changes in China's domestic politics, the 
principle of peaceful coexistence was developed in a more 
flexible way. Deng Xiaoping stated that the principle of
14,iA Proposal Concerning the General Line of the 
International Communist Movement", the CPC's letter to the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union on 14 June 1963; ibid. 
pp.406-420.
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peaceful coexistence was a good method not only to handle 
state relations, but also a good method to deal with internal 
affairs.15
PRC leaders and scholars have claimed that peaceful 
coexistence between two different systems within China had the 
following aims: to settle all disputes by peaceful means on 
the base of respecting reality and history; neither sides to 
undermine the other, but to complement each other; mutual 
cooperation and mutual understanding. However, they have also 
claimed that the major part of the system within the framework 
of 'one country, two systems' should be socialist in nature 
and that the central government should represent the national 
sovereignty when the special administrative regions should 
only have autonomous rights granted by the National People's 
Congress.16
Some Chinese scholars have argued that two different 
systems have in the past existed both in China and other 
countries. According to their view, the cases in question 
include a dual system of a slavery system and feudalism in the 
Liao Dynasty of 926-1125 A. D. in China; a dual system of 
slavery and feudalism in Japan from the 7th century to the 9th 
century; and the coexistence of a feudalist slavery system in 
the South and a capitalist system in the North in the United
I5Deng Xiaoping, To Construct Socialism with Chinese 
Characteristics (Jianshe You Zhongguo Teshe de Shehui Zhuyi), 
People's Press, Beijing, 1987, p.84.
16Deng Xiaoping, "Talks to the Delegation of Hong Kong 
Prominent Business People" on 22, 23 June, 1984; in On 'One
Country. Two Systems', edited by the Taiwan Affairs Office of 
Shanxi Province, 1988, pp.9-10.
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States in the period of 1789-1865.17
However, other Chinese scholars have held different views, 
and they have argued that there must exist distinguishable 
differences between the two systems and that they must 
represent two totally different and opposing socio-economic 
systems, such as capitalism and socialism. In the cases 
mentioned above, there was no fundamental difference between 
the two systems because they were all exploitative ones, and 
therefore, they could not be viewed as 'one country, two 
systems'. According to this view, the two systems must be
opposing ones, and must have their respective administrative
regions and conduct themselves independently.18
According to this definition, it seems that in East Asia 
there has been only one case which fits the criteria of 'one 
country, two systems' —  namely the case of Tibet. This case 
was, in fact, mentioned by some Hong Kong scholars as an
example to challenge the feasibility of the concept of 'one 
country, two systems'. In some of the papers written by the 
PRC scholars, the case of Tibet was also mentioned. For
instance, an article on 'one country, two systems', published 
in the Journal for Taiwan Studies, stated:
"After the establishment of the PRC, a system differing 
from that of other provinces was introduced in Tibet. The 
central government fulfilled strictly the 'Agreement of the 
Central People's Government and the Local Government of Tibet 
on the Measures for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet' reached 
in May 1951. For the next eight years, Tibet continued to 
implement a feudal slavery system. In March 1959, the ruling
17Li Jiachun and Yao Yiping, "On 'One Country, Two 
Systems'", in Journal of Taiwan Studies, Issue no.l, 1986.
18Lu Deshan, "On 'One Country, Two Systems' from the 
Constitutional Perspective" (Cong Xianfaxue Lun Yiguo 
Liangzhi), Journal of Social Science, Jilin University, China, 
March 1986; pp.48-53.
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clique of Tibet, at the instigation of foreign powers, openly 
tore up the agreement and launched an armed revolt, in an 
attempt to establish the independence of Tibet. Then, the 
central government, in coordination with local patriotic 
leaders, and strongly urged by Tibetan people, gradually 
carried out democratic reforms and abolished the brutal 
slavery system."19
On another occasion, though, a senior Chinese official 
dismissed the case of Tibet as being of relevance to Hong 
Kong, saying that: "the Tibetan example is cited repeatedly by 
some scholars, but that is a complete distortion because there 
was an open rebellion there that was supported by foreign 
powers" .20
Both the arguments of PRC scholars and Chinese official 
statements contain considerable ambiguity. However, the case 
of Tibet is frequently mentioned by those who are doubtful 
about the concept of 'one country, two systems', suggesting 
that what happened in Tibet will inevitably be repeated in 
Hong Kong. It is therefore necessary to examine in greater 
depth the case of Tibet in order to identify more clearly the 
points of commonality and difference with the case of Hong 
Kong.
In constitutional theory, Tibet had a completely different 
system from rest of China before 1959. There was also an 
agreement between the central government and the local Tibetan 
government to maintain the status quo in Tibet. For about 
eight years after this agreement, Tibet enjoyed considerable 
autonomous rights, allowing the Tibetan government to conduct 
local affairs based on established practice. The Chinese
19Li Jiaquan and Yao Yiping, "On 'One Country, Two 
Systems'" in Journal for Taiwan Studies, Issue no.l, 1986.
20Li Chuwen, Deputy Director of the NCNA in Hong Kong, 
interviewed by Newsweek 23 January 1984, p.48.
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central government promised not to change the existing socio­
economic and political system, nor to introduce reforms in 
Tibet. The main clauses of the agreement stated:
"1. The Tibetan people shall unite and drive out 
imperialist aggressive forces from Tibet; the Tibetan people 
shall return to the big family of the Motherland-the People's 
Republic of China.
112 . . .  .
M3. ... the Tibetan people have the right of exercising
national regional autonomy under the unified leadership of the 
Central People's Government.
"4. The central authorities will not alter the existing 
political system in Tibet. The central authorities will also 
not alter the established status, functions and powers of the 
Dalai Lama. Officials of various ranks shall hold office as 
usual.
"5. . . .
"7. The policy of freedom of religious belief laid down in 
the Common Programme of the CPCC shall be carried out. The 
religious belief, customs and habits of the Tibetan people 
shall be respected, and lama monasteries shall be protected. 
The central authorities will not effect a change in the income 
of the monasteries.
M8. Tibetan troops shall be introduced by stages into the 
PLA, and become a part of the national defence forces of the 
PRC.
"9. The spoken and written language and school education 
of the Tibetan nationality shall be developed step by step in 
accordance with the actual conditions in Tibet.
"10. Tibetan agriculture, livestock raising, industry and 
commerce shall be developed step by step, and the people's
livelihood shall be improved step by step in accordance with
the actual conditions in Tibet.
"11. In matters relating to various reforms in Tibet,
there will be no compulsion on the part of the central 
authorities. The local government of Tibet should carry out 
reforms of its own accord, and when the people raise demands 
for reform, they shall be settled by means of consultation 
with the leading personnel in Tibet.
"12 In so far as former pro-imperialist and pro-KMT 
officials resolutely sever relations with imperialism and the 
KMT and do not engage in sabotage or resistance, they may 
continue to hold office irrespective of their past.
"14. The CPG shall conduct the centralised handling of all 
external affairs of the area of Tibet; and there will be
peaceful co-existence with neighbouring countries, 
establishing relations with them on the basis of equality, 
mutual benefit and mutual respect for territory and 
sovereignty.
"15. In order to ensure the implementation of this 
agreement, the CPG shall set up a military and administrative 
committee and a military area headquarters in Tibet, and, 
apart from the personnel sent there by the CPG, shall absorb 
as many local Tibetan personnel as possible to take part in 
the work.
"16. Funds needed by the military and administrative
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committee, the military area headquarters and the PLA entering 
Tibet, shall be provided by the CPG.21
"17 ....
All the same, autonomy in Tibet was restricted, though 
it was much greater than that in other autonomous regions, 
such as Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia. The local government did 
not have right to conduct its external relations, and there 
was no separate customs border. Theoretically, local 
officials, including the Dalai Lama, had to ask permission 
from the central government to visit foreign countries. The 
Tibetan government was under the close supervision of the 
military administrative committee. The stationing of the PLA 
in Tibet was important, since the army could carry out defence 
activities, and at the same time watch over Tibetan activities 
and act as a deterrent force.
According to some Western observers, the Chinese 
government was cautious towards changes in Tibet. "Most of the 
effect [of Chinese rule] was informal and indirect", they 
wrote, "and much of it concerned only the fringe areas of 
Tibetan life without penetrating the inner recesses of the 
communities' traditions... Although many of the more barbaric 
and objectionable aspects of Tibetan customary law and justice 
were discouraged and in practice abandoned, the main body of 
communist China's statutory law was never enforced in 
Tibet. "22
21"The Agreement of the Central People's Government and 
the Local Government of Tibet on Measures for the Peaceful 
Liberation of Tibet", in People's China, vol.iii, no.12. 16
June, 1951.
22George Ginsburg & Michael Mathos, "Communist China's 
Impact on Tibet: The First Decade (II)", Far East Survey, New 
York, 29, 8, 1960, p. 123. See also, A. Tom Grunfeld, The
Making of Modern Tibet, Zed Books Ltd., 1987, p.119.
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On 27 February 1957, Mao Zedong made a speech to a state 
conference in which he reaffirmed China's policy on Tibet:
"Democratic reforms have not yet been carried out in Tibet 
because conditions are not ripe. According to the seventeen- 
article agreement reached between the Central People's 
Government and the local government of Tibet, reform of the 
system must be carried out, but the timing can only be decided 
when the great majority of the people of Tibet and the local 
leading political figures consider it opportune, and we should 
not be impatient. It has now been decided not to proceed with 
democratic reforms in Tibet during the period of the Second 
Five Year Plan (1958-1962). Whether to proceed with them in 
the period of the Third Five Year Plan can only be decided in 
the light of the situation at the time."23
The local party and army leader also stated in 1956:
"Tibet has no other road to travel but the road of 
socialism. But socialism and Tibet are still very different 
from each other. A gradual reform has to be carried out...This 
will depend on circumstances and it will be carried out by 
the leaders of the people of Tibet and will not be imposed on 
them by force by other people."24
Yet, some important steps towards changes were still 
taken, including the setting up of the "Preparatory Committee 
for the Autonomous Region of Tibet" in April 1956, with the 
Dalai Lama as the chairman and the Panchen Lama as vice- 
chairman. The committee had fifty-one members. Although only 
five of them were officials sent by Beijing, the committee 
functioned only on matters that the Chinese authorities had 
already decided. "Far from having a hand in the decision­
making, the Tibetan representatives could neither bring 
forward new proposals nor express any disagreement with 
Chinese decisions."2'’ Thus, the establishment of the committee
23Mao Zedong, "Speech at the Eleventh Session (Enlarged) 
of the Supreme State Conference", in Selected Work of Mao 
Zedong, Foreign Language Press, Beijing, 1978, vol.V.
24Zhang Guohua, "Work on the Tibet Region", RMRB, 21, 56. 
Also see, Grunfeld, ibid., p.122.
25See, Tsepon W.D. Shakabpa, Tibet a political history, 
Yale University Press, 1967, p.310.
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was seen as an important step towards changing the 
constitutional structure of Tibet.26
Chinese leaders seemed under pressure to "offer some 
relief to the masses in order to gain their allegiance", 
though they acknowledged that changes could create alienation 
and resentment.27 On the other hand, there existed powerful 
forces in Tibet which desired independence and resisted Han 
presence in the region. A confrontation was inevitable. The 
coexistence of the two systems ended in 1959 after a 
unsuccessful revolt led by the high ranking monasteries.
A combination of factors contributed to destroy Beijing's 
original plans for Tibet. As A. Tom Grunfeld has stated, these 
included a "misunderstanding of the nature of Tibetan society, 
a lack of consistency in Beijing's political line, persistent 
Chinese chauvinism and an inability to respond adequately to 
growing resentment on the part of the Tibetan populace".28
In comparison with the situation of Hong Kong, Tibet's 
position was more vulnerable. Firstly, the agreement between
26See, Tibet and the People's Republic of China, A Report 
to the International Commission of Jurists by its Legal 
Committee on Tibet, International Commission of Jurists, 
Geneva, 1960. p.
27The Tibetan leaders also acknowledged the necessity of 
reforms. As the Dalai Lama stated: "We have no desire to
disguise the fact that ours is an ancient society, and that we 
must introduce immediate changes in the interests of the 
people of Tibet. In fact, during the last nine years, several 
reforms were proposed by me and by my government, but every 
time these measures were strenuously opposed by the Chinese in 
spite of popular demand for them, with the result that nothing 
was done for the betterment of the social and economic 
conditions of the people." "The Dalai Lama's statement at a 
press conference held in Mussoorie, India" on 20 June 1959. 
see, Tsepon W.D. Shakabpa, Tibet: A Political History, Yale 
University Press, 1967, pp.314-315. See also, Grunfeld, ibid., 
p.119.
28Grunfeld, ibid., p. 126.
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the CPG and the local Tibetan government was not an 
international)!' agreement, and the CPG was not bound by 
international law. There was no third party which was in a 
position to influence the CPG's policy. Secondly, there was no 
clear guarantee from the CPG as to how long the existing 
Tibetan status quo would be maintained. To maintain the status 
quo in Tibet was clearly an expedient and a tactical policy, 
rather than a 'fundamental state policy'. Although the Chinese 
leaders were committed not to alter the status quo in the 
short term, they believed that the Tibetan system had to be 
changed when the conditions were ripe. The Seventeen Point 
Agreement in fact stipulated that the Tibetan government 
should carry out reforms of its own when the people raised 
demands for reform. The term 'people' , though, was left 
ambiguous.
Thirdly, there were strong ideological and cultural 
tensions between the two sides. According to Chinese leaders, 
the social system of Tibet was "a reactionary, dark, cruel and 
savagely feudal serf system", and only the introduction of 
democratic reforms would "liberate the Tibetan people, develop 
the economy and culture of Tibet and provide the groundwork
for building a prosperous, happy and socialist Tibet."29 The
Han often considered themselves superior: culturally,
politically and militarily. Attitudes of cultural superiority 
led to policies that only further exacerbated mutual 
hostility.30
Above all, the independent tendency among Tibetans came to
29Resolution of the Preparatory Committee for the
Autonomous Region of Tibet, NCNA, 20 July, 1959.
30Grunfeld, ibid., p. 126.
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be the most important source of confrontation between the two 
sides. The Tibetan government was accused by the CPG of 
violating the Seventeen Point Agreement, particularly relating 
to activities for independence. With a vast land and rich 
natural resources, Tibet was important to China, strategically 
and economically. In addition, China was deeply concerned 
about a possible 'chain reaction' following Tibetan 
independence, since China's other minority regions, such as 
Xinjiang and the Inner Mongolia, could follow Tibet in 
demanding independence. Official Chinese historiography has 
seen Tibet as a classic example of separatism being 
encouraging and assisted by foreign imperialists, and as an 
area that all Chinese patriots (who were mainly Han Chinese) 
were determined to see re-united with China. Thus, while the 
PRC was flexible towards the apparently intolerable socio­
economic conditions that it saw in Tibet, it became guite 
ruthless towards the independence tendency there, since it 
related to the highly sensitive matter of sovereignty.
In spite of these differences, the case of Tibet still 
contains some valuable lessons for Hong Kong. For the Chinese 
government, it is important to demonstrate its sincerity not 
only by words, but also by actions, in the implementation of 
the concept of 'one country, two systems' and the Sino-British 
agreement. It is also important that a greater understanding 
of the political and socio-economic nature of Hong Kong be 
achieved by the Chinese leaders, as well as by the Chinese 
officials who manage Hong Kong's affairs on a daily basis.
For the international community, especially the United 
Kingdom, certain international assurances are essential in 
safeguarding Hong Kong's freedoms. The notions of
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'sovereignty' and 'internal affairs' must not be seen as 
unchallengeable, particularly when they are used as a cover by 
authorities for their possible erroneous policies or actions. 
After all, the 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration was an 
international agreement and was registered at the United 
Nations.
7-3 The uncertainty of the socialist system in the mainland
In Marxian theory, socialism denotes a system of 
production relations that is supposed to characterize the 
transitional stage between capitalism and communism. In the 
phase of socialism, the state remains in place, serving as the 
instrument of the working classes in a revolutionary 
dictatorship, and upholding a new order of legality and a new 
system of rights, in such a way as to permit the emergence of 
true common ownership and the eventual abolition of the state. 
In socialist society, the means of production are taken into 
social ownership and each producer remunerated in accordance 
with work done.
The CPC divided the Chinese revolution into basic two 
stages. The first stage was the bourgeois-democratic 
revolution, up to land reform in the early 1950s, in which the 
CPC's task was to overthrow imperialist, feudal and 
bureaucrat-capitalist rule. As a result of the seizure of 
power on the mainland by communist forces and the completion 
of land reform led by the CPC in the early 1950s, it was 
claimed that thenceforth China had entered the era of 
socialist revolution and socialist construction. After land 
reform, the CPC launched a campaign of socialist transforma­
tion, which was designed to ’’alter capitalist ownership and
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the system of private ownership" in agriculture, handicrafts 
and capitalist industry. By 1956, most of Chinese agriculture 
had been collectivised and privately-owned industries were 
transformed into state-owned and collectively-owned 
operations. The Eighth Congress of the CPC thus declared that 
the socialist system had been basically established and that 
the principal contradiction within the country was no longer 
the one between the working class and the bourgeoisie, but 
rather that between "the people's demand for the building of 
an advanced industrial country and the realities of a backward 
agricultural country, between the people's need for rapid 
economic and cultural development and the inability of China's 
present economy and culture to meet that need."31
After 1958, China's economic development was dominated by 
the more radical approach which led to the Great Leap Forward. 
As a result of the Great Leap Forward, the rural commune 
system was established, further collectivizing China's 
agriculture, and numerous private small industrial and 
commercial units, small co-operatives and industrial business 
were merged with state enterprises. The Great Leap Forward led 
to a great setback for China's economy and to a division 
within the Chinese leadership over development strategy and 
the implications of ideology. It also reflected some of the 
intrinsic problems of the system.
These problems had in fact been exposed by Chinese 
intellectuals during the Hundred Flowers movement of 1956-57, 
in which they were encouraged to criticize bureaucratic and 
elitist tendencies in the party leadership. The Hundred
31Supplement to People's China, no.22, 1956, pp.1-2.
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Flowers movement ended with the Anti-Rightist campaign. The 
campaign smothered the first serious attempt led by 
intellectuals to challenge the existing political system, 
dominated by the CPC, and to demand greater freedom and 
democracy.
After the Great Leap Forward, the moderate leadership 
within the Party tried to introduce limited reforms in order 
to save the crumbling economy, but such reforms were 
restricted to the economic field. In the political field, the 
CPC further consolidated its control. The practice of putting 
"politics in command to override objective constraints" and 
the notion of class struggle were strengthened. The Tenth 
Plenary Session of the Eighth Party Central Committee, meeting 
in October 1962, set a line which considered socialism as a 
transitional period from capitalism to communism, and in which 
existed a class struggle between the working class and 
bourgeoisie. The Plenary Session also established class 
struggle as the basic line of the party. Since that time, as 
official Chinese historians claims, China has been faced with 
two entirely different paths: one entailing a further
consolidation of socialism and steps towards communism, and 
the other a weakening of socialism and steps towards 
capitalism.
As has been discussed in Chapter Four, the post-Cultural 
Revolution reforms brought a great relaxation and changes to 
all aspects of Chinese life, providing opportunities to re­
examine the basic political and economic principles and 
practices of Mao's era. On the other hand, it also raised 
questions about the future of socialism in China and about the 
legitimacy of the revolution that brought the Chinese
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communists to power in the first place. The Chinese leadership 
admitted that the question of socialism was not fully 
understood by the Party. Deng Xiaoping stated on various 
occasions that it was important to understand properly the 
principles of socialism in carrying out "socialist revolution 
and socialist construction". He posed the problem of what 
socialism was and how it should be built.
Yet, in reviewing China's social, economic and political 
systems, the Party continued to hold that China was a 
socialist country. As the Chinese leadership continued to 
emphasize the importance of economic development, it also gave 
considerable attention to the question of how to remain true 
to the ideals of socialism and to "safeguard the socialist 
orientation of China's modernization". Deng was once closely 
associated with Mao's position of class struggle. Although he 
has no longer believed that there existed two different lines 
within the Party, he was still deeply concerned that the 
danger for China becoming a capitalist country continued to 
exist.
The Chinese leadership acknowledged the necessity of 
political reform and realised that, without political reform, 
it would be difficult to push forward China's economic 
reforms. Nevertheless, with the establishment of the 'four 
cardinal principles' as the Party's guideline, the CPC's 
political reforms were limited. The main reforms were designed 
to separate the functions of the party from those of 
government; transfer power to low levels; simplify 
administration; reform the state and party personnel systems; 
and enhance socialist democracy and impose the socialist legal
306
system.32 The general objective of the reforms was limited to 
consolidating "socialist productive forces and establishing an 
effective working system at the various levels of government, 
promoting a better exercise of governmental function and 
powers. "33
Ironically, just when the CPC leadership was emphasizing 
the importance for China of holding on to socialism and 
Marxism, it failed to give a clear definition of socialism and 
Marxism. On the one hand, it claimed that "the scientific 
predictions of Marx and Lenin remain the guide" to China's 
development, but on the other hand, it also admitted that 
classical Marxism was insufficient for the study of a 
socialist economy because "socialist systems never existed in 
Marx's and Lenin's time". Socialism with Chinese 
characteristics also remained ambiguous. The CPC leaders 
acknowledged that "building socialism in a large and backward 
eastern country such as China is something new in the history 
of the development of Marxism" and that China would have to 
find a way to build socialism with Chinese characteristics 
through practice".34 In other words, as a senior official 
pointed out, China would "neither follow the capitalist road 
nor copy the Soviet model, nor return to the old track of
32Deng Xiaoping, "On the Reform of the System of Party and 
State Leadership", speech at an enlarged meeting of the 
Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee in 1980, English 
text in Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Foreign Language 
Press, Beijing, 1987, pp.309-317.
33Deng Xiaoping, ibid.
34Zhao Ziyang, "Advance along the Road of Socialism with 
Chinese Characteristics", Report delivered at the 13th 
National Congress of the CPC on 25 October, 1987, see, 
People's Daily. 26 October, 1987; English text in Beii ing 
Review. No.45, 15 November, 1987.
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before 1979".35
However, the Chinese leadership is agreed that the CPC 
must maintain its dominant role in China's politics. Deng 
Xiaoping stated in no uncertain terms that "to uphold the four 
cardinal principles, the key lies in upholding the Party 
leadership". CPC leaders have argued that a big country like 
China would be "torn apart and accomplish nothing without the 
leadership of the Communist Party" and that "only under the 
Party leadership can the nation remain politically stable and 
focus its people's will and strength on reform and 
development". "The Party," Zhao Ziyang once argued, "has made 
mistakes in the course of successfully leading the Chinese 
revolution and construction, but it is none other than the 
Party itself that has corrected these mistakes in a most 
resolute and courageous manner. True, there are not a few 
weaknesses in the Party, but it is precisely the Party itself 
that has taken the initiative openly to expose and overcome 
them. "36
Thus, even though the reforms led to a move away from a 
Soviet-type centrally planned economy towards a reliance on 
market forces, resulting in some freedom in the economic 
sphere and, to certain extent, in intellectual circles, there 
has so far been no significant change in the political sphere, 
particularly as regards the leadership of the Party. On the 
contrary, demands for political freedom and challenges to the 
Party in the post-Mao period have encountered great dif­
35Interview with Ke Zaisuo, the head of Chinese side of 
the Sino-British Joint Liaison Group in April 1989.
36Zhao Ziyang, "On the Two Basics of the Party Line", 
People's Daily. 29 January, 1987.
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ficulties, and, sometimes, even suppression and persecution.
Yet, if it is to maintain its dominant position, the CPC 
has to adjust its policies against a changing situation and 
rectify its errors. Its policy has to be acceptable to both 
the Chinese people and the international community. The 
reforms initiated by the CPC won considerable support 
internally and externally. The CPC has to continue the reform 
process, for any setback would inevitably damage its own 
position. While it might still adopt a rigid attitude towards 
profound political reforms, it has not introduced even mild 
reforms such as a relatively independent media and judiciary 
and more freedom for Chinese citizens to exercise their 
political rights. However, the major question is, as the 
Chinese leaders themselves have said, whether China's economic 
reforms can continue without any significant political 
reforms. If China's economy fails to meet the Chinese people's 
demands, then the leadership of the CPC will be seriously 
shaken and the future of socialism in China might be in 
question.
Much evidence suggests that the passive attitude adopted 
by the CPC leadership towards political reforms and the legacy 
inherited from the past created great uncertainties in China's 
politics and development. Socialism was less clearly defined, 
but that did necessarily not mean that the CPC was interested 
in an alternative ideology or way of development. Thus, 'one 
country, two systems' could be implemented either in a 
restrictive way, while the conservatives dominated China's 
decision-making, or in a more flexible way, while the 
reformers consolidated their position.
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7-4 The prospects for capitalism in Hong Kong
On 22 June, 1984, Deng Xiaoping met a group of Hong Kong 
business people, and the following day some prominent Hong 
Kong figures, including Sze-yuen Chung, Lydia Dunn and Q.W. 
Lee. In his talks with these people, Deng, for the first time, 
described China's detailed policy regarding Hong Kong's 
future. He said:
"We have said on many occasions that Hong Kong's current 
socio-economic system, its life-style and its position as a 
free port and an international trade and financial centre will 
remain unchanged after China resumes the exercise of its 
sovereignty over Hong Kong in 1997. Hong Kong can go on 
maintaining and developing economic relations with other 
countries and regions. We have also stated repeatedly that, 
apart from stationing troops there, Beijing will not dispatch 
cadres to work in the government of the Hong Kong special 
administrative region."37
Deng's statements provided the core for China's proposals 
towards Hong Kong after 1997. In the 1984 Sino-British Joint 
Declaration, the position of Hong Kong's economic system was 
formally defined as follows:
"(6) The Hong Kong SAR will retain the status of a free
port and a separate customs territory.
(7) The Hong Kong SAR will retain the status of an 
international financial centre, and its markets for foreign 
exchange, gold, securities and futures will continue. There 
will be a free flow of capital. The Hong Kong dollar will 
continue to circulate and remain freely convertible.
(8) The Hong Kong SAR will have independent finances. The 
Central People's government will not levy taxes on the Hong 
Kong SAR.
(9) The Hong Kong SAR may establish mutually beneficial 
economic relations with the United Kingdom and other 
countries, whose economic interests in Hong Kong will be given 
due regard.
(10) Using the name of 'Hong Kong, China', the Hong Kong
SAR may on its own maintain and develop economic and cultural
relations and conclude relevant agreements with states, 
regions and relevant international organizations."38
37"Deng Xiaoping On Hong Kong Issue", in Documents on 'One 
Country, Two Systems'; also see, Beijing Review, no.30, 2 3
July, 1984, pp.16-17.
38See 'Sino-British Joint Declaration on Future of Hong 
Kong'.
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A more detailed description of the provisions for Hong 
Kong's economy was provided in an annexa. It can be seen that 
Hong Kong's existing economic system and practices were well 
defined under the Sino-British agreement.
Clearly, maintaining Hong Kong's economic stability and 
prosperity was the common aim of the PRC and the United 
Kingdom. Chinese officials, in fact, showed a considerable un­
derstanding for the necessity for Hong Kong to continue its 
capitalist economic, trade and financial systems. It would 
seem justifiable to conclude that, as long as China was able 
to benefit from Hong Kong's economic system, Beijing's 
commitment would be granted.
However, on the question of the political system, the 
Sino-British agreement contains a certain degree of ambiguity. 
According to the agreement, the Hong Kong SAR "will be vested 
with executive, legislative and independent judicial powers". 
Its government "will be composed of local inhabitants", and 
the chief executive "will be appointed by the Central People's 
government on the basis of the results of elections or
consultations to be held locally". "Principal officials will
be nominated by the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong SAR for 
appointment by the Central People's government". The agreement 
also stipulates that "rights and freedoms, including those of 
the person, of speech, of the press, of assembly, of
association, of travel, of movement, of correspondence, of 
strike, of choice of occupation, of academic research and of 
religious belief will be ensured by law in the Hong Kong SAR". 
"Private property, ownership of enterprises and legitimate 
right of inheritance and foreign investment will also be
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protected" .39
In an appended annex, the Chinese government elaborates 
that: "the legislature of the Hong Kong SAR shall be
constituted by elections. The executive authorities shall 
abide by the law and shall be accountable to the 
legislature.1,40
It is obvious that the provisions defining the future Hong 
Kong's political system are more progressive and more 
democratic, especially regarding the organization of 
government, than the current system in Hong Kong as defined by 
the Letters of Patent. The current Hong Kong government is not 
democratic, since it is not elected by the people of the 
territory, but is instead appointed by the government of the 
United Kingdom. Peter Wesley-Smith, a leading Hong Kong legal 
scholar, has written:
"The Prime Minister is responsible to an electorate but
Hong Kong citizens have no voting rights. The government of
Hong Kong must act in obedience to law, including law made 
locally, and cannot necessarily control the law-making 
process, yet it is constitutionally responsible to Britain, 
not to the people it governs. . .Whether the system in Hong Kong 
operates effectively and provides good government is a 
different question from whether it is democratic."41
Thus, it was not surprising that the Sino-British
agreement failed to give a clearer definition of Hong Kong's 
political system and the direction in which such a system 
should develop. The Chinese side knew what it wanted. It was 
possible, if China had insisted, have demanded a specific
clause to be written into the Sino-British agreement in order
391 bid.
40 T bid.
41Peter Wesley-Smith, An Introduction to Hong Kong's Legal 
System, p.26.
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to seal the current political institutions in Hong Kong. It 
was the British side that was reluctant to do so.
The British government and Hong Kong government were well 
of aware the weakness of the political system of Hong Kong, 
and twice proposed a democratic reform before the 1980s. With 
the settlement of Hong Kong's future, the Hong Kong government 
and the British government saw an even stronger demand for 
reform of the colonial system, and set out to create a more 
democratic system before 1997. Such an intention was clearly 
stated in the Green Paper of the Hong Kong government, 
entitled 'Further Development of Representative Government in 
Hong Kong', which was published on 18 July, 1984. The 
objective of the proposals put forward in the Green Paper was 
"to develop progressively a system of government, the 
authority for which is firmly rooted in Hong Kong, which is 
able to represent authoritatively the views of the people of 
Hong Kong, and which is more directly accountable to the 
people of Hong Kong."'12
It ought to be noted that although the government of Hong 
Kong is not democratic, the colonial administration is 
accountable to the democratic government of the United 
Kingdom. The government is restrained, in Wesley-Smith's 
words, "not by fear of losing the next election, but by its 
own notions of how it should carry out its functions, by 
responsibility to Her Majesty's government in the United 
Kingdom and, ultimately, by the threat of civil unrest by Hong 
Kong residents. Many people in Hong Kong, especially the 
younger generation and intellectuals, fear that in the absence
42See, Hong Kong /Annual Report, 198 5.
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of democracy, freedom and the rule of law are the gifts of the 
rulers, which can also be withdrawn when it pleases them".43
Hence, to a certain extent, the Hong Kong government's 
proposals reflected the anxiety of Hong Kong people, and par­
ticularly the demand from intellectual circles for a more 
democratic political system. Presumably, the strength of the 
current Hong Kong government would be enhanced if it could 
implement necessary political reforms. It was believed that to 
introduce political reforms, the British authorities could, on 
the one hand, establish certain mechanisms which might provide 
the conditions to prevent possible intervention by the PRC in 
the future. On the other hand, the reforms could provide the 
opportunity eventually to transfer power into the hands of 
reliable and experienced guardians who would play an essential 
role in safeguarding the stability and prosperity of Hong 
Kong.
Nevertheless, any significant political reforms cannot 
possibly be conducted smoothly without the consent of the 
Chinese government. This has been particularly true since 
1984. Although the Chinese government made considerable 
compromises regarding the future Hong Kong system and allowing 
Hong Kong people to enjoy greater democracy, the provisions of 
the agreement were still designed for the establishment of a 
powerful and effective executive authority. The Chinese 
leadership believed that an effective government was central 
to Hong Kong's economic development.
When the CPC put forward political reforms in the 
mainland, it aimed merely at increasing the Party's and the
43Peter Wesley-Smith, ibid., p.26.
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government's efficiency, and was not concerned about democracy 
except as a possible means to that end. In Beijing's view, 
democracy, as a means, should serve the aim of economic 
development and political stability. Chinese leaders were 
interested in the experience of the four "little dragons" in 
Asia -- namely Hong Kong, South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore -- 
and believed that an authoritatiejft style of political system 
could help further economic advancement.
In the case of Hong Kong, they considered the existing 
Hong Kong governmental arrangement highly acceptable. Beijing 
has constantly faced a dilemma between increasing demands for 
political reform in Hong Kong and the maintenance of the 
current, relatively non-democratic Hong Kong political system. 
Chinese leaders saw democracy as posing a challenge to 
stability and prosperity, but they also realised that openly 
objecting to political reforms aimed at a more democratic 
system would damage China's reputation and lose support, at 
least from intellectuals in Hong Kong. Thus, Ke Zaisuo, head 
of the Chinese side of the Sino-British Joint Liaison Group, 
once claimed that the Chinese side had never objected to 
political reform, not even to the direct election of members 
of the Legislative Council before 1997. He said that if direct 
elections could manifest the spirit of democracy, the Chinese 
side "will support and promote them".44
However, this "support" was highly conditional and 
evidence existed at an early stage of official Chinese concern 
that democratic political reform in Hong Kong should be 
closely coordinated with Chinese constitutional plans for the
44Ta Kuna Pao (TKP) , 16 June 1987.
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territory. The evidence showed that a problem existed from a 
Chinese perspective in allowing democratic change in Hong Kong 
under British auspices while also preparing for the new Basic 
Law for the future Hong Kong SAR. The difficulty was 
compounded by the Sino-British agreement that a convergence 
between the two sides should deepen as 1997 approached.
The basic position of the Chinese government towards 
political reform was that, firstly, it objected to any rapid 
changes, and secondly, any significant change in the political 
system should be closely linked with the Basic Law. Chinese 
officials claimed that there could be three possible outcomes 
for political reform in Hong Kong in relation to the Basic 
Law: "One, the representative system dove-tails with the Basic 
Law; this is the ideal possibility. Two, the one partly dove­
tails with and partly contradicts the other; this would not be 
a good situation. Three, each goes its own way; this would be 
unfortunate for Hong Kong, and for Britain and China as 
well.1145
Chinese officials often reiterated that, according to the 
Sino-British 1984 agreement, Hong Kong's current socio­
economic system and life-style would remain unchanged for 50 
years and, therefore, China did not wish to see any drastic 
changes before 1997, including in the political structure, 
since it was part of the whole socio-economic system. They 
argued that any political system was "a superstructure which 
services the economic base" and no reform "should destroy the 
economic base". They also pointed out that to maintain the 
stability and prosperity of Hong Kong was in the common
45Xu Jiatun, "On Current Issue", TKP, 4 December 1985.
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interest of everyone concerned, and that China's aim was "to 
avoid the emergence of any unnecessary chaos, and to bring 
about in 1997 a smooth transfer of sovereignty and a smooth 
realization of the policy of Hong Kong people ruling Hong 
Kong" .46
Moreover, Chinese officials argued that Hong Kong's own 
experience proved that a democratic political system could be 
irrelevant to economic development, and that under British 
rule, the people of Hong Kong had never enjoyed a high degree 
of democracy. Thus, a gradual reform would help the people of 
Hong Kong to achieve what they wanted, while avoiding 
unnecessary chaos.47
However, while the Chinese government objected to any 
drastic changes in Hong Kong's political system, it also
recognized the necessity for certain changes. Chinese
officials made it clear that the Hong Kong Basic Law would not 
leave the territory's political structure completely 
unchanged.48
What sort of political system did China wish to see 
established in Hong Kong? In the first place, Chinese
officials simply denied that China had any set conceptions for 
the political system in a future Hong Kong. Later, Beijing's 
attitude became more straightforward. The Chinese insisted
that Hong Kong was not an independent country, and, therefore, 
neither Western nor Chinese models of democracy should be
46TKP 12 February 1986 ; 9 June 1986; Xu Jiatun's talk to 
Hong Kong students (TKP 3 February 1985);also Ji Pengfei's 
talk to a group of architects of Hong Kong on 19 October 1985 
(TKP 24 October 1985).
471 bid.
48TKP, 16 October 1985, p.l.
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followed. They stressed that, "being a unique place, Hong Kong 
should find a system that is suitable for itself", and that 
the future political institutions of Hong Kong should take 
account of the maintenance of Hong Kong's stability and 
prosperity, a balance of interests between all strata of 
society, an efficient government and adherence to the Joint 
Declaration.49
It was clear that the Chinese government preferred an 
executive-led government which would be accountable both to 
the central government in Beijing and to the Hong Kong SAR, 
but not necessarily to the legislature. Beijing was concerned 
that a legislature-led government might encourage party 
politics and reduce the effectiveness of the SAR government. 
It was also worried that a powerful legislature might become 
less accountable to the central government in Beijing, 
creating a confrontation between the central government and 
the SAR government. The Chinese government believed that an 
executive-led government could provide a highly effective 
government which could also enjoy a degree of flexibility and 
adaptability and respond to any immediacies.
In addition, it considered that such a political 
institution could maintain the consistency of government 
policy and avoid unnecessary changes both in personnel and the 
established policies. Professor Xiao Weiyun, a mainland member 
of the Basic Law Drafting Committee argued clearly in favour 
of the present system. He said that the strength of Hong 
Kong's political system should be reserved and a minimum 
change in Hong Kong's political structure would be good for
49See, TKP 20 November 1985 p.l, and 19 June 1986 p. 14.
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the region's stability.'’0
Beijing wanted the future Hong Kong SAR not to adopt a 
parliamentary system nor a cabinet-responsibility system, 
since the Hong Kong SAR was merely a local administrative 
division of China. It believed that such systems could only 
destabilize the situation in Hong Kong, and would thus be 
detrimental to the daily life and economic development of the 
territory.51
China's position showed its caution towards political 
reform in Hong Kong, but it also reflected, to a certain 
extent, the concern of business people who were unenthusiastic 
about a democratic system that might reduce their influence 
and might raise taxes to finance higher social spending. 
Because of concern from business circles and pressure from the 
PRC, the government of Hong Kong showed considerable caution 
towards the introduction of democratic political reforms, 
though it had initially broached the topic. Sir David Wilson, 
the governor, acknowledged that: "any changes which might be 
introduced should not disrupt the steady progress we have been 
making, nor the stability which is so important to our 
community. 1132
The governor also observed that it was widely accepted 
that Hong Kong must have a system of government which suited 
its own special needs, rather than simply copy some model from 
elsewhere. He stated that the system of government must be
50Interview with Professor Xiao Weiyun in Beijing, 21 
December, 1990.
51Interview with Hu Caiji, deputy of the Propaganda
Department of the NCNA in Hong Kong in April 1989.
52TKP, 17 December 1987.
319
understood by and have credibility with the people, and that 
it needed to evolve from the existing systems, which had 
served Hong Kong well and which operated in a fashion more 
responsive to the public than the formal constitutional 
position might suggest.''3
The government of Hong Kong also recognized the importance 
of the link between the political reforms and the Basic Law. 
As the governor said: "if the Basic Law lays down a certain
structure for after 1997, and that looks like a feasible 
arrangement to try to mirror-image before 1997, then we would 
see advantages in trying to bring in that sort of structure 
before 1997. "-vt
Chinese officialdom was also deeply suspicious about a 
Western style of democracy. The Chinese leadership have seldom 
admitted that the Western political system is democratic. They 
stress the importance for China to learn from Western 
countries, but only as regards advanced technology and 
management skills. They even regard that the socialist 
democracy as superior to capitalist democracy, because the 
latter supposedly represents only the interests of a minority 
of people. Although some Chinese senior officials recognized 
that the development of socialism remained far behind the 
early expectations and that capitalism had matured with 
experience which it would be worthwhile China examining, the 
top leadership still considered that the introduction of 
Western-style democracy would create trouble and chaos. In 
this context, Deng said that the Hong Kong SAR should not copy
53TKP, 17 December 1987 p. 15.
54TKP, 21 April 19 8 8 p. 16.
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Western systems, and that one should not use the parliamentary 
systems in Britain or the United States as the sole yardsticks 
to judge whether a place was democratic or not.55
Since the Chinese leadership believed that the capitalist 
system merely represented the interests of capitalists and 
that the bourgeoisie had a dominant position in a capitalist 
system, they considered such a system should apply to Hong 
Kong. Thus, it appeared justifiable for China to choose a 
political system that suited the bourgeoisie rather than the 
working class in Hong Kong. The Chinese leadership understood 
something of Western political systems, which, in their 
various forms, provided opportunities for people to 
participate in politics, and for governments to be accountable 
to public opinion, in general overtly and freely expressed. 
They were also aware that, although most politicians and 
members of parliament were from the capitalist class and thus 
no doubt paid special attention to their own interests, with 
the existence of a political system of checks and balances and 
with general elections, they could not only represent their 
own interests. The governments set out to rule, not in the 
interest of any one group or alliance of groups, but 
supposedly in the common interests of all. However, what 
Chinese leaders failed to understand was why such a plurality 
of interests and powers was necessary for a successfully 
developed capitalist system.
55TKP, 29 April 1987 p.l.
321
7-5 The mainland vis-a-vis Hong Kong
Under the framework of 'one country, two system', the 
relationship between the central government and the government 
of the future Hong Kong SAR is more problematic. The Sino- 
British agreement assures China of its two basic demands —  
the resumption of sovereignty over Hong Kong and the 
maintenance of Hong Kong's stability and prosperity. In order 
to achieve the second objective, the Chinese authorized the 
Hong Kong SAR to exercise "a high degree of autonomy, except 
in foreign affairs and defence affairs". They also stressed 
that the policy of "one country, two systems" was aimed at 
preserving national unity and territorial integrity and at 
ensuring a high degree of autonomy in Hong Kong.- However, "one 
country, two systems" ought not to be unbalanced. The Chinese 
therefore insisted that, in order to fulfil China's 
sovereignty, the central authorities should retain several key 
rights, including the right to interpret and amend the Basic 
Law and the stationing of troops in the special administrative 
region. They considered it essential that the central 
authorities should supervise the autonomy of the Hong Kong SAR 
and, therefore, that the chief executive should be appointed 
by the central government on the basis of the results of 
elections or consultations, and that principal officials 
should be nominated by the chief executive for appointment by 
the central government. In other words, executive power, 
legislative power and judiciary power are to be vested with 
the central government in Beijing.
During the Sino-British negotiations, in order to 
counterbalance the idea of an exchange of sovereignty for 
administrative rights, as proposed by Britain, Beijing put
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forward the formula of 'Gangren Zhigang' (Hong Kong people 
govern Hong Kong, or self-administration), which was 
considered to be the core of the concept of 'one country, two 
systems'. Deng Xiaoping claimed:
"We believe that Hong Kong people have the ability to 
administer Hong Kong. It is a mentality inherited from the old 
colonial times that Hong Kong people do not have the ability 
to administer Hong Kong. . .The prosperity of Hong Kong was 
created by Hong Kong people, of whom the majority were 
Chinese. . .We believe the people of Hong Kong are able to 
administer Hong Kong. We will not allow foreigners to govern 
Hong Kong."56
Self-administration is something new to people in Hong 
Kong. The potential problems have been outlined by Hong Kong 
scholars, such as which people would play leading roles and 
would be sufficiently trusted by the various communities, and 
which organizations or parties could be identified with the 
interests of the Hong Kong people.^
The Sino-British negotiations did not provide 
opportunities for Hong Kong people to express their will, 
though some of them had chances to be consulted either by 
Beijing or London. Neither the government of Hong Kong nor 
other organizations had any opportunity formally to 
participate in the Sino-British negotiations on behalf of Hong 
Kong people, though the negotiations were to decide their 
fate. The governor was a member of the British team, but he 
was seen as a representative of the British government. Some 
people in Hong Kong, including some government officials, put
56Deng Xiaoping, "Talks to a delegation of Hong Kong 
business people", on 22, 23 June 1984, see, Documents of 'One 
Country, Two Systems', edited by Taiwan Affairs Office of 
Shanxi Province, 1988.
57Interviews with Professor Wang Gungwu, University of 
Hong Kong, and Dr Joseph Y.S. Cheng, Chinese University of 
Hong Kong, in April 1989.
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forward the "three-legged stool" argument, demanding a role in 
the negotiations. However, the Chinese leaders firmly rejected 
this demand, claiming that the PRC fully represented the 
interests of Hong Kong compatriots. During the negotiations, 
the people of Hong Kong were not informed of their progress. 
Both business and professional circles were able to present 
their views through discussions with officials of both sides, 
while the majority of Hong Kong residents had little say in 
what went on.58
Some seats in both the NPC and the CPCC were reserved for 
the 'compatriots' of Hong Kong, and the Hong Kong deputies on 
the NPC and the CPCC were selected and appointed by the 
Chinese government. They were regarded as pro-Beijing and were 
not seen as true representatives of the Hong Kong people, 
though, to a certain extent, they might express their view.
Migration was the major factor contributing to the growth 
of Hong Kong's population in the 19th century and in the first 
part of the 20th century. Large numbers of people streamed 
into Hong Kong as the civil war in China broke out in the late 
1940s. In 1949, the population of Hong Kong was estimated at 
around 1,860,000. Estimates for the subsequent three or four 
years fluctuated between 2,000,000 and 2,250,000. The 
population further expanded to exceed the two and a half 
million mark in 1956, and the three million mark in 1960. The 
attitudes of Hong Kong immigrants towards the mainland regime 
were mixed. Many of them had moved to Hong Kong from the 
mainland because of political reasons. Yet, they were not
58See, Joseph Y.S. Cheng, edited Hong Kong: In Search of 
a Future, Oxford University Press, 1984, pp.6-7
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necessarily "die-hard anti-communists".5'
The majority of Hong Kong Chinese were politically 
apathetic and welcomed economic and political achievements in 
the mainland, particularly the increasing international 
prestige of the PRC. Even though they were not willing to live 
under communist rule, they considered the concept of self­
administration acceptable after China had confirmed its 
position on sovereignty.60
The scope of Gangren seemed broad and the Chinese leaders 
did not, at least not openly, exclude anyone from it, though 
the people of Hong Kong were divided into different categories 
according to their attitudes towards the PRC's policy and the 
unification of the whole of China. On 22 June, 1983, Deng 
Xiaoping defined Gangren to a group of Hong Kong 
industrialists:
"What are Hong Kong people? They are patriots in Hong 
Kong. The criterion for a patriot is that he agrees that 
sovereignty be ceded back to the mother country. Only this. 
Whether he agrees to capitalism or socialism or whatever 
passport he holds is not important here... Patriotism means 
agreeing to the recovery of sovereignty and agreeing that Hong 
Kong belongs to the People's Republic of China. If we have to 
add one more criterion, it would be love for the, mother 
country and love for Hong Kong, as well as not doing anything 
detrimental to Hong Kong's prosperity and stability."61
'To love Hong Kong and to love China' was the general 
criterion for appointment to certain positions. Even foreign 
nationals could be employed by the Hong Kong SAR in public
59See, Lau Siu-kai, Society and Politics in Hong Kong, 
Chinese University Press, Hong Kong 1984, p. 12.
60See, "A Summary of Opinion Polls on Hong Kong's Future", 
in Joseph Y.S. Cheng edited, Hong Kong in Search of A Future, 
Oxford University Press, 1984, p.119.
6IDeng Xiaoping talks to Hong Kong industrialists on 22 
June, 1983, English text in H.K. Lame, A Date with Fate, 
lincoln Green Publishing, Hong Kong, 1984, p.201.
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services. Annex I of the Joint Declaration contains the 
following stipulation:
"The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region government may 
employ British and other foreign nationals previously serving 
in the public service in Hong Kong, and may recruit British 
and other foreign nationals holding permanent identity cards 
of the Hong Kong SAR to serve as public servants at all 
levels, except as heads of major government departments 
(corresponding to branches or departments at secretary level) 
including the police department, and as deputy heads of some 
of those departments."62
It seems highly possible that not all important positions 
of the future Hong Kong SAR will be occupied by those who are 
friendly to the PRC. However, Beijing could promote its 
influence by various means. The most effective one would be by 
using the right to appoint the chief executive and the 
principal officials, though the chief executive will be chosen 
by election or through consultations held locally, and the 
chief executive will nominate the principal officials. Either 
they would be approved or rejected by the Central People's 
government.
It should be noted that the autonomy which the Hong Kong 
SAR will have is very comprehensive, given that Hong Kong will 
be a part of China. The Hong Kong SAR will enjoy executive, 
legislative and independent judicial power, including that of 
final adjudication, and will have independent finances, 
practise an independent taxation system and issue its own 
currency. In foreign affairs, representatives of the 
government of the Hong Kong SAR will be able, as members of 
delegations of the central government, to participate at 
diplomatic level in international negotiations directly 
affecting the region. It will also be able, using the name
621 bid.
"Hong Kong, China", to develop relations and conclude 
agreements with foreign states and other international or­
ganisations in areas such as the economy, trade, finance, 
money, shipping, communications, tourism, culture and sport. 
In addition, the special administrative region will be able to 
issue passports and travel documents of the Hong Kong SAR and 
to establish official or semi-official economic and trade 
missions in foreign countries.
In the Sino-British Declaration, the PRC declared that 
"the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region will enjoy a high 
degree of autonomy, except in foreign and defence affairs 
which are the responsibilities of the Central People's 
government". It further declared, in the elaboration of basic 
policies, that "military forces sent by the Central People's 
government for the purpose of defence shall not interfere in 
the internal affairs of the Hong Kong Special Administrative 
Region" and "expenditure for these military forces shall be 
borne by the Central People's government".63
Britain has troops stationed in Hong Kong and the British 
army has a duty to defend the territory. The role of the 
British Army, however, has changed. "On a realistic view the 
operational role of the British army is now confined to 
internal security duties", and it "acts as visible proof of 
Britain's continued commitment to the colony and its 
determination to retain full responsibility for its welfare 
and security until 1997".64
According to the Joint Declaration, the PLA will not
63See, The Joint Declaration.
^Norman Miners, The Government and Politics of Hong Kong, 
fourth edition, Oxford University Press, 1986, p.19.
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handle the internal security of the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region, since, it is clearly defined that 
military forces "will not interfere in the internal affairs of 
the SAR". It seems that the PLA's role will be to demonstrate 
China's sovereignty and its commitment to retain full 
responsibility for Hong Kong's defence, a role similar to that 
of the British army. Such a role could be more symbolic than 
necessary.
Yet the Chinese leaders, and in particular, the military 
leaders, were reluctant to confirm that the PLA's role was 
basically symbolic. They also never specified the position of 
Hong Kong in the sphere of China's defence. Theoretically, as 
part of China, Hong Kong ought to bear a certain 
responsibility for the country's defence. Yet, this 
responsibility was not clearly defined, either in the Sino- 
British Joint Declaration or in the various statements made by 
the Chinese authorities on what kind of role the Hong Kong 
Special Administrative Region would play were the PRC's 
security to be threatened.
For Britain, Hong Kong was an important naval base in the 
Far East, but its significance was largely reduced after 
1950s. Because of the close Anglo-American relations, the 
British colony played a considerable role in providing 
American naval forces with certain facilities, in particular, 
somewhere for American soldiers to rest. During the period of 
Sino-American hostility, the PRC would occasionally warn the 
British authorities not to let matters go too far. However, 
the British authorities were well aware of the PRC's concern 
and took care not to provoke the Chinese leaders. With the 
Sino-American detente in the early 1970s, the PRC's perception
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of a threat from the United States declined, and it was the 
Soviet Union that became China's major security concern.
In China's strategic considerations, Britain was seen as
an important force which China could win over in its anti- 
Soviet international united front. As a British colony, Hong 
Kong's position in China's defence was obvious and it became 
something of a buffer between the PRC and the Soviet Union 
against a potential attack from, the sea.65 Presumably, an 
attack on Hong Kong would have been seen as one on Britain as 
well and Britain would have had to fulfil its duty to defend 
the colony.
As has been discussed, in the 1980s, the PRC perceived a 
considerable decline in the external threat .from the two 
superpowers, particularly from the Soviet Union. For this 
reason, Hong Kong's role in China's defence was even further 
reduced. Hong Kong could provide the Chinese navy a useful 
base, but such a base was not unreplaceable.
However, the PRC still paid considerable attention to 
military affairs. China's "four modernizations" also contained 
the modernization of defence. The PLA was determined to play 
a role in China's Hong Kong affairs and its position was 
ensured by the Joint Declaration. For the PLA, defence affairs 
were no empty matter, and certainly not symbolic. The PLA 
wanted to take over some of the places used by the British
army.66 The problem here is that the presence of the PLA in
Hong Kong might be seen as a threat, an instrument of 
politics. British concern on this matter would be
65Interview with Ambassador Ke Zaisuo.
66Interview with Zhen Weirong in April 1989 in Hong Kong.
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understandable given the political nature of the PLA —  
controlled by the CPC and closely linked with China's internal 
political affairs.
Although a British colony, Hong Kong has been allowed de 
facto autonomy in conducting its external commercial 
relations. Hong Kong's external interests are basically 
concerned with trade, to secure convenient access to markets 
for its exports unimpeded by tariff or quota barriers.67 The 
Hong Kong SAR will enjoy considerable autonomous rights in 
conducting its external affairs in the field of economic 
relations, but in the political field its rights will be 
restricted. Generally speaking, the external relations of Hong 
Kong SAR will be determined by the PRC's position in the 
world. The PRC's international position will either help Hong 
Kong maintain its relations with other countries and regions 
or else will limit its flexibility. It would appear that, as 
a socialist country, the PRC has been in a less flexible 
position to develop external relations than has, for instance, 
Britain. The PRC's relations with COCOM can be seen as an 
evidence of this.
Since its establishment in 1949, the Coordinating 
Committee of the Consultative Group (COCOM) has served as the 
principle mechanism for controlling exports to communist 
nations of any strategic commodities and technologies that 
might have a decisive impact on the national security of the 
Western alliance. The PRC was, for a long time, its major 
target. China's opening to the West and its policies of reform 
in the 1980s reduced the concern of most COCOM members. Thus,
67Norman Miners, ibid., p.224
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in the early 1980s, restrictions on the transfer of technology 
to China were substantially relaxed, both within the United 
States and in COCOM. However, COCOM remained as a major 
obstacle for China to obtain certain items of high technology. 
It is likely that the matter in Which COCOM handles the policy 
issue of trade with China will continue to affect Sino-Western 
relations, and will therefore have a marked impact upon Hong 
Kong's trade relations with the West.
Currently, Hong Kong's relations with other countries and 
regions are highly commercial, while the PRC's external
relations are much more comprehensive, in political and 
economic terms. During the Cold War period, even as a British 
colony, Hong Kong's economic relations with the .West, 
particularly the United States, were adversely affected 
because of its close economic links with the Communist
mainland. For instance, during the Korean War, the United 
States expanded its embargo to include Hong Kong, something 
which had a strong impact on the colony's economy. The PRC's 
external relations will continue to be affected by its
domestic politics. Less stable and less flexible foreign
relations could create great difficulties for the future Hong 
Kong SAR, since, as a part of China, it will not have much 
choice but to follow Beijing's foreign policy line.
Beijing has made great efforts to convince the people of 
Hong Kong that the central government has no intention of 
intervening in Hong Kong's internal affairs. On the other 
hand, the Chinese leaders have claimed that it would be 
impractical for Hong Kong people to manage all the territory's 
affairs without the central government assuming any 
responsibility whatsoever.' The Chinese leaders believe that
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destructive forces were bound to exist in Hong Kong. Deng 
Xiaoping once stated: "If Beijing gives up all its rights,
chaos might occur and this would be to the detriment of Hong 
Kong's interests. Therefore to leave some rights with the 
central authorities would do nothing but good." He further 
argued:
"Will some problems arise in Hong Kong some day which 
cannot be solved without the central authorities taking the 
matter up? When something happened in the past, Britain also 
took the matter up. There are certain things which can hardly 
be solved without the central authorities dealing with the 
matter. The central authorities will not infringe upon Hong 
Kong's interests with their policies. Therefore, I ask you to 
give consideration to these aspects in the Basic Law. After 
1997, if there are people in Hong Kong who condemn the CPC and 
China, we will allow them to do so. However, it will not be 
permitted for condemnations to be turned into actions, or for 
Hong Kong to become a base to oppose the mainland, under the 
cloak of 'democracy' . In the such a case, we would have to 
interfere. We would not necessarily have to call out the 
troops. Only if great turmoil occurred would troops be called 
out."68
Deng's statements reflected China's deep concern that Hong 
Kong could become a base of subversion against the mainland. 
Under the framework of "one country, two systems", the 
relationship between the central government and the Hong Kong 
SAR government, and the relationship between the mainland and 
Hong Kong are uneven. The central government is in a dominant 
position, as is the mainland socialism. Under certain 
circumstances, the central government has the right to 
intervene in Hong Kong's internal affairs, while according to 
the Sino-British agreement, there is no room for the Hong Kong 
SAR to defend its autonomous rights. The price for Hong Kong 
to maintain its high degree of autonomy could be non­
interference in the mainland's affairs, particularly as 
regards politics.
68See, TKP, 29 April 1987.
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Moreover, there exists a strong determination at the 
centre to exert bureaucratic and political control over the 
commercial southerners, particularly the Cantonese. Guangdong 
was, for centuries, a major trading centre of southern China. 
The Qing government wanted to keep all foreigners away from 
the centre and therefore decreed that all foreign trade was to 
be conducted through Guangdong. The Guangdong area had always 
posed difficult problems for the central government because it 
was far from the capital and also because of social 
differences. The Cantonese had been antagonistic towards the 
Manchus in the north.
When the Communists established the new government, they 
faced a difficult task establishing central control over the 
regions. Many Cantonese felt uneasy about communism, while the 
leaders in Beijing were determined to guard against a 
flourishing of Cantonese localism. Through the campaign of 
land reform of 1950-52, the centre achieved its aim of 
establishing a disciplined local administration with strong 
central control. As a result of land reform, 80 per cent of 
the local cadres of the rank of county-level leaders or above 
lost their position.69
However, localism has continued and localist sentiment 
remains strong. The decentralization of decision-making in 
economic policy to provincial level, the introduction of 
special economic policy in coastal areas and, particularly, 
the establishment of special economic zones, have encouraged 
the regions to increase their strength. The coastal provinces,
69See, Ezra F. Vogel, Canton under Communism, Programs and 
politics in provincial capital, 1949-1968, Harvard University 
Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1959, p.121.
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especially Guangdong, have become more confident in bargaining 
with Beijing and demanding more autonomy. In the past, the CPC 
leadership was prepared to pay whatever price was necessary to 
avoid open conflict between the centre and regions.
In the 1980s, the leaders in Beijing became deeply 
concerned about a challenge from a powerful Guangdong or other 
coastal region. If local interests became linked with Hong 
Kong or Macao, such a challenge could have been even more 
critical. Localism, which had disrupted the nation during the 
previous century, was continue to worry the CPC leaders in an 
era of reform and openness.
Another matter that has worried both China and Britain is 
the issue of confidence. During the negotiations, the 
uncertainty of the future of the territory caused a severe 
problem of confidence among Hong Kong people. Many of them 
doubted the ability of Britain and China to reach a workable 
agreement. The problem of confidence was reflected in the 1983 
financial crisis, when Hong Kong people reacted to the lack of 
progress in the negotiations by determinedly selling Hong Kong 
dollars. Although the Sino-British Joint Declaration turned 
out better than that most people had expected, the problem of 
confidence has not disappeared. In spite of the assurances 
laid down in the agreement and repeated by Chinese leaders, 
there are still serious doubts as to whether 'one country, two 
systems' is feasible.
An important problem linked with the issue of confidence 
is the 'brain-drain' of talent that affects Hong Kong's future 
prosperity and stability. Although in the past, there was a 
certain amount of emigration from Hong Kong, the pervading 
political uncertainty has become the major reason for
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emigration since the early 1980s. In a letter to Chinese 
leaders from a young professional group in Hong Kong in May 
1983, the problem of the 'brain-drain' was stressed. The 
letter stated:
"Those people of Hong Kong who are not rich enough or 
otherwise qualified to emigrate elsewhere by and large accept 
the suggested proposal, perhaps not because they think it 
would work but because they have no alternative. But those 
people in Hong Kong who are capable of leaving the territory 
and setting up homes in other parts of the world where they 
can continue to enjoy the same freedoms are already looking 
elsewhere for their future."
They also warned the Chinese leaders that the problem was 
unlikely to stop unless a major policy change was to occur in 
the near future.70
Chinese officials admitted that there existed a problem of 
confidence, but believed the problem had been exaggerated by 
the British and Hong Kong authorities. They blamed Britain for 
deliberately playing the 'confidence card' in order to put 
pressure on China for further concessions. Whether or not 
there was truth in this charge, the problem remained that 
large numbers of Hong Kong people had shown their lack of 
confidence by emigrating. Lord MacLehose, the former governor 
of Hong Kong, once stated that a great problem for Hong Kong's 
future was "how to find a way to convince them [the people of 
Hong Kong], and to convince the world of international finance 
and investment, that they can rely on the package being 
preserved intact in the future".71
70The letter is in Joseph Y.S. Cheng, edited, Hong Kong: 
In Search for a Future, Oxford University Press, Hong Kong, 
1984. pp.197-199.
71See, H.K. Lame, edited, A Date with Fate, Lincoln Green 
Publishing, Hong Kong, 1984, p.135.
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7-6 The position of Taiwan
The factor of Taiwan has had an important impact on the 
shaping of China's Hong Kong policy and the formation of the 
concept of "one country, two systems". Previously, China's 
strategy for the unification of the country had been to settle 
the question of Taiwan first, and then to solve the question 
of Hong Kong and Macao. Thus, much effort was spent on how to 
settle the question of Taiwan. When China was forced to search 
for a solution for Hong Kong, in the face of the question of 
the lease of the New Territories, it applied the major parts 
of its Taiwan policy to the case of Hong Kong. Even during the 
Sino-British negotiations, Chinese leaders continued to use 
their Taiwan policy in referring to policy on Hong Kong. For 
instance, in July 1983, in a meeting with an American 
professor, Deng stated:
"After the country is reunified, the Taiwan special ad­
ministrative region may retain its independent nature and 
practise a system different from that of the mainland. It may 
exercise an independent judiciary and the right of final 
judgement need not reside in Beijing. Taiwan may also keep its 
own armed forces, so long as they do not constitute a threat 
to the mainland. The mainland will station neither troops nor 
administrative personnel in Taiwan. The political . party, 
government and armed forces in Taiwan will be administered by 
Taiwan itself. Seats in the central government will be 
reserved for Taiwan."72
Following the Sino-British agreement on the issue of Hong 
Kong, the Chinese leadership considered that the question of 
Taiwan's reunification with the mainland "stood out more 
glaringly before the Chinese" and that the question of Taiwan 
could be settled by the method of "one country, two systems". 
On 22 October 1984, shortly after the announcement of the
72"Deng Talks to American Professor", in Documents on One 
Country/ Two Systems; also see, Beijing Review. 10 January, 
1988, p.17.
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settlement on Hong Kong, Deng Xiaoping claimed that the 
resolution of the Hong Kong question would have a direct 
impact on the Taiwan question. He argued that under the 
framework of "one country, two systems", neither the mainland 
nor Taiwan would overwhelm each other, and that the two 
systems could peacefully coexist.73
Such statements were reiterated by Chinese officials on 
various occasions. The Taiwan factor has had an impact on 
Beijing's attitude towards Hong Kong and Macao. The Chinese 
officials have admitted that it is difficult to convince the 
Taiwan authorities to accept the 'one country, two systems' 
formula without its first having been successfully conducted 
in Hong Kong and Macao.7'1
To a certain extent, Beijing has recognized the 
differences between the issues of Hong Kong and Taiwan. It has 
considered Hong Kong and Macao to be issues that concerned a 
resumption of sovereignty, requiring negotiations with foreign 
countries, while Taiwan was an internal matter among the 
Chinese, which should be solved through co-operation between 
the ruling parties of the two sides. It also admitted a geo­
strategic difference between the two. Thus, Beijing has 
offered even more flexible policies towards the settlement of 
the Taiwan issue than it has in the case of Hong Kong and 
Macao. It has claimed that after the reunification of Taiwan 
with the mainland, the period of time during which "it will 
retain capitalism not be shorter than that allowed for Hong
73"Deng Calls 'One Country, Two Systems' Realistic", Ibid; 
also see, Beijing Review, no.5, 4 February, 1985, p.15.
74In my interviews with Chinese officials in Beijing and 
Hong Kong, the Taiwan factor was often emphasized.
337
Kong" and, in addition, Beijing would allow Taiwan to maintain 
its own forces.7;>
The Chinese leadership has argued that the formula of 'one 
country, two systems' should take into account the interests 
of the various concerned parties, including the Kuomintang, as 
well as the overall interests of the Chinese nation. According 
to Beijing, this formula could enable Taiwan to be unified 
with the mainland without suffering major turbulence and would 
guarantee Taiwan's prosperity and stability. It would help 
Taiwan "to remain in touch with the various parts of the 
world, particularly the capitalist world", and "to retain the 
necessary international conditions for further development".76
The settlement of the issue of Hong Kong on the basis of 
'one country, two systems', and the subsequent campaign of 
reunification launched by the mainland, have put pressure on 
the Taiwan authorities and have been one of the factors that 
led to some significant changes in the relationship between 
the mainland and Taiwan. Many thousands of people from Taiwan 
have visited the mainland. Trade between the two sides, though 
still largely via Hong Kong, has increased rapidly. With the 
growth of indirect trade, economic exchanges between the two 
sides have gradually expanded from trade to investment and 
technological cooperation. Several hundred small and medium­
sized enterprises have made investments in the mainland. Some 
large enterprises in Taiwan have also sent delegations to the
75 Speech made my Deng Xiaoping at the Third Plenary 
Session of the Central Advisory Commission on 22 October, 
1984; Englisg translation in Beijing Review, 4 February, 1985 
p. 15.
76Wen Qing, "'One Country, Two Systems', the best way to 
peaceful reunification", in Beijing Review, 13-19 August, 
1990, pp.14-21.
338
mainland to conduct inspections. In response to these 
developments, Beijing has made further efforts to prompt 
economic links with Taiwan, by providing favourable conditions 
for Taiwan business people to invest in the mainland. The 
Chinese authorities have also continued to call for direct 
trade between the two sides.
The Taiwan authorities have also adopted some flexible 
measures in their relations with the mainland. Following the 
decision to allow Taiwan citizens to visit the mainland, the 
Taiwan authorities decided to permit non-political books and 
video tapes depicting mainland scenery, and with non-mainland 
copyright, to be made available for publication and screening 
in Taiwan. They have also relaxed the restrictions on athletes 
from one side taking part in international sports competitions 
in the other side's territory. In addition, Taipei has 
gradually relaxed the restrictions on indirect trade between 
the mainland and Taiwan.
Even more significantly, Taipei's attitude toward the 
government on the mainland has undergone some changes. For 
instance, in order to counteract the concept of 'one country, 
two systems', the Taiwan authorities broached the idea of "one 
country, two egual governments". The main aspects of this 
concept are that both sides of the Taiwan Straits would retain 
their independent sovereignty; the relationship between the 
governments of the mainland and Taiwan would be an equal one 
rather than one being subordinate to the other; the mainland 
government would continue to rule the mainland while the 
Taipei government would continue to rule the Taiwan region; 
and within one China there would be two equal governments, 
each maintaining its own status quo while not damaging the
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prospect of a peaceful reunification of China. This formula 
would appear to be more flexible and pragmatic than previous 
policies from Taiwan. Under it, Taiwan would no longer claim 
to represent the whole of China, and but would recognize the 
legitimacy of the mainland government while still insisting on 
its view that "there is but one China".
However, Beijing regards such a formula as unrealistic. It 
insists that the Taiwan government is merely a local 
authority, ruling a place with only "one two-hundred-and- 
sixty-sixth of China's territory and one fifty-fifth of the 
entire Chinese population" which, therefore, cannot be seen as 
equal to the government in Beijing. It also argues that from 
the perspective of international law, a country can have only 
one sovereign government, and that with two sovereign 
governments, the country would be divided.
Clearly, there still exist great gaps between the .mainland 
and Taiwan over the question of the reunification of the 
nation. Taipei regards the concept of 'one country, two 
systems' as a trap for the CPC's united front policy, and is 
deeply suspicious of Beijing's intentions. The Kuomintang 
Standing Committee openly condemned the formula and called on 
all Chinese to recognize the "treacherous nature" of Deng's 
policy. The reunification of the two sides under the framework 
of 'one country, two systems' appears to be unacceptable by 
the Taiwan authorities. Beijing insists that the 'one 
country, two systems' formula is the best method to settle the 
Taiwan issue, but at the same time it is realistic and admits 
there is no immediate prospect of reunification.
Beijing has argued that on the question of reunification 
there are only two methods, the use of force or by peaceful
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means. The CPC claimed to be in favour of the peaceful 
solution, because, firstly, China needs a peaceful environment 
for its economic construction; secondly, any conflict between 
compatriots on the mainland and in Taiwan could only weaken 
the Chinese nation; thirdly, the liberation of Taiwan by armed 
force would inevitably consume large amounts of human, 
material and financial resources, hindering the development of 
the Chinese nation; and fourthly, Taiwan compatriots oppose 
the possible consequences of a war and do not want to change 
their present way of life.77 In this context, there already 
exists a framework of 'one country, two systems', ready to 
incorporate Taiwan.
However, the actual reunification of the mainland and 
Taiwan is still a long way off. Deep suspicion exists among 
the people of Taiwan over Beijing's intentions. As for the 
Kuomintang, the bitter experience of being defeated by the 
Communists in the mainland has hardened their distrust of the 
CPC. Moreover, the people and the authorities of Taiwan have 
become more self-confident because of their economic 
achievements and their capacity for peaceful change to a more 
democratic political system. Unless the authorities in Taipei 
show greater enthusiasm for Beijing's proposals, Beijing's 
options will remain limited.
The settlement of Hong Kong and Macao has provided the CPC 
with some opportunities to exploit its plans for unification. 
The PRC could try to develop its idea of 'one country, two 
systems' in Hong Kong and Macao, and set up an successful 
model to convince Taiwan. By so doing, however, it also
77Wen Qing, ibid., p. 18.
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creates constraints on its own approach to Hong Kong. Taipei 
could refuse to enter any substantial talks with Beijing on 
the question of unification before the formula of 'one 
country, two systems' works out in practice for Hong Kong and 
Macao after it goes into effect in 1997. Any change in 
Beijing's policy towards Hong Kong and Macao could be used by 
the authorities in Taipei to play down the concept of 'one 
country, two system', and to attack the CPC's credibility. So 
long as Beijing continues to consider the reunification of the 
nation as one of its most important objectives, and 'one 
country, two systems' as a model for the settlement of the 
Taiwan issue, its top priority must be to make the formula 
work in Hong Kong and Macao. If Beijing fails to set the right 
example in Hong Kong and Macao, there will be no chance of 
convincing Taiwan to accept a similar formula, and thus of 
achieving reunification with the mainland.
Conclusion
While the Chinese leaders have continued to insist only 
socialism can save China, they have also maintained that only 
capitalism can save Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan, by the 
introduction of the idea of 'one country, two systems'. Under 
the framework of 'one country, two systems', the CPC has 
officially recognized the position of the capitalist system in 
China's domestic politics. However, the CPC has been 
determined to limit the influence of Hong Kong, Macao and 
Taiwan on rest of the mainland, claiming that the capitalist 
system is only suitable in Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan.
There also exist potential benefits for the PRC. According 
to the Sino-British Joint Declaration, a Basic Law would be
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issued in order to codify existing legal practices in Hong 
Kong for the future SAR. The process of drafting the Basic Law 
presents Chinese scholars and officials with an opportunity to 
learn a different legal system which could be also beneficial 
to the mainland. The Basic Law, though it only applies to Hong 
Kong, could provide a useful example and experience for the 
central government to handle regional affairs in a possible 
further decentralization of decision-making, while the 
regions, particularly the coastal provinces, could also invoke 
the Basic Law to demand more autonomous rights.
The mainland could continue to benefit from Hong Kong if 
'one country, two systems' works, and at the same time avoid 
a possible political confrontation. The Chinese central 
government will have significant powers to control the affairs 
of Hong Kong, and it could manipulate the major decisions made 
by the Hong Kong SAR without being seen to exert a direct 
involvement.
With Hong Kong under China's sovereignty, business people 
from the mainland will feel more confident in conducting 
business in Hong Kong. China's enterprises could take 
advantage of the change of sovereignty to expand their 
businesses and try to secure a more favourable position.
Through the successful implementation of the formula of 
'one country, two systems', China could prove its faith to the 
international community and Taiwan, strengthening its position 
in the world and helping to speed up the process of 
unification with Taiwan.
These are very challenging opportunities, while at the 
same time there are tremendous difficulties in successfully 
carrying out the formula of 'one country, two systems'. As far
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as China is concerned, the most difficult problem will be the 
lack of understanding and experience of how Hong Kong works in 
practice. The PRC has never had any successful experience in 
handling a situation such as Hong Kong. The Chinese leaders 
were keen to introduce a capitalist economic system, but 
ignored the importance of preserving in Hong Kong a capitalist 
political system, an independent judiciary and freedom of 
information. China has no intention to turn Hong Kong into a 
socialist system, but it clearly favours a kind of 
authoritarian capitalism, or something similar to the British 
colonial structure. China has been opposed to the reforms put 
forward by the Hong Kong government, although these reforms 
are necessary to strengthen the confidence of Hong Kong people 
and could at the same time result in a more democratic 
political system.
The Chinese authorities are deeply worried about the 
political challenge from Hong Kong, particularly when the 
integration between Hong Kong and the mainland's coastal 
provinces becomes solidified. China will also face the problem 
of how to distinguish foreign and defence matters from other 
affairs. In order to demonstrate its sovereignty, Beijing has 
secured substantial powers over Hong Kong. Because of the 
nature of China's political system and the uneven relations 
between the mainland and Hong Kong, the central government in 
Beijing could easily misuse its powers. Thus, there exist 
great dangers of intervention by the central government in 
Hong Kong's internal affairs. If there are no convincing 
reasons for such interventions, they could be highly damaging.
As 1997 approaches, the Chinese authorities will need to 
find leaders whom they trust to operate the formula of 'one
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country, two systems'. In spite of the Chinese government's 
power to appoint the chief executive of the Hong Kong SAR, it 
has no formal position in promoting Hong Kong's leadership. 
Beijing can make its influence felt through its representative 
organs and controlled enterprises. However, because of the 
considerable mistrust among the Hong Kong public of the 
Chinese government and its policies, China will find it 
difficult to groom leaders who are also acceptable to the 
people of Hong Kong. For the sake of promoting Hong Kong's 
leadership, Sino-British cooperation is necessary, since the 
most likely candidates for leadership will be those who can 
display a neutrality between China and Britain, particulary 
during the transitional period. As a distinguished Hong Kong 
scholar has stated: "Leaders favoured by Britain have to be
endorsed by China if they are to be taken seriously as the 
future rulers of Hong Kong. Leaders acceptable to China have 
to be inducted into the governmental apparatus by Britain in 
order to gain the necessary experience."78 The present mutual 
distrust between Britain and China is likely to be the major 
obstacle for the emergence of a Hong Kong leadership.
The PRC will also have to convince the people of Hong Kong 
as well as the people of Taiwan that the formula of 'one 
country, two systems' will work. Many Hong Kong people, 
especially intellectuals, consider the most important 
condition for safeguarding Hong Kong's position to be the 
further development of a market-oriented economy and the 
establishment of a democratic political system in the
78See, Lau Siu-Kai, "Decolonization Without Independence 
and the Poverty of Political Leaders in Hong Kong", Hong Kong 
Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, The Chinese University of 
Hong Kong, Occasional Paper No.l, November 1990, p. 29.
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mainland. Indeed, there will be growing connections between 
the mainland and Hong Kong, not only economically but also 
politically. What has happened in the mainland has already had 
considerable impact on Hong Kong's development, and Hong Kong, 
on the other hand, has also been involved in the mainland's 
economic development, particularly in the special economic 
zones. It is inevitable that Hong Kong people should be 
concerned about the mainland's political situation. What the 
balance of mutual influence between the mainland and Hong Kong 
should be is a guestion well beyond the scope of the Sino- 
British agreement. It is something, though, that will 
certainly be of concern of the Chinese authorities in Beijing.
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Chapter Eight
Conclusion
The past three decades have seen several major shifts in 
China's foreign policy, while China's Hong Kong policy has 
adapted to such shifts with relative consistency. China's Hong 
Kong policy has not only reflected the pragmatic tendency in 
Beijing's external relations, but also some of its fundamental 
principles. Unlike those principles which have often been 
repeated by the Chinese leaders, the principles concerning 
Hong Kong have strongly linked with the country's national 
unification, territorial integrity and national security. They 
have reflected China's state interests as perceived by the 
Chinese leaders -- the protection of the nation's physical, 
political, and cultural identity and the promotion of economic 
development to meet domestic needs. The issue of Hong Kong has 
involved more than just the land, as it reflects a deeply- 
rooted principle concerning questions of 'unequal treaties' 
and 'lost territory', and a commitment to defend the 'Central 
Kingdom'. These are not simply foreign policy issues, but 
also matters concerning domestic politics.
Yet, China also had an interest in maintaining the 
position of Hong Kong under British rule, for economical, 
political and strategic reasons. Hong Kong was a unique place 
from which the PRC could conduct trade with the outside world, 
communicate with the overseas Chinese community and obtain 
Western information and technology. The British presence in 
Hong Kong also complicated the strategic calculations of those 
who might have sought to threaten China's southern coast. Hong 
Kong also played a positive role in China's external policies.
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China's Hong Kong policy from the beginning, was related to 
the country's overall foreign policy. Hong Kong was a useful 
link between China and Britain. Hong Kong was valuable to 
Britain, which wished to maintain its status quo. Because of 
the existence of Hong Kong, London had to deal with the PRC 
and thus adopted a more moderate policy towards it, while the 
United States and some other Western countries were more 
hostile towards the new regime. Hong Kong was a card that the 
PRC could play to put pressure on London. Britain was seen by 
the Chinese leaders as an important power which China could 
use in its strategy of counterbalancing the external threat 
from the two superpowers.
The maintenance of Hong Kong's position was used as an 
example to demonstrate China's policy of peaceful coexistence. 
Although the PRC claimed that the treaties on Hong Kong, Macao 
and on the boundary issues were unequal, it did not intended 
to challenge their validity before negotiated settlements were 
reached. Presumably, if the PRC had wanted to launch a 'world 
revolution', it would have begun by taking over Hong Kong and 
Macao.
Thus, China's Hong Kong policy was characterized by a 
balance between principles and pragmatic needs. As a matter of 
long-term principle, the PRC government claimed that Hong Kong 
belonged to China and that the unequal treaties on which 
Britain based its claim to rule Hong Kong were invalid. In 
addition, it stated that when the Chinese people were ready 
and when the conditions were ripe, it would recover Hong Kong. 
Beijing arranged for representatives from Hong Kong and Macao 
to participate in both the NPC and the CPPCC, while there were 
no such representatives from the overseas Chinese communities
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abroad. Hong Kong Chinese, in fact, are called as Tongbao 
(compatriot) instead of Huaqiao (overseas Chinese) or Huayi 
(people of Chinese descent).
The existence of Hong Kong as a British colony was, for 
the Chinese people, a humiliation left over from the past, and 
for the Chinese leaders an embarrassment, given their 
denunciations of colonialism and neo-colonialism. Yet in spite 
of some important factors which pushed Beijing towards taking 
over Hong Kong, the Chinese leaders developed a flexible 
policy towards Hong Kong in the 1950s based on the recognition 
of the status quo. This policy could be summed up as 'changqi 
dasuan, changfen liyong' -- 'within the context of long term 
objectives, utilize short-term opportunities'. There was no 
clear idea of how long the 'long term' would be. As long as 
China's principles remained without challenge, and China 
continued to benefit from Hong Kong, the status quo would be 
respected and the 'long term' could last indefinitely. In 
practice, China did not challenge British control over and 
administration in Hong Kong, and adopted a cooperative 
attitude towards British rule. All the PRC's organizations, 
including political organizations such as the NCNA, were asked 
to conduct their affairs in accordance with the rules of Hong 
Kong. On such matters as water and food supply and emigration 
control, the PRC's cooperation was central to Hong Kong's 
stability and development.
There was a mutual understanding and a tacit agreement 
between the PRC and the United Kingdom over each other's 
position' which became the most vital factor for Hong Kong's 
existence. Britain never openly provoked Chinese leaders on 
the question of sovereignty and never challenged their claim
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that Hong Kong would be recovered in due course. The British 
authorities have never created any difficulties for those 
people selected to attend the NPC and the CPPCC, as long as 
they are not from government bodies. More significantly, the 
British authorities rejected those proposals which attempted 
to change the colonial system, and consequently, no 
significant measures were taken to establish a democratic, 
self-administering government, and the colonial-style 
political system remained in place without any important 
changes. Britain was well aware that if China wanted to take 
Hong Kong, there was not much Britain could do to stop it. But 
Beijing never stated that it wanted Hong Kong back, except 
expressing its legal position in a general way. Even during 
the Cultural Revolution, the Chinese leadership did not show 
any intention of taking over the territory. Britain adopted an 
attitude of not challenging China's position and not doing 
anything which might provoke China and leave it no alternative 
but to take over the territory. In the mean time, however, 
Britain made it clear that any interference from Beijing in 
Hong Kong's affairs would not be acceptable and that the 
British rules must be followed.
China's Hong Kong policy was seriously challenged when the 
turmoil of the Cultural Revolution spread into Hong Kong, 
resulting in demonstrations and riots. The issue of Hong Kong 
was used by the radical elements at home to challenge Zhou 
Enlai's authority over foreign policy and his political 
position. But there was no attempt in Beijing either to take 
Hong Kong or to change its situation. When Zhou consolidated 
his position, the moderate and flexible policy was restored.
The Cultural Revolution certainly provides some valuable
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lessons concerning the relations between the mainland and Hong 
Kong. There have always existed different views among 
Beijing's leadership on policy regarding Hong Kong. These who 
were not concerned with China's economic development did not 
appreciate Hong Kong's value. In their view, the existence of 
Hong Kong was of no use, but rather a challenge to the 
mainland's socialist system. It is not impossible that China's 
Hong Kong policy could experience a major shift under their 
leadership. Hong Kong survived the Cultural Revolution largely 
because Zhou Enlai was able to restore his authority over 
China's external policies, including the policy regarding Hong 
Kong. However, the situation almost went the other way. 
Beijing's carefully cultivated Hong Kong policy was challenged 
and radical action was about to be taken which could have led 
to direct intervention by the PRC into Hong Kong's internal 
affairs, and even to a takeover of the territory.
The importance of Hong Kong to China was further 
strengthened with the end of the Cultural Revolution and the 
subsequent changes in China's internal politics. The CPC was 
under great pressure to improve the living standards of 
Chinese people. Greater emphasis was laid on economic 
development and modernization than on the class struggle which 
had been an earlier priority of the CPC. The importance of 
ideology in the country's internal as well as external 
policies was diminished and the vitality of the capitalist 
system was recognized. Meanwhile, the CPC resorted to 
nationalism to mobilize people and adopted a firmer stand on 
the matters concerning territorial integrity, sovereignty and 
unification.
In order to assure its domestic economic development,
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China's external policies changed, focusing on the promotion 
of a more stable and peaceful international environment and 
seeking closer economic and trade relations with the Western 
world. However, the Chinese leaders' attitude toward changes 
in the internal socio-political structure was a cautious one, 
and they felt a sense of vulnerability to possible 
destabilizing external influences on the Chinese domestic 
scene. This was particularly so at a time when contacts with 
the outside world were being expanded, when many barriers to 
international communication were being lowered, and when 
internal pressure for domestic change was increasing.
Much encouraged by normalized relations with the United 
States, and by the adoption of the policy of reform, the 
Chinese leadership saw an opportunity to realise a peaceful 
unification with Taiwan. Towards this end, Beijing offered the 
Taiwan authorities conditions which were more favourable and 
flexible than earlier ones it had put forward.
Much evidence suggests that the PRC saw the maintenance of 
the status quo as crucial in promoting the mainland's 
modernization, and had no intention of changing it. However, 
as 1997 approached, Britain was under pressure to find a 
solution to the problem of the lease of the New Territories, 
since from the legal point of view, Britain's property rights 
there would end when the lease expired. China thus faced a 
dilemma when the British government called for a settlement. 
It was not China, but Britain, that raised the issue of 1997. 
When Britain asked for a settlement, it challenged Chinese 
leaders to make decision on the basis of recognition of the 
existed treaties. Principles of territorial integrity and 
sovereignty were involved, and Beijing had to take a definite
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decision.
By the time China entered diplomatic negotiations with 
Britain towards a settlement of future of Hong Kong, it had 
set up its basic policy. This could be summed as regaining 
sovereignty over Hong Kong and maintaining stability and 
prosperity there. China wanted to achieve two seemingly 
contradictory objectives. For the sake of stability and 
prosperity, the status quo needed to be maintained. But the 
transfer of sovereignty from Britain to China meant a 
fundamental change in Hong Kong's situation.
In order to solve this problem, the Chinese leaders 
introduced the formula of 'one country, two systems' —  an 
idea derived from Beijing's Taiwan policy. Chinese leaders 
hoped that under this framework Hong Kong's stability and 
prosperity would continue after 1997 when the sovereignty of 
the territory would return to China. During the Sino-British 
negotiations, Beijing stuck firm on its stand over the 
question of sovereignty, rejecting the proposal put forward by 
the British side to exchange sovereignty for administrative 
power. Britain yielded, making great efforts to accommodate 
the ideas put forwards by China. After its basic position had 
been assured, China became much more cooperative and flexible 
toward Britain's own suggestions, and also made considerable 
compromises. A detailed agreement was reached in the autumn of 
1984.
The 'one country, two systems' formula reflects the 
characteristics of China's external policy in that it upholds 
both principles and ' flexibility. The Chinese leadership 
refused to make any significant compromise over the question 
of sovereignty over Hong Kong, considering that this would
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have not only damaged China's national prestige and pride, but 
also could have weakened the CPC's position in dealing with 
Taiwan. Thus the options such as self-determination by the 
Hong Kong people or a continuation of British administration, 
which might have done more for Hong Kong's stability and 
prosperity, were regarded by Beijing as unacceptable. However, 
Beijing was intent on utilizing Hong Kong's unique position as 
an international financial and trade centre in order to 
benefit the mainland's modernization. That is to say, 
maintaining Hong Kong's stability and prosperity was as 
important to Beijing as recovering sovereignty over Hong Kong. 
The formula of 'one country, two systems' seemed to be a 
suitable means for China to solve this dilemma.
Under the framework of 'one country, two systems', Hong 
Kong would enjoy a high degree of autonomy. Beijing has 
demonstrated considerable flexibility in assuring this 
autonomy by introducing various special clauses designed to 
maintain the current socio-economic system and life-style of 
Hong Kong. The autonomous rights that are to be given to the 
Hong Kong SAR cover most facets of its existence.
The Sino-British agreement concluded during the period 
when China's economic reforms reached a crucial stage. The new 
socialism —  stressing the importance of economic development 
and modernization —  seems more appropriate and rational than 
the old one stressing class struggle. In the period when the 
orthodox socialism dominated, the Chinese government never 
directly interfered in Hong Kong's internal affairs, even 
during the turmoil of the Cultural Revolution. Now, the 
Chinese government has even more reason not to interfere in 
Hong Kong's internal affairs, because in addition to the
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economic benefits, Beijing also needs to make Hong Kong work 
well under the framework of 'one country, two systems' in 
order to convince Taiwan to accept a similar arrangement.
Before the settlement on Hong Kong's future was reached, 
Britain's policy was one of non-interference in Hong Kong's 
affairs, the provision of a law that respected human rights, 
a laissez-faire economic policy and social and political 
stability. Despite the lack of self-administration, Hong Kong 
operated a an independent judiciary, a free enterprise 
economic system, and enjoyed considerable degree of freedom of 
speech. China was in a position of 'onlooker', bearing no 
direct responsibility for the running of Hong Kong and 
respecting the British rule, but, at the same time, keeping a 
watch on the British authorities to prevent any thing 
happening that might damage its position. With a diplomatic 
settlement of Hong Kong's future, China's position, on such 
matters as sovereignty and national unification came to be 
securer. However, while China's policy towards the settlement 
of the future of Hong Kong was affected by the pragmatic need 
to maintain the status quo, it was also restrained by China's 
principles.
The 'one country, two systems' formula can be seen as 
combining principles with flexibility. But, with its tradition 
of interference in almost all aspects of social, political and 
economic affairs, the Chinese government would face great 
difficulties in conducting a flexible Hong Kong policy. While 
the existence of Hong Kong as a special administrative region 
with a high degree of autonomy would provide greater 
opportunities for the mainland's economic development, it 
could also challenge China's political and legal system. In
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implementing the concept of 'one country, two systems', 
Chinese leaders have to pay more attention to the political 
and cultural requirements that are central for a successful 
Hong Kong. Additionally, the increasing economic and social 
integration between Hong Kong and China's coastal regions, 
particularly Guangdong, would add further difficulties for the 
CPC to maintain socialism in China. In the 1950s, Mao said 
that "today's Soviet Union will be tomorrow's China". A 
popular saying in China in the 1980s was that today's Hong 
Kong would be tomorrow's Guangdong.
The CPC leadership feared that Hong Kong could become a 
base of subversion against the mainland. This concern has 
become even deeper since June 1989, when the Chinese 
authorities suppressed by force the students and other 
demonstrators of the democracy movement. The Chinese 
authorities were very critical of Hong Kong people for their 
involvement in the 1989 democracy movement and considered that 
such involvement added "fuel to the flames of turmoil in the 
mainland". Beijing warned of the danger of turning Hong Kong 
and Macao into bases for subversion of the central government 
and stressed that Hong Kong and Macao should not interfere in 
or attempt to change the socialist system in the mainland.
It was against this background that the final version of 
the Basic Law incorporated a new article which stipulated:
"The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall enact 
laws on its own to prohibit any act of treason, secession, 
sedition, or subversion against the Central People's 
government, or theft of state secrets, to prohibit foreign 
political activities in the region, and to prohibit political 
organizations or bodies of the region from establishing ties
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with foreign political organizations or bodies.1'1
The intention of this article is clear, but it contains 
ambiguity. What are acts of treason, secession, sedition and 
subversion against the central government? What is the 
definition of foreign political activities or political 
organizations? Any political activities disapproved of by the 
central government could be included in these categories, 
unless their definition were made more specific.
The event of 1989 proved that the post-Mao CPC leaders 
have been able to conduct China's economic affairs and 
external relations in flexible way, but that flexibility was 
constrained by their commitment to maintaining the communist 
political system. In spite of several major revisions, there 
existed great uncertainty of politics in the PRC's reform 
which has been the major concern of many Hong Kong people with 
regard to the promised "one country, two systems". It is most 
unlikely that the CPC would make further concessions on its 
principal positions of sovereignty and unification, and go 
beyond the scope of 'one country, two systems' . Any more 
flexible policy towards Hong Kong will depend on further 
changes in the mainland's political system. Such changes, 
which could to lead to a more democratic and stable China, 
could also provide stronger guarantees for the success of the 
policy of 'one country, two systems'. However, even if the 
Chinese government were completely democratic it would not be 
able to grant any more autonomy to the Hong Kong SAR than 
exists under the agreement, short of full independence.
The case of Hong Kong indicates that the CPC has been
Article 23, the Hong Kong SAR Basic Law
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pragmatic in interpreting its ideologies. Its policies, 
therefore, have been characterized by a tactical opportunism 
and adaptability. The principles that have been applied in 
China's external relations are also related to China's basic 
interests. As a nation-state, China has sought to follow these 
principles in order to develop normal state-to-state relations 
with other countries. But, at the same time, it has demanded 
that other countries do the same.
China's external relations are considerable complicated 
and the principles serve as the 'correct lines' that the 
actual policy should follow in different situations. The 
impact of the principle has had is also related to the Chinese 
leaders' understanding of the relations between principles and 
flexibility of policy which, in turn, are related to long-term 
interests and short-term objective. Chinese theorists argue 
that the party, while formulating policies, must take into 
account the immediate interests of the people, and must be in 
accordance with their long-term interests. As a country 
dominated by the communist party, China's view on long-term 
goals is connected with world revolution, which in turn should 
lead to communist harmony. Indeed, communist ideology has 
provided an important conceptu or the perception and 
interpretation of the environment in which the major foreign 
policy are made. The communist ideology has also had an 
effectiveness serving the purpose of the government, in 
mobilizing the masses and providing a legitimate base for its 
policies. Yet, in practice, China did not formulate a clear 
plan for accomplishing such an end of world revolution, and it 
has a more practical ideology, such as nationalism, which 
creates guidelines fro action in China's external relations,
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and as such is closely related to its national interests. Like 
most other countries, China has set its primary goals of 
foreign policy as these of preserving its national unity, 
independence and security. It never lost sight of its ultimate 
end of realizing communism, but in the meantime, it seldom 
applied such an end to its actual foreign policy. When it 
mobilised an anti-American united front or an anti-Soviet 
united front, it was primarily motivated to preserve of its 
security and national unity, although such a policy was also 
ideologically affected.
It seems that, in general, immediately pressing problems 
and short-term objectives demand greater attention from the 
decision makers than long-term goals relating to communism. 
Nevertheless, those short-term or immediate objectives have 
not been equally distributed throughout time in Beijing's 
foreign policy. In practice, there has sometimes existed 
considerable conflict over what the foreign policy priorities 
should be. For instance, immediately after the take-over of 
the mainland, the new China acknowledged that it faced an 
arduous task in returning the country's economy, which had 
suffered a great damage from the civil war, to normal. Thus, 
in 1950, the government set itself the goal of improving 
financial and economic situations as a priority and Mao 
himself even recommended a demobilisation of part of army in 
order to lighten the burden on the state's finances. But the 
intervention of America into the Korean War put great pressure 
on China's security, and Beijing decided to send its troops to 
Korea to assist Kim II Sung, even though it was hesitant to do 
so at the beginning. China's direct confrontation with the 
United States retarded its process of economic reconstruction
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progress.
For near 3 0 years before the 1980s, pressures from one or 
other superpowers had dominated China's external relations. 
Not until 1980s did this situation change. In the 1980s, the 
economic constraints that China faced forced it to look to a 
significant interaction with the international community in 
order to develop its economy at a reasonable speed over the 
final two decades of the century. A peaceful and stable 
international environment is essential to China's 
modernization efforts. In this connection, a shift in China's 
foreign policy became evident at the Twelfth National Congress 
of the CPC in September 1982. Instead of advocating an 
international united front against Soviet hegemonism, China 
decided to adopt an even more flexible independent foreign 
policy, both towards the Eastern bloc and the Western 
countries. This shift was related,to the evolution of China's 
domestic politics and to changes in the overall international 
situation. For the first time in the history of the People's 
Republic, Beijing was able to put its economic development as 
the first priority.
There also existed contradictions in China's various 
principles. In China's effort to improve relations with 
neighbouring countries on a state-to-state basis, it often 
faced the dilemma of fulfilling both its international 
revolutionary commitment and its attachment to peaceful 
coexistence, and found it difficult to allay the suspicion of 
China's neighbouring countries. For them, the CPC's support 
for revolution could and did encourage communist subversion in 
their countries. There was considerable concern when the PRC 
condemned Western countries, particularly the United States,
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for trying to interfere in China's domestic affairs, but being 
at the same time determined to support revolution in other 
countries. It was not until the end of the Cultural 
Revolution, that China's revolutionary aspirations gave way to 
more practical need of maintaining state-to-state relations. 
It seems that, since then, so long as the governments of other 
developing countries adopted an attitude of friendly 
neutralism, Beijing was reluctant to depart from its stated 
policy of non-interference by offering significant support or 
encouragement to elements opposing those governments.
The case of Hong Kong has also shown that the PRC does not 
always take the initiative to push its principles. If there 
are difficulties over reaching an agreement or if it has other 
priorities, China normally prefers to maintain the status quo 
on contentious issues. As long as its principles are not 
challenged, Chinese leaders are able to conduct China's 
external relations in a flexible way. Beijing has been 
unwilling to move away from its underlying principles, since 
they reflect its basic interests, and it has also been 
unwilling to give up its ideology since it provides a 
legitimate base for its policy and its commitment to maintain 
China as a socialist country. Although both China's principles 
and ideologies, marked with programmatic tendency only produce 
a general guideline for the actual policies, they most likely 
could make their influence under circumstances such as in the 
cases of territorial issues and national unification.
It should be noted that, although flexibility in China's 
decision-making can often be highly convenient for the 
Chinese leaders, it would be wrong to assume that such 
flexibility is not without its limitations or difficulties. It
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can also produce uncertainties in both substance and 
procedure, especially when this flexibility is derived from a 
highly centralised system such as exists in China. China's 
policies have had the reputation of varying according to 
particular personalities, and major shifts in policy have 
often gone along with changes in political figures. Thus, a 
clear line can be drawn between the policies before and after 
Mao. There is also reasons for the world to be concerned about 
whether China's policies might change after Deng. Deng said 
that China's Hong Kong policy would not change for at least 
fifty years after 1997. When he made this statement he did not 
need approval from any legislative body or from the National 
People's Congress, even though it is supposed to be the 
highest authoritative organ. Whether his successors will 
continue his policies is questionable. According to Mao's 
philosophy, objective things change constantly and it is 
therefore necessary to follow the motion and development of 
the thing in order to adjust one's thinking to its changed 
nature and to adjust policies and methods accordingly. This is 
a major question mark over the direction in which China will 
move.
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